Just a moment

By M J Akbar

The height of George Bush's power can be measured very easily, by the depth of Arab impotence. Bush is as potent as Arab Governments are impotent. The two are directly related.

It can be argued that the major lesson that the United States learnt from Vietnam was to choose its enemies with far more care than it chose its friends. This is an important lesson. It took ten years after the Vietnam defeat in 1973 for America to mobilise again, when Ronald Reagan ordered the invasion of tiny and inconsequential Grenada in 1983. He then took on Libya in 1986, but only from the air, and for some 24 hours. Attention was also paid to the local parish: El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama. But there was nothing significant until Saddam Hussein, an American ally till that moment, offered an opportunity by occupying Kuwait. America mobilised the world against Iraq, and then sent a bill; the world paid up, because what Saddam had done was so manifestly wrong. Bill Clinton's adventurism was totally airborne, and always pinned to a moral cushion, whether it went right, as in Yugoslavia (1999) or it went awry, as in Sudan and Afghanistan (1998).

George Bush is a soft-target war-maker. He would never have brought America from the air to the ground without carefully measuring cost and consequence. He will never go to war against North Korea, which advertises its weapons of mass destruction, since that would take him into China's zone of influence. Critical to Bush's decision to invade Iraq was his analysis of the Arab world in general and Saddam Hussein in particular. He understood a few facts about the Arab world that are unarguable.

First, all pretence to Arab unity is a sham. If the Arabs do nothing about the merciless pounding of Palestinians, whose cause would be obvious to the blind, delivered daily and in full view of international media, then there is no likelihood of Arab governments working together to protect established states. This situation has been brought about because virtually every Arab country is either under an archaic regime that needs western support to sustain itself; or is burdened by an oligarchy that has long outlived its utility, assuming that army regimes ever had any utility in a modern environment. It is unsurprising therefore that not a single Arab country in the bonfire area, barring Egypt, can claim to have any semblance of a national defence system and Egypt has been purchased by the annual transfer of billions of dollars in aid in reward for its compromise with Israel during the Carter-Sadat-Begin era.

Most of the Arab world has virtually handed over its defence to powers that control their oil, and never paused to consider the irony. Those Arab governments that did not mesh into this pattern, were slowly squeezed into stagnation or decay. This was made easier by the fact that Arab nations, even after their oil wealth explosion, have made barely any attempt to industrialise. A region that cannot create consumer products can hardly hope to develop an indigenous defence industry. Instead, local elites thought they had entered the modern world because they could import office stationery and fill their cities with luxury car dealerships and McDonald's franchises.

Given such welcome conditions all that George Bush needed was an excuse, and he picked one up from the nearest trashcan, those famous weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration once claimed that such weapons existed on some 14,000 sites. The war is over without any such weapons having been used; Saddam Hussein and his Government have vanished (rather literally), and there is still no sight of any such weapon. Maybe the wags are right when they point out that the only weapon of mass destruction discovered during the war was called CNN. CNN did a very effective job in damaging the credibility of mass media.

There is said to be despair among Arabs at the sight of Marines giving orders from Saddam's palaces (which have suddenly become useful, after being symbols of decadence for so long). Despair is another term for self-pity. Introspection might be a more appropriate response.

George Bush's calculations have brought Iraq under the orders of a military regime headed by General Tommy Franks and a civilian administration under Lieutenant General Jay Garner. But his miscalculations may offer a significant opportunity for change beyond his comprehension.

In search of oil, construction contracts and the security of Israel, George Bush has created vacant space in Baghdad. He does not know what will fill this vacuum. Bush may have won a war but intellectually he is not significantly different from the man who could not remember Pervez Musharraf's name before the elections that made him President. He wants to repeat Afghanistan, and place a Hamid Karzai prototype at the head of an obedient administration. The Iraqi Karzai is Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi has not set foot in Iraq for 45 years, after he was involved in a bank fraud in Jordan. I do not know if Karzai has surrendered his American passport yet or not, and I suppose Chalabi will be another advocate for dual citizenship.

The anger against a Chalabi-Garner-Franks administration is already evident on the streets of Iraq. This does not equate to any sympathy for the Baath Party. Saddam's excesses have destroyed the Baathists. Since cynicism is a natural outcome of dissent, some seemingly preposterously linkages are being made. There is certainly the extraordinary matter of a whole Cabinet that disappeared into thick air ---the air was thick with American satellites and roving eyes and warheads. One television station has shown footage of Saddam alive after the heavy bombing that was meant to have killed him. How could he have vanished so neatly, and with his family, his colleagues and their relatives? The buzz originates from a banished past: the allegation, repeated by American insiders now ready to talk, that Saddam Hussein was on the CIA payroll when a law student in Cairo. In 1963 the CIA's Cairo bureau planned the coup that overthrew the pro-Soviet Government of General Abdel-Karim Kassem in Baghdad. The agency was helpful again when Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr organised the internal putsch in 1968; Saddam took over from his protege in 1979. Was there a last-minute deal between Saddam and the Americans in which four full Republican divisions disappeared instead of making a stand in Baghdad, thereby saving their own as well as American lives? No one knows, and perhaps no one will ever know for certain. But such whispers are the brushwood of new fires that seek to burn as fiercely against the despot as the invader.

The biggest miscalculation that George Bush made was to believe that the Shias of Iraq would not be loyal to their nation. In a sense both Saddam and Bush miscalculated. Saddam thought he could mobilise support inside Iraq indefinitely for himself by confronting America. And Bush thought he could mobilise support inside Iraq for America by confronting Saddam. The facts were askance of perception in both cases. Paradoxically, by removing Saddam Hussein, George Bush may have released the Shias from any ambivalence; the despot has gone, now the foreigner must leave. A demand is already being heard in Iraq, that Shias and Sunnis must unite to confront foreign occupation. This will appear romantic to the hard-boiled, but Iraq is in ferment, and passion creates new equations. Those who dwell too strongly on the differences forget that for many centuries Persians and Arabs, Shias and Sunnis harmonised well enough to create the infrastructure of the substantial empires that were ruled from Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo.

This confrontation between a resurgent Iraqi people, energising along the way other Arabs, and the American alliance, is not inevitable, but it is difficult to see how it can be prevented, given the initial American impulses. Bush preferred to protect the oil ministry building while permitting the loot of Iraq's priceless cultural heritage of over 170,000 pieces from 5,000 years of civilisation. These were the memories of Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian, Greek, Parthian, Sassanid, Arab and Jewish culture and religion. The Baath Party may have been despotic, but they were not Taliban. Did Bush need to remind the world of an analogy that he must resent---the destruction of Baghdad's cultural heritage by the Mongols?

The first construction contract, as reported, has been awarded to Bechtel; and Jay Garner is in charge of the 'civilian' administration despite his avowed bias towards Israel. Was any of this necessary?

The Bush -Blair answer is to establish a Palestinian state, and Ariel Sharon has been requested, very politely, to start delivering. But Israel has already conveyed 14 objections to the famous Bush road map towards a Palestine state. That is for starters. Don't be surprised if the Palestinians get blamed as traffic jams clog this road map.

Wars can be won in three or thirty days. The management of its consequences is a longer process. Bush and Blair may have noticed the deafening silence with which their victory has been greeted by the rest of the world. The cheering has been restricted to Washington and Tel Aviv.

The moment may be on the side of the victors, but time could be on the side of the defeated.

21st Century Media

Pak may witness Iran- type revolution

By B L Kak

Pakistan seems to have entered the most crucial phase, with highly ominous signals vis-a-vis the shape of events to come having been noticed by both its people and rulers. People are divided. Politicians are divided. The bureaucracy is divided. And there is a sharp division within Pakistan’s armed forces, particularly the Army.

The ruler in uniform, soldier-President Gen. Parvez Musharraf, is in a fix, not powerful enough, not fully equipped—politically speaking—to take on his foes in his country’s political class and armed forces. He just cannot deny that he himself as well as others, including contemporary historians,stand stumped with the spectacular rise of the extremist religious groups operating under the banner of the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

The MMA, an alliance of six groups, is in power in the NWFP (North West Frontier Province). The MMA is part of the coalition Government in neighbouring Baluchistan. These two regions may represent only 14 per cent of Pakistan’s population. But the fact remains that the two provinces are highly sensitive as they share a long border with Afghanistan and a small border with Iran.

Iran’s Islamic fundamentalists have already focused their eyes on Afghanistan and Pakistan. These fundamentalists have reasons to be satisfied with the massive surge of the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal, considering the fact that the spectacular rise of the MMA in NWFP and other Islamic rebels in Baluchistan was primarily due to the unconcealed anger and anguish among the majority Pashtuns and Baluchis in the two provinces against the US-led campaign against Muslim Afghanistan.

The moderates in Islamabad’s power corridors—they are numerically smaller than the hardliners—failed to prevent the MMA from capturing the centre stage of electoral politics. It had to happen as military rulers of Pakistan did not want the mainstream parties and political players to arrive on the scene as instruments of consequence. If that kind of situation were to be allowed, the Musharraf camp would be left with no option but to bite the dust.

Islamic fundamentalism finds source of energy and sustenance from almost all areas in Pakistan, other than the two provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan. And precisely after a sudden resurgence of interest of vast numbers of the people of the two volatile provinces in Muslim fanaticism and fundamentalism, observers and analysts, both Pakistani and non-Pakistani, began to discuss the question: Is Pakistan poised to witness the type of revolution that Iran experienced in 1979 ?

Such a possibility cannot be ruled out, if on were to take into account the nexus in Pakistan between Muslim clerics and a powerful section of the Army. In fact, fears in this regard have also been the outcome of the unbridled freedom, enjoyed on Pakistani soil, by a host of jihadi outfits.

Gen. Parvez Musharraf is, of course, under the heavy pressure from the international community, particularly the United States, to act decisively against the terrorist infrastructure in his country. But he has, significantly, allowed himself to go on record about the "limitations" involved in what is termed as "freelance jihadis" in the face of the "stubborn" attitude adopted by India.

A study of a 43-page report, prepared by International Crisis Group (ICG), has brought to the fore quite a few revealng stories about the process of Islamisation in Pakistan with the tacit approval of the military. Based in Brussels, the ICG is a non-Governmental organisation (NGO).

The report contains quite a bit of material to establish Gen. Musharraf’s failure to live up to his "pledge to crack down" on extremist religious elements. The report has made a pointed reference to the "fact" that he made common cause with the military and the clergy on issues such as Kashmir.

The report says: "The economic clout of the religious parties remains considerable. They continue to collect funds in the name of madrassas, mosques, welfare projects and jehad. Despite promises, the Musharraf government has yet to introduce a law on financial oversight of religious institutions. Religious fiefs continue to operate without any regulatory framework, and reforms of madrassas were stillborn".

Another finding contained in the ICG report: "The government (of Pakistan) has reversed even minor steps, such as procedural changes in the blasphemy laws. It has also failed to come up with legal provisions to institutionalise an ad hoc ban on jihadi organisations, currently enforced through executive orders. It has yet to curb activities of banned groups, whose literature circulates unchecked and who routinely hold jihad conferences".

Finding number three: "Neither the MMA (Mutahida Muslim-e-Amal) nor any other religious group can or desire to confront the military. Nor do they feel the need since the Musharraf administration has simultaneously appeased the clergy, hoping to use them against its domestic opponents. Although Musharraf rules through decrees and ordinances, with virtually absolute authority, he had done next to nothing to restraint or reform the religious sector".

Finding number four: "By assisting the military’s electoral manoeuvres, including formation of suitable governments in the centre and the provinces, the MMA has obtained major concessions, such as the release from jail of party workers and the dropping of several prosecutions".

MMA’s decision not to join the ruling combine at the Centre was a tactical one. Hence, the Brussle-based ICG’s finding number five: "This strategy helps it to promote an anti-American agenda while avoiding direct confrontation with the military’s support for the US-led war on terrorism".

It is generally believed that moderate sections of Pakistani society continue to be marginalised. This is not the case with religious parties. These parties and their causes are flourishing. And the report’s finding number six: "The religious Right, jihad and Islamisation have once again gained currency in Pakistan’s political life".