Time for some cold business

By M J Akbar

The easiest thing to do in politics is to do nothing. The do-nothing school of politics has a very distinguished alumni and growing body of students, as well some very eminent intellectuals in its faculty and among its mentors. The dean-for-life of this institution is of course the venerable P V Narasimha Rao, who was so good at this art that even when he actually did something he made it seem as if he had done nothing.

Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee is under some heavy-duty pressure after the pathetic performance of the BJP in this round of provincial elections to do nothing.

You can always rearrange any set of facts to suit your preferred interpretation. Example: If the BJP had improved its position its position in any of the states (that is, in effect, entered double digits from single digit status) their publicists would have brandished an even larger drum than the one purchased by the AICC for Sonia Gandhi and argued that this ''mandate from the nation'' had made the coalition in Delhi safe for eternity.

Now that the BJP is wiping the floor (while Mamata Banerjee wipes her forehead), the same BJP spindoctors are arguing that the finest adhesive for a coalition is called adversity. Why should any partner of the ruling party create a crisis that will be seriously injurious to its health? True : why should it? There are still some three years of power, privilege and summer jaunts to Europe and America to enjoy.

I have always been curious about the motivation of this school. Why does anyone want power if they want to do nothing with power?

A second school has begun to lobby the Prime Minister for admission into its portals. The RSS, chief ideologues of a traditional BJP flank, wants the Prime Minister to do something; reverse. On economic policy their view is simple; stop the world, we want to get off. On social policy their attitude is not very much more complicated either: stop the future, we want some of that old-fashioned bloodshed from the past.

Mr Vajpayee has been what might be called a sporadic Prime Minister. Long stretches of calm are punctuated by bursts of creative energy. Long years in public life have made Mr Vajpayee a careful man. He raises a storm and then sits back and waits for the dust to settle. He believes that in the time-space thus created public opinion will move a little forward, towards the direction he wants to travel. That is his style. As one sympathiser pointed out, even when Mr Vajpayee had to get his knees operated, he did them one at a time, and a year in between.

What would be the consequences of the two options being offered to him? The hardline option is built around two propositions. First, the BJP has no answers for the electorate in Uttar Pradesh, the next segment of India to pass a verdict on the ruling party. Unlike the states that went to the polls, the BJP is a central presence in Uttar Pradesh. It can shrug off losses where its presence is on the fringe; decimation in Uttar Pradesh would be a body blow. Some party thinkers are even suggesting that general elections be merged with the Uttar Pradesh polls so that the positive flavour message of keeping Mr Vajpayee in Delhi mitigates the negative current of the BJP's misrule and corruption in UP. That will not work, since the people will wonder why Mr Vajpayee is returning to electorate midway when they gave him a full term. But the hardliners are convinced that they cannot ask for a vote in Uttar Pradesh without reviving Ayodhya and sparking tension. A communal fire is the only light at the end of a fundamentalist tunnel. If Mr Vajpayee accepts this advice, he will destroy much of what he has achieved accepts this advice, he will destroy much of what he has achieved since his improbable thirteen days in office four years ago. Every single element of his agenda will burn in that fire, his economic policy, his integrative social policy, and of course his Pakistan and foreign policy. The Vajpayee legacy will be that of a chaotic meteor, which promised good fortune but turned into an ill omen. Mr Vajpayee himself would not survive such a shift in strategy, for the very good reason that he would be incapable of implementing it. A different leader would be required and would be found.

The second option is to do nothing. This is tempting; the path of least resistance always is. The problem for the Prime Minister is that this is not going to work either. From the last general elections to this moment, Indian politics was a one-side football match. The BJP kept scoring into an empty goal to loud applause from its supporters. The Opposition has not managed to put together a team yet, but you can be sure of one thing: quite a few goalkeepers are manning the post, and will not allow the kind of free scoring in which every minister began to pose like Pele. The last session of Parliament saw the BJP under pressure but it was uncoordinated pressure, largely because Mrs Sonia Gandhi could not draw the line between a personal issue and a political cause. She did not, and could not, get support from other Opposition parties for her demand that the House should not function as long as there was any attempt to conduct an enquiry against her. The Congress, typically, placed her well-being over larger national issues. But that session was a match in the qualifying rounds; the real contest will begin in the next session of Parliament. All the Opposition parties are buoyant and revived by electoral success: the Congress survived its own mistakes to squeak past in Assam and tok Kerala handsomely in the company of its partners. Jayalalitha humiliated the DMK, a partner of the BJP, in Tamil Nadu, Paradoxically, the only result from which the BJP could have drawn an element of satisfaction was Bengal, where the Left neatly outthought Mamata Banerjee. An analogy from military warfare would be appropriate. Mamata charged early and vigorously; the Communists simply opened a passage and let her charge right through their ranks. She kept charging ahead until she reached nowhere land, while the Left rearranged its ranks, consolidated and quietly awaited her return to the battlefield. By this time her behaviour had conviced the electorate that she was less of a general and more of general hysteria. The Marxists will be a replenished voice in the next session. The Prime Minister cannot hope to meet his political challenge by doing nothing.

He has to change the chemistry of the environment and revitalise the rationale of his government. A reshuffle always helps, but we cannot expect too much drama from the shuffle that Mr Vajpayee has promised. There is a section that is pressing for a change in the finance ministry, but Mr Vajpayee is unlikely to oblige the hardliners who want swadeshi instead of liberalisation. This is going to be a Cabinet expansion, a distribution of rewards and bonuses, rather than a reshuffle of portfolios or a major induction of heavyweights who can contribute their individual credibility to the exercise of policy. Mr Vajpayee will have to do more to change the mood of the country.

There is room for a dramatic thrust in one area; Kashmir, and of course in relations with Pakistan. The stage was set last year for a positive and even imaginative play when Mr Vajpayee announced an unilateral ceasefire in the valley. That opportunity was wasted in dithering provoked by clashing views at the top levels of the BJP. (In the process the government made Syed Ali Shah Geelani into a minor hero). The stage is being re-set now. Mr K C Pant has begun his dialogue with the deliberately deaf. But that deafness can be cured, because the medicine is in Islamabad. Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf continues to wait, with both ears alert, for an invitation to talks.

The one significant positive change over last year is the unforeseen shift in Washington's attitude to Delhi. The sharp rupture in Sino-American bonhomie is a principal reason for this, but Washington would not have turned on this arc if it also did not recognise India's potential to play a balancing role in Asia. To that extent it is in Washington's interest to encourage a solution to the India-Pakistan confrontation. In the Sixties, Washington used to dream of unity in the south of the Himalayas against China; but that is neither possible nor even particularly wise.

If Mr Vajpayee has the will, the world will find a way. He has some twelve weeks in which to set the high table for talks, because the General Assembly of the United Nations provides a convenient and neutral environment for talks. There are going to be no more Lahores, for which we should be grateful; practical steps towards a difficult peace, however small, are more useful than declarations of goodwill designed for good television.

Mr Vajpayee faced his first major after the BJP was demolished in the Assembly elections of 1999. The Congress could have pulled down the government and walked towards a general election success.

Instead it waited to improve its fortunes in Uttar Pradesh. (It is still waiting to do so.) Mr Vajpayee turned the political mood around by his determined thrust towards liberalisation at home, and peace with Pakistan. That was the end of the uncertain beginning for his government, and the beginning of a certain end for the Congress. Liberalisation has come some way since then; the Pakistan initiative has floundered, not least because of Pakistan. But the generals who mangled the Lahore spirit are ready to do business.

Business is a cold business, Mr Vajpayee. Keep it cool, but do get some business done.

A view point
Dialogue and K P agenda

By Ashwani K Chrungoo

The Government of India has initiated a process of dialogue with various representative groups of Jammu and Kashmir state. The appointment of an interlocutor Mr K C Pant is a first step towards that exercise. It cannot yet be concluded whether this step is actually for a full fledged exercise of finding a solution to the Kashmir tangle or not. The Govt's assertion that the initiative is for bringing 'peace' in Kashmir does not provide enough political teeth to the exercise. However, in a democratic set-up, ultimately solutions come forth either through dialogue and discussion or through the box of the ballot. In the case of Kashmir, there is a need for a long drawn exercise of serious discussion and dialogue which will enable all partners not only to put their point of views boldly and bluntly but shall also enable others to understand them more clearly and candidly.

The Kashmiri Pandits are a natural party to the Kashmir tangle. Firstly because they are Kashmiris and part of Kashmir and secondly because of the fact that they are forced to live in exile for the last twelve years. There is another factor as well that makes Pandits a fundamental party to any negotiation on Kashmiris i.e. their being the aborigines of Kashmir. Their history dates back to Nilmata Era. They have a working calendar of more than 5,000 years old. Though they have suffered all sorts of persecution over the last 700 years, they have managed to keep their cultural tradition intact. Even in exile they have withstood several odds. The Pandit community that has kept itself alive alongwith its ethos in exile till date is a stark reality that no sane person/s can afford to ignore howsoever politically big or small he/they may be. Today, it is not only a community with an ethos intact but it has also its own political agenda which has got recognition from a number of quarters. Its political agenda is in fact the result of a process of evolution based on the community's experiences and experiments both in kashmir and outside Kashmir.

Over the last more than a decade the KPs responded to various emerging situations. The major responses framed were made on the basis of the recognised political agenda of the Pandits. The various conferences, seminars, meetings, symposize, debates and discussions over last decade either reiterated the same political agenda or further reinforced it. In this context, there are three conferences organised by Pandits which have immense historical importance. These conferences are politically significant events as Kashmiri Pandit political agenda has been formulated for future generations. The foundation of the political agenda was actually laid right in the year 1990 itself. This was the time when the Kashmiri Pandits brought with them horror stories of the terrorist regime of Kashmir. Every member of the community had his own story of turbulence. The whole community was on roads, the dreams were shattered, the colossal India & the mighty nation virtually gave in. The total concentration was on first aid, relief and temporary accommodation. The multi dimensional crisis gave birth to a thinking process culminating in a conference known as Kashmiri Hindu Convention 1990. It was a three day conclave (13-14-15 July, 1990) held at Jammu under the banner of All State Kashmiri Pandit Conference (ASKPC) and participated by representatives of the community from all over India. The conference passed a number of resolutions but the most two important resolutions which caught the imagination of the people were resolution no. 3 and resolution no. 4. These resolutions are documents in itself Reso. 3 details the Grand Design of Muslim Precedence in J&K state and with a compact background analyses the situation that forced the Pandits to become refugees in their own country. Finally the conference resolved through reso 4 to resettle in Kashmir in a reorganised manner with full constitutional guarantees. Thus a new political baby was born.

The Pandits took their time to reconcile to the new idea. A long and marathon public mobilization drive to make people understand what the resolution actually meant paved the way for establishment of a movement known as 'Panun Kashmir'. A well organised young group of politically conscious members of the community with the required initiative and dash slowly and steadily gained ground. A large number of debates, discussions and seminars on the new agenda focused mainly on the political/constitutional vacuum that required to be filled in respect of the emerging political agenda. There was a broad consensus across that the required change or alteration should come only through a representative conference again. Many suggested a complete overhaul while some were in favour of improvision. In fact a majority of activists were in favour of a compact document on general resolve for resettlement in the valley in the background of a complete historical context and necessary political flavour. In the backdrop of a long exercise of public mobilization programme spread over for more than a year, a two-day conference (27-28 Dec. 1991) was organised at Jammu. It had participation of delegates from all over the world. Margdarshan-1991 was a superb and well organised programme which had all its focus on the political and human rights aspects of the Kashmiri Pandit issue. The conference debated the issue for full two days and the resolution commonly known as 'Homeland Resolution' was passed unanimously. This was a major turning point of the Kashmiri Pandit political history. Since the idea was in its own way of a revolutionary nature, it could not be taken lying down by all concerned. The resolve for establishment of a homeland on the north and east of river Jehlum (Vitasta) in Kashmir for seven lakh Kashmiri Hindus was the expression of Kashmiri Pandit political will and the pent up feeling of the last seven centuries. The Pandits evolved a responsible democratic response to the situation they were thrown in. The response was not reactionary. The actual and appropriate reactionary response would have been to take up the gun against the gun. Many would have even justified that position. True to their tradition and in tune with the civilized world order, the Pandits took up the pen and used it with diligence and commitment. They justified their demand on basis of reason and made an attempt to give a wake-up call to the nation in respect of real picture regarding Kashmir. They brought to the fore the hidden picture of Kashmir. The reinforced political agenda got wide acceptance both within and outside the community. It touched the political agenda got wide acceptance both within and outside the community. It touched the nerve centre of the Pandits. They followed it, made others to follow it and even went to the extent of making it a part of their daily prayers. A new environ with compact political ideology was created. It did not only suit Pandits, Kashmir watchers gave credence to it. It was recognised as the representative political agenda of Pandits.

A number of meeting, rallies, seminars, conferences and debates followed Margdarshan. Every occasion was used to reiterate the Homeland philosophy. The human rights papers, reports and projects prepared and presented by the Pandits in the final analysis focussed on the need for creation of Homeland. Pandits took his political agenda to all available forums, institutions, governments and delegations. UNHRC, NHRC, Govt of India, Govt of various states of India , Parliamentary delegations, human rights bodies, various foreign delegations and local important authorities including media were briefed both orally as well as in writing in respect of the homeland agenda. The creation of a process of a decade got its final boost in the year 2000. It was a historical occasion and a great milestone. The Kashmir Pandit Representative Assembly (KPRA) was organised jointly by Panun Kashmir Movement (PKM) and ASKPC at Jammu on 13th July, 2000. It was held exactly after a full period of a decade of Kashmiri Hindu Convention 1990. Time had taken a full circle. Polarisation was virtually complete. The KPRA debated the issues of autonomy, government's so-called plan of rehabilitation of Pandits in valley. The most significant resove was in respect of a demand for creation of a separate state for Kashmiri Pandits in the valley. In fact it was a powerful demand for political rights alongwith creation of a homeland for Pandits in the valley. The demand of homeland with political powers for Pandits in the valley vindicated the stand of Margdarshan-1991 and all other efforts after that in this direction. Another significant achievement of the Assembly was that it was participated by all major frontline political formations of KPs. The follow-up exercise in the shape of public mobilization drives ratified the resolve of the Assembly. It in fact brought greater ideological/conceptual unity amongst rank and file of various Kashmiri Pandit organisations. The whole concept of the political agenda was accepted by the members of the community as the only genuine and appropriate political response on behalf of the community. Its support base cuts across all stratas and sections of the society. Its echo can be found right from the narrow lanes of camps of the displaced people to the drawing rooms of the well-to-do families. The strength of this agenda can be gauged from the situation in which even its so-called opponents have nothing worth an independent political agenda to debate and discuss except making of hollow and meaningless criticism to this agenda. It has marginalised its a few opponents and classified and catagorised them as either 'politically naive' or 'motivated'.

The position as on date does reaffirm that Pandits have a position of strength ideologically and convictionally. Their leadership has exhibited a sense of responsibility and commitment to the political agenda. What they actually need is a coordinated approach. It does not matter too much today whether Pandits are involved in the negotiations or not. Since they are a natural party to the tangle of Kashmir, any solution without their involvement will mean politically nothing. This fact has been brought to the focus several times by many concerned including the Kashmir watchers and international key players. The KP resettlement in Kashmir and the solution of Kashmir tangle are inseparable issues. Moreover, it is not the question of ''return and rehabilitation'' of KPs in the valley, it is the issue of 'political resettlement' of the whole community in the valley. It is a battle not only for their share in the territory of Kashmir but also for political power in Kashmir. Since the Kashmiri Muslims have all along refused to co-exist with Pandits in Kashmir, the Pandits surrender neither their rights nor their claim on Kashmir. They are equal partners of Kashmir's territory and ethos. In fact they are the aborigines of the valley. Their political agenda for resettlement in the valley is the expression of their political will which they will keep on reinforcing brick by brick till they achieve their goal lock, stock and barrel.