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Quite upset by the outcome of recent elections in terms of voters turn-out and dilution in vote share of National Conference in many segments, Chief Minister Dr Farooq Abdullah has indicated pruning of the cabinet besides carrying out massive reshuffle of the bureaucratic and police hierarchy. There is no denying the fact and it has been pointed out in these ......more There is the welcome news from Tamil Nadu wherein the DMK conclave has decided to opt for joining the Vajpayee Government. It is quite a wise step on the part of Karunanidhi whose party has reaped good electoral harvest in the company Vajpayee ....more |
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Rationale Behind Widening oil pool Elections 1999 The electoral lessons |
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EDITORIAL Quite upset by the outcome of recent elections in terms of voters turn-out and dilution in vote share of National Conference in many segments, Chief Minister Dr Farooq Abdullah has indicated pruning of the cabinet besides carrying out massive reshuffle of the bureaucratic and police hierarchy. There is no denying the fact and it has been pointed out in these columns that present cabinet headed by Dr Farooq is unwieldy, inefficient and devoid of experience to tackle multiple problems of the people. It is also a fact that many of them miserably failed to interact with their respective electorate which brought the Government bad name. There are also allegations of mass corruption against many of them and the affected people had been pointing accusing finger at them as regards recruitment process and other things concerning people directly. All this and much more has obviously affected reputation of the National Conference vis-a-vis common man which feels disillusioned with dismal performance and near total non-delivery. Of particular relevance is the fact that they not only avoided their respective constituency to counter massive propaganda drive of the Hurriyat and other pro-Pak militants but also proved their imbecility in meeting the challenge head-on. This was clearly manifested in Baramulla constituency where the minister remained confined to the guest house and dared not move out for electioneering so much so that he failed to visit even his family. This speaks volumes about the quality of the cabinet with which Chief Minister has to cope up. Another reason that has prompted Chief Minister to think of reducing size of the cabinet to between 8 and 10 is that a small state and that too resource starved can ill afford luxury of maintaining white elephants. Such extravaganza is beyond the resources of this State. Perhaps, Chief Minister has begun to feel that small is always beautiful. Reduction of the ministry size from the existing 31 (29 plus 2 Parliamentry Secretaries with MoS rank) to manageable compact team of around 10 will as well reduce the overall expenditure incurred on maintaining a minister. In any case whosoever is retained must be fast on delivery and ought to have wide and varied experience. He should also be capable of building perfect rapport with the people and interact with them to mitigate their hardships. It is worth mentioning that during the initial period almost all ministers were hesitant to move out even in their own constituency. Such was the fear complexion. Even when many areas in the State were declared free of militancy, they continued enjoying company of large security motorcades but avoiding their electorate. Even when problems were brought to their notice, they paid scant regard. Then resource crunch became the usual ploy to hoodwink the people. No wonder they have become a liability unto themselves and the belated realisation to weed them out is welcome from many angles. First, the State coffers that are almost empty will save something. Second, with important slots in the hands of experienced persons, things would start moving. Third, such of the persons who will be out shall have to engage in self-introspection and prepare themselves to be good legislators and performing ministers in future. Fourth, Chief Minister is the undisputed leader and yet remains the tallest personality in the National Conference as also in the State as a whole. There is no question of any dissent because NC commands a comfortable two-third majority. He can very well afford to discard non-performing ministers who have brought the party and the Government to present sorry pass - very low turn out in valley and loss of traditional vote pockets in Jammu region. Fifth, it is possible that pruning of cabinet has also some bearing on the tough stand adopted by Chief Minister as regards action against Hurriyat and other pro-Pak militant outfits. There is no denying the fact that some ministers as also legislators have overtly and covertly become privy to the designs of pro-Pak elements which explains resurgence of militancy in the State. Chief Minister has also talked of administrative reshuffle. It appears that Dr Farooq Abdullah is deeply concerned with dilution of National Conference popularity which is largely attributed to incompetence and indifferent team-mates. He probably has in mind the ensuing Panchayat elections and the next assembly election which has already completed more than half of its term. He wants to regain confidence of the people by giving a good people-oriented lead which begins with getting rid of the incompetent team-mates to be followed by massive administrative and police reshuffle. It is just well that party revamp is also on cards so that an honest beginning is made to win back the shattered confidence of the people who feel badly let down during the last three years of popular rule. He intends taking these steps soonafter return from abroad and after the durbar has settled in the winter capital in early November. Though belated, as the overhaul has been long overdue, his approach appears to be in tune with realities which manifest their ugliness in bringing the Government and the ruling party into disrepute in public esteem. There is the welcome news from Tamil Nadu wherein the DMK conclave has decided to opt for joining the Vajpayee Government. It is quite a wise step on the part of Karunanidhi whose party has reaped good electoral harvest in the company Vajpayee led National Democratic Alliance. It will definitely narrow the gap between north and south besides strengthening federal character of Indian polity. Much more than that it makes the NDA more cohesive and stable. Outside support sometime creates problems for the ruling clan and leg-pulling is the normal feature. One can see how Congress withdrew outside support from Governments led by Charan Singh, Chander Shekhar, Devegowda and I K Gujral. With DMK formally joining the Government the total strength of MPs that are part of the governing apparatus of NDA comes to 274. This obviously makes it decisive. It is also to be noted that Trinamool Congress led by Mamta Banerjee has also decided to join Government whereas last time it had extended only outside support. This leaves only Telugu Desam with 28 MPs giving outside support. But the point to be noted relates to the fact that Telugu Desam leader Chander Babu Naidu wrote letter of support to NDA Government to President even without asking for it. This shows his honesty and sincerity in extending whole-hearted support to Vajpayee Government. Naidu has been quite consistent in such support even during 12th Lok Sabha when his party invariably voted with the Vajpayee Government. Further, Speaker of last Lok Sabha Mr Balyogi belongs to TD and it is possible that this time round also he would be the choice. But indications are that it is only a temporary understanding because Chander Babu faces Local Bodies elections in Andhra Pradesh in another four months time. It seems that vote-pocket considerations and garnering support of minority votes are crucial to repeat of thumping majority achieved in the Lok Sabha elections. It is thus safe to surmise that Telugu Desam would too join Vajpayee Government soon after Local Bodies elections are over in Andhra Pradesh. Stability of the NDA Government is thus ensured for pushing forward various policies and programmes as per National Agenda of Governance. |
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Rationale
Behind Pakistan's N-Strategy Pakistan did not embark upon a nuclear-weapons programme without any consideration of the relevance of such weapons to its security environment. Late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had been an advocate of a nuclear option, but it was not until India's nuclear test in May 1974 that the military seriously addressed itself to the strategic implications of an Indian and then a Pakistani-nuclear weapon. Bhutto then sought a report exploring the military implications of Pakistani nuclear weapons, although evidence exists that plans for a nuclear programme had begun before 1974. The army in its report then assumed that India possessed several nuclear weapons, or at least the capacity to go nuclear quickly. Secondly, it was believed that such Indian weapons were directed primarily against Pakistan, not China. The report ridiculed the idea of India catching up with the Chinese capability or that there were any serious grounds for a Sino-Indian conflict. It pointed out that if Pakistan was the target, then the Indian bomb must have a military as well as political rationale. The report expressed fear that possession of nuclear weapons by India would enable its conventional forces to seize ''the rest of Kashmir'' from Pakistan or even to dismember all of Pakistan. Nuclear weapons held by India in reserve as a threat against Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and other vital targets would effectively paralyse Pakistan and make it unable to resist, and therefore, a Pakistani weapons programme was essential to deter India's nuclear forces, it said. Referring to NATO example, the report had said that possession of nuclear weapons not only deterred a nuclear attack but was also an effective deterrent against conventional attack. It was also argued that such a Pakistani bomb, besides neutralizing an assumed Indian nuclear force, would provide an umbrella under which Pakistan could reopen the Kashmir issue. The army report noted that a Pakistani nuclear capability would not only affect India's nuclear decision, but also Indian conventional forces, and a bold Pakistani strike to liberate Kashmir might go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was indecisive. Those Pakistani strategists who had thought about nuclear proliferation generally believed that although the rapid spread of nuclear weapons was not necessarily in Pakistan's interests, it did not threaten those interests, because the states most likely to confront Pakistan already either had nuclear weapons or were capable of acquiring them quickly. Nor did the behaviour of Pakistan's allies did much to challenge the obvious implications of this analysis: China had long refused to transfer nuclear technology and subscribed to a doctrine of self-reliance in nuclear matters; the US at first seemed to ignore the Indian explosion but then turned its fury upon both India and Pakistan for failing to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was in any case unwilling to provide conventional weapons to Pakistan in sufficient quantity to balance an Indian nuclear capacity (there was some question whether any quantity of arms could check a nuclear weapon in Indian hands). The Pakistanis apparently reached the conclusion that a nuclear programme would enable them to do what their armoured divisions and air force couldn't do in conventional terms: Punish an Indian attack so severely that it would be deterred at the start. Moreover, a Pakistani bomb might enable Islamabad to reopen the Kashmir issue by the threat of force and a Pakistani leadership that was bold enough could seize Kashmir at a time when India was in disarray. The fact that a Pakistani nuclear weapon would probably lead to an Indian one was not in itself a sufficient barrier for Pakistani officers. Pakistani planners did not think that producing a nuclear bomb would be more disadvantageous than the prevailing situation in which they assumed that India already had a covert nuclear capacity. It was argued that if Indians found this conclusion in error, they would have reassured Pakistan in whatever way that would be convincing. Bhutto was assured by Pakistani nuclear plan or that they would have the choice of utilising their nuclear force for tactical or strategic ends. That is, nuclear devices could be used against massed troop concentrations or could be dropped on urban populations as sheer terror weapons. Given the nature of both economies, there were also various targets that were of an ambivalent character. These would include major power-production centres, dams, and irrigation projects, none of which would directly cause much loss of life and would thus not be as ''provocative'' as a destruction of urban areas but might in the long run cause more loss of life. The Pakistani strategists favoured the most dramatic (but realistically the most conservative) use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were 'terror' weapons par excellence. There was no need to use them; mere possession was enough to ward off the threat. Such a strategy would also simplify the command and control problem of Pakistan and would require the minimum number of weapons. Accuracy and timing not being crucial, it would also simplify targeting and delivery requirements. If prolfieration did come to the subcontinent, it was possible that both India and Pakistan would adopt such deterrence-cum-terror strategies at first, and later, when a stockpile of fissionable material was developed, consider diverting some of this stockpile to produce a few tactical nuclear weapons. This could happen if Pakistan felt that it was falling farther behind in its conventional arms imbalance with India, and that its stockpile of strategic weapons was ot adequate to deter a conventional war. Soon after nuclear facilities were set up in Kahuta, a number of Pakistani strategists began to warn their government that India and Israel were likely to undertake air raids or guerilla activity against Pakistan's nuclear installations. Israel was not going to launch such an expedition unless it became sure that the development of Pakistan's nuclear programme would have military implications for the Arab-Israel power structure in the Middle East. Israel might be hesitant to launch an air strike all by itself due to several logistic problems. In addition to the long distance (approximately 5,000 Kms from Israel) and problems of refuelling, any direct air strike by Israel would require entry into Pakistan's airspace via the Makran coast, and then the aircraft would have to fly over Pakistani territory for about 1200-1300 Kms to reach the target. There were clearly risks of being detected even when the aircraft were flying at tree-top level. Greater likelihood was that an air strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities, if and when undertaken, would be resorted to by India. India could do this all by itself or it could obtain, Israel's collaboration. Israel, which destroyed Osirak Nuclear Plant of Iraq, could be helpful to India in planning such an operation and training the personnel selected for the mission. Alternatively, Israel's attack aircraft could use India's air space, ground and communication facilities for launching an attack. Such an attack could take the form of an air raid. It could also be synchronised with guerrilla raid on the surface-to-air gund positions around the nuclear facilities to provide greater freedom to the attacking aircraft to complete the mission. Another possibility might be sabotage by foreign agents but sabotage might cause some damage rather than completely putting the nuclear facilities out of action. Obviously these agents would be employed by either India or Israel or jointly by both. To sump up, the Pakistani strategists felt that there were extremely persuasive strategic reasons for their government to go ahead with a military nuclear programme, even if the political, diplomatic, and economic cost were bound to be substantial. And above all, a Pakistani nuclear weapon would be greeted with widespread support at home, because it was practically the only issue that Pakistanis did agree on. PTI Feature |
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Elections 1999 The election of 1999 has a strange feel about it. It is as if the nation voted in 1998, but the President or whosoever else, asked for a clarification of the vote, as if asking the voters some questions to understand their verdict better: Vajpayee was to be the PM. Okay, but with just 264 seats? No, said the electorate, it is 294 actually; sorry for the confusion. Well, the Congress is to sit in the opposition; with 154 seats, and a hundred more itching to support it? err....sorry again, it is 104 only! Mulayam, Kanshi are out? No, no, how can those poor fellows be out, for theirs is the kingdom! That in a nutshell is the election 1999, for which the nation had to wait four months, vote in five stages, and sacrifice a hundred people. The same trends, same concerns, but with a better definition. A spashtikaran. So, was this all a waste, an exercise in futility? Far from it. The clarification has put to rest the specious speculation that the power brokers of the country had so gleefully revelled in. Whoever pointed to the 264 figure, was met with wise grins of disbelief. Mandate? Whose, said the knowalls and then had a big laugh actually when a lone member switched sides and plunged a seemingly stable Government into a ditch. Vajpayee, is still to be a worried man but those worries shall be the cares of the country, not the convulsions of a tumbling alliance. There shall not be an unduly overactive president breathing down his neck, seeking letter and response to every of his wishes not anticipated by the constitution. After a silence of seventeen months, he can now speak of corruption without shivering at what the righteous stand would do to his ministry's standing. He, probably, can now sit down to govern the country. And, he knows it better than any other Indian, Indian is in need of some governing, the sooner the better. Today Vajpayee begins on a stronger wicket. Here is the man, whom a clear majority of Indian men and women, rich and poor, old and young, want to lead the country. The cloudy confusion of '98 is cleared out. And he can take the comfort that this clarity was gained through his efforts, on his insistance. He shall enjoy a greater leverage in the selection of his Cabinet, allotment of port folios and setting of priorities for the work. The mid-night calls may come, but the tones can be expected to be suitably muted. Pulls shall be there, but certainly of a reduced taut. The pressures too will build, yet they can't but be circumspect. Vajpayee is at a good advantage. And, on a firmer footing too. He had been able to hammer alliances in 1998 too, but there was a definite unholy ring to it. The party had fought Chandra Babu Naidu, and fallen to seek his support. It had opposed Sukh Ram and stood upon his support. Similarly moral had been the support, obtained from Farooq's NC. The alliance with Jaya had sealed the BJP mouth (and fate?) from the day one. Today, there is nothing profane about the alliance called NDA. It has fought elections together, the constituents have supported each other, and none of the partners is uneasy about the partnership. That is something to be much satisfied about. But there is more. The alliance is on a firmer footing. The allies are not itching to get away, nor overly anxious for specific favours. The favours will certainly come, but there would not be anything brazen about it. Storms erupting out of the tea cups can be reasonably ruled out. That is not a breathing space, but a whole vista open for action, governance, leading. There are more advantages. The policies are already opened and are doing fine, particularly the economy. BSE index has crossed the 5000 mark. The FDI position is actually better with more foreign investments having poured in Vajpayee's time that of his predecessor. Production too is looking up. Exports notched up a good growth during the last quarter and floods this year have been less devastating. Bombs are past and the U.S. is actually busy finding ways to dismantle the ignominous sanctions it had imposed on India. Foreign policy has broken ice with China and, thanks to a worldwide terrorist scare, there is a better understanding of Indian perspective in the world capitals. India can talk tough because Pakistan itself falling a victim to terrorism imported from Afghanistan is talking a different language, today. All in all, that gives Vajpayee a unique opportunity to steer India into the next century with confidence and poise. At this juncture it is all advantage Vajpayee. And it is his turn to serve. Now all that is to be seen is whether he serves out aces or turns out a dim volley that may bounce back from the first post. That shall determine whether the advantage that the electorate has handed him shall be consolidated or would be frittered away. Vajpayee this fall has also the benefit of past experience. That also makes the task more demanding for no benefit of doubt shall be given, now. Nor shall the excuse, that the glare of power jaded the new entrees, accepted any more. India expects Vajpayee to do better with the advantage she has given him. |
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The electoral lessons "Histories make men wise" - men of course, includes women (emphasis intentional) also. More than any body else a politician should have the capacity to learn from the past. It is primarily this ability that upgrades a politician to the stature of a satesman. The electoral debacle of the Congress, quite naturally, has its roots in the recent past. If sufficient wisdom surfaces in the party forums even at this late stage, the lost ground could be recovered in due course of time. First, the party must clearly understand, if not openly admit, that they have made a series of serious mistakes during the last few months. Atal Behari Vajpayee had a nearly impossible task in hand after the 1998 elections i.e. to keep an assorted flock together, specially when everybody in the flock knew that he could upturn his apple cart at will. Unfortunately, the level of politics in our land, over the years, has gone so low that being out of power in itself has become a penal offence. The other side of this very coin is that our politicians have apparently convinced themselves that whatever they do our legal system does not have the capacity to catch up with them and to convict them in the end. The things die down once they return to power or retire nobody is talking of Kanti Desai, Partap Singh Kairon's son or Beant Singh's grandson these days. In this scenario, it is politically impossible to blame the lady from the poes garden, if she exasperately desired the dismissal of the Karunanidhi Government in Tamil Nadu last year. The midterm elections in the state at the time world have surely put her in the chief ministerial chair. With the prosecution machinery of the state in her pocket, all the court cases against her could have collapsed one by one. What proved to be her problem was that she appeared to be in a tearing hurry all the time and seemed to have highly exaggerated nations about her own strength. By the time she realised her limitations and resigned to these, the Congress suddenly changed the track and joined hands with her. The old ideas of being mighty big came rushing back to her and she stated boasting abour a 'political earthquake in the country. The political earthquake did strike the nation. However, its real agents were neither Jayalalitha nor that jumping jack of the Indian politics, Dr Subramanium Swamy, but the Congress itself. The Congress under Sonia believed for some time that the days of the BJP led Government were strictly numbered and it would fall under the heavy weight of its internal contradictions some times by the middle of this year. To its chagrin, it saw the Vajpayee Government digging in and doing well-low inflation, booming markets, reasonable growth in G.D.P, high water-mark in diplomacy, a military success and all this in the face of global sanctions. The right role for the Sonia's Congress in this situation was just to keep itself in readiness as a political option to be at hand to the nation whenever its services were needed. It did not have to put a spanner in the smooth moving wheels and go for the Jugular vein of the Government just because it had started doing well. The country had to take precedence over the fact that the Congress was in no proper position to provide an alternative. Even if it thought it would be able to piece together some sort of Government, this would have, in any case, meant its putting itself at the mercy of Jayalalitha and the like. This sudden loss of patience and poise was in itself a suicidal mistake. It straight away turned the tide of sympathy the BJP way. The Election Commission had to be persuaded to defer the Elections, for this national sympathy wave to break. This might have worked for the Congress. However, during this extended caretaker period, 'Kargil' happened. Not only the courage and dare-devilery of our armed forces turned the tide on the intruders from across the borders, but, to our pleasant surprise, the Americans also decided that they had tolerated Pakistan enough and gave it marching orders from Kargil. The Government of the day could, in no way, be denied the electoral benefit of a ground military victory and a significant diplomatic success. The Congress reaction in this hour of national glory proved to be awkwardly imprudent. In stead of standing solidly behind the Government in this crises, it chose to hang by its legs, demanding to know right there why the Pakistan army and the 'mujahideen' were allowed to intrude in the Kargil sector in the first place. When the nation was celebrating a victory, it was seen beating its breast. Its third cardinal mistake was its inability to read the direction of the political wind. With around six hundred political outfits, in the county, it is rather difficult for a single party to muster majority of its own. In the normal course, the Congress would have perhaps still made it with local understandings here and there, but not after devaluing itself so badly by bringing down the Vajpayee Government criticising it brutally over Kargil, much against the national mood. There are a few lessons for the BJP also. It has paid heavily for indiscipline and non-performance in Karnataka, UP, and to an extent in Maharashtra. But for its good showing at the Centre and some other providential factors like the quadrangular nature of contest in UP and parting of company with the Congress by Sharad Pawar, the BJP could as well have come to grief. True, the electoral defeats today are almost akin to the military defeats in the past. There, four youth to got killed, women got raped and wealth got looted there also, your wealth gets wasted and prosecutions may get launched against you. There is bound to be some worry in some chests on this count. Yet, all is not permanently lost for anybody, specially the Indian National Congress that is rooted so deep in our history. They, however, must not refuse to learn from history. |
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