Udhampur Northern Command's right signal

By B L Kak

Slippery Siachen. Sensational signal from Pakistan. A Pakistani publication was apparently encouraged by Islamabad to put out a mind-boggling report after the unpublished reference to the possibility of demilitarising the Siachen glacier during the recent talks, in New York, between Indian Premier, Manmohan Singh, and Pakistan President, Gen. Parvez Musharraf.

The report, in unmistakable terms, claimed that a deal on Siachen "is now in the making", with Gen Musharraf's assurance that he will not occupy the heights if these were vacated by Indian troops. Equally sensational was the Pak publication's yet another claim: Gen. Musharraf's offer evoked positive response from the Indian Prime Minister.

And the Indian Prime Minister, who chose to maintain silence after a section of Indian media highlighted the Pak publication's report, allowed animated whispers in some official and political circles in the country, particularly in the sensitive Ladakh region where the Siachen glacier is located. Top echelons in the Ministry of Defence and Army Headquarters were also found - in fact, it was officially confirmed - engaged in the intense debate on the issue arising from the sensational story put out by the Pakistani publication.

The Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, was contacted by some anxious scribes in New Delhi and Kolkata on the issue. In fact, the presspersons wanted him to confirm or contradict the newspaper report on Siachen. He was asked if the Pak President and Indian Prime Minister had also taken up the Siachen issue during their New York talks. Pranab Mukherjee did not provide a direct answer to the query. Instead, he briefly talked about the "decision" to hold military level talks on Siachen between the two countries.

The Defence Minister, it seemed, was not bound to disclose the opposition from the Army Headquarters to the Siachen offer of Gen. Parvez Musharraf. And the Army Headquarters' policy of wait and watch was said to be the outcome of the Udhampur - based Northern Command's unambiguous opposition to any idea seeking the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Siachen glacier. Northern Command's opposition served as the right signal for the top military leadership in New Delhi to make the troops stay put at the most inhospitable Siachen glacier.

True, Indian military leadership is for a peaceful settlement of the Siachen dispute with Pakistan. But the possibility of the troop withdrawal has been completely ruled out, as, in view of the bitter experience India had in the wake of the Musharraf offensive over the Kargil hills in the summer of 1999, adequate guarantees are called for from Islamabad. Opponents of the offer from Gen. Musharraf cannot be faulted for the pointed questions: Should one forget the fact that Gen. Musharraf in the past used the Siachen conflict to justify the Kargil incursion? What guarantee does India now have that Pakistan will not renege on any commitment that it may make on not occupying the Siachen glacier once it is vacated? The Manmohan Singh Government, too, cannot be faulted for it seagerness to settle all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan through bilateral discussions. The Siachen issue is one of them, which has so far defied a solution to the satisfaction of the two countries. Eight rounds of talks were held at the Defence Secretary -level, while military - level talks were held twice. The August (2004) round of talks between the Defence Secretaries of India and Pakistan saw the two sides coming out with fresh set of proposals. These proposals were extension of the respective stand taken by the two countries in the previous rounds of talks.

That nothing substantial emerged from the New Delhi talks became evident when the Pakistani Defence Secretary highlighted the need to continue the dialogue process with India for seeking a durable solution to the Siachen problem. No end to the Siachen dispute was in sight, even as the members of the two delegations voiced satisfaction at the talks that covered the positions taken by the two countries and proposals floated for an end to the dispute.

If India wants Pakistan to accept the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), Pakistan let it be known that the basis of the solution of the problem was the round of talks held in 1989 when the two sides had reached close to withdrawing forces. Considering the fact that the situation has changed now, India — the military leadership, to be precise-would like to have a guarantee that Pakistan will not re-occupy the area vacated.

In the light of the Kargil experience, it would be hard for New Delhi to accept any guarantee from Pakistan. If wishes were horses, Pakistani rulers and soldiers would ride to ensure that forces of the two countries be on the pre-1972 position. When the Line of Control (LoC) was delineated under the 1972 Shimla Agreement, it concluded at point NJ9842. While India's position is that the line runs south from this point to the Siachen glacier, Pakistan insists that the LoC runs north to the Karakoram mountain pass.

Overlooking Pakistan, India, Tibet, Afghanistan and Russia, the Siachen glacier is located in the Karakorams. With the glacier area situated in the strategic Nubra valley of Ladakh, the confrontation between India and Pakistan has been for its control. Why is control of the Siachen glacier so important from the Indian point of view?

One, if India loses Siachen, it will lose an enormous chunk of territory. Having suffered several territorial body blows in Jammu and Kashmir, India is evidently not prepared to suffer another. Two, if Pakistan controls Siachen, the whole Nubra valley, and through it Ladakh, is jeopardised. Pakistanis being on high ground will overlook all Indian outposts in the Nubra valley. Three, if Indians cannot hold Hubra valley, they will also lose access to the rest of India's Karakoram territory because it (Nubra valley) provides the best access route to our northern outposts like Daulat Beg Ouldi.

Pakistan's preference is for the Belafondla pass, situated to the southwest of Siachen glacier. If Pakistan were allowed to have it, a serious threat would then be posed to the communication lines in Ladakh, especially the Nubra valley.

A peaceful settlement of the problem is called for. The Siachen experiment costs the Indian taxpayer about Rs. 1,500 crores per year to keep soldiers there. It has been found that the cost of a chapatti, by the time it reaches Siachen, the highest battlefield in the world, is about Rs. 10,000.

Small parties in India

By Subhashis Mittra

Small may not necessarily be beautiful. When the Chief Election Commissioner T R Krishnamurthy recently suggested that smaller parties should be made to ally with national level parties ahead of polls, he definitely had a pont to make. He felt their growth was ‘’affecting’’ good governance at the Centre.

With over 700 registered unrecognised political parties figuring in the Election Commission list, in addition to the national and regional parties, the concern of the CEC is bound to generate a debate in an era of coalition. But, on a closer look, his concern seemed to be genuine considering the fact that when regional parties contest national elections, it has bad impact on good Governance as during the period of Government formation, they bring their own lobbies to exert pressure.

Clarifying that he was not opposed to smaller parties, the CEC while delivering a Lecture on 'Problems and Prospects of Electoral Reforms' said it was only a suggestion.

Smaller parties should be free to contest state-level elections, but once it came to national elections, ''there was a conflict of interest, and national interest should be uppermost,'' Krishnamurthy said and his logic was that ''when candidates get elected from smaller parties at the time of Government formation they dictate terms in extending support.''

Smaller parties in India are dime a dozen. There are over three dozen parties operating from small towns with the Akhil Bhartiya ''status'' and around two dozen other parties with the All India ''tag''.

Some of them have interesting names like---Bolshevik Party of India, Federation of Sabhas, Labour and Jobseekers Party of India, Life Peaceful Party, Lok Bhalai Party and Sarvahara Dal.

One will agree that issues of national governance are different from those of the states. And, if local issues are allowed to get the better of national issues, it would not augur well in the larger interest of the country. The country was witness to various pulls and pressures from small parties during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government. It faced problems from as many as 22 allies and Vajpayee had to face the challenge of mollifying them often and keeping them in good humour while balancing local demands with the national agenda. This was certainly affecting the day-to-day governance. Take for example the Telugu Desam Party of Andhra Pradesh which used its alliance with the BJP to get more resources from New Delhi.

The same experiment is being re-enacted at the Centre today. Dr Manmohan Singh's United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government, with 15 regional allies, is not free from similar compulsions. Here one can cite the instance of DMK refusing to join the Government till allocation of choice portfolios.

Small parties per se are not bad for the country. But, the question is to what extent their regional sentiments and approaches will help realise national aspirations and objectives at a time when the interests of national and regional parties are converging.

Against this backdrop, Krishnamurthy said ''regional parties must align with the national parties for contesting elections as the growth of such parties is affecting quality of governance at the national level.''

One will agree that with several political parties having ''limited interests'' being formed at the regional level, there should be some kind of regulation in regard to these parties. There is a need to change the existing political system with cooperation from political parties, State Governments and people for having a long-term system with good governance.

However, Krishnamurthy's suggestions for democratisation of political parties with regular organisational elections, an expenditure limit on the parties themselves and not just candidates, and making their party accounts public are now new.

The Election Commission, the Law Commission and the Dinesh Goswami Committee Report had recommended this, but their suggestions have not been implemented mainly because of the lack of political will.

Experts feel that unless the number of political parties is regulated by law, representational legitimacy of our legislators under a first-past-the-post system cannot be ensured. The norm that a political party will be recognised as a national party only if it secures at least 10 per cent votes all over the country should be strictly enforced.

To improve the quality of electoral process, the Election Commission made around 22 suggestions to the Prime Minister recently.

Taking a dig at political parties for ''not taking'' provisions of election code of conduct ''seriously'', the CEC said that unfortunately most national and regional parties were ''guilty'' of violating this code of conduct.

He favoured a legislation for transparency in account of political parties and to monitor their functioning. Krishnamurthy said such candidates who were chargesheeted by court six months ahead of polls should be disqualified from contesting elections. ''In the interest of good governance it is necessary to disqualify a person from contesting polls against whom prima facie a charge of crime is found,'' he said.

''At least 100 members in the present Parliament have criminal records,'' the CEC said and disapproved the process in which ''bureaucrats start taking interests in political activities''. The CEC also suggested enactment of a legislation to regulate exit and opinion polls ad dubbed them as a ''business''. On political advertisements, the CEC said the level of political advertisements was coming down and ''we need to regulate the business of political ads''.

PTI Feature