Terror and terrorists still exist

From Arun Nehru

The terror attack on Ayodhya is repulsed and the terrorists are killed and we were 'lucky'. Internal security systems cannot be entirely dependant on 'luck' and clearly the ease with which the miscreants cleared the outer defense show that much has to be done on our systems and this was a 'warning' that we cannot take things for granted. Terror and terrorists still exist be it in J&K, the North East or from our porous borders with Bangla Desh and Nepal and whether it is India or the UK where tragic events result in many deaths we cannot forget the immediate past and we have to plan for the future. Things are better after 9/11 and many Western nations which gave political sanctuary to alleged terrorists and their associates on grounds of political harassment no longer adopt a 'liberal' attitude and in many cases these very countries face terrorist acts from these 'refugees'! We are trying to normalize relations with Pakistan and this will continue but it will be naïve if we think that the terror camps and the terrorists created over decades will 'melt away' or listen to their former masters in changed political circumstances. All clandestine arrangements create strong vested interests and these can and do operate independently. Saddam Hussain was armed to the teeth by the West against Iran and Bin Laden was a freedom fighter against the Soviets but look at the turn of events as friends become enemies [works the other way also]. We in India have experience of the LTTE and Sri Lanka and clearly before 'extreme' groups or individuals are used for internal politics or external reasons a great deal of political deliberation is necessary. We can dismiss much of this to the 'Cold war' syndrome but today twenty years after the change terrorism continues to thrive as 'fresh' pressure points develop. The war in Iraq continues with huge loss of human lives and things in Afghanistan are far from settled and clearly India is very much on the 'terror map' of extreme leaders. We are always wiser by hindsight and I think it is in everyone's interest that 'instant' results are achieved with global pressure to isolate the instruments of terror and clearly 'isolation and speedy extradition' are a key to success.

Politics continues and we see a 'new' relationship pattern evolving with the Left and the Congress and besides the BHEL issue there will be matters pertaining to foreign policy and these by itself will generate their own pressure points. The Left clearly make the Third Front a alternative to the Congress from a 'possibility' status and displace the NDA/BJP who are pushed into third place and as Assembly elections unfold during 2006/07 many allies of both the Congress/BJP will gravitate towards the Third Front where their state interests are protected with a share of power at the Center. There are conflicts between the SP/BSP in UP and the SP/RJD [ Mulayam Singh/Lalu Yadav] but politics is the art of the 'possible' and 'numbers' drive ideology and political stances. The Congress to blunt the Third front have to secure a 'safe' base in UP/Bihar but this is not working out at the moment. The revival of the Babri Masjid case against LK Advani and others will help revive the BJP in UP and clearly the Congress is not learning from the past experience in this matter. The interesting thing to watch is that as the Left confront the Congress on economic issues the allies in the UPA [DMK/MDMK/TRS/NCP/JMM/RJD] side with the Left. PM Manmohan Singh along with the Economic team will come under intense pressure as 'reforms' are necessary but cannot ensure success at the 'ballot' box as the gains from the reform process are 'restrictive' to the upper and middle classes.

Inflation induced by the oil prices continues to hurt the weaker sections as prices of almost all items of daily consumption rise and better awareness increases the need for basic material objects.

The BJP spring to action after its very survival has been threatened by indiscreet remarks and interviews given by the RSS Chief who seems to be quite unaware of the ground political realities and I think the 'voting' public may well need a few months of consistency and action to feel that the party is functioning as a 'independent' political entity. Former PM Atal ji and the other BJP leaders come to the rescue of the party as they rally around the 'wounded' BJP President LK Advani but it took many months for all this to happen! The party has clearly lost the political momentum and decisive action is necessary to get the public confidence. Compromise and faceless leaders in the center and the states are no solution and affairs in UP are in a complete mess as the party faces 'extinction' over two election and clearly the BJP have to give the political charge to either Rajnath Singh or Kalyan Singh to move the party forward. Things in MP are no better and the Congress can well gain the initiative and record huge gains. The CM may be a good man and accommodate all political groups but survival rather than governance seems to be the pattern and this can be a disaster and clearly a 'change' is necessary to reverse the trend. Months of bickering and internal fights have weakened the party and unless the BJP President has decisive powers and ability to act with confidence the party will shrink. Dual power controls cannot work and as the Third front gains momentum the BJP will loose 'allies' and key political workers. The immediate test will be in Bihar and the JD[U] is clearly going to take little direction or interference from the ideology of the RSS/VHP and the BJP will be well advised to let the JD[U] lead the charge and make suitable adjustments in ticket allocations. The JD[U]/SP come closer and the RJD/LJP/

Congress have much to do in the next two months as 'election season' begins and a disaster in Bihar on either side can trigger many a change for the future.

IAF in its own planning trap

By Uday Shankar Bajpai

How the air force was blessed with a multibillion-dollar Su 30 aircraft programme for which no air staff requirement apparently existed has intrigued security observers. More so when its plea for a more modest advanced jet trainer had been languishing in ministerial files for some 12 years at the time. Recent articles in the media and more specifically the Justice Phukan commission report, while throwing welcome light on the subject, raise some issues of concern.

During the 1993 air show, the then air chief publicly stated that the Su 27 class of aircraft was irrelevant to India’s air doctrine. Yet by early 1995, the service was evaluating the Su 27. The short intervening period neither saw any change on the national security scene nor indeed was it adequate to evolve an air staff requirement for such a major weapon system. Clearly a conscious breach of institutionalised planning norms was resorted to, the reasons for which remain obscure.

We learn that on the eve of Russian elections in 1996, president Boris Yelstin asked the Indian prime minister to accept the Russian offer of Su 30 and make advance payments. He sought help as workers in the factory within his constituency had not been paid. Elections had been announced in India as well, and contrary to practiced wisdom, the cabinet approved release of $142.268 million to the Russian manufacturer. While such a major procurement decision by a lame-duck government may be termed an indiscretion, making payments in anticipation of a formal contract must certainly rank as a gross violation of financial regulations.

In pre-election posturing, the opposition in India made political noises and even met the president, but after some behind-the-scenes activity the matter subsided. There appears to have been a consensus that larger national interests justified such means. While this may well be true from a purely diplomatic perspective, one wonders whether damage to our own security institutions featured in the government’s calculations. Did the service leadership play its part by cautioning on the adverse impact of adopting a re-equipment methodology that violated the very essence of institutionalised military procurement? Did the service study what impact such an out-of-turn induction will have on its overall re-equipment plans? These questions become relevant in an environment where corruption in high places is no more an exception, where senior promotions in the armed forces are no more determined singularly on merit and a continuing systemic weakness within the armed forces headquarters remains that of planning decisions being command-oriented rather than collegiate.

This even raises serious concern about the cavalier approach to planning institutions built painstakingly over decades. Since the early Sixties, air headquarters have laid considerable stress on long-term planning. Early leaders recognised that the air force was both a technology and capital-intensive service with re-equipment planning requiring long lead times. Planners therefore needed to think of time horizons of twenty years or more.

The crucial process of air staff requirements formulation itself was one of evolution from bottom upwards with considerable interaction between all branches of staff - operational, planning, technical, financial and personnel - and involved external agencies like defence research and production, ensuring wide consultation and expertise. The process being progressive and collegiate would, in its life cycle, see frequent changes of personalities in various key positions, but its institutionalisation itself militated against non-professional course corrections.

An unwritten, but well understood, benefit of this institutionalised mechanism was that it shielded service leadership from undue external pressures. To those who may term such a fear as exaggerated, this writer can recall many such instances from the vantage point of both a mid-level planner and later as a deputy chief. It is to the credit of this institutionalised system that the air force was spared the trauma of getting mired in purchase scandals. That is, until the unholy saga of the Su 30.

Had the government chosen a contemporary aircraft in the light combat class (or even more of Mirage 2000, since they were already in service), this would have been in keeping with the air force’s long-term re-equipment needs. But opting for one of the heaviest fighters in the world with strategic reach makes light of the entire planning process. One has heard justifications that the Su 30 is a very good aircraft. This is true, but is it their case to say that we buy every good aircraft in the world, detached from our operational requirements and divorced from its cost of ownership implications? Indeed, the complex jigsaw that modern-day operational planning is, every weapons system, big or small, must integrate to provide a pre-planned composite operational capability.

A valuable lesson imbibed by air force planners at great cost from the Gnat aircraft was never to commit the service to a combat aircraft until it had been fully developed and evaluated. By evaluating a Su 27 in lieu of Su 30 weapons system, which did not exist, this lesson was ignored. Considering that during a joint IAF-CII seminar in February 1994, the air chief was extremely critical of the poor product-support from Russia, another casualty was product-support assurance over the system’s life cycle. This was compounded by common knowledge in international aviation circles (and by president Yeltisin’s request) that this company was in dire financial straits. Subsequent reports have implied contractual differences, delays and even claims that old components have been used. One wonders what were the pressures that led to such a huge gamble at service and national costs. Indeed one wonders which nation’s larger interests were better served?

Professional service leaderships are honour-bound to safeguard the services’ long-term operational interests and more particularly its institutions. In the early Nineties, the air force had no requirement for a fighter aircraft with strategic reach. Indeed, it was short of fighter pilots and had no known concepts to induct a new two-crew combat aircraft. Were crucial questions having a bearing on the overall long term re-equipment plans of the air force thought through? Were the strategic implications of inducting such a weapon system adequately debated within the services and the government? What changes necessitated such a reversal in its planning process and what roll-on effect would it have in all other areas of re-equipment? What would be the impact on the fighter pilot training requirements, leave alone on the fact that the AJT procurement would be further delayed (as subsequent events proved)? Were the budgetary implications of this project on future plans, including the MiG 21 replacement, made a factor in the decision? The most generous interpretation is that the government wanted the aircraft and the air force acquiesced.

Today the air force is short of its sanctioned combat aircraft force levels and wants to induct 126 new combat aircraft. It must perforce continue to support the indigenous LCA programme. News reports talk of serious gaps in air defence surveillance capability, itself a serious concern in the present nuclear environment. There are replacement needs like tactical transport aircraft, helicopters, air defence systems, space systems, unmanned vehicles and a host of other capabilities so essential for wielding air power effectively in the modern battlefield. Many capital-intensive programmes are ongoing and will need continued funding. Past budgetary allocations for air force capital schemes are inadequate to support even these ongoing schemes, leave alone meet the desire for more combat aircraft and other vital systems.

Now that we know that individual perceptions prevailed over institutional wisdom, it would appear that the air force finds itself into a planning trap of its own making. Those responsible for this sleight of hand have moved on and those in harness are left holding the baby! Modernisation of all the services has suffered greatly since the Bofors scandal erupted. On their part the services would do well to remember that indiscriminate modernisation is as detrimental to national security as is the lack of it. Merely striving for more may only result in unproductive modernisation. INAV

(The author is air commodore)