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EDITORIAL The four day meeting held in Lahore between Border Security Force and Pakistan Rangers can be viewed with satisfaction in that it does help diffuse tensions on the international border in Jammu. There is no denying the fact that this stretch of Indian border with Pakistan from Kathua to Akhnoor has remained exposed to intensive fireworks during the last few months. It has obviously .more There are reports that Hurriyats amalgam is now amenable to talks with the Central Government provided they are invited for such talks. It is quite a changed stance because till recently Hurriyat was loathsome to any such proposition. Change might have come about because Pakistan has repeatedly let down pro-Pak elements and...more |
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Propaganda as a Fresh round of
realignments in the ruling Akali Dal Slogans will not help FM's priorities for
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EDITORIAL The four day meeting held in Lahore between Border Security Force and Pakistan Rangers can be viewed with satisfaction in that it does help diffuse tensions on the international border in Jammu. There is no denying the fact that this stretch of Indian border with Pakistan from Kathua to Akhnoor has remained exposed to intensive fireworks during the last few months. It has obviously dislocated thousands of families from the border villages besides depriving them of their means of livelihood which is largely confined to agriculture. The meeting can thus be viewed from several angles as regards Indo-Pak relations which have remained at the lowest ever since Pak aggression in Kargil and continue during forty days of army rule. First, it is a matter of satisfaction that bi-annual meeting has been held and not given the go-by due to prevailing environs. It may be mentioned that even SAARC meeting was deferred because of the military take-over in Pakistan because more of the democracies wanted to be seen in the company of Army Generals of Pakistan. Likewise, the recently held CHOGM meeting remained unrepresented by Pakistan and the final communique reflects that all the democratic regimes that participated in CHOGM meet (52 countries to be precise) came down heavily on Pak army for disrupting the democratic order. It went to the extent of still recognising Nawaz Sharif as the legitimate elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. Besides, immediate suspension from Commonwealth it has held the threat of more sanctions unless democracy is restored in Pakistan. In spite of all such open hostility and hatred displayed by CHOGM against Pak army take over, Indian Foreign Minister as also Prime Minister Vajpayee has been quite forthright that this does not imply severing of diplomatic relations. They have gone on to say that Pakistan being an immediate neighbour India could always talk to it, the only rider being that Pak army should stop transborder terrorism not only along IB but also all along LoC as well. The BSF-Ranger meet has to be thus viewed from such perceptions. Second, after the conclusion of the meeting it has been agreed that cross border firing would be stopped and in any case hapless civilians won't be targeted. It appears that easing of tensions is more in Pak interest as army rulers are heavily engaged in meeting the internal challenges. There have been rocket attacks in Islamabad targetting American embassy and UN mission. This means army does not have full grip on the internal situation in Pakistan. There is another blast in Lahore which has taken a heavy toll of life and property. With Army in power, those prone to gun-culture and terrorism have no fear of either civilian rule or the army. It hardly makes any difference asto who rules Pakistan because bloodshed and terrorism is deeply placed in their blood, thoughts and actions. So if Pak Rangers agree to stop firing in this sector, it is a one stop forward towards diffusing tensions all along the border. Ultimately, it could gradually percolate to LoC as well. Third aspect relates to change of mind-set or one may as well call it change of tactics with basic policy of belligerency towards India remaining intact. The change manifests its pleasantness in that our delegation says that overall Pak tendency during the meeting was helpful and more conducive when compared to the last bi-annual meet when Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister. This means military rulers tend to talk straight rather than circumvent the issues at stake. Less hostility during latest meet confirms that Pak Army rulers do need to address to internal problems more urgently than invite further problems on borders. It thus settles down to according priority to internal turmoil which also includes setting the economy right and tackling internal challenges galore. Fourth, Prime Minister Vajpayee has already stated that India has been talking to earlier military regimes in Pakistan that totals 26 years i.e. almost half of the era since independence. It thus follows that after some wait and watch, process of dialogue on other contentious issues could resume corresponding to how far Pak goes in putting a break on sponsorship of terrorism and violation of IB/LoC. Talking everything optimistically, particularly because this meeting has also occurred in Lahore and it is the Lahore Declaration that has been sabotaged by Pakistan, the password is caution and strict reciprocity rather than overstepping to shake hands on petty gestures. Besides diffusing tension on international border, the meeting has also decided to check transborder traffic of Bangladeshis particularly in Jammu sector that tend to create problems for both the countries. There is also some understanding on narcotic traffic because this border in Jammu has become favourite transit area for narcotics smuggled in from Pakistan. It may be mentioned that proceeds of narcotics are funnelled for sustaining insurgency not only in J&K but also in the north eastern states. It is to be seen how Pakistan checks such smuggling on their side. There are reports that Hurriyats amalgam is now amenable to talks with the Central Government provided they are invited for such talks. It is quite a changed stance because till recently Hurriyat was loathsome to any such proposition. Change might have come about because Pakistan has repeatedly let down pro-Pak elements and its proteges in J&K, the latest being the ignominous withdrawal of Pak troops from Kargil sector. This has even according to Hurriyat handouts reduced them in size in public esteem and tantamounts to loss of face. It is not the first time though that Pakistan has let down Kashmiri proteges. It also happened during the initial stages of insurgency in 1989-90 when promised entry of Pak troops never materialised. The second reason could be that insurgency is totally hijacked by mercenaries notably terrorist outfits like Lashkar-e-Toiba and Al- Badr. Hurriyat is thus left high and dry as much as JKLF was dumped by Pakistan. There are thus genuine apprehensions amongst them that Pakistan could do to it what it has done to other Kashmiri outfits. Before that happens, Hurriyat would prefer dialogue with India rather than through Pakistan, more so because Pakistan itself is in limbo in international esteem after the army take-over. It has been the consistent Indian stand and that of the State Government that any dialogue with Hurriyat or anyone else is possible only within the constitutional framework. It thus follows that Hurriyat must give up its separatist and secessionist dispensation and declare openly their allegiance to the constitution. After all most of their leadership comprises of ex-MLAs or ex-ministers. Most of them were loyal to Sheikh Sahib who remains the tallest ever personality. After 1953 even he and Mirza Afzal Beg raked up plebiscite but after 22 years of uncertainty they opted for the mainstream under 1975 Indira-Sheikh accord. Hurriyat leaders must take cue from the tallest man of the State and swear by the Indian constitution. As it happens, they can talk to anyone anywhere asto what is best and ideal for J&K State and its people. |
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Propaganda
as a weapon of insurgency Propaganda has long been recognised as an effective weapon of war. So effective, infact, that Mao Tse Tung has advocated the employment of propaganda as a substitute for guns- both possessing the same potential of breaking the opponent's will to fight through demoralisation. The use of propaganda as a weapon assumes even greater importance in insurgencies and guerilla warfare, where, with inhabitated areas forming part of the battle-ground, the populace presents the most vulnerable target. A survey of the insurgent activity in Kashmir would show that the militants are religiously following the text book as far as the employment of the propaganda weapon is concerned-achieving its four general objectives with an appreciable amount of success. Firstly they have succeeded in establishing self-determination, with its known universal appeal, as the ''rallying cry'' for the insurgency, through sheer propaganda, evan as they are actually fighting Pakistan's proxy war with India with the avowed aim of annexation of Kashmir by that country. And this despite the fact that while the people of the State have no legal right to self-determination, Pakistan has no locus standi in Kashmir other than that of an aggressor. The insurgents have also met with fair amount of success in their second objective of drawing the attention of the international community to their struggle, through concerted efforts of Pakistan. Although Pakistan failed to manipulate direct international intervention, suffering much humiliation in the process, it has managed to advertise the issue sufficiently enough for the international community to take notice and exert pressure on India, even if covertly, to come to terms with the insurgents ''in the interest of peace and tranquility in the region''. It is also, perhaps, because of international pressure to the contrary that India has not been able to exercise its option of an open war, which is the only obvious and known antidote to proxy wars, such as has been unleashed by Pakistan. Insurgent propaganda has, however, been most successful in its third objective- denigrating the State Administration. Indeed the State Government today stands totally discredited before its people, and not entirely, because of its own fault. It is blamed not only for what it does, or does not do, but also for what the militants do. Though one may not be able to completely exonerate the Administration from the often repeated charge of misgovernance, it would have to be remembered that accountability does not have the same connotations under conditions of insurgency as it would in the case of governments functioning without such unusual constraints. Considering the manner in which a large number of Human Rights Organisations have mushroomed both within as well as outside the country, to take up the militants' cause without caring to highlight the most reprehensible violations on their part, the militants seem to have met with considerable amount of success in achieving the fourth objective of their propaganda; namely defaming the armed forces to instil in them a sense of caution and hesitation while dealing with insurgents. In the furtherance of their propaganda objectives, the insurgents are making effective use of terror and sabotage. Both selective and indiscriminate killings have been carried out not only for silencing dissent but also for gaining positive support for the intelligentsia and creating the impression of popular support for the cause. Indeed even as there is a long list of intellectuals killed by the militants for refusing to tow their line, there is a longer list, still, of those who, though at one time on the hit-list of the terrorists, have bought their lives by rendering undertakings for such support. These are the intellectuals in the Valley who, today, speak up fo the insurgents, and while lending dignity to Every, insurgent activity, make wild allegations against the Government and the Security Forces, for running down the two. Indiscriminate killings of innocent people through bomb blasts is being resorted to for producing a general morale shattering effect on the common man specially in areas where the population is known to be antagonistic towards the militants' cause. While it is extremely difficult to catch a terrorist, who is surrounded by a vast organisation, which prepares his tasks and assures his withdrawal and protection, even the most loyal begin to lose faith in the government whose duty it is to guarantee their safety. Unfortunately, apart from the support that the insurgents have been able to extract from the people of the Valley through terror, they also seem to have succeeded in influencing a section of the Indian intelligentsia even within the citadels of Indian nationalism. Apparently due to the usual love of the Indian intellectual for being associated with the upholding of high ideals and fair play (even if they be of utopian nature), that enables him to stand out among the lesser mortals, some of his ilk have been wrought by the insurgent propaganda without subjecting it to close scrutiny. Much damage to the national cause has, inadvertently perhaps, been done by those among them who, because of their association with the writing profession, have been instrumental not only in spreading the insurgents' message but also in obstructing counter-insurgency measures. For those who may be feeling a genuine prick of the conscience over the sufferings of the people of Kashmir, it would be well to remember that the situation in Kashmir is not of our making. These sufferings have been wrought by the insurgents and their foreign collaborators and will cease the day insurgency is wiped out from the State. The Indian and the State Governments are only engaged in doing their bonafied and obligatory duty of ridding the State of this scourge. Unfortunate thogh it may be, the fact remains that, because of the nature of the operations, human rights violations are bound to occur in the performance of such a task, even with best efforts of the governments to avoid them. Little wonder that no country in the world has been able to deal with armed insurgency and terrorism in a manner that has not involved violation of civil rights. It should be a matter of some consolation to us that the Indian soldier has a splendid track record of restraint and respect for human values under such situations; not only in Kashmir but also while serving under the UN. His performance in Somalia, under similar conditions is, particularly, one that could make us look up with pride. in contrast to the cold-blooded atrocities, against women and children, committed by soldiers of some ''advanced'' countries, and the case of Pakistani troops going berserk against innocent locals out of frustration, the Indian contigent had the rare honour of earning the gratitude of the locals, who wrote an emotional letter to the Prime Minister of India, praising the human approach of the Indian troops, and, in their innocence imploring him not to withdraw the Indian contingent from Somalia. It may also help to remember that, though a sad reflection on human behaviour, there has been no period in history when innocent people have not suffered due to some calamity or the other. Insurgency is akin to a calamity and suffering therefrom have to borne as stoically as one would during a calamity. We also do not have to feel applogetic about the low turn-out in the recent Parliamentary elections, which fact is being exploited by the militants to create doubts about the legitimacy of the popular government in the State. It is being made out that the low turn-out reflects the unpopularity of the State Government, due to its poor performance. It needs to be understood that good or bad governance is a relative term and J&K is certainly not the worst administered state in the country, despite the severe handicaps under which it is functioning. In any case, while, in general, governments could be blamed for failing to enthuse their people to come out and vote because of their own poor performance, the governance factor would appear to become totally irrelevant in case of a terrorist-stricken state like J&K, where the voter is threatened with dire consequences, including being shot or having his hand out off, if he dares to vote. If only ten percent of the electorate in the Valley voted, all that it means is that atleast ten per cent of the Kashmiris are brave One wonders how many other states in India have such a large number of brave people who would come out to vote under threat to their lives- threat not only made but also carried out. |
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Slogans will not help
counter terrorism India's victory at Kargil could, and should, have been translated into concrete gains on the ground in Jammu and Kashmir. A window of opportunity had certainly been created to launch a massive and coordinated campaign against the terrorists. A precondition for such a campaign, however, was a vision that went beyond the petty scrambling for jurisdiction and dominance between the forces, and an end to the ruinous system of competitive command that presently pits force against force in the state (as in every other theatre of low intensity warfare in India). Unfortunately, the Government preferred to restore the status quo ante, vesting supreme command in the Army. The results, tragically are now evident, as the initiative shifts squarely back into the hands of the militants. Three army camps in Jammu and Kashmir _ at Rampur, Wagoor and Karnah _ were attacked on a single day on November 10, taking a toll of 13 soldiers killed, and another 12 injured. These incidents followed the attack on the Corps Commander's headquarters at the Badamibagh Cantonment in Srinagar just a week earlier. This year has already seen almost 300 security personnel killed in the state. In addition, over 750 civilians have so far been killed by the terrorists this year. The significance of the escalating violence since July this year, and particularly of the increasing incidence of attacks on army camps and installations is heightened by the Laskhar-e-Toiba's unambiguous declaration of intent at its three-day annual conference at Muridke (November 3-5), and the obvious support of the Pakistani state and its intelligence agencies who facilitated this meeting. Terrorist handlers in Pakistan must be congratulating themselves on the success of their current strategy as the death toll in Jammu and Kashmir mounts, and as the terrorists deliver blow after blow against the morale of the security forces. It is important to note that the Pakistan-terrorist strategy now shows a visible shift towards dramatic and high-risk attacks against security force establishments, as against the earlier tactics of concentrating on soft and predominantly civilian targets. This does not mean that civilians are now somehow safer in the state. Only that the vulnerabilities of the security forces will be increasingly highlighted. The consequences of this shift can prove to be disastrous. The increasing role of foreign mercenaries and terrorist atrocities against civilians had, over the past years, led to a gradual but steady erosion of popular support for militancy in the state. This trend could well be reversed if public confidence in the efficacy and ability of the security forces plummets. Inevitably, there will be a clamour in Kashmir that, if the security forces cannot protect themselves, how can they protect the people? At this stage, the political response to such a clamour is difficult to envisage, but going by the past record, it will surely be inadequate. Generalisations are, of course, impossible, and it would be imprudent to suggest that there are some simple and stock formulae that could help meet this new set of challenges. Any solution would have to take into consideration radical local variations in topography and the distribution of available forces. Nevertheless, it is clear that the system is not responding at a level adequate to seize the initiative, which remains firmly in the hands of the terrorists. This does not speak well of the tactical abilities and the strategic vision of local commanders, whose responses have remained absolutely stereotypical and predictable. The need for flexibility, for continuous adaptation to new tactics, new weapons, and an undefined and constantly changing battlefield has neither been understood nor taken into account. The Badamibagh incident is a case in point. There is much talk of a "two-tier" security system _ essentially two static posts that were neutralised almost simultaneously to give a group of just four terrorists free access to the most sensitive military camp in the state. Clearly, such static posts are inadequate, and this has been demonstrated again and again, since the attack on the BSF camp at Bandipur in the wake of Pakistan's withdrawal from Kargil. And yet, no system of general mobilisation or of immediate or rapid access to arms has been devised, which would allow every soldier to respond immediately to such an eventuality, instead of each trying to save his own life by locking himself up in stores and bathrooms, or simply dying without the possibility of resistance. It is not enough to put our entire faith in a few rapid response units since, however well trained they may be, they cannot be everywhere at once, and the terrorists do not send advance intimation of their intent to attack. Clearly, moreover intelligence channels in the state, especially those yielding immediate intelligence to the Army have become somewhat clogged _ perhaps another aspect of the inability of the state forces to collaborate and cooperate in their war against terrorism. Moreover, the location and architecture of at least some of these security force camps makes them peculiarly vulnerable, and these factors must be taken into consideration while planning future defences. There is, evidently, also a comprehensive failure to understand the need for established protocols, exercises and flexible response patterns to deal with the inventiveness and the suicidal audacity of the mujahideen. If the military response has been inadequate, the political and administrative response has also displayed no significant measure of intelligence. It has, by and large, exhausted itself in the same patterns of "high level meetings" to discuss "proactive strategies", and cosmetic relocation of forces and officials _ patterns that have been established over decades, and that are little more than exercises in political rhetoric and face saving. Our leaders, both political and military, appear to have an almost inexhaustible ability to be surprised by Pakistan's tenacity and unrelenting aptitude for keeping the Kashmir cauldron on the boil. There are unceasing protestations against the ISI and the mercenaries, as if their complicity somehow dilutes the accountability of our own security forces, civil administration and political leadership. But the role of the ISI and of Pakistan in every theatre of strife in India has been a given since their massive intervention in Punjab in the mid-eighties. In Kashmir, their intentions have been clear since the very moment of Independence. What has been the response of the Indian state? Over the past months, we have made some gains on the Kashmir issue at the level of international diplomacy. At the same time Pakistan has steadily worsened its own case, initially through the Kargil misadventure, later compounded manifold by Pervez Musharraf's military coup. Nevertheless, it must be understood that the war against terrorism cannot be won through paper victories at the UN, in the US legislative assemblies, or through diplomatic triumphs in Europe, if it is lost on the ground in Kashmir. We are at a critical crossroads in history today. It has never been more urgent to review and reshape our strategies and responses, not merely in terms of existing threats and provocations, but in terms of the much greater dangers that technology and a malevolent neighbour will inevitably devise in the twenty first century. "Proactive strategy" has, for some time now, been the dominant political slogan in all major pronouncements on internal security. It is a useful slogan. Translated into a visionary programme, it could help frustrate Pakistan's designs in Jammu and Kashmir. Equally, however, it must be realised that terrorists cannot be defeated by slogans alone. INAV |
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FM's priorities for
quickfix solutions The second generation of re forms is the talking point these days. The Government is very keen to push ahead with the reform agenda. Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha is naturally the toast of corporate India. He is not disappointing them with his "educative, business like discourses" - to quote Sudhir Jalan, the outgoing FICCI president. With his ears to the ground Sinha is better placed than some of his immediate predecessors to handle the task ahead. As he himself confessed before a who's who of the corporate world in the Capital the other day, his voters do not know what is a fiscal deficit. They want results "not tomorrow, today. They (people) are unwilling to wait for five years, ten years." Admittedly, Sinha's concern for the voters' interests is no sweet music to his audience in the airconditioned conference halls of the metros. They are looking for quickfix solutions, lower interest rate regime, lower tax regime, incentives for investments in the infrastructure sector and above all, flow of Government money into infrastructure to propel the economy to a higher trajectory. For this wish list to materialise, the Government has to slash the subsidies and cut down its own borrowings, which are carrying market determined interest rates for the past seven-eight years. Wasteful or unproductive expenditure that a Government often finds itself saddled with also needs to be pruned. Expenditure on administrative side is a wasteful item and it has gone up courtesy the United Front Government's willingness to accept the Pandian Commission recommendation on wage revision for Central employees only in part. The Commission, while calling for a steep hike in pay scales and increase in retirement age (to 60 years), spoke of the need to prune the bureaucracy. Both these steps should go hand in hand if one goes by the letter and spirit of the pay commission report. While the UF accepted the new pay scales and hiked them further to please various lobbies at work, the BJP-led NDA increased the retirement age to 60 years. Neither the present nor the previous Government attempted downsizing of the bureaucracy. In fact, the NDA regime has just created new ministries and new posts. That may be due to exigencies of coalition politics. There is nothing wrong per se in having a big ministry. More so since the overall size is within the ten per cent norm fixed by the Morarjibhai-led Administrative Reforms Commission more than three decades ago. The problem is that the Government's expenditure plans are bound to go haywire to the dismay of economists who prefer to remain true to the text-book they read and teach from. Be that as it may, what is really interesting in so far as the present Government goes is while it is conscious of the lack of its parliamentary majority to clear any controversial legislation, it has not given up the effort. The plethora of announcements about the impending "progressive legislation gives the impression that all is going to be hunky dory. Whether the impression is justified will be known when the IRA Bill, the FEMA Bill and Bank Denationalisation Bill survive in Parliament. From reports in the media and from the mood in the trade Union offices as also the camps known for their penchant to champion the status quo, this much is clear as of now: The country is entering a long winter of discontent unless statemanship is displayed in full measure to rise above the considerations of econometrics. Because the very purpose of reforms, in the words of the architect of first generation reforms, is to transform the society. P V Narasimha Rao did not get the credit due to him for that he had done in opening up the economy. For which the politics of the day is as much responsible as the emergence of passenger cars, televisions and refrigerators as the symbols of reform. From what he had said at the second Tata Memorial Lecture organised by the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM) the former Prime Minister appears to be duly conscious of the flip side to reforms in the public perception. Said Rao, "In my own assessment as a consequence of first generation of reforms, instead of a solid infrastructure, phenomenal multiplication has occurred in the manufacture of passenger cars, TVs and many other consumer items. While this may be good, it is not the basic philosophy of the Government behind the reforms". Admittedly, he was at his introspective best when he observed, "I want liberalisation to grow as a sturdy child; I look upon it almost with parental affection." Naturally, therefore, his strong plea that there should be an intensive lookback on the overall results and the benefits that had accrued to the people class-wise and section-wise, deserves attention not only from his successors on the Raisina Hills, but also from all students of economic reforms. Also worth paying heed to is his warning about the liberalisation and globalisation process benefitting only one kind of economy - the mainstream one-at the expense of the other, hitherto independent and insulated, minibarter village economy. From the public pronouncements so far, Yashwant Sinha appears to be too mindful of the danger zones ahead. He has not spelt out how he would try to skirt the potential minefield for his own survival and that of the ruling alliance, while ensuring sizeable and simultaneous benefits to the lower strata of people who wait for the trickle down. The just concluded national executive meeting of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has not thrown much light on how the party expects the Government to chart the new road map. What all one heard from the new leadership was the usual rhetoric about the need for hard decisions and to carry the masses along with the establishment in implementing the decisions. The quote P V Narasimha Rao once again, the package of economic reforms was conceived as a means to transform the society purely as a socio-political process than as a business policy or ploy. Sad part of the story at the end of eight long years of tryst with reforms is that the reform process is being considered as anything but socio-political process. At least as of now. At least, that is the general perception and impression! CNF |
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