Taliban-Al-Qaeda after one year of war

By Sreedhar

The US-led war against Tali-ban-al-Qaeda completes one year on 7 October 2002. Even now one is not clear what happened to the Taliban-al-Qaeda leadership and their thousands of cadres. Media reports indicate that the theatre of war quietly shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan where most of the Taliban-al-Qaeda cadres escaped with Islamabad's connivance. The US was in no position to repeat in Pakistan the war strategy it had adopted in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Taliban-Qaeda are quickly regrouping and have started guerilla operations against their enemy targets.

Upto to August 1998, Taliban-al-Qaeda were friends of the US and were used by it to achieve strategic objectives in South and Southwest Asia. After attacks that month in Dar-e-Salaam and Nairobi, they suddenly became wanted persons, and after September 11, 2001, they became adversaries. These adversaries are ''invisible''. They are continuously on the move, making it that much difficult for the US to attack them. This is a peculiar war for the first time the US is fighting.

After the formation of International Islamic Front for Jehad against the US and Israel in February 1998, the membership of Taliban-al-Qaeda was reported to have increased to over 200,000. In fact various accounts originating from the US estimate that they are spread over 70 countries. No one still has a clear picture of how many are their sympathisers, how many are supporters and how many are the active cadres of Taliban-al-Qaeda. Prior to September 11, 2001, it was estimated by various Indian agencies that the Taliban-al-Qaeda active cadres, in Afghanistan-Pakistan area were in the region of about 55,000, including 15,000 Pakistani military personnel.

When the US and its allies started aerial bombing on October 7, 2001, the Taliban-al-Qaeda's strategy was to retreat quickly as they were not militarily prepared to fight an air-land battle. Initially this retreat was seen from two angles. At one level, it was seen by observers as a tactical retreat, since the Taliban-al-Qaeda had no effective answer to the enormous technical superiority of the US war machine. At another level, some observers felt that the Taliban-al-Qaeda were on the run as their chief patron, had made a U-turn in its policy towards them.

As the US and allied forces started advancing, we saw systematic shifting of Taliban-al-Qaeda bases into Pakistan. Now one can say with a certain amount definitiveness at least four reasons for the change of strategy. They were :

* There is a long land border which can be crossed over very easily without being noticed by any surveillance authority. In fact, Taliban-al-Qaeda combine's crossing into Pakistan started sometime in late October 2001; and at that time the surveillance of Pakistan-Afghanistan border was not intense enough to detect those sneaking through.

* A section of the Government in Pakistan was and still is friendly and loyal to the Taliban-al-Qaeda leadership and providng safe havens without much difficulty.

* In the existing state of anarchic situation in Pakistan, it is easy for organisations like Taliban-al-Qaeda combine to relocate their bases.

* The US and it allies cannot carry out carpet bombing in Pakistan like they did in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is virtually a door-to-door search to track down the 50,000 odd Taliban-al-Qaeda leadership and cadres. It appears to be quite clear that it is not going to be an easy task American and allied troops to search for them among the 140 million Pakistan population amidst whom they find easy shelter.

Once the action shifted to Pakistan, the US and its allies were forced to take the help of locals extensively. There are also unconfirmed reports that the US forces, like they did in 1980s, are now taking help from the drug barons in Pakistan- Afghanistan region to track the movement of Taliban-al-Qaeda leadership and cadres. By March 2002, the US took over the management of Pakistan security apparatus, including the armed forces and the Inter Service Intelligence Agency (ISI). Inspite of all these measures, success so far has been extremely limited.

This limited success is for two reasons. As a first principle of Jehad (holy war), Taliban-al-Qaeda cadres penetrated into the Pakistani armed forces over the years and they did succeed in their efforts. The lower rank and file in the Pakistani armed forces are a disillusioned group at the way the top leadership is providing direction to the country. They perceive that an Islamic form of Government, like the Taliban did in Afghanistan, is the only solution to take Pakistan forward. The Taliban-al-Qaeda leadership also perceived that the US and its allies cannot disarm the entire Pakistani army and replace them with their men.

Secondly, it was also able to evoke the traditional tribal loyalties across the border provinces in Pakistan, in NWFP and Balochistan. The time-tested tribal loyalties are more effective than the directives from Islamabad.

The next question that arises is what happened to the leadership and cadres of the extemist regime of Afghanistan. In the first three months of the US operations, though no clear picture emerged, the number of casualties suffered by them was roughly estimated to be in the region of 5,000 cadres killed or wounded and more or less equal number taken prisoners of war. Along with this there were civilian casualties, estimated to be around 30,000. By the end of August 2002, it was increasingly getting clear that identifying the Taliban-al-Qaeda cadres and isolating them from ordinary citizens of Afghanistan and Pakistan was difficult for US-British forces. Therefore, at the end of one year's operation the Taliban-al-Qaeda network, though crippled largely, could not be finished. The top leadership remained intact.

Since the beginning of 2002, Taliban-al-Qaeda, by a series of actions, have been demonstrating that they are a still a potent force. These include.

* Killing of Daniel Pearl, a Jewish-Christian origin journalist working with the Wall Street Journal in Karachi.

* Killing of eleven French engineers, working in Pakistan on a submarine project in Karachi.

* Blowing up of a church in Islamabad where some US diplomats were offering their Sunday prayers.

* Bomb blast near US consulate in Karachi.

* A plot was hatched to pump poisonous gas fumes into the US Embassy in Italy.

* Suspected culprit for making dirty bombs being arrested in the US.

* Assassination of two ministers in the interim government of Hamid Karzai in Kabul in broad daylight.

* An assassination attempt on Hamid Karzai during his visit to Kandahar, and the same day a bomb blast in Kabul killing about 30 people.

In addition to these random attacks on Western targets, the Taliban-al-Qaeda cadres are also offering resistance to the US forces in mountainous region in southern Afghanistan. The early March 2002 surprise attack on an US helicopter, killing six American soldiers, is one incident reported extensively in the media. Similar stray incidents were also mentioned by the people visiting Kabul and its surrounding areas.

At another level, new arms and ammunition are reaching Taliban-al-Qaeda fighters. In fact the US Defence Secretary in an interview to the Washington Times, disclosed that in Afghanistan ''we have recently (May-June 2002) discovered some new stuff that is not old and it is modern''. ''It is expensive , it is well done'', he said without disclosing there the equipment was found. He said it included ''25 backpacks all well done with the right equipment and modern stuff and professionally done.''

In another interview to CNN, he observed that he was amazed at the quantity of weapons that have been accumulated in Afganistan throughout its long history of warfare. ''Literally you cannot imagine the hundred of things, armoured vehicles and rockets, everything under the sun. Surface-to-air missiles must have been from 20 different countries,'' he said. In his assessment Taliban-al-Qaeda forces have remained probably in one-third of the 32 provinces in Afghanistan.

There are still a considerable number of hardcore Taliban in the southern provinces with large quantities of arms and ammunition, including Stinger missiles that may pose a threat to new rulers in Kabul. The US forces stationed at Kandahar and the new Afghan administration in these provinces are well aware of their presence. The US, through Karzai Government, is continuing its efforts to win over the tribal elders who were staunch supporters of the Taliban during their six-year rule.

Many Taliban have now resumed their religious studies in Afghanistan and Pakistan or resumed their duties as peshimams or muezzins in the mosques in both countries. Some have gone back to their villages and are biding their time. Some of them roam the streets of Kadahar in the same dress and turban, while some have changed their garb.

''The Taliban exist everywhere. They cannot be separated from Pushtun culture. It is not necessary that they rise under the same name, but they could launch another movement on the same lines'', said Talib Qari Noorduddin, who is now a peshimam in the city of Kandahar.- CNF

Optimum utilisation of irrigation

By Dr Navin Chandra Joshi

India’s progress in agricultural pro-duction has largely been helped by the availability of irrigation water resources. It is, therefore, appropriate that the Government has laid emphasis, on completing the ongoing works in medium and major sectors and on improving the quality of irrigation in the command of existing projects.

Even so, water as a resource is going to be under tremendous pressure from population growth, rapid urbanisation, industrialisation and environmental degradation. A long-term perspective planning of water resources is thus the need of the hour to meet the various competing demands an water.

The main objective of the national perspective plan for water resources, as the National Water Grid in its new form is called, should be to gainfully utilise the surplus water available in some rivers by transferring it to river systems in the water-scarce tracts.

As is well-known, our total water resources of 1150 cu km per year are not uniformly distributed throughout the country. For example, 29 per cent of it is available in the Brahmaputra basin which constitutes only 6 per cent of the country’s area and where only 3 per cent of our population resides.

As against this, the availability of water is much less than the national average in certain southern and western regions. In many southern regions, for instance, the water availability is as low as one-fourth of the national average.

To gauge the need for substantial increase in irrigation potential, it is pointed out that the present demand of 200 million tonnes of foodgrains in India is likely to go up to over 450 million tonnes by 2010. As such, an integrated approach is required to harness the country’s entire irrigation potential through major, medium and minor irrigation projects, including groundwater and maintain its sustainability through watershed development at the national level.

Today, the country has only 37 per cent agriculture under irrigation. The rest is rainfed. The Government has also launched schemes for saturation with rain water harvesting in certain districts in. the recent years. But planning is still quite haphazard and half-heartedly implemented.

It must also be said that our agricultural holdings are quite small and therefore large irrigation projects become quite expensive for them. Needless to mention that it is the small irrigation schemes which have been very effective in the agricultural growth of countries like China and others.

For this purpose, a Million Wells Scheme was started in 1988 so as to provide water to small and marginal farmers. The scheme did not work well in the initial years but in 1990, 20 per cent of the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana funds were specifically allocated for it. This allocation was raised to 30 per cent in 1993 to cover a whole lot of minor irrigation schemes as also the land development works.

Ultimately, MWS was considered as an important programme for eradication of poverty in rural areas. The scheme is centrally sponsored and expenditure is shared between the centre and the states on 80:20 basis.

While allocation under the MWS is primarily for open wells only, the funds could be utilised for other schemes of minor irrigation like irrigation tanks, water harvesting structures and for the development of lands belonging to small and marginal farmers. Each well/irrigation scheme is to be located in the holding of the beneficiaries and it is recorded in the revenue records.

No wonder, if full utilisation of the potential is made, there would be no shortage of irrigation facilities in the country. The total area under irrigation is around 83 million hectares and it needs to be increased to about 110 million hectares by the end of 2001.

This is not a difficult task if adequate and appropriate measures are undertaken by connecting the country with all types of water routes and if water is harnessed and utilised properly without waste.

An important aspect in utilisation of the potential is the proportion of medium and major projects on the one hand, and minor irrigation on the other. There is a huge gap between irrigation potential created and its actual utilisation in respect of major and medium irrigation projects.

This gap was 1.2 million hectares in the First plan period and it went upto 6 million hectares by the end of the Eighth plan period. As for the minor irrrigation projects, such gap was of the order of 3.3 million hectares.

Thus, the aggregate gap in the utilisation of the potential happens to be around 9.3 million hectares at present. This situation is one of the important reasons for shortfall in foodgrain production during the earlier years.

Most of the major and medium projects are predominantly fed by rain which is mainly restricted to three months of July, August and September, though rain during June to October also contributes to some extent in augmenting the water supply. Consequently, the cropping pattern of almost all major and medium schemes provides for a very substantial proportion of irrigation during kharif or rainy season. The water used in raising these crops is replenished by rain.

Minor irrigation schemes, it may be noted, include ground water and surface water schemes, while ground water schemes include dug wells, shallow tube walls and pumpsets, the surface water schemes include banks and reservoirs, diversion schemes, life irrigation from rivers and streams, and so on. The minor schemes are quick maturing and labour-intensive having a good potential for labour employment.

Unfortunately, water management in our public canal irrigation is not all that good. Farmers located at the head-end of a canal system, say a canal outlet, tend to appropriate more of irrigation supplies, to the disadvantage of their brother farmers at the end of that outlet.

Besides reduction in maximum total output from canal irrigation, this unequal sharing of water leads to waterlogging and soil salinity problems, which are more visible in head-end reaches of a canal system. This brings us to the question of environmental degradation from canal irrigation development.

Waterlogging and soil salinity are undoubtedly bad both for the present as well as the future generation of farmers. These negative environmental consequences also raise problems of inter- generation equity. That is why environmentalists insist that agricultural development should take place on a durable or sustainable basis, without there occuring a fall in agricultural production in the future.

Worse, however, is the fact that due to lack of utilisation during the rainy season, floods occur in the lower reaches, while water is wasted by going to the sea. In fact, creation of irrigation potential has been treated as an end in itself and no sufficient attention has been paid to its end-use.

As such, any programme for improving water management over a large portion of an entire irrigation system should involve a rapid assessment of the present situation, a review of the alternative methods of improvement, and monitoring of the improved programme so that when new or additional constraints are observed, they can be dealt with according to the existing resources.

Extension services can play their role effectively only if the irrigation systems are properly laid out. This suggests that in addition to the main canal system, water channels and field channels should be fully laid out and executed for carrying water to the farmers’ fields. It should be incumbent on the state department of irrigation to consult agriculture department and evolve a proper water distribution system for optimal use.

Water should be so regulated that it becomes available at predetermined and well-publicised periods as also during critical stages of water requirements for different crops according to an agreed cropping pattern.

But then, at the same time, emphasis should shift from major to medium and to minor irrigation projects with simultaneous efforts to develop the huge ground water potential that may be compatible with the national water policy. Along with that, there has to be an equally important emphasis on creating software components such as extension, credit, marketing, research, etc., with aview to make full use of the heavy investment made in irrigation methods of various types.

In India, irrigation potential has come to be created by both the Government and the farmers. By and large, major and medium irrigation dams have been constructed and managed by the Government whereas irrigation wells other than the state-owned tube wells have been constructed and managed by the farmers.

The data relating to the irrigation potential created is open to dispute mainly because the irrigation Department provides information based on the exaggerated potential created by projects just to get the approval of the Government and ofcourse, the World Bank. But the Revenue Department goes by the assessment of actually irrigated land for purpose of collecting the land revenue.

Besides, in the case of minor irrigation works like tanks and wells, the originally estimated irrigation potential gradually shrinks on account of silting and owing to decling in the ground water level. The data on irrigation potential is not annually or even periodically adjusted to these changes. Consequently, a wrong impression is created for the correct potential with the help of exaggerated or even fudged data doled out by the irrigation department.

Recently, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Agriculture expressed dissatisfaction with the plea of the Water Resources Ministry that a lag of a few years between creation of irrigation potential and its utilisation is unavoidable as it takes time for the farmers to prepare the land for irrigated farming. It noted with concern the neglect of the existing irrigation projects while new projects were being taken up by the State Governments.

Since plan funds are not adequately allocated for irrigation projects, their’ maintenance and modernisation programmes are generally neglected. The situation has been aggravated by the low recovery rates while water rates have not been raised sufficiently for a long time.

According to the Water Resources Ministry, the country’s potential to irrigate our agricultural land is around 114 million hectares at present. Out of this, potential to irrigate 59 m. ha can be tapped by major and medium projects and 55 m. ha by minor schemes. As much as 40 m. ha of minor irrigation potential is from groundwater and 15 m. ha from surface water. In addition, inter-basin transfers can enable irrigation in about 35 million hectares of land.

The slackening in the pace of new large-scale surface irrigation projects has brought into focus the role of ground water exploitation for irrigating the thirsty croplands of India. Although wells have been a traditional source of irrigation, there is no gain saying the fact that there is need for scientific exploration of groundwater resources and their rational exploitation. Above all, the present status of irrigation through canals and wells needs to be improved considerably. Only then we can increase productivity of land for enhancing our agricultural output which is very low at present.

PTI Feature