Kabul's Calculus: Why the Taliban will not abandon the TTP

Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh (Retd)

bhopinder593@gmail.com

The latest United Nations monitoring assessments leave little room for complacency about the relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Despite repeated Pakistani demands, diplomatic initiatives and warnings about the consequences of cross-border terrorism, Kabul has shown no inclination to fundamentally sever its relationship with the TTP. The pattern instead suggests a familiar Taliban formula i.e., make limited concessions when pressure becomes intense, but preserve the relationship when core strategic interests are at stake.

The distinction is important. Moving TTP fighters and their families away from the Afghan side of the Durand Line is not the same thing as dismantling the organisation. Nor do public assurances against attacks amount to a comprehensive counterterrorism policy. Earlier UN reporting documented the relocation of TTP elements away from the border under Pakistani pressure, while subsequent assessments continued to find substantial TTP strength and Taliban logistical, operational and financial support inside Afghanistan.

This is why Islamabad should be wary of mistaking tokenism for a strategic shift.

The Afghan Taliban have demonstrated that they can make tactical adjustments without abandoning the larger relationship. Fighters can be moved from Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost or Paktika to more distant locations. Leaders can be cautioned to reduce the visibility of attacks. Statements can be issued calling for restraint. But unless the TTP's organisational infrastructure, freedom of movement, recruitment, financing and command arrangements are actually dismantled, such measures merely alter the geography and optics of the problem.

There is a deeper reason for Kabul's reluctance to go further. The TTP is not simply another militant organisation operating from Afghan territory. For the Taliban, it can also serve as a potential instrument of leverage against Pakistan.

This is where Pakistan's old and infamous concept of 'Strategic Depth' acquires an uncomfortable mirror image. Islamabad's pursuit of influence in Afghanistan during earlier decades was partly shaped by the desire to prevent a hostile western flank and to retain strategic leverage against India. The Afghan Taliban, having fought successive foreign-backed governments and ultimately inherited Kabul, are unlikely to forget that history. Their suspicion of Pakistani intentions does not disappear merely because the present Afghan regime is no longer a Russian client or a Western client. Indeed, the opposite may be true.

The Taliban today possess something their predecessors did not i.e., sovereign control over most of Afghanistan and an independent strategic relationship with regional powers. They no longer need to operate primarily as a proxy for another great power. That greater autonomy can make them more, rather than less, determined to retain instruments that they believe can constrain their neighbours.

From Kabul's perspective, therefore, maintaining a relationship with the TTP may provide several forms of leverage. It gives the Taliban an indigenous Pakistani-facing partner; it provides a means of signalling displeasure with Islamabad without relying exclusively on conventional military power; and it preserves an option against what Kabul may perceive as Pakistan's continuing interference in Afghan affairs. None of this means that every Taliban leader necessarily wants an unrestricted TTP campaign against Pakistan. It does mean that the Taliban have powerful reasons not to surrender the relationship altogether.

The UN's findings strengthen this interpretation. Its monitoring reports have repeatedly described the Taliban-TTP relationship as more than accidental coexistence. The implication for Pakistan is uncomfortable but straightforward: pressure alone is unlikely to persuade Kabul to abandon an asset it regards as strategically useful.

That does not make the TTP threat any less serious. On the contrary, the continued presence of a large, organised and externally supported TTP infrastructure creates a persistent security challenge for Pakistan. It also carries the danger of transforming an essentially bilateral dispute into a wider regional problem, particularly given the documented connections among terrorist organisations operating from Afghan territory.

Pakistan should therefore distinguish between two objectives that are often conflated. The first is securing an immediate reduction in attacks. The second is changing Kabul's underlying strategic calculation. Relocating cadres away from the border may assist with the first. It does very little to achieve the second.

For the second objective, Pakistan needs to make clear that relations with Kabul cannot be normalised indefinitely while Afghan territory remains an enabling environment for attacks against Pakistan. At the same time, Islamabad needs a broader regional strategy rather than relying exclusively on bilateral pressure. The UN itself has repeatedly warned that Afghanistan's militant ecosystem presents a threat extending beyond Pakistan.

The Taliban, for their part, should understand that retaining the TTP as a strategic hedge carries costs. A movement that seeks regional legitimacy cannot indefinitely demand recognition as Afghanistan's sovereign authority while tolerating an armed organisation whose principal theatre of operations is a neighbouring state. Nor can Kabul credibly claim that it has resolved the terrorism question simply because it has taken action against Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIL-Khorasan faction) while dealing with other groups through accommodation.

The central issue, then, is not whether Kabul can be persuaded to issue stronger condemnations. It is whether the Taliban are prepared to relinquish the strategic utility they perceive in the TTP. So far, the evidence suggests they are not.

Pakistan must recognise that reality. The Afghan Taliban are no longer the clients of Moscow, nor are they the clients of Washington. Their strategic autonomy has changed the nature of the relationship with Islamabad. But autonomy does not mean neutrality. Kabul has its own interests, its own fears and its own calculations about Pakistan. And one of those calculations appears to be that the TTP, however troublesome and costly, remains too useful to discard.

That is why the movement of TTP cadres from the Durand Line to Afghanistan's interior should not be mistaken for a solution. A terrorist camp does not cease to be a strategic instrument merely because it is moved farther from the border.

Until Kabul is prepared to dismantle the TTP's infrastructure rather than merely relocate it, condemn attacks rather than merely counsel restraint, and end material support rather than manage its visibility, Pakistan should assume that the fundamental Taliban calculus has not changed. The geography may change. The rhetoric may change. The patrons of Kabul may have changed. But the strategic competition has not.

(The author is former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands & Puducherry)