Arakan Army’s ‘Dream State’ And Emerging Security Challenge For Bangladesh

Tajul Islam

The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organization based in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, is seeking to consolidate its influence through more than battlefield gains. Researchers, analysts and people familiar with developments along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border say the group is also using ethnic history, nationalist narratives and the idea of restoring a long-lost Rakhine state to attract young people.

The issue is becoming increasingly relevant for Bangladesh because the AA’s activities are no longer confined to Myanmar. Allegations have emerged that Rakhine youths from Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts and Cox’s Bazar have established links with the organization, with some reportedly joining its armed ranks. Intelligence assessments cited by local sources suggest that more than 800 people holding Bangladeshi national identity documents may have joined the AA, although the precise figure is difficult to independently verify. Some are reportedly serving as fighters and, in a few cases, commanders.

What was once viewed largely as a conflict inside Myanmar is therefore developing into a broader security concern for Bangladesh. For years, many Bangladeshis paid little attention to the AA’s activities in Rakhine State or around the Thanchi border area of Bandarban. Even communities living close to the border often had limited understanding of the objectives behind the organization’s armed struggle.

The situation changed significantly after the AA began making substantial battlefield gains against Myanmar’s military. Many in Bangladesh initially viewed those developments positively, hoping that the weakening of Myanmar’s military would create an opportunity for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees who have been living in Bangladesh.

Instead, the humanitarian situation has become more complicated. The AA has been accused of committing serious abuses against Rohingya civilians as it has expanded its territorial control in Rakhine. Thousands of Rohingya have reportedly fled renewed violence and crossed into Bangladesh, further reducing hopes for an early and sustainable repatriation process. Rohingya representatives have described the situation as a continuation of persecution, but with a different actor at the forefront.

Mohammad Rafiqul Islam, a 39-year-old Rohingya youth leader living in Leda camp in Teknaf, told media outlets that the Rohingya had suffered destruction at the hands of Myanmar’s military in 2017 and were now facing attacks and dispossession amid the AA’s expansion. He argued that while the earlier violence focused heavily on destroying homes and property, the current danger increasingly involves direct threats to civilian lives.

The emergence of Rohingya armed groups fighting alongside Myanmar’s military against the AA has added another dangerous dimension to the conflict. Some Rohingya fighters have reportedly been captured by the AA, deepening the cycle of violence between the two communities. Despite allegations of growing AA activity among sections of the Rakhine population in Bangladesh, the issue has received comparatively limited public attention.

Researchers and security analysts believe the organization is attempting to cultivate support through a combination of ethnic identity, historical narratives and the promise of a future Rakhine homeland. An example that attracted attention was the reported celebration of Shangrai, the Rakhine New Year festival, by armed AA-linked individuals in the border areas of Bandarban. Another group was reportedly seen celebrating the festival at a residential hotel near Laldighi in Cox’s Bazar town. Reports of armed men participating in cultural celebrations highlighted how the political and social networks associated with the Rakhine community can extend beyond Myanmar’s borders.

The significance of such activities goes beyond cultural celebration. Security analysts say that ethnic and cultural networks can provide an environment in which political narratives and recruitment messages are circulated. There are also allegations that some local political figures in Cox’s Bazar and the Hill Tracts have maintained contacts with individuals associated with the AA. These allegations require independent investigation and verification, but their emergence illustrates the growing complexity of the issue.

The AA’s appeal among some Rakhine youths is closely connected to a historical narrative of a once-powerful Rakhine kingdom. The idea has been promoted in books and public discussions that portray Rakhine as having an ancient civilization and a distinct political identity that was gradually destroyed by outside powers.

Researchers believe that the AA’s recruitment strategy should not be understood solely in military terms. The organization’s political messaging and historical narratives may be equally important in mobilizing young people.

The present crisis also has deep historical roots. During the Second World War, the political and military alignments of different communities in Burma contributed to violent conflict between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. The Rohingya largely supported the British, while sections of the Rakhine community aligned with Japanese forces. Weapons supplied to opposing sides contributed to communal violence and massacres. The events of that period left deep scars and helped establish a pattern of mistrust that has persisted for generations.

The historical memory of that conflict continues to influence contemporary narratives on both sides. For the Rohingya, the history reinforces fears that territorial control by Rakhine armed forces could lead to further displacement. For Rakhine nationalists, however, historical grievances are often presented as evidence of a long struggle for political autonomy. The competing narratives make reconciliation particularly difficult.

For Bangladesh, the AA presents a complicated diplomatic dilemma. Myanmar’s government regards the organization as a rebel force. At the same time, the AA has emerged as a powerful territorial actor in large parts of Rakhine. As a result, Bangladesh cannot simply ignore the organization if it wants to address the Rohingya crisis.

The AA’s rise has created a fundamental problem for Bangladesh’s Rohingya policy. Even if Bangladesh reaches an understanding with Myanmar’s central authorities, meaningful repatriation will remain extremely difficult if the AA controls the territory to which refugees are expected to return. This has led some experts to argue that Bangladesh may eventually have to establish some form of communication with the AA, despite its status as a non-state armed organization.

The security consequences of the conflict are also visible along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Cross-border smuggling has become another major concern. Fertilizer and other goods are reportedly being illegally transported from Bangladesh into Rakhine, while yaba and other illicit drugs move in the opposite direction. The flow of yaba has already caused severe social and law-enforcement problems in Bangladesh. At the same time, allegations that smuggled materials are being used in the manufacture of explosives or landmines raise an even more immediate threat to border communities.

Landmines and unexploded ordnance in and around the conflict zone have caused casualties among civilians and border residents. People who lose limbs or suffer permanent injuries face consequences that extend far beyond the immediate conflict. (IPA )