Fudged facts on water and power issues

With its own water and power situation in a con-stant state of shambles because of mismanagement and politicking Pakistan is bent on a dog-in-the-manger posture over India’s use of the Chenab waters for irrigation and power production. Few new water management schemes have been implemented since the Indus Waters Treaty with India and the laying of the extensive canal network in the decade after partition. The Kalabagh dam and the Thal canal projects have not been implemented because of the fierce tug-of-war between the upper riparian – NWFP and Punjab; and lower riparian – Sindh and Balochistan.

"Pakistan has formally served a second notice on the Indian government to settle by December 31 the dispute over the Baglihar dam that is being built on the Chenab river in Kashmir, informed sources said", reports DAWN from Islamabad.

"The first notice was served on India in August before a team of technical experts led by Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters Jamaat Ali Shah conducted an inspection of the project.

"If India fails to respond to Pakistan’s plea by December 31, the likely next step for Islamabad will be to approach World Bank for the appointment of neutral experts to resolve the dispute. World Bank brokered the water-sharing Indus Waters Treaty and stands as its guarantor."

DAWN also reported that "President Pervez Musharraf directed the parliamentary committee on water and Irsa’s technical committee to come up with a workable solution to all contentious water issues, enabling the government to start the construction of the Kalabagh dam or the Bhasha dam not later than the next year.

A.A. Musalman, in an article in NEWS says: "Gen Musharraf’s implied advocacy and justification for the construction of Kalabagh dam to start next year and his authoritarian posture in this respect brought back the memories of the later President and Chief Martial Law Administrator General Yahya Khan’s refusal to handover power to Awami League, because of one or the other reason" stresses. "Besides some serious political opposition, Kalabagh dam is opposed at its present site by many eminent engineers purely on technical, functional and financial grounds, particularly its limited useful life."

NEWS article by A A Musalman adds: "Sadly, however, our ruling elite always, because of their special interests, have gone after the elusive one in the bush. There was an LFO then and an LFO now and the belligerent reaction to

Kalabagh’s implied start next year by credible political forces of three provinces is highly worrisome unless better sense prevails on either side.

"The need to conserve water is inescapable but the emphasis to do it through a controversial dam defies comprehension and encourages opposition for the right or wrong reasons. Why tread a debatable path when better alternatives are available to achieve avowed objective at a much lesser cost. One is unable to withhold the criticism of Wapda (Water and Power Development Authority), whose top management is misleading the President of the country through slanted data and contrived figure work. The figures given in this article are taken from officially published Economic Survey and the Report of the Study Group comprising of world repute appointed by World Bank that brokered the infamous Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.

"Consequently, a consortium was created to plan and execute the provisions of the treaty under Indus Basin Replacement Works that included construction of link canals, barrages, tube-wells and allied structures and the Mangla and Tarbela dams and their hydel power houses. It is correct that the study group recommended sites at Kalabagh, Basha, Bunji, Skardu and some other places in the upper reaches of the Indus as suitable for dam construction but Kalabagh was never assigned precedence over others. On the other hand, it recommended conservation in the existing system through lining to stop colossal waste through seepage and percolation."

The contretemps over the issue is highlighted by the reference to Fatehullah Khan, an eminent engineer and a former chairman of IRSA, and his article "Escapades downstream Kotri vis-a-vis sea intrusion" in NEWS "That no water is required to escape downstream either to stop sea intrusion or to preserve marine life in the delta which thrives on seawater.

"The prudent way out of this crisis is the lining of the existing irrigation network, starting with watercourses to eventually save 52 MAF that is more than seven times that Kalabagh or Basha storages at only one-tenth the cost of dams and that too in local currency."

NEWS article by Engr Fateh Ullah Khan: "Secretary Irrigation Sindh and Punjab are locked in a controversy over considering river escapades downstream Kotri as conditionally provided (subject to investigation) in para 7 of the Water Accord to check seawater intrusion. Sindh demands a minimum of 10 maf of floodwater as escapades below Kotri to be dumped into the sea during monsoon with a vague idea to check sea intrusion. Sindh has not indicated methodology how can river escapades push seawater intrusion to be replaced by river water. Secretary Sindh using pressure tactics further demands precious storage water for dumping into the sea during the non-surplus flow period from the shares of the three provinces allocated to them under para 2 of the Water Accord. This new demand is irresponsibly playful and laughable. National interest demands that technical reasons and merits must prevail to end controversy between Sindh and Punjab as that creates hurdle in the way of water development for agriculture."

NATION article by Dr M Iqbal Wahla: "It is a pity that the poor people of Pakistan engaged in agriculture have been denied their access to a valuable resource like water. About 35 million acre feet of water, on the average, is allowed to go into the sea every year while the poor people are starving and dying because of non-availability of much needed water for their use. This drama must end."

Bemoans Sirajul Haq, Senior Minister, NWFP in an article in NATION: "Unfortunately no comprehensive planning was made in the past to utilise these (natural) resources in efficient manner with least concerns to ameliorate lot of poor masses and remove the immense backwardness prevalent over here (Frontier province). The Centre has to discharge its Constitutional obligations in letter and spirit now to give people of all provinces a realisation that their rights have finally been given to them.

"It then depends on Federal government as to how, when and how much it pays according to its sweet wishes. Hydel power generation and tobacco crop are our two main cash earning resources. But since both these resources are directly controlled by the Federal government, hence we have to wait for payment of our share of profit in this respect.

"This decision of AGN Qazi formula was even guaranteed by the President but unfortunately Wapda is continuously violating this decision and the well-accepted formula is intentionally kept in the cold storage. Wapda is even intransigently delaying payment of outstanding hydel net profit dues of NWFP, which have now reached up to the tune of Rs. 309 billion." The crux of the problem may well lie here: "The Senate was told that official residences of President of Pakistan, the Chief Justice and former chairman of the Senate were on the top of defaulters of Wapda, owing it millions of rupees and that the Ministry of Water and Power had expressed its inability to disconnect power to these places", reports NEWS from Islamabad.

"The startling information came in response to a question put by ruling party Senator Mohammad Anwar Shinder. The Senators wondered where departments had spent money given to them for payment of utility bills. ADNI Bureau

Whether to acquire Gorshkov or not?

By Commodore (Retd.) Surendra Sharma

Defence planners are divid-ed on the controversial issue of ac-quiring the ageing Admiral Gorshkov at an exorbitant cost of Rs. 3,000 crore. A group is of the opinion that India should go for the aircraft carrier; while the opponents say that it would be a sheer wastage of money.

The group supporting the acquisition theory says that there is the need for an aircraft carrier or of more than one, and counter-arguments that shore-based aircraft are as good as those on a mobile maritime platform. One main reason the 1971 India-Pakistan war ended in barely two weeks, with the historic surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops, was that sea routes were effectively sealed. This would have been difficult with just a few ships. The INS Vikrant provided the Indian Navy the added edge of ‘search and capture’ capability so that it could assert itself in the two seas of the Indian Ocean- the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. The air force, with its shore-based aircraft committed to counter-air operations, would not be able to spare aircraft for the army or navy. That kind of effort, at very short notice, is best provided by ‘here and now’ sea-based aircraft.

The fleet’s basic purpose is to establish sea control in the area of interest, where sea lanes of communications (SLOC) are kept open and secure for own vessels, while denying the same to the enemy. With India’s maritime security perimeter extending across the Indian Ocean from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits, including the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan in the North West, China in the North-East and down to Southeast Asia, shore-based aircraft from say, Mumbai, Kochi, Vishakhapatnam or anywhere along India’s coastline will waste too much time, effort and expenditure and still not achieve what a carrier can by being able to reach, say, even Aden.

Like the soldier on the ground, a ship in the ocean needs support from all arms of the service. It needs to hold the sea around it, while protecting itself from submarine, air and missile attack. For a submarine threat, a surface ship lacks the advantage sea-based aircraft have as an airborne anti-submarine threat; a surface ship lacks the advantage sea-based aircraft have as an airborne anti-submarine warfare platform. Individual ships, which have a helicopter or two, cannot achieve the anti-submarine capability that carrier-based squadrons can.

When both confronting navies have missiles of the same range, it is detection that matters; this is best achieved by the air element. If the opposing country’s air force maritime reconnaissance aircraft are equipped with air-to-surface missiles, aircraft integral to the navy will be required to shoot them down. Countries not possessing aircraft carriers will require shore based air force aircraft to remain circling over their ships in combat air patrol, which is very expensive to provide even over land. Circling requires a lot of fuel; add the cost of covering the reach-out and return distance. But in this case the vital factor is reaction time which increases due to the distance from shore to target area. The Indian Navy has deck-launched interceptors just like the Indian Air Force has operational readiness platform interceptors.

Yet another problem for shore-based air force pilots is locating own or allied country’s fleet at sea. Any fleet moving or operating in conflict situations will use maximum stealth, making the task for its air force difficult. For air force pilots to be successful in locating and identifying their own country’s fleet, they need to be constantly flying over waters to be really familiar. Naval aviators operating from carriers are certainly better off in this respect.

Rear Admiral K. Mohannan – second-time Additional Chief of Naval Staff, Air, a veteran naval aviator and a former Commanding Officer of the Vikrant (the last till the vessel was decommissioned), who flew missions during the 1971 war – mentioned to me once that aviators feel inhibited while operating over waters in which the adversary country has an aircraft carrier.

India is an emerging regional power, with an economy that has just stabilised and is expected to rise. It needs to keep its seas lanes safe in times when, in addition to terrorism and other tensions, modern piracy is rampant. Remember, Britannia rule the waves and so was able to colonise a large part of the world. The key to the power projection of the Soviet Union in earlier years or the US today has been powerful navies. While India has no territorial ambitions, there is no doubt it needs to protect its assets and interests, for which a sound, even if silent, navy with enough capability for its air defence from a mobile platform is a must. In fact, the ultimate aim as spelt out by the Naval Chief, Admiral Madhavendra Singh, is a fleet of 200 vessels including three air defence ships, of which one remains reserve while two are for each of the seas of the Indian Ocean.

The opponents say that the carrier (launched by the Soviet Navy in 1982 and out of service since 1991) will have about 15-years life with the Indian Navy. Meanwhile, India’s indigenous Air Defence Ship (ADS) whose keel was finally laid at the Mazgoan docks in Mumbai is expected to join service by 2010.

According to some retired senior naval officers, the answer is a no. Gorshkov was first offered to India in 1991 and was rejected by the navy on technical and operational grounds. Part of the reason was that the navy was certain that the indigenous ADS which were meant to replace the Vikrant carrier would be sanctioned soon. This did not happen, and unfortunately, Gorshkov is the only carrier which has been on sale in the world. Russia lured the Indian Navy back to accepting Gorshkov once it tied the deal with the leasing of Akula nuclear-powered submarines. In any case, after the 1998 nuclear tests, the navy has few choices regarding nuclear deterrence. The navy’s indigenous Advanced Technology Vehicle, whose nuclear propulsion is based on the outdated Charlie I class submarine leased by India in the 1980s, is nowhere in sight. The naval leadership hopes that if the Brahmos missile, which has been produced jointly by India and Russia, can be fired from a torpedo and a nuclear warhead devised for the missile, the Akula subs would be a good platform.

In any case, once the only carrier Vira retires from service by the middle of this decade, India will be without a carrier if Gorshkov does not join the service. The navy sees this as a big prestige comedown. The dilemma, then, is how to acquire Gorshkov and also justify it as meeting our security needs.

It does not seem to bother many that Gorshkov has little life left, will be expensive to buy, equally expensive to maintain, difficult to berth and dry-dock in the country and in the event of a war, be the Pakistan Navy’s target number one. In security terms, the navy’s tasks are to protect own supply lanes during crisis, sea denial of hostile naval powers in the Indian Ocean and, in the event of a war with Pakistan, be able to blockade Pakistani seaports for replenishments. None of these tasks requires a ‘power projection Gorshkov carrier.

There is merit in the argument India instead needs to strengthen its land-based aircraft until the ADS joins the service. India already maintains half-a-squadron of Jaguars configured for a maritime role, and has recently acquired air refuelling capabilities which can help Mirage aircraft to cover large portions of the Indian Ocean. The navy also needs to strengthen its submarine arm by rationalisation. At present, there are subs from three sources: Russia, Germany and now the French with their Scorpene are in the fray. Moreover, the navy’s focus should be on its replacement programme. Given that the Defence Acquisition Council has cleared the navy’s 10-year shipbuilding plan, the need is to follow it diligently. Even as the navy claim to have 140 ships and hopes to have 198 in the future, the truth is that, at present, not more than 90 ships would be sea-worthy. According to informed insiders, cannibalisation of system has taken a toll on the navy’s war-preparedness. The navy urgently requires to stem this decline, focus on state-of-the-art weapons systems, acquire more anti-missile capabilities, work on anti-ballistic missile systems and continue to maintain a sea control role. Gorshkov with its power projection capability is both unnecessary and expensive. INAV