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EDITORIAL

DE-ESCALATION

The reports of Pakistani regular army withdrawal to peace time positions on International Border in J&K State indicate that Pakistan has no fears of any Indian aggression to recover PoK or cross the IB to create problems for Pakistan. To be precise India had made it very .....more

POWER CURTAILMENT

Acting Chief Minister Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Shah reassures hard-pressed and hapless citizens of Jammu that power curtailment schedule will soon be reviewed to provide badly needed ....more

Delhi won’t talk to ‘terror merchants’
UN resolutions on Kashmir are irrelevant: India


From B L Kak

A rapprochement between Islamabad and New Delhi ...
more

The India-China divide

By S. K. Singh

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) dislike for the 'hard-line Hindu...
more

Fallacies in food security

By Satyendra Pratap Singh

Even as the government celebrates the record foodgrain...
more

EDITORIAL

DE-ESCALATION

The reports of Pakistani regular army withdrawal to peace time positions on International Border in J&K State indicate that Pakistan has no fears of any Indian aggression to recover PoK or cross the IB to create problems for Pakistan. To be precise India had made it very clear right from day one and even during peak of Kargil war that Indian forces are under orders not to cross LoC/IB under any circumstances which if done would have escalated the limited war in Kargil into full-fledged war with Pakistan. Present Chief Executive of Pakistan who is also Chief of Pak Army Staff Gen Musharraf is thus quite calculating and does take the initiative of ordering withdrawal of troops from International Border. By doing so he kills two birds with one stone. First, he wants to prove to the international community his peaceful intentions vis-a-vis defusing tensions on borders between India and Pakistan. Second, he wants to tell India that he is less hawkish than his dislodged predecessor Nawaz Sharif. But while doing so he ignores similar withdrawal from Line of Control. It is this aspect that is crucial to de-escalation.

Indian Army Chief General V P Malik correctly analyses the difference between Mujahideens and Pak regular army. According to him they are chips of the same block in as much as insurgency is controlled and master-minded by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which in turn derives its strengh from Pak Army. These are the regular Pak Army personnel who run the ISI and they revert to Army soon after completing their deputation with ISI. ISI in turn has enough of narco-dollars and full control on all types of mercenaries, their training programme and assigning targets to them which also includes supply of sophisticated weapons. To that extent the ongoing proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir which has completed ten years still continue and Indian Army perforce is involved because this war is foreign sponsored. The second point relates to the fact that most of the trouble is on LoC and unless with drawal of troops is ordered from LOC, tensions shall persist recklessly. For instance Pak gunners have not stopped firing and border people this side of LoC continue to live in perpetual fear. To prove his honest intentions for peace with Indian and defusing borders, Musharraf must order, stoppage of cross border firing immediately so that innocent citizens can be spared the agony of dislocation from their hearths and homes with all the resultant woeful plight. It is just as well that Pakistan starts withdrawing from LoC to make the de-escalation meaningful exercise which shall definitely be treated by India as confidence building measure. The third point is Siachen Glacier which comes under repetitive fire from Pakistan soldiers. Wisdom must dawn on current Pak rulers that they cannot gain an inch in Siachin Glacier and the next best thing is to order cessation of hostilities there. As long as Pak troops remain on LoC and resort to indiscrimnate firing, mere withdrawal from International Border is not going to be taken seriously.

Together with the above, Musharraf has also to stop cross-border terrorism which ought to include closure of training camps for ultras in PoK and Pakistan. In fact, this is precondition to any meaningful resumption of dialogue with Pakistan. Military rule is just a week old and one definitely cannot do any business with this regime. Pakistan has already been suspended from membership of Commonwealth. Increasing pressure is being built by European Union countries for resumption of democracy in Pakistan within stipulated time-frame. IMF/World Bank as also other donor countries have kept the loans/grants on hold. By far the most clinching factor is the indication from Washington that it is ready to do business with Musharraf Government. Perhaps, entire coup had the prior American concurrence because gradually America is cooling down as regards military dictatorship in Pakistan and its criticism. This is so because Pak Army right from its inception has Washington blend and there is very close understanding between ISI and CIA. It is certain that America hates to see Talibanisation of Pakistan. Nawaz failed to checkmate them. Musharraf though a staunch Sunny Muslim is being considered as a better bet as regards saving Pakistan from total Talibanisation, particularly when Pak have nuclear weapons which could be passed unto terrorists and other Pan-Islamic countries to the detriment of American interests. All such American concerns notwithstanding, one tends to welcome at least some aspects of stated American policy and advice to military rulers of Pakistan. American spokesman wants withdrawal of Pak troops from LoC as well before meaningful dialogue can be initiated in the sub-continent.

That explains why Indian Army Chief General Malik sees not much in Pak announcement of withdrawal from international border. In fact, neither Indian Army nor the Government is prepared to take anyone at its face value due to Pak aggression in Kargil. India thus likes to finish terrorism with a heavy hand. General Malik provides interesting figures of good gains for India and heavy losses amongst Pak infiltrated terrorists in J&K during September. One hopes that ensuing winter would be decisive for neutralising mercenaries entrenched in thick forest and inaccessible heights on either side of Peer Panchal.

POWER CURTAILMENT

Acting Chief Minister Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Shah reassures hard-pressed and hapless citizens of Jammu that power curtailment schedule will soon be reviewed to provide badly needed relief. The very fact that he feels wrong has been to the people and it needs to be undone shows his pragmatic approach. There is no denying the fact that consumers of all hues continue to lead primitive life in the absence of proper and adequate power supply. They have been put to unnecessary hardships and humiliated with such shabby treatment. In fact, it has never happened either before the insurgency or during the 10 year long turbulence. It was also not so during the three year popular rule although as regards power curtailment and enhancement in tariff, it has worked against the peoples interests. No wonder spate of protests continue unabatted from this or that organisation because long curtailments are bound to create physical, mental and psychic problems for children of all ages. It has also paralysed whatever is left of the industry in the State besides affecting the trading community badly. Above all such curtailments have added to the pollution of the city as never before because of nauseating smoke and noise generated by the power generators in all the bazars. One really wonders why Pollution Control Board is silent. The Government must remember that Apex Court has given several rulings on enforcing pollution control measures in Delhi. In a way, such things are definite health hazards. The only tangible solution lies in stopping this curtailment business. Citizens cannot be penalised for the defective administration in such indiscriminate manner. Acting CM Mohi-ud-Din Shah will earn the goodwill and gratitude of all citizens if orders for stopping such curtailments are issued immediately. Revenue collections will pick up as soon adequate power is supplied.

Delhi won’t talk to ‘terror merchants’
UN resolutions on Kashmir are irrelevant: India


From B L Kak

A rapprochement between Islamabad and New Delhi has been ruled out, with Pakistan’s military ruler, Gen. Parvez Musharraf, questioning the validity of Kashmir’s accession to India and reaffirming his regime’s resolve to continue moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri people for their right of self-determination.

And even as Gen Musharraf has announced a unilateral military de-escalation along the borders with India, New Delhi has let it be known that it cannot be thrilled since Pakistan’s military ruler has merely talked about the pullback from the international borders with India. In the absence of a specific mention about the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir in Gen. Musharraf’s message, India, a top Government source said, "does require to be cautious and vigilant".

Commenting on Gen. Musharraf’s observation that India and Pakistan "must sincerely work towards resolving their problems, especially the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir", the source said, at the end of Prime Minister, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee’s consultations with his External Affairs Minister, Mr Jaswant Singh, and Home Minister, Mr LK Advani, that even as Mr Vajpayee had already demonstrated India’s sincerity by favouring talks with Pakistan on all subjects, New Delhi’s reservations on the question of resuming the dialogue with Islamabad required to be studied in the context of the absence of a democratic Government in Pakistan at this stage.

The source regretted: "Instead of initiating measures to create conditions conducive to the resumption of India-Pakistan talks, Pakistan’s military ruler has sent out wrong signals. And his offer of ‘unconditional’ talks with India on all issues is a mix-up of political and military strategy vis-à-vis Jammu and Kashmir. His apparent intention is to take New Delhi for a ride".

The Government of India has taken note of Gen Musharraf’s talk of military de-escalation on the international borders with India. However, the Vajpayee Government, it was officially stated, cannot be expected to present bouquets to the authors of this move, since Pakistani troops along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir continue to be "hostile" to India.

The Vajpayee Government, it was argued, cannot be faulted for its reservations, considering the fact that Gen Musharraf had, on the one hand, offered to hold an ‘unconditional result-oriented’ dialogue with New Delhi on all issues including Kashmir and, on the other, had deliberately sent out a clear signal of his regime’s support to anti-India militants and terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Government source made it clear that India cannot and should not be expected to hold talks with ‘terror merchants’. Talks with Islamabad, the source explained, can be result-oriented only after the end of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

Jammu and Kashmir State, the source emphasised, "is an integral part of India", and, hence, the talk of the self-determination right of the people of Kashmir "is preposterous". The source described as "outdated" the UN resolutions on Kashmir and said: "New Delhi would like Islamabad to proceed within the framework of the Shimla Agreement, as the UN resolutions are not only outdated but also irrelevant".

Official circles attach much significance to Gen. Musharraf’s open message to the militants and mercenaries in Jammu and Kashmir about Islamabad’s continuing support to them. The message has surfaced at a time when Gen. Musharraf’s action against the Nawaz Sharief establishment is being seen in Pakistan as ‘heroic’ because he(Gen. Musharraf) dared to defy Washington’s warnings,and, secondly, when the Taliban would continue to run their terrorist training camps for Pakistani nationals in Afghanistan.

These training camps, where scores of Kashmiri militants, too, have already been trained, were centred by Pakistani Armed Forces to pursue their strategic objectives. And "attack" by Mr Nawaz Sharief, before he was toppled, on them was perceived by the Pak Armed forces as a direct attack on them at the behest of the United States.

According to one section of Indian defence analysts, the Pakistani Armed Forces which have not been able to get over the trauma of the defeat in the war with India in 1971, may be waiting for an opportunity. These analysts charge Pakistani Armed Forces with behaving irrationally in their dealings with India, arguing that the Kargil adventure of May-June 1999 has further reinforced "this irrational behaviour".

The India-China divide

By S. K. Singh

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) dislike for the 'hard-line Hindu nationalist' Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is no secret. The shifts in India's China policy since May 1998, as evident in the nuclear and missile arena, military spending and this pro-Tibet and pro-Taiwan views expressed by some ministers, are said to have undermined the key assumptions underlying China's India policy. Conversations with officials and strategic analysts reveal that the Chinese are concerned over the rise of BJP as a major political force in Indian politics and its implications for China's strategic objective of supremacy in Asia. Before Pokhran II, China's India-watchers had convinced themselves that there would be no significant or fundamental changes in the BJP-led government's nuclear policy and that BJP-led India would not take any major strategic initiative (such as overt nuclearisation, strategic alliance with the US, or support to Tibetan independence).

Although the aspirations for major power status are held by almost all Indian political parties (barring the Communist who fear provoking their Chinese masters), the BJP covets that status most ardently and is the most willing to assert it through military policy. Beijing would prefer a non-BJP weak government like the left-dominated United Front (UF) government before Pokhran II, and the successive Congress governments that preceded it, which had fine-tuned Sino-Indian bilateral relations by playing second fiddle to an assertive China.

A policy paper prepared for the Chinese leadership has recommended "targeting the BJP" as its policies have eroded Beijing's leverage against New Delhi. One article compared India with Nazi Germany and Iraq arguing that since the end of the cold war, India had become too powerful and ambitious (for example, demanding a permanent seat on the UN Security Council) and warned that if India does not wish to suffer the fate of Japan in the 1940s or Iraq in the 1990s, it should give up its ambition for regional hegemony and take concrete steps to improve relations with China.

The main objective of China's Asia policy has always been to prevent the rise of an Asian rival or peer competitor to challenge its status as the Asia-Pacific's sole 'Middle Kingdom'. As an old Chinese saying goes, "one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers." That China does not want India to emerge as an equal is evident from its opposition to India's membership of the P-5 (UN Security Council), N-5 (Nuclear Club), ASEAN (Asia-Europe Summit), and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).

Speaking at the Munich security conference in February 1999, National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra hinted at the BJP government's much broader political ambition by predicting that "in the 21st century a new security order is likely to arise in the Asia-Pacific region in which India would be granted as much respect and deference by the US and others as is China today." Beijing India-watchers believe that only a firm policy based on absolute strength and proactive containment of India will force the BJP-led government to act soberly towards China. Beijing knows that while China's emergence as a great power has been accepted by Western and Asian nations, India's claim to great power is yet to be accepted. So it is in the CCP's interests to keep the BJP out of power. Beijing has been blamed by India's intelligence agencies, media and some politicians for the overthrow of the BJP-led government in April 1999. But once again BJP-led coalition is back in power.

Strange as it may seem, the CCP has more in common with its bete noire, BJP, than its counterpart in India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist). In the BJP, the CCP has met its match, the latter's 'communist' credentials notwithstanding. Contrary to the popular conception of the CCP and the BJP occupying opposite ends of the political spectrum, the BJP is the CCP's mirror image. Just as the CCP believes in the superiority of the Han race, Han civilisation and the Han culture while displaying patronising and condescending attitude towards minorities such as Tibetans, Mongols and Muslims and downplaying the repeated colonisation of the Han race by Inner Asian tribes such as Mongols, Manchus and Hsingnus, the BJP believes in the superiority of the Hindu race, Hindu civilisation and Hindu culture while downplaying the repeated colonisation of India by Greek, Muslim and European invaders as a result of Hindu disunity and their contributions to Indian culture.

What is more, the CCP's goal of a unified 'Greater China's is not much different from the RSS/BJP's dream of 'Akhand Bharat'. Just as the Chinese Communists lay claim to territories annexed by non-Chinese Mongol and Manchu empires (such as Tibet, eastern Turkestan, Mongolia), the 'Akhand Bharat' (United India) concept includes territories (such as Burma and Sri Lanka) brought under control by the British. Both have long nurtured the belief that as the two oldest civilisations and once great powers which were subjected to centuries of foreign domination, they must acquire the full spectrum of economic, technological and military (conventional, nuclear and information warfare) capabilities in order to be dominant regionally and influential globally.

Furthermore, the BJP's slogan of 'prosperous and powerful country' bears remarkable resemblance to the CCP's national goal: 'rich country, strong military (fuguo qiangbing). Interestingly, both are courting the United States to help balance their relationships with each other until they are strong enough to do so on their own. Both want a new international status that is commensurate with their size, strength and potential. Historically and civilisationally, while China was the 'Middle Kingdom' of eastern Asia, India was as the 'Middle Kingdom' of southern Asia.

The two parties are thus manifestation of the growing nationalism in India and China. Both also share remarkable similarity in economic outlook and rhetorical excess, the BJP-led government is as aggressive in the pursuit of national interests as the CCP. Nor is it shy of flexing muscles and warning neighbours with 'serious consequences' if they don't behave _ just as the Chinese Communists have always done! Although both the CCP and BJP have been labelled 'fascist', 'militarist' and 'ultranationalist' parties by their critics, the reality is that both are nationalist parties deeply conscious of their countries' history, culture and civilisational heritage to humankind and committed to restoring their countries' great power status.

Both China after a century and India after a millennium of decline are keen to assume the great power roles they believe to be their historical and civilisational right. Both remain suspicious of each other's long-term agenda and intentions, and both see themselves as newly rising great Asian powers whose time has finally come. This means the BJP's resurgent India will face the CCP's rising China which will ensure a conflict of interests between the two giants unless their power competition is managed carefully. India-versus-China, not India-versus-Pakistan, has always been the main game in Asia.

The BJP-CCP clash is borne not out of conflicting, but complementary, visions for their respective countries. It is not so much a clash of civilisations as clash of the two 'Middle Kingdoms' which had historically dominated their respective spheres of influence, or rather the clash of identical world-views, similar aspirations and interests of two giants. INAV

Fallacies in food security

By Satyendra Pratap Singh

Even as the government celebrates the record foodgrain output this year NGOs have been pointing to the fragility of this performance. The growth in foodgrain production in the nineties is much less than it was in the eighties. And the production of coarse cereals, the diet of the poor, has not really changed all that much since the seventies. Despite the sharpness of these differences, this critique shares an error with the official view. It treats the problem of food security as one of adequate production within the country. It assumes that food security is assured as long as the national economy as a whole produces more foodgrains than can be bought within the country.

A major fallacy of this view has been popularised by Amartya Sen's Nobel Prize. The prize has focused attention on his legitimate argument that what matters is the availability of food to those who need it, and this is not guaranteed by adequate production alone. He has used the extreme case of famines to prove his point, but it is not difficult to recognise the principle in situations that are closer to normal. Compare a situation where a country is a net importer of foodgrains but ensures that everyone has as much food as they want, with one where food is produced at such a high cost that the people cannot afford to buy as much as they would like. Clearly the first situation offers greater food security than the second.

Interestingly, it is the second, less food secure foodgrain production, since a part of the population cannot afford to buy the high cost foodgrain. And it is quite possible that the Indian surplus is of this kind. The strategy of trying to meet farmers' requirements through higher procurement prices has continuously pushed up foodgrain prices. During the nineties the wholesale prices of foodgrains have risen at a rate that is significantly greater than that of the overall wholesale price index. These consistently higher prices may well have prevented the poor from buying as much foodgrain as they would have liked.

The buffer that the public distribution system provided has been largely eroded. In the effort to keep the food subsidy in check, the PDS prices of foodgrains have been consistently raised. This has prevented the off-take from the public distribution system from regaining the peak it reached in 1991. Optimists may like to see the reduced off-take as a sign that people can afford to buy from the open market. But it is equally, if not more, likely that the higher prices have forced people either to simply reduce their intake or to switch to inferior cereals.

The paradox of food insecurity in the midst of a surplus is compounded by the tendency to focus on the overall national picture alone. In a country of India's diversity in eating habits, surplus foodgrain production at the national level does not necessarily imply adequate production of the foodgrains needed in each region. The problem has become even more relevant three decades after the Green Revolution, as there has been a consistent shift in area towards wheat and rice, and away from coarse cereals.

Similarly, adequate availability at the national level does not automatically imply availability in each region of the country. The differences that can occur in the rise in prices of individual commodities may have gained national attention during the onion crisis in Delhi. But bottlenecks in availability occur in a variety of foodgrains as well. In some cases, these bottlenecks can take the form of inadequate storage facilities, while in some other cases the bottleneck may be in transportation.

A preoccupation with the national picture can also lead to an inefficient relationship with the world market. Food security demands procuring food from the cheapest source, whether it is within or outside the country. This choice is not a matter of domestic and international prices alone. There could be situations where international prices are lower but there are hidden costs, such as the food not being available at the right time; the costs of foreign exchange; or even other countries exerting political pressure at times of food shortages.

An effective system of food security would procure food where it is cheapest to do so and then make sure that it is available to country. This availability must exist not just in physical terms but also in the sense that every Indian must have the resources to buy as much food as he likes.

Government policy has traditionally tried to achieve this target through the public distribution system. But if this system is to take on the entire task of providing food security on its own the subsidies involved would be more than the budget can bear. In fact, the budget has been struggling with the food subsidy even after raising the issue prices of foodgrains in the Public Distribution System. A more sustainable solution would be to keep foodgrain prices at the lowest possible level and simultaneously increase the ability of the poor to afford the food they like.

The main hurdle to this strategy would be resistance from farmers. And it will be difficult to ignore these protests. Though the share of agriculture in national income has been declining quite rapidly, there is no sign of an equally rapid decline in the share of farmers in the population. This could ensure that the number of farmers whose livelihood depends on each unit of foodgrain produced remains high, if it is not actually increasing. There is then pressure to increase prices in order to protect the earnings of individual farmers.

Keeping down food prices thus requires a major shift in population away from agriculture. Technology can then he used by fewer farmers to generate the same, or even higher output. The creation of alternative employment opportunities that draw farmers away from agriculture should also improve the ability of the poor to afford the foodgrains they like. The challenge of food security thus lies not in merely raising production in the country as a whole, but in also developing a rural economy that is less dependent on agriculture. Traditional nationalists may not like the idea of playing down the national dimension when analysing food security. But food security is one issue where the humanitarian dimension is more important then the nationalist one. INAV

 
 



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