The Mecca Agreement

 US RoleIn Gulf Fading

By Juliusz Gojło

Washington is ceasing to be the sole security guarantor for the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, which are beginning to build their own networks of alliances. The Mecca Agreement signed in August between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signals the Middle East is entering an era of multipolar autonomy. The rapprochement between these three is driven by the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf.

For Saudi Arabia the recent months have been particularly painful: despite spending tens of billions of dollars annually on defence, missile and drone attacks have inflicted severe damage, while the American security umbrella has proven ineffective. Ankara, meanwhile, has leveraged the war to strengthen its position as a regional player capable of balancing between different camps, while Islamabad—acting as a mediator between Washington and Tehran—has gained prominence as a communication hub linking the region to the broader Indo-Pacific.

The agreement stipulates that an armed attack on any of the three states will be treated as an act of aggression against all of them. It also envisions development of joint defence capabilities, enhanced deterrence, and integration of military assets. At first glance, it appears seeds of an Islamic—or, as some prefer, Sunni—NATO are being sown.

Turkish politicians have explicitly drawn comparisons to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, though Ankara emphasises its NATO membership remains inviolable and the arrangements are complementary to existing structures. It would be a mistake to view the new agreement as a simple equivalent or clone of NATO. Its significance lies not so much in its specific provisions, which do not detail response mechanisms, as in the fact that it signals a shift in how the region's countries think about their own security.

The End of an Era

For decades, security of Gulf monarchies rested on the premise: the United States provided a strategic defence umbrella. Countries under it purchased American weaponry, developed their armed forces according to American doctrines, standards and procedures, and ultimately made their territory available for American military infrastructure.

This framework hasn’t disappeared, but it’s no longer sufficient. The Mecca agreement doesn’t replace American system of guarantees; rather, it fits into a broader strategic hedging. Saudi elites are not breaking ties with US but are seeking additional deterrence mechanisms and new partners, while maintaining room to manoeuvre among Washington, Beijing, Ankara, Tehran and other capitals.

Three Distinct Calculations

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan don’t form a monolithic bloc; their interests and motivations differ. For Riyadh, fundamental issue is its vulnerability to military threats despite massive defence spending which is approximately $80 billion annually, yet recent conflicts demonstrate that merely purchasing equipment doesn’t translate into a credible deterrence system. The agreement serves as an additional instrument of political leverage for the Kingdom: a potential adversary must now factor in reactions not only of Riyadh and Washington but also of Ankara and Islamabad.

Turkey views the agreement to bolster its strategic autonomy and status as a regional power. For years, it has been expanding its military presence beyond its borders while simultaneously building an autonomous defence industry. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan enhances its ability to exert influence both in Middle East and the West.

Pakistan, for its part, presumably brings a nuclear deterrence component to the arrangement. Estimates for 2025 indicate it possesses approximately 170 nuclear warheads. Participation enables Islamabad to strengthen its position as a mediator and communication intermediary, while simultaneously enhancing its geopolitical weight as a state linking the Muslim world with the Indo-Pacific, including China.

Not Just Iran

The simplest interpretation of the agreement would reduce it to an attempt to create a counterweight to Iran. However, the signatories emphasize that the alliance is intended to serve “collective deterrence” and strengthen stability, without singling out a specific adversary.

Significantly the creation of one security network encourages other states to build their own structures. Alongside the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan axis, increasingly advanced military-technological cooperation is developing between UAE and Israel. The region is shifting from rivalry between individual states to competition between rival security ecosystems: one based on Saudi financial resources, the Turkish defence industry, and Pakistani military capabilities; and another combining Emirati capital with Israeli technological superiority.

Close India-Israel Relations

Against this overlapping axis, another dimension is the increasingly distinct rapprochement between India and Israel. Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Israel this February compliments this observation.

For Pakistan, engaged in rivalry with India over Kashmir and regional influence, the New Delhi-Tel Aviv rapprochement acts as an additional incentive to seek allies within the Muslim world. Thus, the agreement can also be interpreted as an emergence of a counterweight to extension of US-Israel axis into an Israel-India branch.

Such a configuration fosters a classic security dilemma: actions perceived by one side as defensive are viewed by the other as a potential threat, leading to further armament and entrenchment of parallel blocs.

Standing Aside

Egypt, which didn’t join the Agreement, illustrates strategic flexibility of regional powers. Cairo participated in the four-nation format mediating the US-Israel-Iran conflict and was invited to join the new agreement yet didn’t become a signatory. There’s no reliable or definitive answer as to why President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi chose not to sign the pact. Perhaps, Saudi Arabia opposed Egypt’s participation, or Cairo itself decided against joining, fearing a loss of strategic autonomy.

Regardless of whether Saudi Arabia blocked Egypt’s participation or Cairo declined on its own, the situation illustrates a broader trend: regional powers no longer wish to choose between existing camps. Instead, they are pragmatically opting for a multi-vector foreign policy.

A New Security Architecture

It’s premature to definitively characterise the agreement as a groundbreaking alliance. A developed joint command structure, integrated forces, and clear procedures for initiating defensive actions are lacking. The agreement remains at a framework stage—providing for regular meetings, a ministerial committee, and a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia—yet it fails to specify how members would respond to attacks by states or non-state actors.

The agreement’s significance lies elsewhere: it demonstrates that regional security increasingly resembles a complex web of overlapping partnerships, accords, and competing axes rather than an arrangement with a single guarantor. Besides, the agreement highlights anxieties dominating the region: uncertainty and a lack of channels for building trust. The construction of parallel security networks could trigger an arms race and entrench existing dilemmas.

The durability of this new architecture depends significantly on to what extent it accommodates Iran’s interests. Turkey and Pakistan actively maintain communication channels with Tehran, while Riyadh has for several years pursued a policy of normalizing relations. Permanently excluding Iran from balance of power would prove more difficult than including it—even if only tacitly.

Consequences for Europe

From the perspective of European Union, the pact is significant in three dimensions: energy security, foreign policy, and security—specifically regarding migration and military matters.Shifting the locus of decision-making from Washington toward regional networks increases uncertainty regarding stability of oil and gas supplies. Europe and Gulf states are already negotiating as partners aware of mutual interdependence: EU needs gas and oil from the region, while Gulf monarchies require Western technologies and access to European markets.

The pact is a broader process in which regional powers are building security more autonomously, which diminishes EU’s previous capacity to exert influence through its relationship with a single dominant external player, namely US. This requires a more nuanced approach from Brussels: maintaining transatlantic cooperation while simultaneously developing dialogue with Riyadh, Ankara, Islamabad, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Tehran.

Therefore, Mecca agreementis less a finished alliance than an indication of a changing regional order. Its significance will ultimately depend on whether the new networks develop into durable mechanisms of cooperation.---INFA