Destablised Pak - A threat to world peace

By Brig. (Retd.) S.N. Sachadeva

The al-Qaida commander and spokesman Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid told the Italian news agency Adnkronos International (AKI) in a phone call from an unknown location claiming responsibility for the assassination of former Pakistan premier Benazir Bhutto, whom he described as "the most precious American asset". He also told the agency that the decision to kill Bhutto was made by al-Qaida No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri in October. He also revealed that death squads were constituted for the mission and a cell comprising a "Punjabi volunteer" of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi carried out the mission.

It was during the premiership of Benazir Bhutto in 1996 that she had asked Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then Director General of Military Operations, to rehabilitate Al Qaida chief Osama bin Laden in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, who was hounded out from Sudan under pressure by the US government. In fact it is a travesty of truth that the Frankenstein she created decided to kill her. That-a decade later-Al Qaida should claim responsibility for Bhutto's assassination marks not just a cruel irony, it also underlines once again the risk of Frankenstein's monster turning upon the master.

Bhutto's return to Pakistan this year may have been marked with her claim to wipe out terrorism, but the fact remains that it was her interior minister, Major General (Retd) Naseerullah Babar, who played a key role in raising the Taliban and consolidating Al Qaida in Afghanistan. The reason: a desire to secure strategic depth by controlling Pakistan's western border, and to have a say in future Afghanistan affairs.

The present day terrorism in India, and now turning on Pakistan, can, to an important extent, be traced to that fateful decision taken by the Bhutto government. Taliban soon became host to a menacing jehadi conglomerate-the Qaida-led International Islamic Front (IIF)-the components of which included anti-India gangs like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, which later became Jaish-e-Mohammed, HuJI and others.

The objective of the group was to establish Sharia rule in this important region of Asia, and it was determined to go to any length, even acquire weapons of mass destruction, to realise it.

After the collapse of Taliban post-9/11, this terror infrastructure led by bin Laden moved to Pakistan, and has added to the radicalisation which has claimed so many innocent lives, including that of Benazir Bhutto. A look at the history of militancy in the subcontinent also brings out the fact that Islamic fundamentalism is a direct result of the efforts of hardline Sunni groups to subdue Shias, Ahmadias and others. Fundamentalist Sunni outfits like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which went after Shias, enjoyed the patronage of influential sections of the Pakistan establishment.

There was an overlap of objectives, of course. The late Pakistan dictator-president General Zia-ul-Haq, follower of Deobandi sect of Sunnis, set up SSP in 1979 to not only marginalise pro-democracy forces seeking an end of his brutal military regime.

Some of the radical elements of the SSP parted ways and formed Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 1996. LeJ, which is suspected to have carried out the attack on Bhutto at the behest of Al Qaida, is nothing but the armed wing of SSP like Jaish-e-Mohamed and HuJI which had also branched out of SSP. The connections of all jehadi groups with each other are obvious whether they are fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq or India.

Why the US government which invested more than $10 billion in Pakistan failed to eradicate the menace of Islamic fundamentalism? It also waged war in Afghanistan and Iraq to fight Islamic militancy. One of the reasons for US strategy going haywire is its abysmal record of intelligence gathering in this region. The policy of promoting jehadism in Afghanistan blew up in their face. Their assessment on enlisting Musharraf's cooperation has saved bin Laden and the Al-Qaida, revived Taliban in Afghanistan and resulted in Talibanisation of Pakistan.

George Tenet's recent book, at the Center of the Storm, highlights the shortcomings of US intelligence. Washington claims not to have known about A.Q. Khan's proliferation in the 1980s. There is an absurd reference to Pakistani fears of two war fronts-with Taliban and India-to explain Pakistan's cooperation with Taliban. With such low understanding of the ground situation in Pakistan, one must be sceptical of America's ability to influence developments in the region.

To tackle terror Pakistan needs a legitimate and popular government and the focus has to shift from personalities to institutions and processes. The holding of credible elections under present conditions looks unlikely. There has to be at least a medium-term plan, in which the international community should be involved, to bridge this divide. The UN has helped in repairing many failed states; perhaps an election could be held under its auspices.

Indian intelligence agencies have many lessons to learn from the security fiasco in Pakistan that killed its former premier, Benazir Bhutto. Security agencies here are closely reviewing the terror attack on Bhutto and the modus operandi adopted by the terrorists in planning the killing of the Pakistan leader.

It is probably for the first time that the suicide bombers have preferred 'two-tier attack' first by launching abrupt fire attack on their target to disrupt security arrangements and then sneaking near their target for the final suicide attack. The attackers had left little chance of failure.

Besides, there is a great possibility of spill-over of terrorist groups in India, and a nuclear Pakistan is all the more dangerous as a failed state. A failed state can disintegrate, and in that eventuality terrorists may lay their hands on nuclear devices. India being a next door neighbour faces greater danger than any other country. Thus, a stable and democratic Pakistan is in the larger interest of not only India but the world as a whole. (INAV)