Export of democracy

By N. B. Menon

A group of senators in the US Congress have moved a resolution named "Advancing democratic values world over". Specifically, this draft contains a proposal to establish a special "Democratic movements department" within the State Department, which will monitor internal political situation in so-called "non-free countries".

One should not exclude that matters could finally run up to a "certification", i.e. splitting states into groups depending on to what extent their political system complies with American "democratic model". If a Government is undemocratic and violates human rights should be replaced by a compliant regime. The US government is not hesitant to spend millions of dollars on such projects to bring about regime changes world over; and some success has been achieved, particularly, in erstwhile Soviet Union ruled countries.

First, it was the "revolution of roses" in November 2003 when a reluctant President Edward Shevardnadze capitulated and handed over the Georgian presidency to the pro-West Mikhail Saakashvili. Then, a little over a year later, the "orange revolution" occurred in Ukraine ushering in one more pro-West president and government.

President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan was another victim of such an "export of democracy" by the West nicknamed the "velvet revolution". In the parliamentary elections on 27 February, pro-West candidates were elected to form a new government.

Just before the election President Akaev had emphasised on several occasions that he had no desire to allow the parliamentary election to be converted into a Kyrgyz version of the Georgian and Ukrainian "velvet revolutions". Earlier, he had likened the increasing trend of exporting democracy to the Bolshevik practice of exporting communism to countries.

In September last, he said in Moscow he thought that a further spread of the "rose revolution technique" was planned to weaken the Confederation of Independent States in order to wean its constituents away from the influence of the Russian Federation and last December he cautioned that the social and political situation would sharply deteriorate as a result of Parliamentary and Presidential elections (to be held in 2005). The only survivor of the change of regimes is president, Nursultan Nazarbayev.

The Central Asian Republics (CARs) are in great turmoil as the hydrocarbon rich region has become a great game between Americans, Russians, Chinese, and also India is in the run to acquire some foothold for its energy requirements. As most of the CARs have shifted towards American and Chinese monetary allurements for developmental reasons, Russian influence is on the decline as the former rulers cannot match the new entrants.

There is also revival of Islamic fundamentalism backed by West Asian countries, pouring funds to set up madarrsas, which will prove catastrophic for peace, stability of Russia, China and India, by and large, for world peace.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the Central Asian Republics proved axiomatic to both Russia and India and the two pulled out all stops in a bid to befriend them. As longstanding and dependable allies, Moscow and New Delhi had much to share during the tumultuous years pertaining to the face off between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. Although India professed to be a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement, its dependence on the Soviet Union and the successor state Russia, especially in the acquisition of military hardware, was undeniable and a source of strength to the Indian leadership.

The Socialist dispensation in Moscow from Leonid Brezshnev onwards considered India a staunch ally with both coming to each other’s succour during times of crisis. But as the Soviet Union disintegrated, both New Delhi and Moscow girded themselves to exploit the window of opportunity, which appeared as the CAR countries came into being. However, the supreme national interests of the two allies seem to have placed them on an uneasy path with conflicting interests, if not direct confrontation.

The Indian presence in the Tajik military affairs of Dushanbe is a case in point. The fact is that the government of Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmanov has been at loggerheads with Russian President Vladimir Putin on certain matters with a major bone of contention being the presence of other foreign powers in this erstwhile constituent of the Soviet Union under which it (Tajikistan) invariably played to the Russian tune. The emergence of the CAR countries has brought in its wake independence for them, that precious commodity which all of them are loathe giving up.

In the Russian context, matters are not helped as foreign countries; including the US, try to gain influence and access into the CAR countries with the leadership in Moscow infuriated at its pristine clout getting increasingly pared down. The friction between Dushanbe and Moscow increased after a leading Russian official passed a disparaging remark against the Tajiks, allegedly underlining that Moscow was "full of beggars and Tajiks." The outraged Tajiks vociferously protested and relations between the two countries seemed to reach a nadir. But President Putin seized the initiative aggressively and on October 17 2004 unfurled steps to consolidate Russia’s strategic hold on the CAR countries. Moscow unleashed a comprehensive plan for military and economic cooperation with Tajikistan.

The consequent agreement between Moscow and Dushanbe allowed Russian companies to gain controlling interests in key Tajik economic sectors. More significantly, the agreement permitted the Russians to have a permanent military base in Tajikistan. A look at the ground realities reveals that the Russians were determined to derive mileage from the fact that the Tajiks owed a $300 million debt to Russia. What eventually transpired was that President Putin did not balk at arm-twisting the Tajiks to make significant concessions in lieu of Dushanbe’s outstanding debt. The Russian President’s sense of urgency can be understood in the backdrop of the US military presence in Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan and NATO’s sabre-rattling moves in the region.

As underscored by the late national security advisor J N Dixit, Indo-Russian bilateral relations remain cordial but nevertheless they are subject to Moscow’s equations with the US and its NATO allies. Therefore, if New Delhi is reconciled to this realism, it certainly will have no qualms in fending for itself in the matter of its supreme national interests and go about building its relations with the CAR countries, its ties with Russia notwithstanding. But the trick is to ensure that Indo-Russian relations are neither destabilised nor deglamourised. They have their own importance but at the same time they cannot be obstacles to India’s relations with the Central Asian Republics.

The post-9/11 international scenario and Washington’s declaration of the global war against terrorism suit both New Delhi and Moscow fine, especially in the Central Asian theatre where both are trying to consolidate their hold. The perennial threat to Russia from the Chechen terrorists and India (chiefly Jammu and Kashmir) from their counterparts from across the latter’s western border is a cause for concern to both. Fortunately, the CAR countries, despite their Islamic identity with Pakistan and Afghanistan, have swerved towards the secular and democratic traditions as represented by India. How long this relationship lasts is matter of conjecture.

Notwithstanding revival of Islamic fundamentalism CAR states gear up to fight the international ultra menace in the region. The five CAR states - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgystan - are crucially situated straddling the location linking South Asia, Russia, the Middle East and the Far East. Given their geo-strategic position, India, like Russia, has strategic interests in maintaining cordial relations with them. A major factor for India is its growing oil needs. Although it produces 100 million tones of petroleum and petroleum products, that accounts for only 30 per cent of its requirements. The oil and gas resources of the CAR countries are mind-boggling.

According to the thinktank Heritage Foundation, these countries have 15 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. They also have proven gas reserves of nine trillion cubic metres. So it should not come as any surprise if India and Russia have minor differences on certain issues which affect both.

The singular fact remains that the benefits of Indo-Russian relations far outweigh their demerits. If Russia is piqued at India’s increasing ties with CAR countries in the military and energy spheres, India does not relish being outmanoeuvred by Russia on nuclear and other issues at Washington’s behest. But both have stood by each other when naked US-actuated unilateralism has sought to stamp out the multilateral approach of the Third World countries led by India. That is as it should be. Both New Delhi and Moscow have discouraged American trends to overpower the rights of sovereign states for Washington’s own strategic gameplan. The whittling down of Indo-Russian ties, for both these countries’ sake, will only facilitate more mischief by the lone superpower.

Americans feel that the time is ripe for another "democratic" revolution, all the way from Georgia to China’s border. This will also hem in the Russians and isolate them from the warm waters of west and south Asia while challenging the Chinese across the Gobi and Lop Nor. Where does India stand in this fluid central Asian scene? INAV