Airports must become UAV-proof

Armritsar shutdown a warning

SK Saini

satinder1.1961@gmail.com

The Amritsar airport had to be closed for operations at around 9.50 PM on September 11, after the Indian Air Force informed the Air Traffic Control about drone activity across the airfield. As per media reports around seven flights had to be diverted to Chandigarh and Delhi because planes scheduled to land at Amritsar were already holding near the airport area. This incident in Amritsar reminded India and the world how vulnerable civil aviation remains to small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The police investigation concluded that the drone was being used to cover a sports event within the notified area of eight kilometres around the airport in which air activity is prohibited. While this violation can be described as inadvertent and innocent, inimical elements can adversely disrupt civil aviation operations thus causing serious ramifications. Apparently, this is not an isolated problem. Similar disruptions across Europe have been occurring repeatedly by state sponsored or proxy actors in hybrid operations by deploying drones to harass civilian infrastructure and military targets. The last reported incident was in eastern Germany at Halle Airport, where a drone carrying explosives was discovered near the runway on August 4 and later defused. With civilian air traffic density rising and drones becoming cheaper, heavier and more capable, security establishment and aviation authorities must urgently harden airports against an evolving aerial threat.

The precautionary suspension of civil aviation can affect departing and arriving flights, causing delays and passenger inconvenience and creating logistical headaches that ripple across the network. Financially, the shutdown imposes immediate costs on airlines and the airport and disrupted cargo movements and time sensitive connections. Operationally, it forces air traffic managers and airline dispatchers into contingency modes that magnify complexity at busy aviation hubs. In recent years, UK airports have repeatedly experienced drone incursions that forced runway closures. Elsewhere on the continent, drones have been used to probe defences and target military bases near civilian airfields, part of a pattern of hybrid operations designed to test response times and create asymmetric pressure without escalating to conventional conflict. Such operations underline that the drone threat to civil aviation is not limited to accidental interference by hobbyists but can form a deliberate campaign component. In our context airports along the borders are particularly vulnerable.

Rapid diffusion of drone technology means launch platforms can be cheap, mobile and operated with minimal training, allowing adversaries to launch from concealed positions close to airfields. Therefore, low cost UAVs can produce disproportionate disruption to civil aviation. The aircraft involved range from commercially available quad copters to more capable fixed wing platforms, modified to extend range or payload. Whether flown by mischief, protesters, criminal networks or foreign operators probing defences, these devices exploit gaps in detection, legal frameworks and response protocols. Small drones have low radar cross sections and limited acoustic signatures, making detection difficult in urban clutter and over busy airfields. The legal and technical limits on counter measures further complicate responses, because aviation safety rules are conservative and many defensive actions risk unintended impact on nearby aircraft or avionics. Airports are inherently soft targets in several respects. They operate in largely uncontrolled low altitude airspace that is also used by general aviation, helicopters and, increasingly by registered or authorised drones for services such as agriculture, traffic control and logistics.

A layered, risk based approach is necessary to make airports UAV proof. Detection and tracking must be strengthened by deploying complementary sensors including radar systems tuned for small targets, electro optical and infrared cameras, acoustic arrays and radio frequency detectors. Sensor fusion using artificial intelligence can improve discrimination between drones and benign objects such as birds, reducing false alarms and giving operators reliable, real time tracking. Extending surveillance out from airport perimeters to off site locations increases the chance of detecting launches or operators before drones reach protected airspace. Proportionate neutralisation and interdiction capabilities should also be available under clear legal authority and strict oversight. Soft kill options such as directed radio frequency or GPS disruption, capture nets and approved kinetic interception can be effective in exclusion zones when designed to avoid collateral impact on civilian avionics. Rapid response teams trained and equipped to interdict drones near airports can shorten incident durations and reduce the need for prolonged airfield closures.

Airspace management and coordination should treat drones as part of national airspace security. This requires enforceable geo-fencing and remote identification rules around airports, real time data sharing between airport operations, air traffic control, defence agencies and law enforcement, and pre agreed protocols that enable military or civil defence support when civilian capacities are eshausted. Integrating drone monitoring into national airspace management systems will allow local authorities to escalate response appropriately and to marshal resources quickly. Resilience measures are equally important. Airports and airlines must prepare graded operational contingency plans that prioritise safety while minimising complete closures, for instance by using alternate runways, holding patterns and predefined diversion procedures. Regular joint exercises among civil, military and law enforcement agencies will help validate these procedures and reduce response time. Timely, transparent communication with passengers during incidents retains public confidence and limits reputational harm.

Governance and deterrence should complement other measures to make civil aviation secure. The agency responsible for counter UAV measures around the airport, especially dual use airports along the border, needs to be clearly promulgated. Strengthening criminal penalties for deliberately launching drones near airfields should enhance legal deterrence. Public engagement and industry partnerships should be part of an effective response. Public awareness campaigns can inform hobbyists and commercial operators about safe practices, registration requirements and penalties for violations. Drone manufacturers should be encouraged or regulated to embed geo-fencing, remote identification and fail safe behaviours so that devices remain away from exclusion zones.

The Amritsar shutdown and repeated European incidents are warnings, not aberrations. Drones will continue to proliferate and evolve, and civil aviation with its tight itinerary and public facing infrastructure will remain a tempting target for disruption. Practical, layered defences that blend technology, legal clarity and operational readiness can reduce the risk and cost of such disruptions. Treating drone threat mitigation as an urgent safety and national security priority will make airports safer and keep the skies open for passengers and commerce. Failure of imagination should not make the security establishment complacent and cloud its judgement to visualise emerging threats to civil aviation.

(The author is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff)