EDITORIAL
Love
or war?
Like every wise man Leo
Tolstoy too had believed that greed and lust led to
violence and evil. He had put love at the highest
pedestal: "Everything that I understand, I
understand only because I love." The opposite of
love can only be extreme dislike. By no stretch of
imagination can it be an outright killing. Tolstoy was
born in a different era. Yet, he had spoken an eternal
truth. If anything there has been further devaluation of
old healthy values and customs. Every aspect of human
existence is being redefined. Yet, we must be grateful to
sages and the heavens for ensuring some sort of
continuity in this country. People still do cherish
family life and nature. That is why one comes across the
Hindi movies like "Diljale" and
"Yahaan". One may cite a couple of more
films and enough of literature in this genre. Suffice it
to say for the moment that . ......more
Never
too late
For us in this State the
concept of civil defence is nothing new. In 1962 it was
heartening to see young persons undergoing training at
various camps in this city to meet any eventuality
arising out of the Chinese invasion. The practice was
further strengthened following the Pakistani attack in
1965. These two assaults had truly stirred the nation
into alertness as possibly no other event had done after
1947. Not surprisingly, therefore, the civil defence
organisation acquired a formal structure in the years
that followed. Parliament enacted the Civil Defence
legislation in 1968. The Act further improved and
strengthened the policy which till the Chinese betrayal
was confined to making states and union territories
conscious of the need of civil protection measures and
asking them to keep .........more
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Security
meltdown
By John P Holdren
As a result
of existing arms control reduction commitments,
approximately 80 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium is
expected to become surplus in the United States - and a
similar or larger amount in Russia - over the next 10-
years. It is crucial that this surplus weapons plutonium
be managed in a way that minimises the danger that it
will be re-used for .. ...more
Ulfa
militants after truce
By Subhashis Mittra
After a brief lull, the
guns have begun to boom in Assam. In a grim reminder of
the bloody past, ULFA militants have once again unleashed
violence. Days of encounters and killings are back with
the militants attacking a police patrol which came close
on the heels of the killing of a tea plantation manager
after a failed extortion attempt. The militants have
blown up a natural gas pipeline belonging to state-owned
oil exploration company... .......more
Iraqi
chernobyl
By M.A. Ansari
Whether a
country supported the US war in Iraq or opposed, it seems
to be of little significance for the country that has now
erupted in both anger and jubilation following the death
sentence to the deposed President Saddam Hussein. If the
60 per cent Shiite population is in celebration mood, the
remaining 40 per cent's hatred is directed against all
foreigners. The Arab world is equally divided some having
sympathy for Saddam while others expressing their hatred
for the man . ......more
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EDITORIAL
Love or war?
Like every wise man Leo
Tolstoy too had believed that greed and lust led to
violence and evil. He had put love at the highest
pedestal: "Everything that I understand, I
understand only because I love." The opposite of
love can only be extreme dislike. By no stretch of
imagination can it be an outright killing. Tolstoy was
born in a different era. Yet, he had spoken an eternal
truth. If anything there has been further devaluation of
old healthy values and customs. Every aspect of human
existence is being redefined. Yet, we must be grateful to
sages and the heavens for ensuring some sort of
continuity in this country. People still do cherish
family life and nature. That is why one comes across the
Hindi movies like "Diljale" and
"Yahaan". One may cite a couple of more
films and enough of literature in this genre. Suffice it
to say for the moment that those holding guns in their
hands can melt. There is enough space for genuine
affection. After all the living beings do have a heart.
We have seen many local militants giving up guns. One
major faction of the Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF) has abandoned the arms struggle. Till evidence to
the contrary is available one will believe that it has
struck to its principle of pursuing a peaceful course.
One is also aware that a section of Hizbul Mujahideen
(HM) has been craving for peace. It has also made its
stance known at a considerable risk and suffering. How
and why it has not succeeded so far does not need any
elaboration. It is only too well known that another wing
of this "homespun" militant organisation is in
the grip of Pakistan. Like a frog in the well of its own
making it is making noises not compatible with moral and
religious ethics it claims to practise. It is possible
that it has Pakistani agents functioning in its name.
One will like to find out
how Syed Salahuddins (should one say Moulvi Yusuf Shahs?)
of the HM react to the report that the "love"
of a member of their outfit for a girl has led to the
liquidation of four members of the latter's family. The
available information says that the militants had barged
into a house near Gool in Udhampur district of this
region. They had tried to kidnap a daughter of the family
to force her marriage with a HM member only to face a
stiff resistance from parents, the concerned girl and her
cousin sister. The militants opened fire snuffing lives
out of all four of them on the spot. Who is responsible
for such heinous act? What is the fault of the girl and
her parents who have been done away with? Is this the way
to send a wedding proposal?
One must condemn this
brutal incident with all the force at one's command. Such
madness can't be condoned. It is insane for one human
being to slay another. In this case it is mass murder. A
routine clarification from the HM will not satisfy
anyone. Its leadership has besmirched its reputation.
Often it has allowed Pakistan to find justification for
its machinations in its name. It is high time it realised
the difference between love and lack of it.
Never too late
For us in this State the
concept of civil defence is nothing new. In 1962 it was
heartening to see young persons undergoing training at
various camps in this city to meet any eventuality
arising out of the Chinese invasion. The practice was
further strengthened following the Pakistani attack in
1965. These two assaults had truly stirred the nation
into alertness as possibly no other event had done after
1947. Not surprisingly, therefore, the civil defence
organisation acquired a formal structure in the years
that followed. Parliament enacted the Civil Defence
legislation in 1968. The Act further improved and
strengthened the policy which till the Chinese betrayal
was confined to making states and union territories
conscious of the need of civil protection measures and
asking them to keep ready paper plans for major cities
and towns under the then Emergency Relief Organisation
(ERO) Scheme. It is mainly a voluntary exercise with only
a small nucleus of paid staff of trainers and experts.
They are called upon to play their part not only during
wars but also in natural calamities. Although the Civil
Defence Act is applicable to the entire country the basic
infrastructure is specifically raised in such areas and
towns which are considered tactically and strategically
vulnerable especially to enemy attacks. With the
emergence of new threats a system of proper training has
been introduced. At the same time, various other wings of
the governmental apparatus have been equipped with the
latest gear and technology. This has been done to keep
pace with the times. Terrorism has brought in fresh
turmoil. It has added a new dimension of internal danger
to external risks that linger on. The Army, para-military
forces, police and intelligence agencies have been
suitably geared up to overcome the menace. However, they
can't function in top shape without the active
cooperation and participation of citizens at large. For
their part the people are also expected to respond in
equal measure. A silver lining is that not all of them
are in distress at all times.
Viewed in this backdrop it
seems a little odd that private security guards and
detective networks have yet to make desired contribution
in this behalf. It is perhaps because they mostly deal
with people agitated over their personal and professional
problems. These instrumentalities can be an excellence
source of information. Key functionaries admit that a
basic flaw in the present dispensation is difficulty in
gathering "timely" and "actionable"
intelligence. That is where they can step in to lend a
helping hand. Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil has put
the matter in correct perspective: "We need to know
when something is going to happen and where it is going
to happen. It is only intelligence that can help and in
this context the services of private detectives and
security agencies will be useful." He has given a
fair indication that the Central Government is planning
to rope in them. There are about 50 lakh private security
guards across the country including in this State. A
readymade advantage in involving them is that most of
them are former military personnel. Their working is
regulated by the law but not of that of the hidden
private eyes. Once the Government makes up its mind it
should be possible to tie loose ends.
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Security
meltdown
By John P
Holdren
As a result of
existing arms control reduction
commitments, approximately 80
metric tons of weapon-grade
plutonium is expected to become
surplus in the United States -
and a similar or larger amount in
Russia - over the next 10- years.
It is crucial that this surplus
weapons plutonium be managed in a
way that minimises the danger
that it will be re-used for
weapons by the initial possessor
nation, another nation, or a
sub-national group; strengthens
national and international
institutions and incentives for
control and reduction of nuclear
weapons; does not lead to
increased accessibility of
civilian plutonium for weapons
use; and meets reasonable
standards for safety, health, the
environment, and cost.
Although nuclear
weapons may contain either highly
enriched uranium (HEU) or
plutonium or both, and although
stocks of either represent a
danger of re-incorporation into
nuclear weapons by the original
possessor nation or by others,
plutonium poses a much more
difficult security problem than
does HEU. HEU can be easily
diluted with natural uranium to a
form unusable for bombs.
Recovering bomb-usable fissile
material from diluted HEU
requires technologically
demanding and costly isotopic
separation. In contrast,
plutonium offers no such
possibility of isotopic
"denaturing".
Diluted HEU has
substantial economic value as
fuel for civilian nuclear
reactors, whereas reactor fuel
made from plutonium is not
economically competitive today -
and is not likely to become so
soon. Society is not going to
"make money" on the
disposition of weapons plutonium.
While public
interest and concern has tended
to focus on the ultimate fate of
the plutonium from dismantled
weapons, greater attention must
be paid to three earlier phases
of the management of this
plutonium, on which near-term and
middle-term security against
misuse of the material critically
depend. The first three phases
are:
Establishment of a
reciprocal regime of monitored
net reductions in the stockpiles
of nuclear explosive material.
Such a regime would include the
clarification and verification of
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
of all nuclear explosive
materials in the US and Russia;
an agreement to halt the further
production of nuclear-explosive
materials for weapons; and an
agreement on bilateral (and as
soon as possible, international)
monitoring of warhead
dismantlement and warhead
assembly, if the latter activity
is resumed.
Agreement on the
methods and the locations of
secure interim storage of the
nuclear-explosive material from
dismantled nuclear weapons. Such
interim storage is necessary no
matter what the ultimate fate of
the plutonium might be, because
none of the options for making it
much less accessible for weapons
use could begin to make a
significant dent in the
stockpiles in less than a decade.
International monitoring would
insure that the inventories in
storage could be withdrawn only
for non-weapons purposes.
Superseding interim
storage as quickly as possible
with measures to minimise the
accessibility of the plutonium
for re-use in weapons by the
imposition of substantial
radiological, chemical and
logistic barriers. That would not
only improve security against
such re-use but also send a
reassuring political signal about
the intentions of the US and
Russia with respect to this
material. The steps in phase one
are essential to establish clear,
mutually understood baselines
from which the reductions
proceed, as well as to provide
assurance to the two countries
and the rest of the world that
the reductions are indeed real,
not offset by the production of
new warheads or by shuffling
material between counted and
uncounted categories.
The measures in
phase two are vital to this
regime of reassurance about the
commitment of the US and Russia
to remove this material from
weapons use. These measures are
also urgently needed to minimise
the danger - which seems to be
especially acute in Russia - that
plutonium or HEU could be stolen
for weapons use.
As for phase three,
the most sensible aim is to
render weapons plutonium
approximately as inaccessible for
weapons use as civilian-reactor
plutonium in spent fuel - a
target dubbed as "spent fuel
standard".
Today three are some
800 metric tonnes of civilian
plutonium in spent fuel around
the world, and the total is
growing at a rage of about 70
tonnes per year. Putting the
weapons plutonium into a similar
form would considerably reduce
the danger of its being
reincorporated into weapons.
The security risks
of plutonium in spent fuel,
however, are not zero. And this
is so whether the plutonium is of
military or civilian origin. Even
civilian plutonium can be used -
if separated from the spent fuel
by reprocessing - to make nuclear
weapons.
Although civilian
plutonium has some disadvantages
for this purpose compared to
weapon-grade plutonium,
terrorists could make crude but
devastating bombs from it, and
sophisticated weaponeers could
make even more destructive bombs.
The most important
protection against weapons use of
the civilian plutonium now
embedded in spent fuel comes not
from the plutonium's different
isotopic composition compared to
weapons plutonium, but from the
bulk and the intense
radioactivity of the spent fuel,
thus making it difficult and
dangerous to steal. Equally
important, civilian plutonium
requires great chemical and
engineering sophistication to
separate the plutonium from the
fission products and the uranium
while avoiding lethal radiation
doses to the people doing it.
So while it is
worthwhile and not too difficult
to provide these same forms and
degrees of protection to weapons
plutonium - one must be attentive
to two crucial caveats:
The security risks
associated with civilian
plutonium that has been separated
from spent fuel by reprocessing,
but not yet loaded into reactors,
are not greatly smaller than
those of separated weapons
plutonium. If it is important to
protect the latter - and it
certainly is - it is also
important to protect the former
with comparable diligence.
For similar reasons,
it is not worthwhile to invest
significant resources or suffer
significant delays in an attempt
to make weapons plutonium less
accessible than civilian-reactor
plutonium in spent fuel, unless
and until society is prepared to
reduce further the accessibility
of civilian plutonium, too. After
all, once the weapons plutonium
has been brought to the spent
fuel standard, the residual
security risk will reside more in
the large quantity of civilian
plutonium in spent fuel than in
the smaller quantity of weapons
plutonium in the same form.
There are two
leading candidate approaches for
reducing the accessibility of
weapons plutonium. One is to
fabricate the weapons plutonium
into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel to be
used in a small number of
commercial light-water reactors
in the US and Russia, or in
heavy-water-moderated CANDU
reactors in Canada.
The other
leading-candidate approach is to
mix the weapons plutonium with
already reprocessed high-level
radioactive waste when this waste
is vitrified into glass logs to
stabilise it for long-term
disposal, a process scheduled to
begin at the Savannah River
nuclear site (USA) in a few
years.
In either of these
approaches, the end result would
be the dilution and the
contamination of the weapons
plutonium with a radioactive
waste form that will exist in any
event. In both cases, the
plutonium's ultimate destination
would be geologic repositories.
Both approaches for
converting weapon-grade plutonium
to the spent fuel standard are
likely to cost $1-5 billion for
processing 50 tons of weapons
plutonium.
A study by the US
National Academy of Sciences'
Committee on International
Security and Arms Control (CISAC)
recommended against developing
and deploying advanced types of
nuclear reactors for the
disposition of weapons plutonium,
mainly because existing reactor
types can bring the weapons
plutonium, mainly because
existing reactor types can bring
the weapons plutonium to the
spent fuel standard more quickly,
surely, and cheaply than
yet-to-be-demonstrated advanced
reactors. Speed in imposing the
spent fuel standard level of
protection is essential to
minimising the security dangers.
Because plutonium in
spent fuel, whether weapons or
civilian in origin, does entail a
non-zero risk of eventual weapons
use, the CISAC study recommended
continuing consideration of
further institutional as well as
technological measures to reduce
these risks for all such
plutonium, irrespective of
origin.
Improved
institutional measures are
possible in the near term,
including, for example, the
extension and the strengthening
of IAEA safeguards. Technological
approaches for reducing the
quantities and accessibility of
plutonium associated with
nuclear-power generation are
possible in the longer term - and
they might well involve the use
of advanced reactors.
But which of such
approaches to use - and when -
can be sensibly addressed only in
the context of society's overall
nuclear and non-nuclear energy
strategy. INAV
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Ulfa
militants after truce
By
Subhashis Mittra
After
a brief lull, the guns
have begun to boom in
Assam. In a grim reminder
of the bloody past, ULFA
militants have once again
unleashed violence. Days
of encounters and
killings are back with
the militants attacking a
police patrol which came
close on the heels of the
killing of a tea
plantation manager after
a failed extortion
attempt. The militants
have blown up a natural
gas pipeline belonging to
state-owned oil
exploration company Oil
India Ltd. Both incidents
took place in Dibrugarh
district. The rebels
carried out a grenade
explosion at a busy
marketplace in Tinsukia
town while in Digboi oil
township seven persons,
including two
para-military troopers
were injured in another
blast. In their latest
attack on October two, a
boy was killed and 20
people wounded in a
grenade attack at a Durga
Puja pandal in Dhemaji
town.
The
recent turn of events in
Assam has a grim
foreboding for the entire
north eastern region,
which could be in for
another bout of turmoil.
The immediate provocation
is the Government calling
of its six-week truce
with the ULFA on
September 24 and the army
resuming its operations
against the rebels who
squandered yet another
opportunity to work
through the democratic
mainstream and chose to
continue on its path of
terror and extortion.
The
ground rules that the
Centre had set forth for
direct talks to take
place appeared to be as
fair and reasonable as
possible that ULFA should
give the Government a
written communication on
direct talks, set a
time-frame for the
process and name in
advance its leaders for
the dialogue. But the
ULFA kept harping on
release of five of its
jailed leaders as a
precondition. To the
Government's credit, it
repeatedly indicated that
it was not averse to
releasing them. This
rigid stand of the ULFA
makes one believe that
the banned group is
hardly serious about
talking with the
Government and looking
for a solution . It is as
if ULFA does not care for
its credibility as a
possible partner in
peace.
That
the ULFA issue has been
receiving the attention
of the Government at the
highest level became
clear when Prime Minister
Dr Manmohan Singh while
referring to the matter
said at a press
conference that certain
pre-conditions had to be
met to make the dialogue
fruitful. Dr Singh
pointed to the role of
elements based abroad, as
opposed to those who
remain in the country, in
prolonging conflict. The
Government should, as
such, intensify its
efforts to halt the
support that the ULFA is
evidently getting from
across India's borders.
At the same time the
Centre should outflank an
organization that has
proved once again to be
non-serious in trying to
find a solution through a
democratic dialogue and
seems to bent on
violence.
ULFA
is one of the most
powerful of nearly a
dozen separatist groups
fighting Indian security
forces in the north-east
and more than 10,000
people have died in the
rebel fight for
independence during the
nearly 25 years of
insurgency. While most of
its top leadership
reportedly operate from
unspecified locations in
Bangladesh, its links
have been established
with Pakistan's ISI and
Afghan Mujahideen. At the
Home Secretary level
talks between India and
Myanmar in September this
year, discussions were
held on a wide range of
issues, including the
strategy to be adopted to
flush out insurgents
based in the neighbouring
country. New Delhi is
upset as Myanmar has
given refuge to cadres
belonging to other
militant outfits in the
Northeastern region like
ULFA and People's
Liberation Army (PLA).
Intelligence
sources said the NSCN
(Khaplang), which is
opposed to peace talks
being carried on between
the NSCN (Isak-Muivah)
and the Centre, has begun
preparations to face a
full-scale army offensive
in Myanmar from where it
operates. In the past,
operations by the
Myanmarese army left 20
cadres dead in 2000 and
another 20 last March.
It
is encouraging to note
that both India and
Myanmar have decided to
jointly address issues
relating to security,
drug trafficking and
effective border
management. The agreement
on sharing of real time
intelligence on a
sustained basis to tackle
cross border militancy
will certainly help in
curbing the movement of
militants, gun running
and drug trafficking.
While heroin is smuggled
into India, precursor
chemicals needed for
producing stimulative
drugs like Ecstasy are
exported to Myanmar.
According
to a Government estimate,
around 15 camps have been
set up by the
northeast-based
insurgents in Myanmar,
which has 1,643 km porous
border with India
facilitating criminal
activities and movement
of militants. The Union
Home Ministry feels there
is a need for a crackdown
on the insurgents similar
to 2003 Bhutan army
operation against ULFA
whose militants take
advantage of the unmarked
boundaries running
through rugged
mountainous terrains.
The
ULFA was formed on April
7, 1979 by Bhimakanta
Buragohain, Rajiv
Rajkonwar alias Arabinda
Rajkhowa, Golap Baruah
alias Anup Chetia,
Samiran Gogoi alias
Pradip Gogoi, Bhadreshwar
Gohain and Paresh Baruah
to establish a
"sovereign socialist
Assam" through an
armed struggle. Arabinda
Rajkhowa is the
'Chairman' of ULFA, which
has a clearly partitioned
political and military
wing. Paresh Barua heads
the military wing as the
outfit's
'commander-in-chief'.
Following the military
operations in Bhutan in
December 2003, most of
its top leadership
reportedly operate from
unspecified locations in
Bangladesh. According to
reports, ULFA is in the
process of relocating its
camps in Myanmar, Mon
district of Nagaland,
Garo hills of Meghalaya
and Tirap and Changland
districts of Arunachal
Pradesh.
The
ULFA sought shelter in
the forests on the
Indo-Bhutan border from
the early 1990s and
established several camps
in the forest areas of
southern Bhutan. In 1986,
ULFA first established
contacts with the then
unified National
Socialist Council of
Nagaland (NSCN) and the
Kachin Independence Army
(KIA) of Myanmar of
training and arms.
ULFA
linked up with the
Kachins through the 'good
offices' of the Naga
rebels to learn the
rudiments of insurgent
tactics. Subsequently,
links were established
with Pakistan's Inter
Services Intelligence
(ISI) and the Afghan
Mujahideen. Reports
indicate that the at
least 200 ULFA activists
received training in
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Seized documents and
interrogation of some
arrested activists
revealed that the Defence
Forces Intelligence (DFI)
of Bangladesh had also
trained ULFA cadres in
the Sylhet district. ULFA
also has a number of
camps in Bangladesh.
The
ISI also 'introduced'
ULFA to LTTE tranporters
who, for a fee, undertook
to transport arms from
southeast Asia into
Myanmar. A close nexus
between ULFA and the
Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam had also been
reported . The LTTE is
reported to have trained
various ULFA cadres in
explosives handling.
(PTI
Feature)
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Iraqi
chernobyl
By M.A.
Ansari
Whether a country
supported the US war in Iraq or
opposed, it seems to be of little
significance for the country that
has now erupted in both anger and
jubilation following the death
sentence to the deposed President
Saddam Hussein. If the 60 per
cent Shiite population is in
celebration mood, the remaining
40 per cent's hatred is directed
against all foreigners. The Arab
world is equally divided some
having sympathy for Saddam while
others expressing their hatred
for the man whom they described
as a "despot" or
"dictator", who was
blood thirsty. However, the death
sentence in itself is not the end
story either for Iraq, USA or the
Arab world. If Saddam Hussein is
hanged, his ghost will stalk Iraq
and the Arab world for years to
come.
The US intervention
in Iraq was in itself a political
Chernobyl, the fallout of which
cannot be controlled by anyone,
not least the coalition forces.
Like circles on water, or to be
precise blood, it is ominously
expanding. The United States as
the occupying power is failing to
fulfil its obligations set out in
UN Security Council resolution
1483. The US forces besieged the
entire country using banned
bombs. The explosions even
destroyed mosques' domes. In
short, in the language of
international documents, we
witnessed a disproportionate use
of force. The Iraqi tragedy
showed how international law was
being ripped apart. The strong
were recklessly destroying and
punishing the weak. The strong
cannot be justified, but they can
be understood. The Americans made
a gross mistake when they closed
a leading Shiite newspaper, which
they considered to be
oppositionist, and arrested a
close associate of the radical
Shiite cleric, Maktad al-Sadr. In
so doing, the occupying
authorities did exactly what they
should not have done - they
created a victim with their own
hands.
The consultants of
Paul Bremer, the US
administration head in Baghdad,
forgot to explain one thing to
their boss, i.e., that the
Shiites see their religion as one
of martyrdom and almost a cult of
the victim, the basis of which is
to take the holy fight to the
very end. As soon as great
martyrs appear, the majority of
the Shiite population will
consolidate around them.
In 2004, the
moderate politician Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani led the Shiites. He
was ready to conduct talks with
the occupying forces about
adopting a constitution and the
provisional government, which
should receive power on 30 June.
Today, the Americans
are making the Iranian mistake.
They have started with
repression. They are trying to
deal with the idea of martyrdom
with force, i.e., by throwing
fuel on the fire. In an attempt
to conceal his confusion,
Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld
has announced that the US will
not back down and is preparing to
send another expeditionary force
to Iraq. Accordingly, an entirely
new front has opened up in Iraq:
the Shiite-Sunni revolt against
the occupiers, inspired by
revenge for what their believers
see as a victim. In his time, Che
Guevara called on
anti-imperialists to give the
United States "two, three
and many Vietnams".
The prophecy of the
revolutionary, it seems, has come
true. The American generals in
Iraq now have to face two, three
and many armies. And these
fighters are led by an army of
foreign Islamists and terrorists,
who sweep up everyone else behind
them and dream of disrupting the
handover of power. For in this
case, the US would sooner or
later leave Iraq, maintaining the
vestiges of honour, or at the
very least without any obvious
disgrace. However, the Islamic
radicals need something
completely different: they need
to rout and shame American and
Iraqi soil.
The results of the
Iraqi Chernobyl cannot be found
in figures - 3,000 coalition
soldiers and 1,20,000 Iraqis dead
- but in more general categories.
Conclusion number one: The United
States has not succeeded in
implementing the Roman principle
of divide and rule. The Shiites
have united with their religious
opponents - the Sunnis - and
formed a united front against the
occupying forces.
Conclusion number
two: the USA has fallen into the
Iraqi trap. The US forces cannot
leave Iraq, as this would be
tantamount to a death sentence
for the neo-conservative wing in
George Bush's team, which is the
faction that pushed the president
to pursue the violent
"democratisation" of
the Middle East. On the other
hand, any move to send more US
contingents of troops to Iraq,
which is being increasingly
actively advocated in Washington,
would leave the US merely digging
a deeper hole for itself.
Conclusion number
three: Iraq is now in danger of
breaking up. In the wake of
Desert Storm, George Bush Sr.
decided against moving on Baghdad
because it meant risking the
country's disintegration. Did his
reckless son take this lesson on
board?
The coming days will
be decisive for how the situation
in Iraq develops. The main
dilemma is the following: will
the Americans insist on pursuing
their hard-armed tactics of
crushing the opposition,
developing military units in line
with the Vietnam scenario or will
they open a dialogue with the
very same opposition? Much
depends on the will of the
international community.
India has mooted the
idea of calling an international
conference on Iraq featuring all
the influential Iraqi leaders,
including opposition
representatives, and under the
aegis of the UN as soon as
possible. The leaders of the
ethnic communities from
neighbouring countries - Shiites,
Sunnis and Kurds - should also be
invited.
The conference's
main subject should be
international law. The forum
would have to confirm a scenario
to hand over power to a
legitimate, representative
government of Iraq. The final
date for elections will have to
be set, too. However, if Saddam
Hussein is hanged the Iraqi
Chernobyl will remain
unextinguished. INAV
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