Kashmir: A third world paradigm

By Indranil Banerjea

Kashmir occupies centrestage in any discourse on Indian politics and regional relations in South Asia. Most discussions on Kashmir focus on either the constitutional position of the state, the legality or illegality of the instrument of accession or the externally-sponsored terrorism effected by foreign mercenaries. Some also look at it from the point of view of human rights of distinct nationalities and recommend self-determination for the people of Kashmir. Rarely is the Kashmir issue seen as part of bigger problem faced by most Third World states to integrate their multi-racial and pluralistic societies in their attempt at nation and state building. If viewed in the larger context, Kashmir, far from being an exception or a specific South Asian problem, conforms to a pattern.

Almost all states in the Third World have one or more minority groups within their national territories, and minorities frequently live on different side of state borders. Consequently, the treatment of minorities presents a moral and political dilemma with both domestic and international ramifications. In this sense, Kashmir is a paradigm and the lessons learnt here have implications for all Third World nation states grappling with the problems thrown up by heterogeneity and the demands of a pluralistic society. Therefore, to view the Kashmir problem in isolation and to offer prescriptions specific to this territory without addressing the larger questions of Third World nation building would be intellectually presumptuous and practically unacceptable.

The modern nation state, undoubtedly one of the world’s most enduring institutions, is facing major challenges: it is going through a period of stress and strain that may not only alter the political map of the world but also transform the very notions of sovereignty and nationhood. States are being pressed in different unpredictable and politically violent ways by ethnic, religious forces or by demands for reunification with homelands across border. The results are visible not just in the turmoil in most Third World states, in the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, Yugoslavia and others, but in all the seemingly more stable and established nations. Canada is an interesting example. It should not be forgotten that the process of state-making in Europe, home of the modern nation state, followed a gradualist pattern. It took decades and several bouts of unprecedented violence to stabilise these states.

Even the USA went through a tumultuous period culminating in the historic Civil War. Even so, imperfections remain. A case in point is Britain with its unruly mixture of Scots, Welsh and the English, and its war zone in northern Ireland Sub-surface ethnic tensions persist in the United States as well due to the complexities of race relations and the continued (and often illegal) inflow of new migrant races. For the newly independent countries it is not time alone that constrains their journeys to nationhood. They have to tackle the political, social and economic dimensions of the de-colonialisation process simultaneously, rather than through a process broken into phases as was the case with the Western developed states.

The Western nation states were fortunate in having the chance to solve some of the intricate problems of nation-building well before they had to face the ordeal of mass politics. This makes the problem of nation and state a more difficult and complicated task in the Third World. Then unfortunate part is that Western leaders and intellectuals often try to foist their values and ideas which have centuries to evolve to nascent Third World states for their own interests and in the process sometimes de-stabilise the process of nation building. Given this theoretical framework, Kashmir is no exception, and in fact shares the experiences of other pluralistic societies nearer home, particularly in southeast Asia. All the countries of Southeast Asia with the single exception of Singapore, have problems of some national groups trying either to assert their autonomy or to secede from the state. While armed communist movement constituted the most serious threat to regime survival in post-colonial Southeast Asia, armed separatist movements involving indigenous ethnic minorities are challenging the very basis of statehood and national identity in the region. Southeast Asia is home to at least 32 ethno-linguistic groups and all the world’s major independent rebel groups have organised armed campaigns against the state structure within the ASEAN countries.

In the case of Myanmar (Burma), for instance, about 10 sub-ethnic groups are demanding sovereignty ever since the country became independent. Burma since ancient times has been dominated by the majority Burman ethnic group.

In Thailand too the problem of ethnicity affects the stability of the State and of national integration. The country is predominantly Buddhist, only 4 per cent of the entire population follows other faiths. About 3.82 per cent of the population is Muslim, the rest being Christian. It is this minuscule Muslim minority that has most vociferously opposed the national integration plans in matters of administration and other Government activities.

The Philippines is also not free from such ethnic separatist movements. Ever since the country’s independence, the central government at Manila has tried to assimilate the Moros, who are Muslims living in a predominantly Christian country and who have always looked to the Malay world and to the Middle East for cultural and religious sustenance. But under former president Marcos, who ruled from 1966 to 1986, the movement for a "Bangsa Moro" began to gain momentum.

An interesting aspect of the movement for independence in Kashmir is that it is directed not only at the Indian state in terms of secession but also at the established ruling groups within Kashmir. Its social origins are neo-bourgeois and its philosophy a combination of Kashmiriyat and Islam. Depending upon the weightage given to each of these two elements respectively, we have the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the two main militant groups. The current crisis is the culmination of many years of perverse democratic politics within the state, compounded by rampant corruption and sluggish socio-economic development. All this fanned political disenchantment especially among the growing numbers of educated unemployed Kashmiri youth. Also, the sense of alienation from the Indian state among the Kashmiri emergent middle class is due in part to a feeling of discrimination by New Delhi. Rightly or wrongly, this feeling is deeply embedded in the Kashmiri psyche. The winds of fundamentalism and the stories of "heroic terrorism" across the world provided the inspiration for many Kashmiris to adopt militancy. These feelings within Kashmir constitute a great opportunity for Pakistan to exploit.

Given the past history of the subcontinent, a further division or granting of independence to any of the constituent units of India will not solve any religious, linguistic or other ethnic disputes. The same is true for Pakistan. The case of Bangladesh was very different because the two former wings of Pakistan were not only physically separated by another country, but they also had nothing in common except religion. Long years of neglect, indifference, and bad policies, although not deliberate, have led to the alienation of a large number of Kashmiris. It is proving difficult to bring Kashmiris back into the mainstream. If the Southeast Asian experience holds any lessons for Kashmir, it is first that it will be difficult to reach a solution as long as the armed Kashmiri movement continues to receive support from an external source, which in this case is Pakistan and a few other Islamic countries. Second, the Kashmir movement cannot be solved by force alone. The case of Thailand and to an extent the Philippines shows that a more considerate policy towards minority groups succeeds in diminishing alienation and with it the problem of armed insurgency and terrorism.

In short, a compromise needs to be worked out. The Kashmiris clearly need more devolution of powers and autonomy. At the same time, they need to be reminded that secession is unacceptable. The solution to a dispute like that in Kashmir cannot be the fragmentation of the Indian state, but decentralization and devolution of power to the constituent units; better communication between the state and its sectarian and ethnic minorities; and cultural tolerance and fairness in the form of constitutional safeguards for the disadvantaged. A careful scrutiny of the roots of unrest in South Asia reveals that many of the urgent issues confronting the region centre around the tension caused by either a central government or a particular dominant ethnic, linguistic, or religious group arrogating too much power to itself.INAV

Quality controllers of higher education

By Damodar Agrawal

The need for controlling the quality of the institutions of higher learning can never be over-emphasised. As their number in the last decades went up, the standards went down. Figures show that there are 65 lakh college students, 3.10 lakh teachers, 207 Universities, 9278 Colleges and 37 deemed Universities which consume around four per cent of our Gross Domestic Product.

This has been from time to time prompting the authorities to take action to control standards. From trying to increase teaching hours to granting autonomy for self financing, they have tried every weapon in the armoury, though without any significant success.

The latest attempt was the Surya Foundation’s think-tank on higher education comprising eminent scholars and educationists. It said higher education was virtually "robbing the country" and that there was no proportion "between the money invested and the returns".

The Birla-Ambani Committee report was also critical about the quality of higher education. In its "Policy Framework for Reforms in Education,' it suggested the establishment of Private Universities. It says, "A private university Bill should be legislated to encourage establishment of new private Universities".

The Committee was part of the Prime Minister’s Council on Trade and Industry, with Mukesh Ambani as its convenor. It’s most controversial recommendation was to appoint an independent agency on the pattern of the CRISIL to rate the performance and link the funding accordingly.

The failure of the system was attributed, among other reasons, to Universities having become hotbed of politics. "The teacher-turned-politician is largely responsible for falling standards and commitment .... University unions are seen as nurseries for political careers."

Directly or indirectly, this was an indictment of the University Grants Commission (UGC) which is now generally perceived as failing in its duty. It was constituted to "coordinate and maintain the standards of higher education" as provided under the Constitution. But it has turned out to be a funding authority only.

Many have suggested that UGC should be closed down and funding should be done directly by a private or Corporate agency. When the ‘quality controller, itself is deficient in quality,' how can it guarantee quality in the institutions under its guardianship?

A major step in quality control was taken by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC). The Bangalore-based national body was asked to perform the onerous task of assessing the universities and their colleges and accord them ratings. The deadline for the Universities to respond to its offer of evaluation is December 31, 2002. For the colleges it is December 31, 2003.

But till now, the response of the institutions has not been good. Most of them believe that NAAC was endeavouring to interfere with their right to judge their performance within the framework of their own ordinances and statutes there was also this apprehension that institutions with lower ratings might be disqualified for future grants.

In public mind, what is more important than NAAC assessment and rating is the general perception about a college or University. People don’t require any NAAC testimonial to choose their college. Parents are knowledgeable enough to distinguish between a bad college and good college.

While the intention of this 'quality controller, might be good and noble, its constitution has been held in doubt. "It needs to be assessed for its efficiency and capability," says the head of an All-India Teacher’s Association, many go to the extent of saying that its inspectors are not beyond extra-academic influences.

Still, if one does not submit to NAAC's offer of assessment and accreditation, it will hypothetically amount to admitting some deficiency in service. UGC’s 22-strong short-listing of national centres of academic excellence does not include even the renowned colleges and departments of Delhi University. As a result, the University’s Centres of Nanomaterial Sciences, Theoretic Studies, Earth and Environment and Genome Sciences have lost out in the race for excellence.

NAAC is an autonomous institution under UGC and is a founder-member of the International Network for Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education (INQAAHE) with 120 Internal Agencies engaged in quality assessment and academic audit. It’s accreditation status will remain valid for 5 years, and as on date it has valued and accredited 61 Universities and 200 colleges, the results of which are available on the NAAC Website.

The poor response to NAAC’s proposal of assessment is evident in a newspaper advertisement put by the NAAC itself. It shows that the assessment process was completed only in case of just a few universities and colleges in Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala in the South-Eastern region and Maharashtra, Goa, Gujarat in the Western region. In the Northern regions, which include Haryana, U.P. Punjab and Delhi, the assessment process has been much slower.

The institutions of higher education in North are accustomed to considering their own quality status a little too high and are averse to any external agency trying to examine their performance. In the Universities falling in this part of the country, the standards vary from very poor to very good.

In the institutions in these States, there is too much of politics in managements, admissions, appointments and course formulation. Hence, one cannot say that the standards are good generally. Institutions in these States are in the habit of leaving the course contents unrevised for years on end, making question papers on the basis of the old ones and delivering lectures from old copies. Beyond talking about pay and service conditions they hardly do anything to relate the subject to changing times and social needs.

In an open and competitive economy, it would be a retrograde step to let ‘quality-deficient, institutions thrive on Government grants, which perhaps is the main cause of quality deterioration. By not doing well, if a college or University loses its grants, let it do so. They may then be forced to tap internal resources by improving their output.

The Nehruvian concept of education being funded by the State, with guarantee of endless flow of tax-payees’ money must now be totally trashed. It has proved the worst enemy of academic accountability. The grants will now have to be linked with the value of the product’.

In a so-called welfare State, this measure would be difficult to implement. Teachers, students and administrators have failed. Politicians pay just a lip-service. UGC and the Universities are no more than salary-distributing authorities. Try the private players and wait for results.

PTI Feature