Memory losses in elites
Men, Matters, Memories

By M L Kotru

Memory losses, particularly among the ruling elites the world over, have become such a common place that you sometimes begin to wonder what our fate would be if we forgot the fact that such lapses are more often than not self-induced. Take the instance of George Bush, literally shaking with rage, the day our dear leader Kim Jong II had his nuclear blast deep inside in the earth's womb in mountains of North Korea.

Ignoring Bush's dire warnings Kim had gone ahead with his little nuke. And George Bush, his back to the wall, domestically, thundered that North Korea would have to face the consequences not just for having imploded the bomb but as the biggest proliferator of missiles to ‘‘Syria and Iran’’. Not a word about North Korean missiles and missile technology transferred by Pyongyang to Pakistan. Not that one would have expected Bush to mention the planeloads of nuclear technology transferred from Pakistan to North Korea or to Libya which has , of course, made a clean breast of it and assured Bush that Libya was longer in the race.

Similar memory loss has grievously afflicted Bush's great friend, the Pakistani President, Gen Pervez Musharraf, who, not so long ago, described Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the metallurgist turned-nuke expert, as a national hero of Pakistan whom he dare not touch even when his flirtations with nukehungry Libya, Iran, N. Korea, etc were known.It has not taken Musharraf long, though to describe Dr Khan as a ‘self-serving egotist’’.

If the original assessment of Dr Khan as Pakistan's foremost nuclear scientist, revered in the country as the father of the Pakistani bomb, was intended to placate the Pakistani people who genuinely admire Khan, the subsequent description was obviously intended to bolster the sales of his just released ‘‘memoirs’’ in the US.

The Musharraf memoirs finally make the discovery that when investigations into Dr Khan's proliferation activities were made the intelligence agencies intercepted a letter by him (Khan) to his daughter Dina Khan, who lives in London, ‘‘containing detailed instructions’’ for her to go public on Pakistan's nuclear secrets. That Khan was actively involved in procuring and later selling technology which he had mastered during his earlier European sojourn is a known fact. What Musharraf obviously does not want to go recorded is the active cooperation he was extended by the Army in his efforts to develop the Pakistani nuke and later in bartering or selling his know-how in return for missiles or cash.

Qadeer Khan's daughter has very wisely chosen to put Musharraf and Co. on alert. Describing Musharraf's charges against her father as ludicrous Dina says the Khan letter was addressed to her mother and gives details of what had really happened. The investigations against her father she says were closed long back but his (Khan's) condition continues unchanged in the hope that he would ‘‘rot quietly at home’’. That will never happen’’, she dares. The truth will come out sooner than later.

That's cause enough for Musharraf to get worried but you can never tell. Not with a hard-headed commando who appears to have fabricated a survival kit that has stood him well so far. The omens perhaps don't augur well for the future. For one thing his memoirs, some of is peers and many politicians argue, are full of untruths or half-truths, all, of course, to build the myth of Musharraf, the invincible soldier, the infallible leader who sees himself, as most military dictators do, as his country's leader in perpetuity. His ambivalance may be seen by some as a virtue but even friends are now asking for the real Musharraf to stand up. He has survived seven years already by trying to be Mr Everyman, one whose sole stated purpose in life is to build a strong, self-reliant Pakistan.

Many suspect him though of being no more than an individual who will sacrifice anyone and everything to stay where he has implanted himself via a coup. Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan Khatak, Musharraf's senior, who was bypassed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, appointing Musharraf instead as the Chief of Army Staff, has refuted most of the claims made by Pervez Musharraf in his memoir.

Gen. Kuli Khan, the last I saw of him was as a Corps Commander, much respected by his colleagues and men serving under him, has denied that he had suggested a military takeover a year before it occurred in 1999. He says he never made a case for military rule in 1998 when the army, according to him a had a ‘‘confrontation’’ with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. He had only pleaded for firm and fair dealings in all situations. He goes on to say that he advised then Army Chief, Gen Jehangir Karamat not to step down, but at no time had he suggested a coup to topple the civilian Government.

It was Musharraf who achieved the impossible-of course, only after having got himself appointed the Army Chief, superseding his seniors. Gen Kuli Khan sounds very hurt when he mentions the untruths listed in the memoirs. A course mate of Musharraf's at the Pakistan Military Academy, he says, the President was never in the shortlist of four Pakistani cadets selected for the top British military academy at Sandhurst, as Musharraf claims in his book, nor was he in the top ten of that particular course. He was placed 11th in the order of merit. You might dismiss the Kuli Khan revelation as mere quibbing but in professional armies as in the civil services of both India and Pakistan batch and rank command a lot of respect.

Gen Kuli Khan takes a dim view of the laudatory account Musharraf gives of his brainchild, the Kargil operation. ‘‘It is fairly obvious that the Kargil Operations were not conceived in their totality, with the result that apart from bringing ignominy to Pakistan, it also caused unnecessary misery to a lot of innocent people’’. ‘‘I regret to say that the conception and planning at the highest level had been poor, in fact so poor that the only word which can adequately describe it is unprofessional, ’’ Gen Kuli says. This to my mind is an improvement on the account of the Kargil misadventure given by Sartaj Aziz who was Nawaz Sharif's Foreign Minister then.

Even Musharraf himself does not seem to be clear in his mind about the seriousness of Pakistani Army's involvement in the conduct of the Kargil operation. When it occurred, the General had conveniently managed to make a trip to Beijing, having given the finishing touches to the operation and seen some of it already in operation. That was the time when the General would not admit any kind of Army involvement in the operation. It was the ‘‘mujahideen’’ who had captured the impassable snowbound peaks during the preceding months, built bunkers, stockpiled ammunition et al.

It was only after the operation had failed and only after the families of the officers and soldiers killed in the operation asked for details about their missing loved ones that some casualties were admitted by the General. Ironically the English version of his memoirs is silent on the number of Pakistani soldiers killed in the operation. The Hindi version ‘‘Agnipath’’ puts the toll 357-157 killed in conflict and 250 wounded. The official record, though, quotes the casualties at over 735, mostly from the Northern Light Infantry.