Col J P Singh, Retd
1965 War, was a short but furiously fought battle between the two fraternal twins. It began as a covert infiltration by Pakistani Mujahids in Kashmir and ended up with the encirclement of Lahore by Indian army. The war which began on 1st September 1965 ended on 23 September.
1962 debacle in NEFA had traumatized the army. Another war was dreaded. Political leadership’s apathy was exposed. Nation was shaken but became security conscious. The defence of the nation got full attention necessitating massive expansion and modernization of the armed forces. New divisions were raised and equipped to fight in Himalayas. Indian Air Force was expanded to its optimum of 45 Squadrons with Soviet made modern aircrafts. Plans were made to double the strength of the armed forces. This alarmed Pak military leadership under Field Marshal Ayub Khan. At the same time they sensed it as a historical opportunity to exploit India’s weakened position and demoralized army to wrest Kashmir militarily.
In 1965, Pakistan had an edge over Indian armed forces. On the ground they had more tanks and guns. Pakistan’s greatest asset for the war was two Armoured Divisions (Armd Div) as against one Armd Div and one Armd Bde of Indian Army. They had 756 tanks including 352 deadly American Pattons whereas India had 608. In the medium and heavy guns they outclassed India. Therefore, in 1965 they felt it was their golden chance to settle scores with India and wrest Kashmir before the expansion and modernization plans of Indian army were in place. Moreover Punjabi dominated Pak military leadership had always nurtured delusions of racial superiority over Indian officers and men. A ‘War Game’ conducted in March 1965 by US Institute of Defence Analysis had concluded that in the event of war between Indian and Pakistan; Pakistan will win. Pakistan also believed that the population of Kashmir was discontented with Indian rule and will revolt when instigated. Poor performance of Indian army in 1962 further encouraged them to take a plunge and make 1965 their year of destiny.
1965 war, code named ‘Op Gibraltar’ was brain child of Maj Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik. His plan was to infiltrate 30,000 Mujahideen into Kashmir for sabotage and subversion. In scope and design it was a radical improvement over 1947 mis-adventure. This covert operation was to be followed by World War II type German ‘Blitz Kreig’ to cut off J&K from rest of India by a sharp Armored thrust aimed at strategic Yuvraj Karan Singh Bridge at Akhnoor.
This plan was put to action in a highly professional manner. To divert attention, Pakistan started series of border violations in ‘Rann of Kutch’ to suck in Indian strategic reserves into this distant area. With a strong and competent military and political leadership at its helms, India did not bite the bait. The lessons from 1962 having been well learnt, army decided not to rush blindly into a trap. On the contrary Indian army swiftly captured sensitive Pak posts along the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Kargil sector rendering Srinagar-Leh Highway safe from Pak interference. Pak plans having been derailed, Indian army was ready for an opportunity to redeem its lost glory.
The stage having been set by both, Pakistan launched its ambitious operation ‘Gibraltar’ on 15 August 1965. 30,000 Mujahids, dressed as Kashmiris, were pushed into the valley. They were to mingle with locals, seize control of the capital city, cause confusion and spread alarm. But they failed to establish the symbolic bonds with civilians so essential for the conduct of clandestine operations. It was local Gujjars who alerted the army about the entry of Mujahids. With the help of locals, army launched systematic operations to mop them up. Their ex-filtration routes were also blocked. Simultaneously, in a brilliant operation, Indian army captured the strategic Haji Pir Pass thereby cutting off Uri-Poonch bulge. (Operation Haji Pir remains as an epic ingress in the history of mountain warfare).
Pakistan quickly responded by unleashing its trump card operation ‘Grand Slam’ on 1 September to capture Akhnoor bridge. An Inf Div supported by 6 Armd Div attacked Chhamb, crossed Manawar Tawi and made quick dash too Akhnoor. Realising the dangers of fall of Akhnoor bridge, Indian Air Force launched all out attacks to halt the enemy offensive at Jeorian. 20 to 25 Fighter Jets would be seen one time scrambling & thundering the sky. The relentless air strikes from both sides and dog fights between Sabre Jets, Gnats and Hunters, including tank hunting and burning of enemy tanks, (which the author saw daily as a student from closest hill tops), blunted the enemy advance and finally stopped it 8 kms short of Akhnoor. Those who saw a burning Pakistani fighter jet, shot over Jammu Airfield, which fell at Bahu Rakh, proudly rejoice the scene till today.
Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri reacted fast and decisively. His slogan “Jai Jawan – Jai Kissan” reverberated the nation. His directive ‘Hathiyaron ka Jawab Hathiyaron Se’ raised the morale of the army. On 6th September, 11 Corps launched an attack over a 70 kms stretch in Lahore Sector. The object was to capture area upto Icchogal Canal and provide depth to Amritsar. Two days later, 1 Corps struck at Sialkot. The attack was spear headed by 1 Armd Div with the aim of capturing Chawinda to draw enemy Armd Div in the battle and destroy it in major battles of attrition. Lahore-Sialkot rail-line was cut off at Pasrur. Enemy immediately recoiled its 6 Armd Div from Chhamb and pitted it against our 1 Armd Div. Pitched battle took place at Chawinda which turned out to be biggest tank battle fought after WW II. As the events turned out, our 1 Armd Div got embroiled with Pak 6 Armd Div when Pak unleashed its other Armd Div in a bold and ambitious offensive in Kasur aimed at investing Amritsar and Beas bridge. Indian 4 Mtn Div countered Pak 6 Amrd Div across Kasur and slowed down its momentum. 4 Mtn Div was forced to withdraw to Asal Uttar when India’s vital reserve, the 2(I) Armd Bde was pushed into action against the Pak Armd Div. Pak launched its main offensive with their 4th and 5th Armd Bdes which were equipped with Patton Tanks. When they ran into Asal Uttar perimeter, they were halted by 62 Infantry Bde. Area was flooded by breaching Madhopur Canal where the Pattons got bogged down. Indian tanks and anti tank guns shot them like sitting ducks. The Armd Bdes were badly mauled and the daring operation turned into a disaster. It was the most decisive engagement of the war which played a stellar role in the outcome of 1965 war. The myth of Pak military superiority was demolished. They left 97 Patton tanks in the graveyard before withdrawing to Pakistan. The credit also goes to 9 JAK (62 Bde) which was the first Bn to attack Rohi Nallah across the border to establish a firm base for attack at Kasur. When attacked they held out for 48 hours to delay enemy offensive by 24 hours. This enabled 4 Div to trap Pak Armd Div in marshy fields of Asal Uttar. 9 JAK was bestowed with ‘Asal Uttar Battle Honour’ and the 1st gallantry award of the Div was won by Maj Teja Singh of 9 JAK. Bn suffered 52 killed, 50 prisoners, and 95 wounded. Had 9 JAK not held fast, there was nothing to check Pak Armd advance up till Beas. The pride of Pakistan had been humbled.
Pakistan had been banking on support from US and China which never came. Pak ammunition stocks were depleting. With the American and Soviet intervention UNSC sponsored unconditional ceasefire came about on 23 September 1965.
Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, neither gained a decisive military advantage. India had the better of the war. It achieved its basic aim of thwarting Pakistan attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from the war it had instigated.
Since Pakistan began the war in Kashmir, India took it to Punjab, Pakistan took it further South to Barmer. Each country opened new fronts as it suited them to relieve pressure on the other fronts. (wish Vajpayee had done the same during Kargil) It is here that the narrative of the war gets muddled, each with a version of their own. The instigator became the defender and the defender became the attacker. In the light of 1962 debacle, 1965 war was viewed as ‘Politico-Strategic’ victory for India. 28 August 1965, the day Indian flag was hoisted at Haji Pir, is celebrated as victory day every year.
Lessons learnt.
First and the foremost lesson is ‘never never trust Pakistan’. The perceived rise of Hindu Nationalism is generating unity among terrorist outfits suggesting greater dangers. To prevent repeat of 1965, ‘Village Defence Committees’ should be raised in the border villages with people having relatives across the LoC and trained to create a ‘Bajrangi Bhaijan’ type bonhomie in Pakistan.
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