BRICS in India

Foreign policy must rise above partisan politics

Brig Anil Gupta

anil5457@gmail.com

India's decision to host the BRICS Summit should ordinarily be a matter of national confidence rather than partisan controversy. At a time when the international order is undergoing profound change, the willingness of major powers and emerging economies to engage with India on Indian soil is not an achievement belonging to one political party. It reflects the accumulated diplomatic, economic and strategic weight of the Republic of India,i.e., Bharat.

It is therefore difficult to understand why the Congress or any other opposition party should oppose, or seek to diminish, India's hosting of a major multilateral summit merely because it takes place under a Government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. There can certainly be legitimate questions about the Government's foreign policy, its handling of individual bilateral relationships, or the positions India takes at BRICS. Those questions should be debated vigorously. But criticism of the very fact that India is hosting an important international gathering risks confusing opposition to a Government with opposition to an opportunity for the country.

India's foreign policy should not be reduced to BJP versus Congress. Indeed, the Congress itself has a distinguished history of using major international gatherings to enhance India's diplomatic profile. India hosted the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in New Delhi in 1983 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting was also hosted in New Delhi the same year. The 1982 Asian Games became a powerful symbol of an increasingly confident India capable of organising an international event on a grand scale. Those events were rightly presented as achievements of India.

Political opponents of the Congress could disagree with Indira Gandhi on domestic politics and still recognise the diplomatic significance of India leading the Non-Aligned Movement. The same principle should apply today. Governments change; India's strategic interests do not change with every election.

There is an even more compelling reason for political maturity today. The world of 2026 is considerably more uncertain than the relatively predictable international system of earlier decades. The post-Cold War era of overwhelming Western predominance has been giving way to a more dispersed distribution of economic and political power. The United States remains the world's pre-eminent strategic power, China has emerged as a formidable economic and military competitor, Russia remains an important geopolitical actor, and countries across Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East increasingly seek greater influence over international institutions.

India must navigate this environment without becoming an appendage of any power bloc. That is precisely where India's tradition of strategic autonomy assumes renewed importance. The terminology may have changed from "non-alignment" to "multi-alignment" or "strategic autonomy", but the underlying principle has considerable continuity: India should cooperate with different countries and groupings according to its national interests without surrendering its freedom of judgement.

India is therefore able to participate in BRICS while simultaneously strengthening its relationship with the United States, Europe and Japan. It can be a member of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation while also participating in the Quad. It can maintain a longstanding relationship with Russia while developing an increasingly important strategic partnership with the United States. India can engage the Global South without disengaging from the developed world. This is not contradiction. It is diplomacy in a multipolar world.

BRICS itself must also be viewed realistically. It should neither be romanticised as an alternative world government nor dismissed simply because China and Russia are influential members. Its significance lies in the platform it provides to major emerging economies and increasingly to countries seeking greater representation in the international economic and political system. India has every reason to remain actively engaged with them.

If New Delhi withdrew from such forums because Beijing enjoys influence within them, it would merely leave greater space for China to shape their agenda. India's interests are better served by being present, articulating its own positions and building coalitions with countries whose interests coincide with ours.

Hosting a BRICS Summit consequently provides India with an important diplomatic opportunity. International summits are not ceremonial gatherings alone. They permit formal negotiations, bilateral meetings, informal conversations and diplomatic interventions that are sometimes impossible through normal bureaucratic channels. They provide the host country with an opportunity to influence the agenda and project its priorities.

India can use such a forum to emphasise reform of global institutions, greater representation for developing countries, counter-terrorism, resilient supply chains, energy and food security, digital public infrastructure, climate finance and development cooperation. It can also continue pressing for reform of institutions created in the aftermath of the Second World War whose structures no longer adequately reflect contemporary economic and demographic realities.

Another dimension that cannot be overlooked is India's aspiration to become one of the principal poles of the emerging international order. A country of India's population, economic potential, military capability, technological capacity and civilisational reach cannot remain merely a participant in systems designed by others. It must increasingly help shape those systems. Leadership, however, is not acquired through declarations. It develops when countries demonstrate an ability to convene nations with differing interests and produce areas of consensus.

India demonstrated this ability during its G20 presidency. BRICS provided another opportunity to do so. That opportunity has already produced a significant diplomatic outcome. Contrary to apprehensions that the expanded BRICS-with its diverse and, on some issues, sharply conflicting membership-might find it difficult to agree upon a Joint Declaration, India succeeded in steering the grouping towards consensus on the New Delhi Declaration. The achievement assumes greater significance against the backdrop of the continuing turmoil in West Asia and the serious differences among member countries, particularly Iran and the UAE. Securing consensus among countries as varied in their strategic orientations as China, Russia, Iran, the UAE, Brazil, South Africa and others is not merely a matter of drafting diplomatic language; it requires patient negotiation, political credibility and an ability to find common ground without compelling countries to abandon their core interests. Coming after India's success in forging consensus on the New Delhi Declaration at the G20 Summit in 2023, the BRICS outcome reinforces Prime Minister Narendra Modi's credentials as a leader capable of communicating across geopolitical divides. More importantly, it strengthens India's emerging role as a bridge-between East and West, developed and developing economies, and countries frequently positioned on opposite sides of international disputes. For India's global stature, this may ultimately be more consequential than the ceremonial success of hosting the summit. A nation aspiring to become a leading power must demonstrate not merely that it can command attention, but that it can build consensus. India has once again demonstrated that capacity.

None of this means that the Opposition should give the Government a blank cheque. A healthy democracy requires scrutiny of foreign policy. The Opposition is fully entitled to question whether India's relationship with China is being managed effectively, whether trade imbalances are sustainable, whether India's interests are adequately protected within BRICS, or whether particular summit declarations serve national interests. Parliament and the media should debate such questions.

But there is an important distinction between criticising the Government's policy at a summit and criticising India for hosting the summit.

The first is democratic accountability. The second can easily descend into political reflex.

The same standard should apply regardless of which party governs India. If a future Congress-led government hosts a major international summit that advances India's interests, the BJP should support the national endeavour while retaining its right to criticise particular policies. Foreign policy must contain space for political disagreement without turning every diplomatic engagement into an extension of domestic electoral warfare.

There was once a broad understanding in Indian politics that on fundamental questions of national security and foreign policy, partisan differences should stop at a certain point. That consensus has undoubtedly weakened. Social media, continuous electioneering and increasingly polarised political discourse have encouraged governments and opposition parties alike to view almost every development through a partisan prism. India can ill afford that approach in the present international environment.

The country today faces an unusually complicated strategic landscape: a difficult relationship with China, instability in its extended neighbourhood, continuing security concerns emanating from Pakistan, conflicts affecting energy markets and trade routes, technological competition among major powers, and an evolving relationship between the United States, Russia and China. At the same time, India's growing economy and demographic weight are creating opportunities that previous generations did not possess. The correct response is neither isolation nor alignment with a single camp. India needs multiple partnerships and multiple platforms.

It should work with Washington where interests converge, Moscow where longstanding strategic interests remain relevant, Europe on trade and technology, Japan on infrastructure and Indo-Pacific stability, the Gulf countries on energy and investment, Africa on development partnerships, and BRICS members on reforming global economic governance.

The guiding test should always be simple, does this serve India's national and strategic interests? If the answer is yes, the initiative deserves support irrespective of whether it originates from a Congress Government, a BJP Government or any future political dispensation.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government will naturally receive political and diplomatic credit for successfully hosting an important summit during their tenure. That is normal in every democracy. Indira Gandhi received credit for India's international standing during her tenure; successive prime ministers received credit for their diplomatic initiatives. Recognition of such leadership does not diminish the role of the country or its institutions.

Equally, an international summit should not become merely an exercise in political branding. Its ultimate value must be judged by what India achieves from it.

The Opposition should therefore strengthen rather than weaken its credibility by adopting an issue-based approach. Support the summit as an Indian diplomatic initiative; scrutinise its outcomes; applaud agreements that advance national interests; question those that do not. That is responsible opposition.

India is no longer a peripheral actor waiting for decisions taken elsewhere. It increasingly has the capacity to influence the conversations that will shape the twenty-first century. Hosting BRICS is one manifestation of that changing reality. In an uncertain global order, India must keep its options open, its partnerships diverse and its strategic autonomy intact. It must engage everywhere without becoming subordinate anywhere.

And when India takes the lead in bringing important nations to the table, political parties across the spectrum should recognise a fundamental distinction: governments may belong to political parties, but India's global standing belongs to the nation.

(The author is a Jammu based veteran and a security and strategic affairs analyst)