Sino - Indian relation

By V.N. Paranjape

The most inappropriate and out of turn interview of the Chinese ambassador, Sun Yuxi's reiterating his country's claim over Arunachal Pradesh has drawn an angry response from the government of India, and the Minister for External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee, rebutted the claim saying "Arunachal belongs to us." Mr. Yuxi merely reiterated a known position of his Government, the timing of his statement has come as a surprise to many. There were fears that the statement would affect the atmosphere of President Hu Jintao's three day visit to India beginning November 20. Sensing the Indian mood, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made an attempt to lower the temperature over the deliberate statement of ambassador Sun Yuxi.

There has been spate of visits by high dignitaries for betterment of Sino-Indian relations, which had soured after October 1962. At present, two commissions are working to settle the boundary dispute, promote business relations and evolve a common strategy to promote peace in Southeast Asia. China claims one-third of Ladakh as its territory on the ground that it does not subscribe to the 1915 Shimla Agreement, which was signed by the then Dalai Lama under duress by the then ruling British Government. In Ladakh Indian-Chinese armies face each other, and new roads are being built to provide logistics by both sides. Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by China in totality. In this sector also both the armies face each other, and hectic activities are going on to strengthen defence positions by the Chinese.

The agreement was that the existing Line of Actual Control (LAC) should be maintained, on both sides and avoid building new roads and helipads, leaving space of 80-km. But Chinese have not honoured this commitment and have built roads and helipads just close to the LAC. This has alarmed Indian defence forces.

Chinese have shown only one concession - removing Sikkim as Chinese territory in its atlas.

Though there have been no border skirmishes between the two armies after 1988, but it is not a peaceful border. Both the armies remain on high alert. Chinese have built roads from the borders to Tibet mainland. According to intelligence sources China has stationed half a million troops in Tibet, 26 squadron of air force and 86 batteries of medium and long range nuclear capable missiles targeting all major Indian cities, including Delhi.

India has also deployed one-third of a million troops along the LAC. It also has built strategic air bases in Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Himachal Pradesh and J&K. All along the border missiles have been deployed capable of hitting targets in Tibet and Xianjiang province.

Except bonhomie when leaders from two countries meet, there is little change in ground realities in relations between the two countries. None of the outstanding irritants like the border dispute or the Chinese tilt towards Pakistan has been either addressed properly or attempts have been made to find an agreed solution. While the identification of the precise alignment of the long border, to say nothing of its demarcation on the ground, would take considerable time, the 'Protocols on Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas' seeks to ensure that nothing happens in the interim to create tension along the border. This is something like old wine in a new bottle. With India having already recognised Tibet as an integral part of China and the latter vice versa in respect of Sikkim, is of not much significance.

In regard to the settlement of the 4,700-km boundary dispute China had always asked for a package deal. The political document now calls for both sides to make meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments so as to arrive at a package settlement to the boundary question.

China's stand on India's membership of an expanded United Nations' Security Council, and with veto power remains at best ambiguous. Nor is there any indication that Beijing is going to turn its back on Islamabad. Neither China nor even the UPA's allies (particularly the CPM) at home seem to share the government's perception that there has been a "forward movement" in China's position on India's candidature for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. During his last visit to India the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao chose to remind New Delhi of his country's position that: "We fully understand and support India's aspirations to play a larger role in world affairs, including the UN," minus UNSC issue. Given the Chinese art of obfuscation, reading Wen's lips alone might not have been enough for New Delhi.

China has often cited the resolution of its border dispute with Russia, which paved the way for a strategic partnership, as a model India must follow. The new document on the "guiding principles and political parameters" is precisely the kind of formula the political leaderships of the two countries needed to move ahead in areas of complementary interest. Again stiff competition between the two Asian powers, both in economic and regional terms, has been seen as a major deterrent to a constructive partnership.

China has been in serious competition with India on the technology sector, hitherto trying to acquire the edge Indians have in software. Admittedly, the newly initiated strategic partnership is silent on contentions, like, Pakistan and the India-China rivalry on regional control. China will not abandon an old ally to please an emerging economic/strategic partner. However, the subcontinent's peace process obviates the need for India to keep the Pakistan phantom alive in India-China relations.

Although India is aware of the pitfalls of allowing the Americans excessive leverage in the subcontinent, it does not as yet want to veer towards an obvious anti-US strategic pole. It can ill-afford to ignore China's plans to manufacture a jointly designed fighter aircraft called the JF-17 with Pakistan, an announcement that came within days of India considering the purchase of F-16 and F-18 fighters from the US. While underlining that it has no issue with India's relationship with the US, Beijing has also cautioned that it should not be directed "against a third country." India remains wary of China's regional and global ambitions as also its game plan vis-a-vis India and Pakistan.

It is not only the Sino-Indian border which is keeping the two Asian giants apart, the Bhutan-China border problem is also causing concern to New Delhi. By 1950 treaty signed between India and Bhutan, the latter's defence and external relations are governed by India. The Chinese incursion had alarmed King Synge Wangchuk and he had rushed to Delhi last year for consultation. India had to move one mountain division along Bhutan-China border, which upset the Chinese leadership.

After all, two countries cannot be talking about a bilateral trade of $40-50 billion over the next decade in an atmosphere of suspicion. Chinese have shown inclination to seek help in the IT sector, oil exploration, but without any result.

Of course Chinese have asked India to loan English teachers. But in terms of trade turnover India is exporting only raw materials whereas China is dumping in Indian market finished products. Thus, China needs India more than India needs China.

It is a free trade dilemma with which India has to survive as a nation and maintain a working relationship with its Northern neighbour; but has to be on guard to defend its territorial integrity.

India and China though not fighting militarily for the present, but there is a palpable tension between the two countries due to lack of trust of each other's motive. The major irritants are boundary disputes and propping up Pakistan as a countervailing force against India. (INAV)