India's low intensity civil war

By Lt. Gen (Retd) M.L. Chibber

In the process of consolidating our continental nationhood, India has been involved, for sometime now, in what may appropriately be termed as a low intensity civil war. When we survey the scene from eastern India to northwestern India, we realise that insurgencies of varying types and magnitude are on our hands, and will continue to be so for a long time to come.

After more than four decades of operations the insurgency in Nagaland is relatively dormant and under control though not fully rooted out. The Manipur insurgents are relatively more active and the Liberation Front in Assam has been crushed. In Mizoram we appear to have resolved the problem satisfactorily after nearly three decades of fighting. The Kashmir valley is one hot bed of insurgency.

The situation in Kashmir has the potential of escalating into the fourth round of Indo-Pak war due to the active support being provided to the insurgents by Pakistan. This can happen depending on how the hawks among policymakers in Pakistan rate their chances of success. Their calculations will largely depend on how we handle the situation in Kashmir.

There seems to be a feeling of alarm and despondency mixed with a great deal of anger among even our enlightened citizens about the problems that we are compelled to face. Can the situation be retrieved? They often enquire. If we understand the type and nature of insurgencies, and know how to handle them, and then act with a firm resolve, there is nothing for this great country to worry about. There is enough literature, based on worldwide experience, in addition to our own, on how insurgencies erupt, and how to fight them.

A popular cause, which catches the imagination of the people, is the first essential in sustaining an insurgency. Independence of an ethnic or a religious group appeals to the sentiments and pride of common people and is frequently used. Historically, kings and the clergy have exploited religious sentiment with considerable success, for capturing or retaining power. Today it is the political activists who are employing the same technique. Thus, the cause that has been exploited in eastern India is a call for ‘independence’ and that in northwestern India is ‘liberation from Hindu India’.

Conviction in the cause is the most important single factor, which sustains a violent struggle. Consequently, more than 50 per cent of the training time of active insurgents is normally devoted to reinforce, nourish and harden their conviction in the cause. In Vietnam the ‘political education’ of the Viet Cong guerrillas occupied more than 50 per cent of their training time.

In any violent situation it is usually a small group of activists who are for a particular cause; an equally small one is against it, but the vast majority of people, almost 90 per cent, are normally with the winning side. When it comes to an active insurgency, the ruthless elimination of opponents is undertaken as a priority task. They are dubbed as ‘informers’ to intimidate people at large to co-operate with them and accept their cause.

Inept and corrupt government machinery greatly facilitates the activists to win over the support of the people. Nagaland is perhaps a classic example of how the supercilious, overbearing and insensitive bureaucracy from the plains of Assam drove the simple and unpretentious Nagas head-on into the arms of insurgents. Every ill or affliction that a citizen suffers from, no matter how trivial, is blown out of proportion and attributed to the ‘misrule’ of the government.

A good intelligence system, which keeps insurgents informed of ‘inside’ information in the government machinery, is another essential ingredient. Ideology, money, blackmail and threats are used to establish sources of information among the government functionaries and the ultimate aim is to infiltrate into even the government intelligence agencies.

A carefully prepared plan stretching over many years is often used to get hardcore young men recruited into the government machinery to provide reliable and timely intelligence.

Common borders with a country that supports the cause of insurgents is absolutely essential for sustaining an insurgency. Safe bases, training facilities, weapons and other allied equipment are needed for success, which can come only from a neighbouring country. That is why border regions inhabited by ethnic or religious minorities are particularly prone to such eruptions. Naga and Manipuri activists received Chinese aid through bases in northern Burma. The Mizos were supported by East Pakistan and after the establishment of Bangladesh, that source slowly dried up. That was a major factor, which eventually led to the settlement of the Mizo problem.

In Kashmir we have the Pakistani involvement in a big and deliberate manner. We must realise that Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which handles the Indian ultras, has gained a great deal of experience under the tutelage of some of the best experts in the western world while supporting the Afghan insurgents. Therefore, the violence in the northwest is likely to continue for quite some time and hence needs skilful and very patient handling.

Terrain and climate play an important role in this type of warfare. Mountainous and jungle-covered terrain like what prevails in Nagaland and Mizoram, where climate is moderate, is ideal for the insurgents. However, contrary to popular belief, the Kashmir valley is not suitable for sustaining a prolonged struggle due to the severity of the winter.

For nearly six months in a year, insurgents cannot operate from mountain and jungle hideouts and have to take shelter in villages and towns where they cannot survive for long against well-organised security forces.

It may be recalled that in 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar to send infiltrators into Kashmir during the month of August. There was a good reason in the timing. August is a warm month and it is also the period when maize crops in the hills start ripening to provide readily available food to those operating as insurgents, guerrillas or terrorists.

It is axiomatic that the cheapest and most effective way to put down an insurgency is to prevent it. Now that we are already facing it, we tend to be self-critical and blame ourselves for letting the situation deteriorate in so many of our states. However, let us not underestimate the gigantic problems of consolidating a continental nation of such diversity as India. After all in a somewhat similar situation another great democracy, that of the US, fought a bitter civil war to prevent secession by some of its states. One American in every hundred died to maintain a population of under five crores. Out of this sacrifice rose the nation, which is today the most prosperous country in the world. The unity of India is based on high ideals and there should be no cause for any despondency. We must handle the violence in our border states with skill, courage and determination.

Simultaneously, we have to persuade Pakistan to see the logic of events and desist from providing support to the secessionist elements without, in anyway, getting involved in a war with that country. Therein lies the statesmanship and diplomacy that befits a potentially great country like India.

It will not be out of place to rule out the technique of converting the people’s minds evolved and adopted by Mao Tse Dong as totally unsuitable to a liberal democracy like India. Since Pakistan tried this technique in East Pakistan it would be of interest to the reader to briefly examine the process of persuasion by terror. Mao says: "In reasoning, we must begin by administering a shock and shouting at the patient, "You are ill" so that he is frightened into a sweat, and then we persuade him gently that he needs treatment." Mao succeeded in administering the treatment of communism through the liquidation of 140 lakh people, although the Chinese indignantly disclaim such a large number and insist that it was only 20 lakhs! Even if it takes much longer and is arduous, our pattern of fighting insurgencies has to be totally different.

A good cause, obviously, has to be the very first factor. For example, counter-insurgency operations in Algeria, Indonesia and Vietnam failed because the colonial powers that were fighting the insurgencies did not have a cause, which could appeal to the people or indeed even motivate their own security forces. On the other hand, in Malaysia, the insurgency was put down because the Malaysians articulated a good cause – independence, integrity and progress of their country. Our own cause in the successes in Nagaland and Mizoram was the maintenance of the unity and integrity of India. The strongest asset of India, and hence our cause, is our Constitution.

It is true that our performance in implementing the spirit of the Constitution has been shoddy, and political skulduggery has made our ideal of a secular society a mere slogan. But then we must appreciate that the maturing of a liberal democracy is a very slow process and the violent eruptions should bring home to us the areas where and the extent to which we have failed to meet the aspirations of the people. Be that as it may, let there be no doubt in anyone’s mind that our ideals of liberty, equality and secularism to uphold the dignity of every citizen, irrespective of his sex, religion, caste, creed or language, are the noblest in the world.

Unity of control by one man, carefully selected to handle the situation, is the next factor. Fighting an insurgency requires simultaneous action on various fronts to achieve speedy and cost-effective results. The appointed individual should control the following vital aspects of the struggle:

Operations by the security forces to flush out and neutralise insurgents.

Police operations designed to arrest, interrogate, re-educate and rehabilitate suspects and agents of the external power supporting an insurgency.

Political, economic, administrative and psychological measures required winning over the population.

In a liberal democracy there is resistance to implement the concept of unity of control and, to that extent, insurgencies get prolonged and remain unresolved. There is always a penalty to be paid when well-proven principles are overlooked.

Good intelligence is the third factor for success. Without reliable and speedy intelligence, a sound basis for important and timely political and security decisions that have to be taken does not exist. In fact, good intelligence is almost the starting point of the struggle.

It is a well-established principle of intelligence work that, to be effective, more than one agency should operate in the field. However, when these agencies are not subject to local control for coordination by an experienced hand in the field, and then intelligence efforts go awry. For example, in Nagaland and Mizoram, six agencies operated independently – those of the RAW, IB, Army Headquarters, local CID, BSF and the local Army formation. It is essential to have a high-powered intelligence coordinator in the field, and it is best if he does not belong to any of the Intelligence Services, but is given full authority to control the agencies working in the insurgency area. Half-hearted measures in this field are bound to fail.

Popular support to put down an insurgency is the cardinal factor. Without it, an insurgency keeps on erupting again and again. Hence, a large number of steps have to be taken simultaneously so that each measure reinforces the other in the struggle to win the hearts and minds of the people. A clinical analysis of the local situation can normally indicate, quite clearly, the lapses, which contributed to the insurgency and the redressal of these, then, have to be undertaken.

The provision of a ‘good government’ to the people goes a long way to win them over. And a ‘good government’ at the people’s level means the policemen, the patwari and so on, in fact, all those who come in direct contact with the public in their day-to-day life. Unfortunately, it is precisely this apparatus, which, over the years, has been corrupted to the core due to political patronage and gross misuse.

To improve this apparatus is not an easy task, but can be achieved through the personal example and hard work of good officers from the all-India and central services, as also those from the state cadres. They have to be carefully selected and then given full support and freedom of action. Weeding out the corrupt, inept and lazy links in the administrative chain has also to be undertaken to tone up the administration to a pitch of efficiency.

On independence we inherited a tradition in which no officer of the all-India services was posted to his home state, or an army officer to a "one class" regiment linked to his own class. This was a sound tradition to keep officers well above the local pressures. This tradition, unfortunately, was totally eroded. Some half-hearted and halting steps were taken to restore some sanity into the system after Operation Blue Star, but there is an urgent need to fully revive this tradition and make it an inflexible rule. Of course, priority for good officers has to be given to insurgency-prone states.

Vigorous political activity by parties who have faith in the unity and integrity of the country is, of course, the key to winning popular support. However, such politicians are normally on the hit lists of insurgents. Consequently, political activity can commence only after containment of the insurgency at an acceptable level.

Vast resources are needed to put down an insurgency. For example, in financial terms, the cost per insurgent in Malaysia was Rs. 10 lakhs when the operation lasted for less than a decade. While no accurate costing has been done for Mizoram, it cannot be less than about Rs. 30 lakhs per insurgent which is really incredible. That is why it is an oft repeated lesson that the cheapest way to put down an insurgency is to prevent it.

Army, para-military forces and police are required in very large numbers to restore a sense of security to a level at which normal administration can function and free political activity is made possible. There is an important step necessary to adequately prepare the army and para-military forces for counter insurgency operations in a particular region.

How to apprehend and neutralise the insurgents without further alienating the people is the dilemma which security forces face. This is principally so because it is a part of insurgency doctrine to use people as a shield and cover for their activities, In Mizoram, the villages had to be uprooted and regrouped in such a manner that insurgents were segregated from the people. Handling this difficult and delicate task of insulation and protecting the people needs a very sound orientation training of forces who are inducted for this difficult and thankless task. For example, after the army’s experience in handling insurgencies in the northeast, it was found necessary to start a full-fledged institution for counter-insurgency training. Thereafter, all forces inducted for operations had to undergo six weeks of training before they were launched into the actual operations.

The security forces have to undertake steps to seal the borders, to sever the lines of supply to the insurgents, and these need very large resources and ingenuity. INAV

Making drip irrigation popular, cheaper

By Ajay Gupta

We have been promoting drip irrigation in this country for over three decades. Yet we have made no impact. Not that there is no scope. There is a good case for drip irrigation given our limited water resources. Obviously several unrelated factors are coming in the way of promoting what I consider to be very cost effective irrigation.

Union Finance Minister Jaswant Singh has constituted a high power committee to examine the myths and realities about drip irrigation and come up with a road map. Chandrababu Naidu, the hi-tech chief minister of Andhra Pradesh heads the committee, which was announced in this year's budget. The Naidu committee will be holding a meeting later this month to take stock of the ground situation and examine the options available.

I am sure the Naidu committee will be well served by the agriculture ministry. Nevertheless, let me present here a few facts which in my view, have contributed to pushing costs and also dilate on areas which will help to cut down the costs to make drip system small farmer friendly. My calculations show the price can be reduced by half from the present Rs 30,000 to Rs 15,000 or even less.

Let there be no doubt that the market price of drip system has been artificially jacked up. Low volumes, inordinate delays in realising the subsidy from the Government, and the need to grease hands that run the subsidy scheme at the block and district level make the manufacturers incur higher overheads and therefore increase the MRP. They are also known to factor in six-eight month delay in subsidy realisation. In other words, the interest cost is built into the system cost.

Given the Indian conditions, there have been all types of mischief in the name of subsidy. For example, there is a mushroom growth of suppliers of spurious spares and products. There are also allegations that a drip system is installed to cover just half an acre but subsidy claimed for ten acres.

This familiar flip side of Indian development programme has made drip system suspect in the eyes of the public and Government alike. Result : very few takers for drip despite acknowledgement that it is best suited to Indian conditions.

Several other factors also contributed to poor adoption of drip, no doubt. Foremost amongst these is lack of awareness among farmers, shortage of information on crop water requirements, absence of guidance on proper hydraulic designs, undeveloped sources of irrigation, inadequate marketing network, and poor after sales service. Bank credit is unavailable wherever drip irrigation did not appear as a component in NABARD's district credit plan.

Contrary to present mode to promote drip, there is another theory, the world of no subsidy, no shadow pricing, real benefit- cost ratio as basis of sales, pricing on cost plus basis. However, this theory needs to be proved by an NGO/private organisation.

If an NGO/private organisation decides to accept the challenge of making the system available at less than half its price and consequently mass adoption, there is a way. First share this conviction. On without subsidy basis, (by saving on various factors) marketing a drip system at half the average present cost of Rs 30,000 per hectare is absolutely feasible.

Scope for cost reduction

As I just pointed out, cost of components can be brought down considerably with some tenacity and some ingenuity. Each reputed system manufacturer has some installed capacity for production of plastics pipes, drippers, filter, and fertilizer tanks. Most of them are running at less than 50% capacity (sometimes at 25-30%), letting the unutilised part remain idle.

For the first 3-4 years ( of a drip system), there is enough scope to approach any of the quality manufacturers and get material made on job work basis, paying them little over variable costs.

Assuming, drip grows enough in 3-4 years and manufacturers are not left with idle capacity, they themselves would be able to offer at the low cost due to high volumes. One can even withdraw at that stage; as such a stage anyway signifies accomplishment of our objective of mass adoption. Hence, if one needs to assemble quality drip system, calculations would show 50 percent savings.

There is a great deal of confusion among farmers when it comes to deciding on the components. One has choice from functional to over engineered ones. The scope for reducing costs exist here by providing what the farmer needs.

i) Take the pump capacit for example. Technical solution exists to resolve this problem as this is related to hydraulic design of system.

ii) The second area of doubts is the type of Filter to be used. Should it be Media/Centrifugal/Screen type, each meant to prevent organic and vegetative matter/sand/fine sand and dust respectively. We may not choose the one, which has provision for all three. What is wrong if a farmer opts for cleaning the filter at regular intervals and thus save money on a costly filter?

iii) The third area for cost reduction is Fertiliser Tank: All one needs is a tank and so there is no need for a fancy item. Moderately priced tank will do.

iv) If we ensure that pipes are made of virgin LLDPE, we save on tremendous long term costs on replacement as those made from reprocessed polymers will shorten life of pipe, affecting adversely cost economics besides blaming technology.

v) Over 50 types of drippers are available. If topography is not undulating, water is not very dirty, hydraulic design has been taken care of, non-pressure compensatory (costing less than half of pressure compensatory) will do the job well.

A word about Crop Geometry. Many experiments in crops such as sugarcane, coconut, and vegetables have proved that change in crop geometry saves on cost of laterals and drippers without adversely affecting the yield. For example, in Sugarcane, multiple canes can be raised at one location and then row-to-row distance is doubled or tripled. Besides reducing cost on system, changed geometry may permit us inter-cropping, bringing in additional profits from another crop to favour quicker pay back period from drip.

According to me, these efforts have the potential to save an additional 10 percent. This brings us to developing a system, which costs just 40 percent (or Rs 12,000 per hectare) of present cost. This is as good as or even better than what is being supplied today at an average of Rs 30,000 per hectare. Successful marketing of such a system benefits brings into its fold all those customers who are ready to pay between Rs 12,000 to Rs 30,000 per hectare.

This still leaves a very large number of farmers who can take the benefit of drip if system is still cheaper. To address this segment, which is very vast, we must give up the beaten track. We have to change our mind set and work on putting in a system that serves the purpose of pumping, filtration, and transportation of water (substitute of plastic laterals) Ingenuity has no cap when the sole purpose is economics. We must learn from our farmers a lot in this respect.

In Karnataka, for instance, many a farmers cut a small piece of around 3-5 inches from a used pipe, sew a fine mesh horizontally at lower end of the pipe and insert it near root zone of a plant. Water is filled from top in such a pipe, which keeps on dripping through fine mesh. It is refilled after few hours. So, the complete drip system becomes functional for few hundred rupees per hectare. Similarly, some cheaper pipes (made of alternatives to plastics) are being used in some places to register substantial savings.

We believe that thorough investigation into similar possibilities shall make us reduce cost of drip system by another Rs 4000 per system. Admittedly, such a system may not be durable or may require more maintenance but point is that it will still be an attractive proposition for those who cannot afford more than Rs 8000 on drip system.

(Syndicate Features)