Indian Air Force
Have we mortgaged ourselves?

By Maj Gen V K Madhok (retired)

As the IAF-world's fourth largest Air Force, having celebrated its 71st anniversary on Oct 8, 2003, which was specially marked by first time demonstrations of UMVs (unmanned vehicles) flight, mid air refuelling and long range SU 30 Mkl flight alongwith Jaguars, Mirages, Migs, transport aircraft and helicpoters enters a new year, a few issues concerning indigenization, accidents, technology, purchases and future employment are worth consideration on this occasion.

Unlike the militants and armies, which are primarily manpower-oriented, an airforce is no good without its flying machines. Today, the IAF- the most visible and spectacular branch of India's military machine- is pitted against China's and Pakistan's Air Forces-an awesome combination.

However, the IAF is itself short of nearly 1500 pilots. This despite the fact that it consists of approximately 38 to 39 combat squadrons, that is nearly 850 or so fighter aircraft, consuming a fourth of India's defence budget annually and whose pilots and technicians have trained the Iraqi air machine in the past besides training the UAE pilots to fly IL 76 or the Malaysians, Singapore, Indonesian and Tanzanian Air Forces to repair, fly and even overhaul their aircraft of Russian origin.

But our air force has become totally dependent for the fighter and transport fleet and missile systems on foreign countries. This raises important questions? Have we been unfair to the service ? Have we mortgaged its future? If so, why? What must be done to retrieve the situation ?

Even after the hunter and Canberra aircraft were phased out in 1995, the IAF continues to fly seven types of aircraft, purchased from three different countries- the UK, France and Russia. And now, with the IAF wanting C 130 transport planes from the US or UMVs and Phalcons from Israel, two more countries will be added to the dependency list. This costs a lot of money. The estimated cost of a Mirage 2000 is Rs 150 crores. SU 30 or a Mig 21 from Russia costs Rs 200 crores piece. and our Light Combat aircraft (LCA) which is likely to be inducted in another 10 years, at today's prices would be Rs 200 crore a piece.

This is not all. In addition to the fighter aircraft for ground attack, the IAF needs radars to get early warning of approaching aircraft and missiles. AWACS (airborne warning and control systems) to enhance the range of its fighters and a logistic system which ensures the supply of indigenous spares, overhaul and repair of its aircraft and replacement of outdated or ageing aircraft and missiles system. A former Air Chief N Suri was quite right when he stated in Dec 1992, that this priorities would be indigenization of spares to keep the aircraft flying, self reliance and upgradation of the ageing Mig fleet to increase their operational life. This view has not changed over the years and remains the same.

The spares crunch has since eased to some extent. Nearly 6000 items have been indigenized with the help of 40 private industries, 12 PSUs and 10 ordanance factories. It is hoped that in the next two to three years spares crisis will be considerably diffused, if not over. More importantly, India would have learnt its lessons not to forget to include a para for continuous supply of spares while signing future contracts with foreign countries. So far, as per reports, spares worth Rs 1000 crores, of which the IAF takes a major share of Rs 650 crores or so are still are being imported annually.

As regards self reliance, it remains a mirage inspite of the technical talent that the country has. The LCA project conceived in 1983 which is designed to replace India's Mig 21 fleet is already twenty years behind schedule. Its cost has gone up. Two prototype LCAs unveiled with much fanfare by ex PM Narasimha Rao at Bangalore on Nov 17, 1995 cost a whopping 2, 188 crores against the original visualised cost of 500 crores. More important, the delay in induction has left no option but to upgrade the Mig 21 fleet (nearly 170 aircraft) for another 4,000 hours of operational flying. Further, the LCA carries an American engine which is likely to be replaced with indigenous Kaveri if all goes well, and French avionics. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not yet indigenous. Initial operational clearance for flight trials is expected in two to three years. And then, India intends to produce 200 LCAs for induction in the IAF by 2020.

The position about the Advance Light Helicopter (ALH) which would replace Cheetah, Chetak and the assortment of Russian helicopters is no better. It has as per vague reports, taken off 30 years after it was conceived. India would need atleast 1000 such multi-role helicopters for all the three services the price level of which is 10-15 crore a piece.

In the meantime, negotiations were on to purchase a squadron of attack helicopters (MI 15) from Russia with night flying and night fighting capability as the existing two attack helicopters squadrons with the IAF lack such capability. Probably, the new acquisitions already stand inducted. In addition, as per media reports, a multi million dollar contract was supposed to have been signed for purchase of Appache helicopters (US) which would support tank formations and other mobile brigades, in Aug 1995.

Fortunately, the PLA and the PAF are no better. Though the former has no dearth of pilots, having created twice the numbers required in a squadron, thus creating a 100 percent reserve. With a manpower strength of 45,000 and nearly 430 combat aircraft of Chinese, US and French origin, the PAF too has been scouting for fighters to compensate for non-delivery of 28 F-16s from the US since 1990. It has since then purchased 50 Mirage 111 (second hand) from Australia, a large number of F7s-nearly 95 from China and has been negotiating with France to buy 40 Mirage 2000-5 (second hand) to fill the void. While the US is once again considering to sell F16s to Pakistan. But the PAF has nuclear capability in the shape of F-16s (three squadrons) and Mirage 2000 whose reach extens upto Agra, Kanpur and Jabalpore from Sargodha.

So far as the PLA is concerned, of its nearly 4,970 aircraft, 50 percent are either non-effective or non functional. It has been negotiating with Russia to buy SU 27 or SU 30s.

Beijing is however finding it difficult to replace or upgrade its aircraft. But then, it is better off with its medium range missiles which can cover India's northeastern states and areas right upto Jamshedpur.

It is worth noting that the sale of three P 3 orions-which India is also trying to buy from the US, jamming devices, Harpoon and AIM missiles, electronic warfare equipment and other gadgets for night operations, part of a $368 million arms aid package by the US-already given, has given a distinct advantage to the PAF by enhancing its surveillance capability.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above ? The most important one is that insufficient attention has been paid to the many projects which India had initiated in the past. Besides, the delay in the production of LCA and ALH, there have been avoidable slips in producing Aakash, Prithvi and Trishul missiles and to replace the Russian SAM 111 (Pachora) ground to air defence systems purchased in the 70s.

One issue is very clear. India will have to display a political will of an exceptional order to make its Air Force self-reliant. In the process, it has to stand up to the global arms market strategies which recognise no principles of morality. Foreign arms manufacturers , in their pursuit to sell products like the aircraft, missiles and other defence hardware, do not hesitate to promote regional conflicts through proxy wars or an arms race. This battle as such cannot be fought without long-range planning, a positive filip to the projects in hand and professional assertiveness by senior commanders. Should we fail to recognise this, the IAF's dependence on foreign countries will continue to increase and indigenization would remain a pipe dream.

Finally, most important, a question is being often raised that since a conventional or a nuclear confrontation between India-Pakistan can be ruled out due to near parity in opposing forces, why is the IAF not being utilised for punitive strikes on those bases, across the border, which are being used to train and support Pakistan's proxy war in J&K? Agreed, Pakistan will retaliate, but India can absorb it. But Pakistan is not in a position to resort to an all out war.

Periscope on Pakistan
N-deterrence and the terror syndrome

There is now little doubt that Pakistan’s nuclear deter-rence and its frenetic attempts to improve its launch vehicles are intended to bolster its policy of exporting terrorism as a means of acquiring strategic depth. Peace under such circumstances can at best be phyrric.

Ejaz Haider observes in FRIDAY TIMES: "In tandem with other measures, which could help improve the atmospherics, the two sides could use the respective nuclear capabilities for cooperation rather than confrontation... The peace movement would become more effective if it could shed its opposition to nuclear weapons and instead use them as a tool towards cooperation.

"Let me put forth a heresy: the way to peace for India and Pakistan lies through their possession of nuclear weapons. It is not through the absence of nuclear weapons, but rather their presence, and an understanding that the nuclear capability may not necessarily be plugged into the conflict that we can hope to achieve peace, even if it is of the cold variety.

"A simile formulation is already there. Nuclear weapons induce the status quo through deterrence. But we have seen India and Pakistan confront each other with more daring since the tests, resulting in calls for de-nuclearisation. There are two reasons for this. Deterrence and war both are problematic concepts and defy simple definitions and responses. For instance, what is war to peacemakers may not be so to policy-makers, especially if the latter can conduct it - or are confident of doing so - in a controlled environment; more so, if it can be fought covertly through the element of plausible deniability", FRIDAY TIMES article adds.

"It's even more complex with deterrence which, quite often, can only stabilise through a series of conflicts and, therefore, in terms of a snapshot view - as opposed to a longitudinal design - may come across to many observers as an unworkable concept. Add to it the various other dimensions and constraints and capabilities through which it works and we get a situation which provides equally potent arguments to both opponents and proponents to draw their own conclusions.

"Is there a way then to keep the weapons - perhaps even continue to augment the arsenals – without necessarily allowing these mascots of respective nationalisms to keep the prospects of peace hostage? I think there is. But it is important to put this in a context.

"The important point to consider is whether the nuclear capability (as in Pakistan's case) is the product of threat perception or is threat perception the upshot of nuclear capability. In other words, to determine clearly what has begotten what. India cites the Chinese and Pakistani threat to justify its nuclear capability. It's a good ruse."

Ejaz Haider maintains: "In real terms, the capability should be de-linked from the confrontation. That would be the first step towards using it to climb the peace ladder. If possession of nuclear capability is important, the two sides would need more room to manoeuvre on its basis. They can't do it alone.

"This route will also be more acceptable to statist interests on both sides, which for sound reasons have come to look at the peace movement askance. The worst thing a peace movement can do to itself is to begin by challenging the entrenched security interests. Peace, from that perspective, seems to come at the cost of security."

Stressing that "India and Pakistan are flanked by the MOU quietly signed between both nations concerning nuclear assets and nuclear testing", Shezray Tenver, in an article in NEWS, maintains: "Nuclear swamps of mass destruction have to be drained, till then the world sits on the precarious tip of an iceberg."

"Despite US sanctions intended to dawdle progress, a Muslim nation possesses nuclear prowess. India hardly wanted this. Israel can't stomach it and so the USA has to step in. The American call for providing security for Pakistan's symbol of strength is seen as an explicit attempt to gain control or access to nuclear assets. Secrecy of the storage sites is a key aspect of Pakistan's nuclear strategy. Even if Pakistan were to accept, finding a proper balance between security and secrecy will be exigent causing breach of confidentiality regarding whereabouts of storage facilities not to mention meting out a furtive scheme for the USA to scrutinise Pakistan's nuclear programme.

"Israel will pull out all the stops to have Pakistan's nuclear arsenals removed. The USA will eventually bow before Israel whim, embrace Pakistan and stab it in the back. NEW YQRKER carried a caption: "Israeli Commandos Train - US To De-nuclearise Pakistan: Report". It reported of an Israeli commando team, engaged in behind-the-lines operations including theft and assassinations, training US forces to divest Pakistan of nuclear weapons in case of coup.

"And speaking of budding relations, what’s prompted India and Pakistan to become cronies? The USA might take advantage of the illusory harmony and pursue Pakistan to back on its nuclear front. But predictably this masquerade will end even before it begins.

Arguing that "the Maulana (Fazlur Rahman's) vision, though essentially futuristic, is based on the solid bedrock of geopolitics and realpolitiks, A.R. Siddiqi, in an article in DAWN, points out: "The relative silence of the media in regard of the Maulana's statements from New Delhi speaks eloquently of the growing desire for peace between the two neighbours at all levels."

"Some of the salient points made by Maulana Fazalur Rahman in his various statements can be summed up as follows: i) resolution of the Kashmir dispute (a reality) in the light of the Simla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999); ii) no US (or third-party intervention for the settlement of bilateral issues; iii) (re)-definition of jehad as 'Jehad Akbar (Greater Jehad), prohibiting murdering, even molesting, innocent civilians; iv) urging India to treat the Muslim minority like an elder brother; v) Pakistani Hindus live in relative safety in spite of the Gujarat holocaust; vi) refutation of any link with Osama bin Laden; vii) terrorism, reprehensible in all events, must not be equated with a liberation war (as in Kashmir); viii) Bhagat Singh and Chander Shekhar were national heroes and freedom fighters and cannot be damned as terrorists.

"Perhaps the Maulana might have to elaborate and explain exactly what he had in mind - whether he thought more of a reunion or a re-unification (the German way). A simple reunion, like a college or a regimental reunion, can be achieved by the revival and reinforcement of mutual trust and camaraderie without redrawing the map.

Reunification will not only be completely out of the question but also have an extended dimension, involving Bangladesh. It can, therefore, be ruled out straightaway.

(ADNI Bureau)