Where is Osama bin Laden?

By M J Akbar

Where is Osama bin Laden? President Pervez Musharraf thinks he is dead. Maybe he just hopes he is dead. Nothing would be more inconvenient for President George Bush's newest friend than an Osama discovered, possibly clean - shaven, in a nondescript safe house in Pakistan.

Would Pakistan's President be able to hand over Osama bin Laden to America's President? Intentions are not in question: he would certainly like to. He could later go on his favourite medium, television, and explain that since Osama was not a Pakistani citizen he did not feel duty - bound to save him for a local trial. Nor have the Americans come halfway around the world to watch Osama bin Laden being tried by a Sharia court. But the reaction would be another story. The street would probably not erupt immediately, but it would smoulder. The Muslim street has been subdued by the crackle of events since September. But it is foolish to underestimate a volcano merely because it has not overflown in front of today's television coverage.

As Hercule Poirot and Sherlock Holmes pointed out so often, there cannot be a death without a body. Osama bin Laden may not these days be presumed innocent until convicted, but he must be presumed alive till buried. The question is larger, and more intriguing, than the fate of only Osama bin Laden. He was a political recluse, for obvious reasons, but not a hermit. He had wives and children, some living with him in Afghanistan. During the war a videotape was circulated in which two young sons of Osama were also shown with him in Afghanistan. Where is this family? They could not have disappeared into thin air, could they? The air is not so thin over Afghanistan, or Pakistan, as to enable a large family and entourage to vanish without a trace.

Where, similarly, is Mullah Omar? Where are his wives and his children? Where are those who occupied his palatial residence in Kandahar? Lurid stories are occasionally put out that Mullah Omar was last seen on a motorcycle, riding off into the sunset, with his second or third wife in pillion. I do not buy such junk. Neither history nor its saucy cousin, journalism, are kind to losers. Where, indeed, is the top leadership of the Taliban Cabinet? Afghanistan had a functioning Government, replete with Cabinet Ministers where are they now? So many questions, so few answers.

A good person to ask would be Hamid Karzai, although you might have to phrase the question a bit differently. Where was he, and where were many of the members of his Government when Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden were in power? They were not always in exile, or on the run, or in a sanctuary provided by a neighbouring power. The Northern Alliance was at permanent war. The answer is evident. The whole of Afghanistan has almost never been under the complete control of any single Government. There has always been space, even if they are no more than the nooks and crannies of a large country, out of the reach of even the most powerful Government. But this brings us to an uncomfortable fact. Such a large group of people, numbering in thousands, can live outside the range of a Government, but they cannot live without the support of some people who provide the essentials of survival: security, food and shelter.

The current dispensation in Afghanistan is much too loose and impromptu to command the allegiance of the whole country. Mr Hamid Karzai barely has the resources to exercise his personal authority in Kabul. For other regions he must depend on the goodwill of those who, in the bad old days, were called warlords but whose designations have changed since they ended up on the winning side. The point to note is that each one of them survived not only the Taliban but also the decade during which the Russians occupied Kabul. The Soviets might not had the technological eyesight of the present American arsenal, but they were not a Third World force. There is of course a vital difference in that the Pakistan Government offered a safe haven that is not on offer now. But the relevant point is elsewhere. Afghanistan is deeper than its surface.

These worries must be nagging an officially exuberant Washington. This columnist learns that present American assessments envisage the presence of its troops in Pakistan and Afghanistan at least till the spring of 2003. One presumes that the will to stay will not be undermined by the success of any sporadic sabotage mission: Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Bill Clinton both withdrew their troops, one from Beirut and the other from Somalia, after casualties. In Beirut a truck bomb killed more than two hundred soldiers, and in Somalia those familiar "warlords" sent back too many of those dreaded bodybags.

In the old days the British handled the problem of Afghanistan with more elan. They simply declared victory and got the hell out.

The British conducted their first Afghan war in 1839 in order, they said, to keep the Russians out. They were premature in their assumptions by about 140 years, but that is another matter. Their war aim was to remove the widely admired Dost Mohammad Khan, of whom it was said: "Is Dost Mohammad dead that there is no justice?" They raised the much-vaunted Army of the Indus in order to place their protege Shah Shuja, who had been living in their care in Ludhiana, on he throne. It had to be the Army of the Indus because the sharp-eyed Ranjit Singh (he had only one eye, but it was sharp) refused, despite his alliance with them, to let the British cross his territories on their way to Kabul. Kabul fell without a fuss. It always does. The British "coronated" Shah Shuja (at Kandahar, as it so happened), and settled down to enjoy two years of polo, champagne and hock, hermetically sealed salmon and, when they could find them, dark-eyed local beauties. Dost Mohammad took shelter with the Emir of Bukhara and handed over leadership of the Jihad to his favourite son Akbar Khan. He also, in an astute move, handed himself over to the British, confident that they always kept space for an alternative in their policy. The British were wise; they kept Dost Mohammad this time in India. In 1842 Akbar Khan surprised the complacent British garrison in Kabul. By the time it found "safety" in Jalalabad, some 20,000 British Army lives had been lost and, famously, only one man survived: Dr William Brydon (he was a great survivor; he also survived the siege of Lucknow). The Army of Retribution succeeded where the Army of the Indus had failed. The redcoats returned to Kabul, hanged a few people and, in a triumph of diplomacy, reinstalled Dost Mohammad. It was the ultimate victory. Both sides won.

That is the way they prefer it in Afghanistan. History, denying Marx his aphorism, repeated itself in the second Afghan war fought by the British forty years later.

President Bush once said that he wanted Osama bin Laden dead or alive. Having conquered a country in search of one man, one can appreciates that President Bush cannot really declare victory until he has brought that one man to the in-camera military tribunals that have been created, at great cost to the spirit of American justice, only for him. But it is a moot point whether the Americans would actually want either Osama bin Laden or the reclusive Mullah Omar alive. What are the odds that it would be difficult to indict Mullah Omar for anything other than abetment of terrorism in an American court? A trial of Osama could be kept in camera, but could it really be kept out of the purview of a million journalists waiting at the door for anything that they could pick up? Could anyone really prevent Osama's lawyers from talking, or him from grandstanding? Would any statement he made become the inspiration for the next round of attacks on America and the American presence worldwide? America is now military engaged in almost all the key areas of conflict in the world. Going by President Bush's State of the Union address, his appetite for war has increased: both Iraq and Iran are now within his target-range, with North Korea getting a nod as well to await its turn. Perhaps a few people in Washington and Islamabad the thinking through the consequences of adding an Osama trial into such a volatile scenario. Perhaps.

Is Osama bin Laden safer (for America) lost in some mystery never never land? Protected by a pronouncement of death that has never been proved? What, to return to a parallel mystery, happens to the families? Are they also to be presumed dead-disappeared? Will those boys on videotape never grow up?

So many questions. So few answers.

(Twenty First Century Media)

Medium-term export strategy

By K R Sudhaman

Critics may dub the five-year medium-term Export Strategy unveiled by Commerce Minister Murasoli Maran as ''old wine in new bottle'' but none can deny the fact that it has made an honest attempt to identify and find solutions to the problems of exporters in doubling exports to 80 billion dollars annually to achieve one per cent share of world trade.

Some of the problems were known already but no one was quite sure about a solution. The strategy certainly does not lay down drastic steps but offers something that could be implemented and, hence, if sincere efforts are made, it could work to achieve 11.9 per cent average annual export growth in the next five years to push up merchandise exports from the present level of 45 billion dollars to 80.48 billion dollars annually by 2007.

One may doubt if exports could be pushed when there is a global slowdown. This year's target of 12 per cent has been slashed to one quarter at three per cent in the face of poor performance after the Sept 11 terror attack in US.

But there is sense when Maran says this is a short-term problem and the average 11.9 per cent export growth target is not ''too ambitious'' considering that the country achieved an average annual export growth of 10 per cent through the last decade since liberalization. An increase of just 1.9 per cent in average growth is possible provided the 15-point policy changes advocated in the 215-page medium-term export strategy.

Maran reeled out statistics to say a 5 per cent increase exports of 101 of the 220 identified items for pushing up trade could result in additional 54 billion dollar annual exports. Also these have to be exported only to 25 countries identified, particularly the United States, the European Union and Japan where these were being already sent. This requires only some focused attention and hence there is nothing unrealistic about the targets.

An important aspect of the strategy is that it does not call for difficult political decisions. It has come out with certain simple prescriptions like cut in tariffs in the budget, modifications and simplifications of procedures for import tariffs to make it balanced and pegging rupee value close to the real exchange rate rather than overvaluing it, as the present practice is making Indian exports uncompetitive.

In the first four decades since Independence, the stress had been on import substitution and domestic market which left very little room for exports. After liberalization, India concentrated on exporting the surplus, besides some thrust on exports of certain commodities. Now the emphasis is on exportled growth as the average 10 per cent annual export growth in the last decade has helped in pushing up economic growth by two per cent. So exports could become an engine of growth in the coming years and according to the Planning Commission, exports will have to be pushed harder if the economy has to achieve 8 per cent annual growth during the Tenth five -year plan beginning next fiscal. The medium term export strategy is co-terminus with the Tenth Plan period of 2002-07.

Absence of a comprehensive market intelligence so far had been an incapacitating lacuna in the country's export strategy. One of the major drawbacks so far is that India has been exporting without any major strategy. This medium-term export policy for the first time has done a detailed market intelligence study so that all that an exporter has to do is to consult the voluminous document before planning his exports. Till now an exporter had to depend on his half-baked market intelligence information.

The report presents a detaied study of the import basket of major countries like the United States, the European Union and Japan besides analyzing those countries' export potential. Two hundred twenty items have been thus identified for export to 25 countries where Indian markets have been growing.

For example, the study points out auto and auto components imported by United States and European Union alone accounted for over 900 billion dollars. But India's total share of engineering exports accounted for a mere 4.6 billion dollars despite our exports being price competitive. The failure is due to the country's inability to mass produce these engineering goods that is required to make inroads into these markets.

The study has identified setting up of facilities like Special Economic Zones for auto components to make export-oriented production of scale. Major players are already in the field. It only needs some additional investment to create the necessary facility to increase the volume of production.

The medium-term strategy involves a paradigm shift from the past approach of mainly focusing on existing markets and products. The new approach is to take advantage of the country's ''real and revealed comparative advantage in exports. In other words, according to Commerce Secretary Prabir Sengupta, the strategy will now focus on demand rather than supply. For the first time 220 items identified for increased exports are at subsecor level in seven areas where sector wise strategy has been prepared.

The seven sectors are Engineering including electronics and electrical, textiles, gems and Jewellery, Chemicals, Agriculture, Leather and toys. It proposed to encourage Special Economic zones and Agri-export zones to boost exports. For example a 5 per cent increase in exports of 44 of the 220 items will lead to increased exports of 18 billion dollars and another five per cent increase in another 57 items will lead to increased exports of 36 billion dollars.

The Government proposes to set up an institutional mechanism to monitor the implementation of the strategy. An action commitee under the Commerce Secretary with Economic Adviser as the nodal officer will ensure that resources are committed to achieve goals and provide a dynamic track against which the progress can be measured.

A market intelligence Unit is also being set up to help the action committee. All commodity divisions and territorial divisions of Commerce Ministry and Indian missions abroad will take steps to concretize the policies.

On Export Incentives, the policy has prescribed that it should be made compatible. To the Finance Ministry's aversion to tax incentives, the strategy points all over the world such incentives are given to exports as it provides employment and contribute immensely to growth.

There are no doubt some leakages of revenue on account of abuse of the export incentives. To this, the strategy has suggested modification of the tax incentive schemes. It has suggested transparent and comprehensive schemes of reimbursement, comprehensive VAT system at every level, rebating services tax, besides lower customs and excise duties for major inputs needed for exports which can minimize the need for duty drawback.

It has also suggested harmonization of customs tariff at 8 digit level so that tariffs could be more balanced. Adoption of common nomenclature at 8-digit level would help in protecting sensitive items by higher tariff while keeping the overall tariffs low particularly for import of inputs. Now the tariffs are topsy-turvy as the absence of a common nomenclature has made tariffs on majority of raw materials much more than finished products making India's exports uncompetitive price-wise. The forthcoming budget is expected to carry out this exercise.

The plan favours strategic free trade agreements with some of the countries . Proposals have come from South Africa, Egypt, Columbia, Brazil and Singapore which are being pursued. It would also work towards reducing transaction cost by introducing digital signature, procedural simplification and increasing accountability.

The strategy would form a valuable input for the five-year Exim policy beginning from April this year. An expert Panel set up under chairmanship of former Commerce Secretary P P Prabha for formation of the exim policy has given its recommendations. It has stressed on developing export infrastructure by identifying and prioritizing specific infrastructure projects within Special Economic Zones.

According to Economic Adviser H A C Prasad the strategy will provide valuable input in the formulation of the Exim policy which would implement the 15-point strategy outlined. It also proposed to give thrust on developing SSI export industry by a well-formulated package offering support.

It has also enhanced the responsibility of state governments to play a pro-active role in facilitating better environment for export production by widening and deepening the scheme already taken up for export assistance to states.

Another important part of the strategy is to strengthen export credit. In a WTO compatible way bank credit has to be enhanced for the export sector particular agricultural exports by giving loans at subsidised interest rates to make available capital at a cost comparable to the international level. It also wants the finances of Exim bank to be strengthen to enable it to give much kore credit for exports.

Overall the policy makes a sincere and modest effort to push up exports in a realistic way notwithstanding some of the criticisms and the forthcoming budget and Exim policy are certainly expected to reflect the suggestions.

PTI Feature