Uncertainty over the future of Tibetan Buddhism after the Dalai Lama!

Ambiguity looms in India after India-China talks

Prabhat Ranjan Deen

prabhatranjandeen@gmail.com

The September 2026 BRICS Summit in New Delhi marked an important development in India-China relations and it may indicate a broader diplomatic adjustment between the two countries. The meeting took place after renewed India-China diplomatic engagement, including National Security Advisor Ajit Doval's August 2026 visit to Beijing for the 25th round of Special Representative-level border talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The discussions followed years of tensions after the 2020 Ladakh standoff. Earlier, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had also visited China in July 2025. Against this background, Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Delhi for the BRICS summit was presented as evidence of improving bilateral communication.

At the summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed appreciation for China's cooperation, while Xi Jinping emphasized that China and India should view their relationship from a strategic and long-term perspective. Both sides stressed cooperation, shared development, and the importance of preventing differences from becoming disputes. These developments are potentially significant for the future of the India-China relationship, particularly concerning the disputed Himalayan regions of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.

The talk between India and China, Tibet was also a central factor in understanding China's approach toward India. It argues that China remains concerned about the influence of Tibetan Buddhists and the 14th Dalai Lama, who has lived in India since arriving there in 1959. India granted the Dalai Lama political asylum but did not recognize the Central Tibetan Administration as a sovereign government. Instead, India permitted the Tibetan exile community to operate from Dharamshala while conducting cultural and religious activities.

India's position has traditionally involved a distinction between religion and politics. The Indian government has recognized the Dalai Lama primarily as a religious and spiritual leader and permitted his religious activities, while discouraging Tibetan political activities that could damage India's relations with China. India has also maintained that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and has not formally supported Tibetan independence.

This balancing policy is particularly important because the future succession of the Dalai Lama could become a major India-China issue. The 14th Dalai Lama has maintained that the authority concerning his reincarnation lies with the Gaden Phodrang Trust, while China asserts that the Chinese government has the ultimate authority to approve and recognize the next Dalai Lama. China also supports the use of the historical "Golden Urn" process. The Tibetan religious establishment and supporters of the Dalai Lama reject the claim that a political authority should determine a religious successor.

Consequently, India may face a difficult diplomatic situation if two competing Dalai Lamas emerge-one recognized through the Tibetan Buddhist religious process and another recognized or supported by China. The succession question will be potentially one of the most sensitive issue in future India-China-Tibet relations.

India's balancing strategy

According to a senior officer of the ministry of external affairs (MEA), India's present approach is essentially one of diplomatic balancing. India supports religious freedom and permits Tibetan Buddhist religious activities but does not want its territory to become a platform for anti-China political activity. In 2025, India's Ministry of External Affairs reportedly stated that the government does not take an official position on the religious beliefs and practices surrounding the Dalai Lama's succession.

The MEA therefore characterizes Indian policy as operating on two levels: religious respect and diplomatic caution. India has historical, cultural, and strategic reasons for maintaining relations with the Tibetan Buddhist community, while simultaneously seeking to avoid unnecessarily escalating tensions with China. The importance of Tibetan Buddhism to India is also linked to its historical relationship with Indian Buddhism. Buddhism originated in India, while Tibetan Buddhism preserved and developed important Indian Buddhist philosophical traditions, particularly those associated with Nalanda. Tibetan monasteries and settlements in Dharamshala, Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Bylakuppe, and Mundgod therefore represent an important part of the religious and cultural landscape.

Tibetan Buddhism v/s Ambedkarite/Navayana Buddhism

A major concern is the potential growth of ideological tensions between traditional Tibetan Buddhism and Ambedkarite or Navayana Buddhism in India. These traditions have different emphases. Tibetan Buddhism is presented as a traditional Buddhist system centered on concepts such as karma, rebirth, samsara, nirvana, meditation, bodhicitta, emptiness, and the Bodhisattva path. Ambedkarite Buddhism, by contrast, is presented as a modern reinterpretation emphasizing social equality, caste emancipation, dignity, and freedom from social oppression.

One particularly sensitive issue is the status of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar in relation to Gautama Buddha. Many traditional Tibetan Buddhists respect Ambedkar's contribution to Dalit emancipation, social equality, and the revival of Buddhism in modern India. However, it argues that attempts to describe Ambedkar as a "new Buddha" or as spiritually equivalent to Gautama Buddha can create doctrinal tensions. In traditional Buddhist philosophy, Gautama Buddha occupies a unique position as a fully awakened Buddha.

The Tibetan Buddhists also challenge the description of Tibetan Buddhism as simply a "foreign religion." They emphasize that Tibetan Buddhism developed from Indian Buddhist intellectual and spiritual traditions, including Mahayana, Vajrayana, and the Nalanda tradition. Tibetan Buddhism therefore has deep historical connections with India even though its institutional development subsequently took place largely in Tibet and the Himalayan region.

The post-14th Dalai Lama question

The period after the 14th Dalai Lama could be a major potential turning point for Tibetan Buddhism in India. The question may increasingly become; who represents Buddhism in India-the Tibetan Buddhist tradition or the Ambedkarite/Navayana movement? Several factors could affect this competition: demographic changes in the Tibetan exile community, migration of younger Tibetans, declining monastic populations, succession disputes, property and land issues, and changing political relationships.

The situation emphasizes that the future struggle may not primarily involve physically taking over monasteries. Instead, it could concern representation, legitimacy, institutional influence, government patronage, Buddhist heritage, educational institutions, foreign funding, tourism, and access to international Buddhist networks.

Ladakh, Karnataka's Tibetan settlements and Bodh Gaya are identified as particularly important locations where questions of institutional authority and Buddhist representation could become more significant.

Three principal sources of potential instability after the 14th Dalai Lama have been identified; succession dispute: A Tibetan-recognized Dalai Lama could face competition from a Chinese-recognized successor. Demographic and institutional weakness: A declining Tibetan exile population or weakening monastic institutions could reduce the community's institutional capacity. Indian Buddhist representation: Ambedkarite Buddhists could increasingly argue that Indian Buddhism should be represented more strongly by Indian citizens and communities rather than primarily by Tibetan or Himalayan institutions.

The role of the Indian state will therefore be critical. The government could face questions about which institutions receive protection, recognition, resources, and access to international Buddhist networks, as well as how it responds to competing claims concerning the legitimacy of the 15th Dalai Lama.

Demography and Dalit political influence

Another major argument is that Ambedkarite Buddhism possesses an important demographic and political base in India. The document cites the 2011 Census figure of approximately 8.4 million Buddhists in India, with around 6.5 million living in Maharashtra, and connects a substantial proportion of Maharashtra's Buddhist population with the post-Ambedkar Buddhist movement.

Ambedkarite Buddhism's influence derives not only from religious identity but also from the wider legacy of Ambedkar, Dalit political mobilization, constitutionalism, equality, social justice, and electoral politics. It further suggests that sections of non-Buddhist Dalit communities may share political commitments surrounding Ambedkar's legacy, potentially creating broader forms of political mobilization. Thus, the future "Buddhist question" in India could increasingly intersect with caste, constitutional rights, social justice, political representation, and electoral politics rather than remaining solely a matter of theology.

Recent developments in Tibetan Buddhism

By reviewing developments in Tibetan Buddhism in India during 2026, we can see the Dalai Lama remains the central spiritual figure of Tibetan Buddhism in exile and continues religious and community activities despite his advanced age. Dharamshala remains the principal institutional and spiritual center of Tibetan Buddhism in exile, while Ladakh has gained increasing prominence. Karnataka's Tibetan settlements, particularly Bylakuppe and Mundgod, remain major centers of monastic education. They preserve Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, language, monastic debate, tantric practices, art, ritual traditions, and scholarly institutions.

The succession of the Dalai Lama remains the most important long-term issue. The continuing controversy surrounding the Panchen Lama is also presented as evidence of the broader political sensitivity surrounding Tibetan religious succession. At the same time, Tibetan culture is reaching wider Indian audiences through festivals and cultural programs involving Tibetan language, art, calligraphy, clothing, and traditions.

Environmental crises in the Himalayan region are emerging as another concern. Floods, landslides, and threats to pilgrimage routes may increasingly affect Himalayan Buddhist communities and sacred landscapes.

Overall, the central argument is that Tibetan Buddhism in India remains institutionally significant but is entering a historic transition period. The future of the tradition will be shaped by four interconnected developments: India-China relations, the succession of the 14th Dalai Lama, the demographic and institutional future of the Tibetan exile community, and the growing political and social influence of Ambedkarite/Navayana Buddhism.

The experts do not present the future as predetermined. Instead, they identify a potentially complex interaction between religion, diplomacy, demography, law, institutional authority, and Indian electoral politics. India may continue supporting Tibetan religious institutions for cultural, humanitarian, and strategic reasons while simultaneously engaging more closely with Ambedkarite Buddhists because of their substantial Indian social and political base.

Ultimately, the central question after the 14th Dalai Lama may extend beyond the identity of his successor. It may concern who defines, represents, and institutionalizes Buddhism in India in the twenty-first century. Tibetan Buddhist institutions, Ambedkarite/Navayana organizations, Himalayan Buddhist communities, the Indian government, and China could all play important roles in shaping that future. The under current developments therefore portray the coming decades as a period of significant institutional transition, with the Dalai Lama succession, India-China relations, demographic change, and competing understandings of Buddhist identity likely to remain interconnected issues.