Daily Excelsior... Editorial

EDITORIAL

By M Rama Rao

India is talking with Myanmar to clear out camps of Indian insurgents on its soil much in the manner that Bhutan did against ULFA some years ago. Both Isak-Muivah and the Khaplang groups of Naga underground, People's Liberation Army of Manipur, United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and other North-east insurgent groups have about 15 camps along the ..more

Ushering free trade
in South Asia

By Pallabh Bhattacharya

India's trade diplomacy was in full play last month as it grappled hard negotiations on two key proposals for ushering free trade in South Asia and South East Asia, producing contrasting outcomes. .......more

Afghan imbroglio and Indo-US relations

By Vinod Anand

EDITORIAL

Is it too much
to hope?

Will Pakistan be sincere enough in setting up an anti-terrorism institutional mechanism along with India? More importantly, will it allow such a joint apparatus to work efficiently and smoothly? According to dispassionate observers even in Pakistan the decision to establish a combined anti-terrorism device is "one new element' in the joint statement of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. They feel that "this is a departure from traditional positions and should help avoid misunderstanding and the blame game in case terrorists strike again" in India. However, the thrust of their argument is jaundiced. It is that the Indian press (to be distinguished from New Delhi which, according to them, has been "a little more circumspect") has blamed Pakistan "without finding any evidence" whether there was an attack on the Parliament House or blasts in Mumbai. This contention will not cut much ice. The fact is that it is not the Indian press but the Union Government that had chosen to postpone the composite dialogue with Pakistan in the wake of 7/11, 2006. Time and again it has handed over to Pakistan incontrovertible proof about its role in terrorist activities in this country. It has met stony stillness instead of drawing a favourable response. Again, it is not the media but the Government that has agreed to resume the exercise apparently in appreciation of Pakistan's condemnation of terrorism including in Mumbai. The press in this country enjoys enviable freedom. This is widely acknowledged. Its responsible functioning has helped remove quite a few irritants between the two neighbouring countries. What is it, however, expected to do, when it finds that Pakistani and Pakistan-trained militants are playing havoc with the unity and integrity of its country? Should it keep silent when top militants leaders from Yasin Malik to Abdul Ahad Waza spill the beans about their arms training in camps in Pakistan? Should it not see through Pakistan's repeated pledges for providing "moral, political and diplomatic" support to "freedom fighters" which are euphemism for unabashed backing to terror machine first in Punjab and now in Jammu and Kashmir? How should it react when Pakistan seeks to defend the presence of Hizbul Mujahideen supremo Syed Salahuddin in the territory under its control? Does Islamabad's stance in this behalf not lend credence to charges that it authors threatening noises that Salahuddin makes? How can Pakistan deny the well-established Karachi address of Mafia don Dawood Ibrahim?

In view of this background it is perfectly justified if the press in India shares the same view as the Central Government about the sponsors of terrorism in this country. In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to say that it is perhaps the only issue on which they see eye to eye with each other. Invariably otherwise they agree to disagree to the extent that even as patient a politician as late P.V. Narasimha Rao had once ended up grumbling about "irreverence" of the Indian media. Given Pakistan's track record we can't be faulted if we think that it will create impediments in the way of joint mechanism. We wish we turn out be wrong but we can't overlook the way Islamabad has treated all previous accords whether signed in Tashkent, Shimla or Lahore. We are for lasting peace in the sub-continent. We in this State know even better the virtues of normalcy and tranquillity between the two neighbours. Right now we are clearly the beneficiaries of ceasefire on the Line of Control and International Border as well as the reopening of road routes across the LoC. Who will not like such bonhomie and the spirit of mutual accommodation to prevail for good? Undoubtedly it can endure for long. But this can happen only if Pakistan comes to terms with the truth that the terrorism is terrorism and can't be camouflaged in the name of religion or any other style. That is why we are extremely happy that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has put the issue in corrective perspective while elaborating the proposed joint anti-terrorism mechanism with Pakistan. According to him, it is the "new beginning" and if it does not work "we will have to deal with consequences". He has quoted the Pakistan President as having denied his country's hand in perpetuating terror in India. He has also noted his promise to work "together in future". This has led him to believe that there is realisation on the part of Islamabad that "things cannot be business as usual if terrorism is not under control or if the Government of Pakistan is seen to be not willing to work with us to control terrorism." He has opined that the mechanism "must be credible, inspire confidence in both the countries and, therefore, we will have to look at the mechanics of the move with due care." The Prime Minister is candid: ""I cannot say for example that we have got forever security for our country. All I can say is we have made an advance. Let us give it a try. Let us approach our state of reconciliation with all the sincerity that we can bring to bear."

Thus there is no doubt that the Prime Minister is willing to give peace another chance while being prepared to meet any eventuality. This is the right approach. It also answers all questions about the options for the country if Pakistan does not live up to its commitment and continues to encourage armed cross-border excursions. Very appropriately the Prime Minister has refused to be drawn into any controversy at this point in time. For the sake of record, however, he has dismissed as "hypothetical" the questions like about the fate of the joint mechanism if more terror hits take place against India and the existence of terrorist organisations like Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad in Pakistan. He has dropped clear hints that the proposed dispensation will take care of these matters. "Let's not jump the gun. Let this mechanism be in place. We will explore all the ways with which we can rid the sub-continent of the scourge of terrorism" is his advice for the time being. There is an obvious hint in his utterances that he has while pursing a wider objective opted to walk a tight rope. He has not hidden his hope that joint mechanism "works". Is this too much to hope?

Cornering North-East insurgents

By M Rama Rao

The Bhutan operation, it is worth recalling, was only partially successful. Many of the ULFA cadres managed to slip through the dragnet and escaped to Bangladesh. ISI and Bangladesh Army's Intelligence, 'rehabilitated' them while the LTTE was roped in to provide weapons and know-how to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of the kind ULFA has now come to be identified with.

It is not for the first time that New Delhi is looking to Yangon for coordinated action. Security forces of both countries worked together in the past also. Myanmar has a vested interest in such operations because it has its own insurgency problem in the north of the country close to the Indian border. Surprisingly, however, this time, it has asked for a new list of camp locations as a pre-requisite for deciding on any action.

Drawing a lesson from Bhutan's operation against ULFA, India should ensure that this time around no one escapes the dragnet and live to fight another day. The number of militants of all shades in Myanmar camps is said to be much larger than the approximately two thousand that were in Bhutan. So, enough numbers of security personnel must be stationed on our side of the border at pre-designated points in coordination with the Myanmar army so that no militant can escape the dragnet and exfiltrate from Myanmar and reach Bangladesh. Since this will be a military operation, it will be the responsibility of the India to create an "anvil" on which the Myanmar armed forces can strike their "hammar" to crush the militants.

Currently, in Nagaland, there is a ceasefire in force. It is under an accord Nagaland insurgents had reached with the government at the start of their negotiations during the NDA regime. The talks have not made substantial headway as yet but the ceasefire is being extended every six months.

ULFA is yet to establish its keenness for peace through negotiations. In fact, it had set off explosions across Assam to coincide with the third rounds of talks the Peoples' Consultative Group led by litterateur Indira Goswami was holding in New Delhi. Yet, the Home Ministry thought it fit to declare a temporary ceasefire in Assam. Apparently it is a measure of goodwill. It was not a popular move with the security forces who like to keep up the pressure and not to allow the insurgents to regroup and resort to their normal activity of kidnappings and extortion.

There is some justification in the hesitation in trusting the ULFA leadership too much. Because despite the 'indirect' parleys with the government, it has slapped a Rs 15 lakh demand on the Regional Director of the Reserve Bank of India. Pursuing the case the security forces nabbed two ULFA cadres and followed it up by killing six others in places as far away as Meghalaya.

Unlike in the past when any action against ULFA for instance would invariably provoke total bandhs in Assam, there is growing disillusionment among the Assamese over ULFA's promise of securing "sovereignty" from India. The Government is, therefore, trying to bring pressure to bear on it to join the mainstream.

Similar is the case with the Naga insurgents. The assessment in New Delhi is that the joint India-Myanmar operations will adversely affect the morale of the insurgent groups. Hitherto they have enjoyed a feeling of immunity as the Myanmar army is pre-occupied with its own campaigns. So, the Indian request to Myanmar has the potential to propel these insurgent groups towards a meaningful dialogue with Delhi.

Given the state of affairs within Myanmar, there is, however, a question mark on the ability of its armed forces to maintain a permanent or even a sustained presence over several months in and around the camps. So we should be prepared for an element of disruption during the "hammer and anvil" operations and to the fact that tribal affinities on both sides of the international border will remain a source of sustenance at least for the Naga rebels.

Also to be factored in is the easy connectivity that exists among insurgent groups. For instance, ULFA is able to secure sanctuaries and bases non-contiguous with Assam. This indicates a kind of overarching organisational set up. Pakistan's ISI is adept at providing such networking. It has traditionally encouraged anti-India activities from the very moment of its birth and made the former "east wing", now Bangladesh, a home to our insurgent groups. The large number of bases of insurgent groups dotting the Chittagong Hill Tracts prompted a wag to remark that well fed and armed 'Indians' out number the locals in the area.

Unlike with Bangladesh, India has no bilateral issues with Myanmar. The remarking of the boundary pillars which was discussed during the recent India-Myanmar Home Secretary-level contacts is not a big issue. Both sides agreed to undertake a joint survey in October. Admittedly, no progress can be made unless Manipuri, which is averse to any new adjustments, cooperates. In the larger national interest some solution will have to be found.

(Syndicate Features)

Ushering free trade in South Asia

By Pallabh Bhattacharya

India's trade diplomacy was in full play last month as it grappled hard negotiations on two key proposals for ushering free trade in South Asia and South East Asia, producing contrasting outcomes.

While Minister of State E Ahamed and the then Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran had travelled to Dhaka in early August to attend the SAARC ministerial meeting to discuss implementation of South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), Commerce and Industry Minister Kamal Nath flew to Kuala Lumpur to attend Trade Ministers' meeting of Asean and East Asian countries to steer the India-Asean FTA out of the choppy waters over the list of goods on which tariff concessions are to be finalised.

The SAARC Foreign Ministers' meeting in Dhaka in early August was overshadowed by the standoff between India and Pakistan following the latter's refusal to allow tariff concessions under South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) to India on all products as promised to other member-countries of the region.

While Pakistan has offered tariff cuts on over 4,000 items to other SAARC countries and kept 1,183 items on the negative list, it is giving concessions to India on only 773 items on the bilateral positive list.

India objected to Pakistan's stand and said it was a negation of the agreement reached by leaderships of the seven member countries. India also made it clear that Pakistan's stand would have a bearing on the future of SAFTA.

The Dhaka meeting failed to resolve the stalemate and the issue has been left to the SAARC Commerce Ministers' meeting on October this year.

Although India has not hit back and hold back concessions promised to Pakistan under SAFTA, New Delhi's patience could be wearing thin, if reports emanating are anything to go by. A section of Indian Government favours keeping in abeyance the Trade Liberalization Programme (TLP) towards Pakistan and witholding the next phase of concessions due in December this year.

India and Pakistan account for more than 90 per cent of SAARC region's GDP and the tussle between them over SAFTA could only jeopardise the future of free trade in the area. The SAFTA is estimated to have the potential to push up the current level of intra-region trade from six billion dollars to 14 billion dollars annually within two years of the existence of the accord.

Pakistan has in the past given enough indications that it is bent on bringing in extraneous consideration in making implementation of SAFTA by saying it should be conditional to solution of the Kashmir issue.

If the outlook for SAFTA appears rather gloomy with Indo-Pak differences hanging heavily, the scenario seems to be looking up for India's proposed FTA with Asean after Kamal Nath spoke to his counterparts from Asean and dialogue partners including India, Japan, South Korea and Australia.

Nath had gone to the Malaysian capital against the backdrop of disputes between India and Asean about the size of India's negative list of goods on which tariff cuts are to be offered and the corresponding list from Asean.

Even before Nath travelled to Kuala Lumpur, he had after a meeting of the Trade and Economic Relations Committee headed by Prime Minister, had indicated it was willing to move ahead in clinching the FTA with Asean with a new proposal that covers tariff concessions on more than 90 per cent of the exports from the ten-nation regional grouping.

Earlier, India had offered tariff reductions for 69 per cent of the imports from Asean and now it has been raised to 94.6 per cent, said Special Secretary in Commerce Ministry Gopal K Pillai who head Indian delegation at the talks with Asean officials in Kuala Lumpur. He said India offered to substantially cut import duty on some highly sensitive products which are of significant export interest to certain Asean members.

On the other hand, Asean is yet to come up with its list of goods for duty concessions to India under the FTA.

By offering far sharper cuts on palm oil, tea and pepper, India has shown considerable flexibility in dealing with Asean FTA.

Alongwith the FTA in goods with Asean, India is also pushing for including services and investments in its ambit within a year to enable Indian professionals gain easier access in South East Asia. India is in talks with Singapore and South Korea for separate agreements that will allow free trade in goods and services. After all, India too needs to show something to its people to have achieved something of particular interest to it in negotiating the FTA with Asean, Indian officials say.

Given the fact that Asia is going to register faster economic growth than other parts of the world (according to Asian Development Bank, Asian Economics are expected to grow 7.7 per cent in 2006 as against initial projections of 7.2 per cent), India needs to remain engaged in FTAs in the region to help give concrete shape to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's vision of a pan-Asian Economic Union unveiled last year. The SAFTA and ASEAN FTA are building blocks for that global vision.

What especially emphasises the need for urgent action to operationalize FTA with ASEAN and SAARC is that India's trade with these two trade blocs fell from 2003 to 2006, according to a study by industry body ASSOCHAM.

It says India's trade in SAARC declined from 3.39 per cent of its total foreign trade in 2003-04 to 2.84 per cent in 2005-06 while with Asean it came down from 9.33 per cent to 3.94 per cent during the same period.

All this happened at a time when Asean has positioned itself as a dynamic economic entity with FDI to the time of 38 billion dollars pouring in 2005 and 14 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2006.

In a region with GDP totalling 800 billion dollars and total trade of more than one trillion dollars, investors from the US, Britain, Japan and France have increasingly turned to ASEAN. India undoubtedly has a big stake in utilising the huge potential of Asean and SAARC.

PTI Feature

Afghan imbroglio and Indo-US relations

By Vinod Anand

Even after five years since September 11, 2001, the situation in Afghanistan looks similar to what it was before. The problems of security, stability, putting democratic order in shape and rising tide of Taliban resurgence remain. This is due to both acts of omission and commission of the US with not an altogether insignificant contribution by Pakistan. While the US policy goals of promoting security and stability, establishment of a democracy and preventing a return of Taliban variety of radicalism and fundamentalism are congruent with Indian objectives in Afghanistan, Pakistan remains US's ‘partner of choice’ in its war against terrorism. It is no big secret that Pakistan's goals run counter to that of the US and India. Even though Pakistan's President General Musharraf during his visit to Kabul in first week of September has promised once again that he would take measures to prevent Talibans from crossing the borders with Afghanistan, the situation on ground is unlikely to improve.

Deferring to Pakistan's ambitions in Afghanistan, the US has refrained from seeking Indian assistance in Afghanistan in improving security, political, military and societal situation in Afghanistan. India's unique strengths, resources and ties in Afghanistan could have greatly supplemented the US and allied efforts in restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan. India's capabilities in area of counter insurgency operations is well known as even American soldiers have attended training courses in Indian military training schools. Yet, the Indian offer of training Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police has not found receptive ears.

India's dissonance with the US policies in Afghanistan arises out of two main factors. First, in spite of convergence of Indo-US interests in Afghanistan, the US follows a policy of exclusion of India from a meaningful participation in addressing stabilization efforts in area which is considered as a strategic neighbourhood by India. Second, the US accommodates or overlooks the obtuse policies being followed by Pakistan in relation to Afghanistan which are antithetical to the US and a strong and stable Afghanistan.

Historically, a strong and stable Afghanistan has always been a rival of Pakistan except during the years of Taliban rule (1996-2001). It was only during this short period that Pakistan establishment believed that they had so called ‘strategic depth’ because a weak Taliban Government was compliant to Pakistan's ambitions. No other dispensation in Afghanistan has either been under Pakistan's tutelage or favourably disposed to it. A strong Government in Kabul has always been a motivator for Pakhtun and Balochi nationalism in Pakistan and has raised questions on controversial Durand Line, border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And it is therefore in Pakistan's strategic interest to have a weak and destabilized Afghanistan. It also needs to be remembered that it was during Taliban years when holy terror was exported to Central Asian Region, India, Chechnya and the US and the West with the active connivance of Pakistan.

The US on the advice of Pakistan had even accepted that a ‘moderate Taliban’ (Jaish-e- Muslimeen) could be allowed to share power in Afghanistan. But, during the spring offensive of Taliban this year, this group reverted to main stream Taliban.

Another strange policy of the US is that Taliban has never appeared either on the US State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations or on similar lists of its coalition allies even when the group has killed civilians (including two Indians), Government officials, US and NATO soldiers besides Afghan Army and police personnel. Is it in order to gain so-called broad base of support for President Karzai or is it to accommodate Pakistani interests? Or does the US feel guilt-ridden because after all, it was CIA and Pakistan's ISI who sired the Frankenstein monster in the first place. What should have been terrorism by any standards is not terrorism according to the US. So, here again double standards are being practiced in the interest of political expediency. Where is the question of taking a unified stand against terrorism? Erstwhile Secretary of State Colin Powell and stated in October 2004 that ‘‘problem of terrorism is not limited to Afghanistan--the US and India are united against terror, and that includes terrorism directed against India, as well’’.

The US commitment to Afghanistan effort also appears to be weakening as it is reducing its troops and has handed over command to NATO forces in the Southern and Eastern provinces of Afghanistan which are hotbeds of ongoing Taliban insurgency. There are concerns whether NATO can handle insurgency because of NATO's charter and each member nation having its own rules of engagement besides lack of mission clarity of NATO forces. Further, the US has plans to reduce the strength of ANA from the earlier planned total of 70,000 soldiers to 50,000 soldiers because the US estimates that Afghan Government will not be able to afford such a large force till year 2063. But, then this is a sure recipe for instability to continue indefinitely.

Meanwhile Pakistan is waiting to claim its self assigned strategic space once the American withdrawal takes place from Afghanistan which according to Pakistan's thought process may take place eventually. Even the present situation suits Pakistan fine since it compels the US and allies to continue to engage Pakistan, provide it with aid of all kinds and keeps Pakistan strategically relevant as preferred ally on war against terror.

Although, of late there have been some soundings by the Americans that they are looking for much greater participation of India especially in terms of assistance in training and rebuilding Afghan police, the proposals have yet to take a concrete shape. Thus Indo-US equation in respect of Afghanistan is unlikely to undergo any dramatic change in near future unless some strategic event like repeat of 9/11 takes place. And the world was closer to this possibility on August 10, when terrorist plot to knock out ten planes in the skies was uncovered with linkages extending to Pakistan.

Further, Pak military's recent agreement with Taliban in Waziristan will provide a safe haven for Al Qaeda and Taliban accentuating troubles of conflict ravaged Afghanistan. US reaction to the agreement has been cautious and muted. - CNF