Future Chinese threats from Myanmar

By Maj Gen V K Madhok (Retd)

The greatest challenge which India faces in the near future is a scenario, when two military dictatorships on India's (Pakistan) and Eastern (Myanmar) flanks can be brought with tacit support from China, under one umbrella (ISI). In a worst case situation, it could mean a coordinated second proxy way by the separatist movements in the North-East, against the Indian union with bases and arms freely available in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal. India's political leadership will therefore do well to do some homework to obviate the development of such a possibility.

Yet it seems strange that no important Indian political leader has visited Myanmar in the last 14 years. During this period of New Delhi's isolation, the Chinese have expanded their influence. It is rightly said, that Myanmar's foreign policy is being drafted in Beijing.

And with the change in China's political leadership, the scenario painted above might turn out real unless India does something about it. The significance of this country which is really India's strategic eastern flank and shares a 1600 km (approximately) long border with the sensitive States of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram (also Bangladesh) has been lost over the years. Yet it was in Myanmar (erstwhile Burma) that Indian troops fought many a battle under Indian and British leadership against the Japanese in the Second World War. Names like Wingate's Raiders, Slim, Irrawady and Chindwin bring back many memories of India Soldier's deeds. Burma campaign was prescribed as a study for entrance examination to India's Staff College. Yet India has kept itself away from its neighbour for reasons difficult to explain.

Although a small beginning was made with ex-Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh's visit to Myanmar on Feb 12, 2001 for opening Rd Tamu-Kalewa. But that is where the interaction ended. The political mileage gained from this event was not progressed.

There is a perception doing the rounds that in the long run, Myanmar-a-military dictatorship, which is more or less reduced to a Chinese satellite, with Americans enforcing sanctions and taking other initiatives to restore democracy in Myanmar, is becoming a battle ground (initially with diplomatic and economic initiatives) between the US and China.

Accordingly, there is an urgent need to assess as to: What is the situation within Myanmar? What initiatives the US is likely to take? And how can a Sino-Myanmar nexus (like the Sino-Pak nexus) impact on India" seven North-Eastern States-Connected only with a narrow 30 km long corridor with the rest of the country?

Myanmar faces several crucial issues in the immediate and distant future. The roots of which lie in its military's ambitions to retain supremacy. On top of the list is Madam Suu Kyi, leader of the Nation League of Democracy and Military Juntas betenoir. She wants the military to quit. Therefore she continues to remain the Chief obstacle to SLORC's (State Law and Order Restoration Council) now renamed as SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) future ambitions.

From amongst the remaining issues one could choose: The continuing insurgency and pro-democracy movements inside Myanmar. The threat of an election under International or UN supervision, redrafting of the constitution to enable the military to retain a tight grip on the country, foreign pressures and stern criticism of human rights violations. Therefore, while the military is caught see-sawing in the process of crucial decisions which it must take to meet future challenges, Suu Kyi is kept now in and out of house arrest and prevented from conducting any party work.

Madame Suu Kyi has now been set free for the last six months. She has been given an option to leave Myanmar for good. But she would rather stay on and be considered a patriot then disappearing in exile. The sympathy of the outside world clearly lies with her- the winner of 1991 Nobel Prize for peace. The SPDC's worry is: if they let her stay on in the country, she will again become the focus of a pro-democracy movement which the military will find difficult to contain. And therefore this remains a genuine worry for the SPDC.

On the other hand, the military has been becoming stronger. With a State controlled media and stringent laws, it has better control over the country. Foreign aid has been coming in. Thai, Japanese and European businessmen have invested a lot of money to establish hotels and other joint ventures in areas adjacent to the golden Triangle. Myanmar's armed forces too have been expending with Chinese help. And massive arms supplies have been pouring in from Beijing in accordance with a Sino-Myanmar arms agreement signed in 1989. The Army has already touched half a million mark. Besides, it will become as much dependent on Chinese defence hardware in the future as Pakistan is today.

Concurrently, Madame Suu Kyi cannot be held without international and superpower support. Therefore towards this end a personal letter from ex-Present Bill Clinton to Suu Kyi which was delivered to her by the then American Ambassador and which promised full support to her is significant.

Besides, an Amnesty international report released sometime ago stated that life in Myanmar was characterised by fear, intimidation and widespread human rights violations. So far as drugs and narcotics and concerned, Myanmar continues to remain the largest producer of opium in the world. Which alongwith other narcotics is being smuggled all over Asia, Europe and the US. The Americans are in the process of finalising their policies in South Asia which will take concrete shape in the coming months and as soon as they have settled scores with Iraq.

The situation in Myanmar therefore indicates the types of issues the US will be confronted with and for which its foreign policy is likely to be tasked. That is, to support the democratic movement more vigorously, condemn human rights violations, combat drug and narcotic traffic, overall encouragement and to help establish a regime which is sympathetic towards its foreign policy goals. Finally, to neutralise Chinese influence.

India should therefore be prepared to see fresh initiative by the US, specially to tackle those issues which concern the restoration of democracy. One of these is the visible friendly relations-US is trying to establish with Myanmar's neighbour Bangladesh. Further, US sees a role for India in its foreign policy and considers India as the centre of gravity in South Asia. At an appropriate time, alongwith support from various Nobel Prize winners and their countries, there is likely to be pressure on SPDC to give full freedom of Suu Kyi, let her stay in the country and permit her to campaign for elections. And when that is done, to convass for elections under UN supervision. Thereby exerting sufficient pressure on the military to abide by people's verdict.

This appears to be a tricky situation for the SPDC but that appears to be its fate. However, the military have embarked on a plan to pre-empt all this by redrafting the constitution for which the first convention was called in January 1994 and for which subsequent meetings have been held. Therefore, with this tool, the elections can be delayed on one pretext or the other. Conversely, sould an elected government come into power with a popular leader like Suu kyi, it may scrap the constitution drafted by the military regime. So far as insurgency is concerned, though under control it has not been totally eliminated. The Karens and Kachins continue to agitate for independent states. Although some efforts have been made by China and Thailand to persuade the dissident leaders to negotiate for a settlement but not concrete results have been achieved so far. Nor does there seem to be a final and visible resolution of the problem in the near future.

As regards India, after Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Yanghon in 1987, the only high dignitary who visited Myanmar was India's foreign secretary and that too only for two days towards the end of March 1993. This visit was followed by Indian Army and Naval Chief's in 1994 and January 2001 respectively. Therefore one wonders as to what were the reasons that no Indian President or Prime Minister visited Myanmar for more than a decade. A country with which India has really no dispute worth the name.

During Rajiv Gandhi's visit a proposal was mooted to have more cooperation between Indo-Myanmar armed forces particularly to resolve border incidents. This made sense. In any case, this was a good starting point. But this was not followed up. Accordingly, majority of the current problems like the drug trade, which has had disastrous effects on the Manipur youth, the current activities of NSCN (K)-the Burmese Nagas, could have been eliminated. In addition, the provision of training bases and other support to ULFA across the border inside Myanmar, smuggling of arms inside Mizoram and a host of other connected activities could have been nipped in the bud had the agreed cooperation taken place.

India's policy makers need to understand that the main issue in Myanmar is the increasing Chinese influence.

And how it can be used to support the separatist movements in India's NE together with support from Bangladesh and Nepal. That by keeping away from Myanmar would only aggravate future threats now seen at the horizon and therefore, the issues need to be debated in the Parliament.

By K. S. Bajpai

As 59-year-old Hu Jintao prepares to rule China beginning March 2003; it is a transition from old guards to the new generation, who had not experienced the ‘Long March’. China as a nation is an enigma to the outside world, and it is an expansionist country, least respectful to the international laws and conventions. As a medium-sized developing country, Chinese leaders have ambitions to join the big league nations. Let it be admitted that the Chinese economy has grown, and today, it is only next to the United States of America. But the ‘Dragon Kingdom’ remains divided as Taiwan continues to maintain its separate identity, thanks to the American support. Then, there is the question of the Tibetan identity which is a major political issue for the Chinese leadership. Though the Sino-Indian relations are stable, but the demarcation of border remains a ticklish issue. China is persistently refusing to acknowledge Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim as Indian territories, and is occupying 4,500 miles in Aksai Chin in Ladakh. Beijing also has settled its border disputes with Russia and Vietnam, but has no inclination to do the same with India. Though Russia for economic reasons is its major supplier of the state-of-art war technologies, but the Russian fear of occupation of Siberia by the Chinese is haunting Moscow.

In the changing world order, Mr. Jintao will preside over the country during a critical period, when China is expected to continue to rise as a great power and must, therefore, overcome numerous foreign policy challenges. The ‘ carrot and stick’ policy pursued by the Chinese leaders has failed to impress Taiwan. If Deng Xiaoping came up with the ‘ one country, two systems’ formula which permits Taiwan to retain its existing political system, Jiang Zemin went further through his ‘eight point’ proposal in 1995. However, the rise of pro-independence voices in Taiwan, intense lobbying by the Taiwanese authorities to get international recognition for their ‘independent statehood’, and Beijing’s deadline to Taiwan to accede to the mainland by 2010 are leading to a even unconfirmed reports of a growing Taiwanese interest in nuclear weapons to deter a Chinese attack.

The balance of power in East Asia and the security guarantee given by the US to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act, 1978, make it more difficult for China to launch a full invasion. At the same time, Mr. Hu cannot be seen as compromising on Taiwan. It is more likely that he will encourage Taiwan to at least agree to a ‘one China’ principle and seek reunification through negotiation.

The other test for Mr. Hu would be Tibet where he has served a full term as the provincial Communist Party of China boss. While there, Mr. Hu merely followed the tough approach of the Chinese leadership and there is little indication now that he will soften his attitude after becoming President. And, international support for the Tibetan cause is increasingly limited to concern over human rights violations. In an indication of a softening of his stand, the Dalai Lama, of late, has been sending signals that he is willing to settle for something ‘less than freedom’. It would be interesting to see if Mr. Hu buys peace with the Tibetans.

Mr. Hu will also have to ensure a peaceful and stable peripheral environment around China to enable it to focus on development tasks. Although the 2000 white paper on National Defence defined the overall security situation in the Asia-Pacific as ‘stable’, China is uncomfortable on three counts. First, the Senkaku (Daioyu) Islands dispute apart, Japan’s growing assertion as a military power continues to be a cause of consternation. It was this factor, which led China to oppose the renewal of the US-Japan security alliance and their proposal to jointly develop and deploy theatre missile defence (TMD) systems. Second, China is also not happy about the prospects of a ‘unified’ Korea. Under Mr. Jiang, China had followed a two-fold policy: support reunification initiatives and at the same time maintain "special’ relationships with the two entities. This balancing act is at best an ad hoc policy. Hence, the more the chances of Korean unification the more will be the pressure on Mr. Hu’s China to evolve an enduring policy in order to retain its influence over a unified Korea and discourage it from joining the US-Japan alliance. Third, China is also uncomfortable with the protracted wrangling over the South China Sea dispute. An inordinate delay will mean ‘energy insecurities’ in terms of oil and gas.

China is worried about the increasing US presence in the region. A US-dominated Central Asia will not only vitiate the stable strategic environment in the region but may also deny vital energy sources to China. The Chinese attempts to dissuade the US through several-coalition building exercise such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are unlikely to have any effect. With Islamic forces asserting themselves in the region, China’s province of Xinjiang, populated by the Uighurs, is increasingly becoming a target of fundamentalism, secessionism and terrorism. A challenge might come from Russia itself. The strategic partnership treaty of 2001 not withstanding, Russia will be loath to follow the Chinese lead for too long. As soon as it comes out of its economic stagnation, Moscow is bound to assert its presence not only in Central Asia but even beyond.

Beyond these regional problems, China also has enough to do at the international level. There is a broad consensus that its continued rise as a great power might even lead to superpower status! The debate is, however, about a more fundamental question: what kind of superpower would China like to be? Until the 1970s, its behaviour in the international arena was that of a ‘revisionist’ which was more interested in bringing down the existing system led by ‘hegemons’ such as the US. Witness, for example, Mao’s ‘two-camp’ theory in the 1950s and the ‘three-worlds’ theory in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, under Deng, China overcome its ideological barriers and started integrating itself with the international system. Under Mr. Jiang China has been more accommodative on major international issues and has so far belied the ‘China threat theories’ manufactured by the Pentagon. Its initiatives in creating regional security architectures, promotion of confidence-building measures, resolution of many a bilateral dispute and active participation in peacekeeping and peace-building ventures under the UN are clear indicators of a flexible attitude. But the process of political socialisation is far from complete. Mr. Hu has to ensure that China continues to rise in a peaceful manner. Only time will tell if China develops as a benevolent superpower eager to cooperate with the US or as one more interested in carving out a separate geopolitical space run by ‘Pax Sinica’. Also, Mr. Hu would have to do more image-building exercises on at least two counts: human rights and democracy. It is on these two issues that there are sharp and often irreconcilable differences between China and the West. Finally, Mr. Hu would need to seek acceptability for Chinese perspectives on international relations. The security practices of the post-Mao leadership have gradually led to the evolution of a ‘new security concept’, which aims at augmenting comprehensive national strength, creating a peaceful environment and maintaining internal stability.

At the same time, China is also promoting the idea of an alternative world order based on multi-polarity, non-interference in internal affairs and sovereign equality. In many ways, therefore, Mr. Hu has his tasks cut out. His success, however, will depend on factors such as his ability to control factionalism in the CPC, support of the PLA, his ability to continue the reforms, high growth rate and enrichment of China, and above all, his ability to overcome the legacy of Mr. Jiang. With very little international experience, he does not seem to have a vision of his own and, therefore, is not expected to do a ‘Gorbachev’. Yet, once firmly ensconced in power, he may not hesitate to undertake bold initiatives with regard to contentious issues, as was done by Deng. We probably have to wait another five years. INAV