Free flow of funds sustains terrorism

By Dr Bhabani Dikshit

Recently, the Jammu and Kashmir police arrested JKLF Chairman and senior Hurriyat leader Yasin Malik under POTO at Srinagar while he was addressing a press conference denying his involvement with two persons arrested earlier for possessing $ 1 lakh. Malik's detention followed the arrest of a JKLF conduit Begum Shazia, who was caught bringing the amount from Nepal, supposedly for a Hurriyat leader. She was travelling from Jammu to Srinagar by a private vehicle with another JKLF activist Mustaq Ahmed Dar.

It is pertinent to note that Shazia, during interrogation, admitted that she brought the money from Kathmandu. The police maintained that she had received the money from Altaf Qadiri, a Kashmiri hailing from Khanyar, presently in Pakistan - occupied Kashmir (PoK) to channel funds to militant groups in Jammu & Kashmir.

Then again close on the heels of the arrest of Yasin Malik, a joint team of the CID branch of the J&K Police and the Delhi Police swooped down and searched the Hurriyat offices at Malaviya Nagar in South Delhi and seized some documents. Sources said that the raid on Hurriyat's office was carried out on inputs supplied Mustaq Ahmed Dar and Shazia Rasool who were arrested for their alleged involvement in a hawala racket.

During interrogation, Shazia Rasool disclosed that she had been to Delhi recently and on many occasions she had contacted the Hurriyat's Malaviya Nagar office. It is alleged that Shazia had also made calls to this office.

These occurrences and the terrorists' attack earlier on the WTC on September 11 and the FBI investigations have brought into focus the urgency to combat terrorism effectively and as such, there has been emerging consensus towards a concerted global initiative for blocking the sources of terrorist financing.

In case of Jammu & Kashmir, the magnitude of funds that are available to the terrorist organizations, are astounding. The extent of financing terrorism in J&K has been reported to be around Rs. 500 crore annually. Pakistan spends around Rs.24 crore annually to maintain terrorist activities in the Kashmir valley, whereas India's expenditure on CI (OPS) is around Rs. 750 crore annually. These statistics show that a target country like India has also to spend on counter-intelligence and other physical operations much more than the amount of terrorist funding.

Controversy has also caught organizations like the All Party Hurriyat conference (APHC), which is alleged to have been the largest beneficiary of foreign funds in the Valley. There have been reports in the local Kashmiri press that Al Barq, a militant organization, has charged Abdul Gani Lone, a stalwart of the APHC, with misappropriating money given by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Pakistani authorities for the cause of militancy in J&K.

Besides, another functionary of the APHC in Jammu had reportedly made allegations against his own colleagues in Kashmir about misappropriation of Rs. 80 crores. Reliable sources point out that a senior Hurriyat leader has been getting a sum of Rs. 3,00,000 per month, besides a sum of about Rs. 5 lakhs collected every month as voluntary donations in the Valley.

The militant organizations spearheaded their activities in the name of Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) initially, but later on Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) overshadowed the former.

Authenticated Government sources reveal that over 60 per cent of militants currently active in J&K are said to be of foreign origin, which is a big jump from a mere 6 per cent in 1989.

The same version also contends that upto 90 percent of the foreign militants are from Pakistan. Except what is collected as voluntary donations in the Valley, 90 per cent of the funding is from other countries and Islamic organizations like the World Association of Muslim Youth, Rabit - e-Islami, World Kashmir Freedom Movement, Kashmir American Council, Kashmir Study Group and Friends of Kashmir, UK etc. In any case, however, the major contributor remains Pakistan through the ISI and its High Commission in India and Nepal as per the same version.

Even the break - up the sources of terrorist funding in J&K has been reportedly mentioned as: direct from Pakistan 25%, from narcotics 15%, from illegal sale of arms 10%, through counterfeit currency 10%, through zakat (an Islamic tax) and donations 10%, from international Islamic organizations and the Organization of Islamic Countries 20% and through extortion/bank robberies 10%.

It is known to everybody that external funding is of much greater magnitude than the collections generated from domestic internal sources. But sometime funding also picks up in response to certain domestic events. For example, the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 was exploited by fundamentalists to collect large donations for terrorists operating against India.

The main sources of terrorist funds are charities, narco - terrorism, extortion and fake currency. It is significant that the terrorist outfits operating in the Kashmir valley get their financial sustenance from charitable donations given by Islamic organizations and also donations by other radical Islamic sympathizers. It is known to everybody that the nexus between narcotics trade and terrorism has led to lethal term called as 'narco-terrorism'. It is one of the oldest and the most dependable sources of terrorist financing as it involves huge financial back-up needed for both the operations.

The magnitude of drug smuggling being carried out by the terrorist outfits in the Valley can be judged from the fact that 19,450 kg of narcotics valued at Rs. 20 crore was recovered from Kashmir during 1997-98. The narcotics traffic involving the Golden Crescent (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) easily cover up the deficits in the terrorists budget.

Though estimates of extortion seem impossible to record, yet it would be plausible to say that crores of rupees have been extorted by terrorists from vulnerable traders, contractors and other rich person. For fear of life and property, these people have parted with their valuables to buy peace. Hence, extortion has emerged as another source of terrorist funding.

The circulation of fake currencies is also a way of life for the terrorists in J&K. There has been a significant increase in the circulation of fake Indian currency notes (FINCS) in the recent years. In 1995, the authorities seized FINCS worth Rs. 8,45,000, whereas the seizure went upto Rs. 3,56 crores in 2001. The circulation of counterfeit currency aims at sabotaging the Indian economy, on one hand, and on the other generating sufficient funds of militants activities.

The usual mode of financing terrorism is through front companies and hawala. Hawala system has been in existence for the last many decades in India. In Pakistan it is known as hundi, in China fei qian (flying money), in Philippines as black market peso exchange. In Kashmir, the terrorist operate mainly through this underground channel.

Even Pakistan's selective crackdown on financial assets of religious extremist organizations did not enthuse India at all, as it was merely an eyewash. During the crackdown in Pakistan only Rs. 900 was found in the Muslim Commercial Bank account of the Jaish -e-Mohammad. The delayed freezing of 50 bank accounts by Pakistan gave sufficient time for account holders to withdraw their money.

The vigorous efforts to block terrorist financing at national and international levels go unabated. The UN Convention for Supersession of Financing of terrorism was concluded in 1999 and Britain has already a Terrorism Act 2000, followed by the recent Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) of India. But there is an urgent need to meet the challenge of terrorist financing in India in tune with other substantially uniform laws framed in other countries.

A study of International Law Association (ILA) based in New Delhi says that the attacks in New York by the ter(Contd. on Page 7)rorists also has triggered the adoption of additional measures designed to prevent abuse of financial systems for financing terrorist activities. The mandate of the ILA's financial actions task force was expanded beyond the field of money laundering to include combating terrorist financing.

Besides ratification of UN instruments, the need for defining the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering as a crime; freezing and confiscating terrorist assets and reporting suspicious transactions related terrorism are of immense significance.

It is also suggested that sanctions should be imposed for the crime committed against persons or legal entities providing a service for transmission of money or value, monitoring wire transfers and ensuring non-profit organizations are not abused for financing terrorism. As a result the terrorists will be denied access effectively to the international financial system.

The UN Security Council has already unanimously adopted resolution 1373 which provided for Governments to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.

Instances of Governments having taken steps to freeze funds of Al-Qaeda/Taliban of Afghanistan are known. The US Congress has already passed the USA- Patriot (the Uniting and Strengthening America Act by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act 2001.

Though India's POTA does have some provisions against supporting terrorism in any form, and that includes funding it, effectiveness of the new law remains doubtful. CNF

Past sins frustrate operations in Afghanistan

By Sreedhar

The US-led Grand Coalition’s war on terrorism, that started on 7th October 2001 is not yet over. The war objectives, the Grand Coalition set for itself, included catching people responsible for 11 September 2001 acts of terrorism and violence, and those that harboured them dead or alive and bringing them to justice, destroying the Pakistan - Taliban Al-Qaeda network, were partially achieved within 100 days. Large scale military operations were over by December 2001, but the painstaking search for leadership responsible for 11th September 2001 continues with the end result being uncertain. According to unconfirmed reports, at least some of the top leaders of the combine have found shelter in a Pakistan-hold area.

To understand the challenges being thrown up by the 11th September attacks and the response of the Great Powers against terrorism, one should have a quick look at the origin and growth of the PATAaQ phenomenon over the years. If we take Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 as a benchmark, the Great Powers left Afghanistan as Pakistan’s war booty. In their excitement of victory over the Soviet Union, they forgot that a faced State like Pakistan was not fit to undertake reconstruction of a war ravaged country like Afghanistan. The Pakistani objectives of this new opportunity were clear.

They wanted a pro-Pakistani regime to be established in Kabul to provide it the much- needed "strategic depth" in the event of an Indo-Pak war. Though unstated, many in the Indian strategic community suspect that in the event of another Indo-Pak war Pakistan wanted to launch its attacks from Afghan soil to place India in a dilemma of whom to attack.

However, the Pakistan plans did not work. After the Geneva and Peshawar Accords failed to form a Government in Kabul Pakistan literally played musical chairs with the Afghan political leadership. Finally in 1994, Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) agency decided to create a totally new leadership. The Taliban thus was born. How Taliban was born and the relationship between the ISI and Taliban ware brilliantly documented by a Pakistan journalist, M. Ilyas Khan, in an article, last year.

According to Ilyas Khan, the fall of Kandahar in October 1994 truly launched Mullah Omar's career as commander of the faithful or amirul momineen. In this campaign, the Taliban were joined by hordes of fighters described by observers as "military-trained students of JUI madrasas in Balochistan. There are recurrent, though unconfirmed, reports that these students included professional army soldiers sent in by Pakistan to free a trade, convoy hold up by a local, commander near Kandahar’.

"Another feature of the Kandahar campaign was that the city fed without a fight. Unconfirmed reports suggested that the Kandahar governor, Gul Agha, was given massive, bribes for ordering his troops to surrender. Bribes have also reportedly featured in most of the Talibans subsequent victories in southern Afghanistan as well as in the north. According to one report the Taliban secured Bamiyan city after paying 800 millions dollars to the Hizb-r-Wahadat commander,'' says Khan.

"Prior to the fall of Kandahar, little is known about the activities of Mullah Omar and his band of the Taliban. According to Taliban anecdotes, the movement started from Mullah Omar's mosque in Sangesar, 15 kilometers west of Kandahar city. But there aren’t enough anecdotes to explain how they traversed unnoticed some 90 kilometers of mujahideen-infested territory past Kandahar border in the east, where they scored their first military victory. The capture of Spin Boldak a town just a few kilometers inside the Afghan border on the Chaman - Kandahar road, gave the Taliban recognition as well as custody of what Pakistani officials described as "an enormous quantity’ of military material, including rockets, ammunition, artillery pieces and small arms," Khan points out.

Some observers believe that the Taliban received full-scale logistics support from the Pakistanis at Spin Boldak. They argue that since the days of the jihad, the ISI had been a running a programme of supplying arms and ammunition to guerrilla groups for ISI-approved operations. In addition, there were reports at the time that the U.S government provided over 400 million dollars to open an arms pipeline to the Taliban," writes Khan.

Fresh weapons supplies to the Taliban from Pakistan territory continued through subsequent years. "As recently as March 2001, the Herald interviewed a truck driver and some Taliban operatives at Sarobi town on the Kabul - Jalalabad road who said they had unloaded rocket - propelled grenades from a Pakistani truck that entered Afghanistan via Torkham. The explosives were supplied to Taliban positions in the Tagab area, they said. Sources at Torkham confirmed the daily crossing of "dozen's of tarpaulin - covered trucks’ with the ISI’s authorisation that precludes customs checks.’ The invoices generally described the goods as, say, fertilisers or wheat, but officials were, not allowed to conduct physical checks. Ilyas Khan had, ‘days after the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996’ met a large number of Pakistan 'technicians' in Kabul who said they were laying telephone cables for the new regime. More surprising was the presence of a senior ISI official who was apparently performing the basic command and control task in Kabul.

The visiting Pak journalist had come across units offering training to the Taliban and other jihadi groups in more than 10 training camps across Afghanistan. One such unit was dispatched by the ISI’s Afghan Bureau to the former Afghan army base of Rishkhor, near Kabul in September 1996. In 1997, a UN report on Afghanistan quoted its employees as having encountered ‘an unidentified foreign military training unit of several hundred persons near Kabul.

"The operations of these units in Afghanistan were facilitated by Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul and its consulates in Kandahar and Herat. The consulates were headed by ISI operative- turned - diplomats, who donned Taliban’s Kandahari clothes and wore turbans. Pakistani trainers and military advisors also grow beards and rubbed shoulders with the Arab operative of Osama bin Laden the Chief Financier of Training Camps in Afghanistan."

"The question as to whether Pakistanis also offered active combat support to the Taliban remains disputed but analysis points to some circumstantial evidence to show that such support was indeed offered in certain major battles. In Herat, for instance, the Taliban switched from the jihadi-style hit - and - run operation to the innovative’ mobile warfare."

A similar flair for speed and flank attacks characterised the battle for Kabul in September 1996 and that for Mazar - I - Sharif in August 1998. On both occasions, credible reports confirmed the presence of Pakistani military advisor in the Taliban ranks. Significantly, say analysts, the Taliban efficiency disappeared when they embarked on operations launched independently of their Pakistan advisors. For instance, the Taliban’s abortive attack on Herat in April 1995 was carried out without the approval of the ISI. In Mazar, the Talibans battle efficiency disappeared when Pakistani advisors were pulled out in the wake of the crisis sparked by the killing of Iranian diplomats."

‘The presence of professional Pakistani fighters became most obvious during the Taliban’s attack on Taliban, the capital of northern Takhar province, in September 2000. There were also reports that Pakistani aircraft were used to rotate Taliban troops on Pakistani - Taliban frontlines,"’ Ilyas Khan reported.

The most crucial part of his observations relates to Osama bin Laden. "While this Pakistan-Taliban partnership was blossoming, in May 1996, Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan. His arrival brought in a new dimension to the Pak - Taliban combine. Being better with monetary resources, due to liberal donations from the Arab world to his activities, he enlarged the scope of the agenda of Pak - Taliban combine. It no longer remained the establishment of a puritanical Islamic State as understood by Pak -Taliban combine, but to remove the injustices being done to the Muslims across the world and establish a Pan - Islamic world.

Towards this end, he established in February 1998, AI-Jabhah al-Islamiya al - Alamujah li - Qittar al - Yabud wal - Salibiyyin (The Islamic World Front for the Struggle against Jews, and the Crusaders). Its mission was to found and assist the prominent Islamic movements in the Arab countries, particularly groups like Egypt’s al - Jihad and al - Gama’a al - Islamiya, but also organisations like Algeria’s GIA." Osama bin Laden family's close ties with Saudi royal family brought it tacit approval of the custodians holy shrines of Islam.

Here two questions need to be answered. Why did Pakistan join this network? After the Kargil war of summer 1999, it became, clear to its leadership that it will not be allowed to fight a war with India by the Great Powers. The deteriorating domestic economic situation has forced Pakistan to be dependent on Great Powers for its economic revival. Therefore, proxy war was the only option left to it. Having decided upon in the ruling elite of Pakistan adopted a strategy of tacit approval to participating in the Taliban - Al - Qaeda gameplan. Technically, there was no official participation. But different of the Pakistani armed forces were allowed to continue to participate in Kabul - Kandahar actions like they do in Jammu and Kashmir of the Indian Union. Pakistan extended ‘diplomatic, moral and political support" to Taliban movement according to a report in The Nation, Karachi.

The other related questions is why Taliban - Al - Qaeda coopted Pakistan? Pakistan proved to be a trusted ally of the Pashtoons of Afghanistan. It has a professional army with nuclear weapons and can be a core-armed force for the proposed Islamic army. The triumvirate, Pakistan - Taliban - al - Qaeda (PATAaQ) combine also realised that it will take a long time to counter the professional armies of the adversaries. Therefore, an unconventional war (or proxy war or war through terrorism and violence) was adopted to attack the enemy. The PATAaQ also worked on the assumption, since they are fighting for the Islamic cause, the Islamic world will extend the needed support to them. -CNF