Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
Just a few weeks ago Daily Excelsior carried my article on Hybrid War. Recalling that makes reading this piece easier and more effective. Briefly I had explained that most modern wars of the world are no longer pitched around conventional weapons and strategy and the physical capture of territory by show of force. Nations today employ a variety of means such as terrorism, political subterfuge, ideology, psychological operations and propaganda, cyber technology, financial networks and media, to name just a few domains, to launch ‘long wars’ which are also fought by proxy. The stamina for such a war is immense and the results can be awaited for more than a generation or two. If anywhere in the world a hybrid war of this nature is being conducted with impunity it is by Pakistan against India, and it is primarily over J&K. In such wars deniability is another major weapon as much is the use of political diplomacy to paint the adversary red and the perpetrator blue.
Nagrota is yet another dot on the graph of events of this hybrid war. 2016 itself had Pathankot and Uri among the major cross border terror strikes launched by Pakistan sponsored terror groups. However there were some interesting aspects which relate to this event. The Pakistan Army had denied the surgical strikes as a figment of India’s imagination. The continuous response by the terror groups and the Pakistan Army on the LoC and in the hinterland of J&K confirms how the response to the surgical strikes has been orchestrated. These strikes did much damage to the Pakistan Army’s ego which could not admit to India’s success. Instead it released its response progressively in the hinterland of the Valley, on the LoC and Jammu IB and now at Nagrota culminating with the departure of Gen Raheel Sharif. By launching the Nagrota terror attack on the day that the new Pakistan Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa was taking charge his predecessor was attempting to tie him down to the continuance of the policy on sponsored terror strikes. Raheel Sharif was a known India baiter because of his personal grudges. His Uncle in the 1965 Indo Pak Conflict and his elder brother in 1971 had been killed at the hands of the Indian Army.
If hybrid war is well understood then the Nagrota terror attack should only draw our concern not our dismay or surprise. This is because in such wars there are no fronts and no flanks or rear. The entire geographical expanse is open. Most nations and armies make the mistake of countering hybrid war through an approach involving one on one, soldier on soldier and weapon on weapon. They forget that deception, subterfuge and complete lack of ethics forms an essential element of the strategy here. The objectives are not soldiers and their defenses alone but also civilian targets and most importantly military billets where soldiers are supposed to relax, train and conduct their administration. The moral high that terror groups and their masters get by targeting military families, army schools and recreational institutions makes for this strategy. The targeted army has to look inwards and fingers will invariably be pointed at it accusing it of inefficiency, insufficient alert and breach of security. Causing this dissension in the target nation and society is considered a moral victory for the sponsor of the hybrid war. This is exactly what is happening after Nagrota. The Indian Army stands exposed and our own countrymen are questioning its efficacy in defending its own assets in the face of the onslaught from Pakistan sponsored terror groups.
The unfair criticism being launched by segments of the supposed intellectual community within India belies that very segment’s understanding of hybrid war and the challenges that it brings in its wake. It’s a long war; there will be ‘win much’ for India but also ‘lose some’. Yet, the planners and leaders of India’s security sometimes forget past events. We were hit by Fedayeen suicide squads in 1999, a phase which lasted till 2006. We improved our security in rear areas but ever since then have done sweet little to enhance it further. Our attention remains focused at the front, the rear remains exposed. Most infrastructure and equipment, including emphasis on training has been concentrated at the LoC. We need to remember that in hot war all the garrisons in the Jammu, Udhampur, Nagrota zone will be vacated off troops with only rear elements located there. They need to have necessary security infrastructure to enable the areas to be secured by small rear parties and other security elements.
There is an increasing tendency among media and therefore within the public to question the viability and effectiveness of the surgical strikes. Unfortunately the hype around the event has created a perception that with the launch of these strikes by India Pakistan would be forced to retract its proxy war and these would act as deterrence for further operations by Pakistan sponsored terrorists. Surgical strikes were launched with a limited purpose and were never supposed to act as deterrence; they never carried that element of lethality which could seal the options for Pakistan. Perhaps in our enthusiasm some who understand the strategic side of these issues should have taken the trouble to explain what had been achieved. The surgical strikes were a form of strategic messaging of intent; that the Rubicon was being crossed; that the strikes were a vanguard action to demonstrate that we too could respond the way we wished; that much more could follow. There is much difference between strategic messaging and deterrence. Deterrence has to carry much more weight while strategic messaging is the tip of the capability which is exposed. Pakistan has chosen to ignore that messaging and that is something which was expected. It has not caught the Indian Government by surprise in any way. A strategy drawn up forty years ago and under execution for twenty seven years by Pakistan is not going to be ceased on just strategic messaging. Does this mean that our next response will be much more robust? There is a range of options not necessarily all military. That is where the understanding of hybrid operations becomes important for planners. No doubt Indian planners will examine all these and respond in a time frame and with actions of our choosing; very much the same message which went out when the Indian DGMO revealed our response after the Uri attack.
Lastly, the public need not be dismayed by losses which will occur in such a proxy war. It must express its concern and that itself is a messaging to the deep state in Pakistan. The most important thing remains and that is the need to withstand the long and vicious proxy war unleashed on us. India will fight back with all the resources and will at its disposal. It needs the full support of the people in executing that.
(The writer is a former GOC of India’s Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies)
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