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EDITORIAL Pakistan says what it means. And taking advantage of Indias flexibility in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has hardened its standpoint vis-à-vis the fencing of the International Border in Jammu. Had New Delhi, too, acted swiftly and effectively in the past, things possibly would have been different altogether. Precisely, New Delhis far-from-decisive role with regard to the Indian troops requirements for....more The crisis may have, for the moment, blown over, with the Samata Party leaving any decision on pulling out of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to the party supremo, George Fernandes. But the political churning that began with the withdrawal of the Trinamul Congress from the ruling coalition at......more |
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The J&K 'peace process' : Chasing the chimera By K. P. S Gill & Ajai Sahni By Shiv Kumar Sharma A Viw Point By Tahir Khurshid Raina |
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EDITORIAL Pakistan says what it means. And taking advantage of Indias flexibility in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has hardened its standpoint vis-à-vis the fencing of the International Border in Jammu. Had New Delhi, too, acted swiftly and effectively in the past, things possibly would have been different altogether. Precisely, New Delhis far-from-decisive role with regard to the Indian troops requirements for defence structures along the International Border encouraged Islamabad to such an extent that the latter did not, all these years, come across any major threat or warning from the former while indoctrinating the Islamic forces to ensure that India did not succeed in constructing barbed-wire fencing. The Indian Army and the Border Security Force (BSF) troops, obviously, possessed the equipment to take on the Pak soldiers, who, in the past, resorted to firing and shelling only to prevent Indian workers from setting up barbed-wire fencing. True, the Indian Government had commissioned the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) more than a year ago to fence the 200 km-long International Border. But the CPWD as well as Indian defence personnel were ordered by New Delhi to give up the work, after heavy fire from the Pakistani side. Why did not the Government of India instruct the BSF and the Army to teach the other side a lesson or two? Why was the work ordered to be suspended? Why did the Government avoid taking cognizance of the unpublished warnings from former chiefs of the BSF, Ashok Tandon and EN Rammohan? They had, in fact, forecast Islamabads tough talk and rough action in the event of New Delhis go-slow methodology. While the need for India was to talk tough and act rough, the choice of operations employed by the power corridors in New Delhi could not prove conducive to the requirements of our forces. And when the decision was finally taken to re-start construction of defence structures on this side of the International Border, one expected that the Government would demonstrate courage to perform the act in the open. What happened triggered sarcastic comments. The BSF personnel were asked to choose the Samba sector for fencing in the first phase. Why so? This sector is hidden a bit from the Pakistani side. True, the BSF managed to complete nearly 12 km of the fencing in the sector. But the construction workers forward movement has been drastically curtailed as a result of the intermittent firing from the Pakistani side. The average Pak soldier seems to have been encouraged by the lack of appropriate response from the Indian side even after 40 iron pillars used for fencing the border were blown up by the Pak Rangers late night on May 19 in the Samba sector itself. Discussions and consultations alone took place in Delhis North Block and at the BSF Headquarters in the CGO complex, even as the situation took a different turn following the fresh assault by Pakistanis, resulting in the damage to some pillars erected by the BSF for fencing the border in the Kanachak area of Akhnoor sector. The two incidents-first on May 19 and, second, on May 22-have also triggered questions: How could the Pakistani saboteurs sneak into the Indian territory when Indian authorities had insisted that vigil had been intensified? What were our border guards doing when the enemy blew up the pillars well inside the Indian territory? At a time when violence has broken out on some points on the International Border, Indian response has to be in accordance with the wishes of the average Indian and not in accordance with the US formula or formulation. The response requires to be adequately effective and effectively adequate, considering the fact that Pakistan has injected a disturbing element into the prevailing scenario with the reiteration of Islamabads standpoint against New Delhis move to construct the barbed-wire fencing along the Jammu border. Pakistani blatant attacks on made-in-India pillars in Samba and Akhnoor sectors came after the military leadership of Pakistan succeeded in conditioning the mind of the average Pak soldier stationed across the J&K border against Indias argument that Jammus International Border cannot be designated and defined as working border. If the prevailing unpleasant scenario along the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border as well as the stepped-up military activity were any guide, there is little possibility of any success, in immediate future, of the process of building confidence and cordiality between Pakistan and India. The crisis may have, for the moment, blown over, with the Samata Party leaving any decision on pulling out of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to the party supremo, George Fernandes. But the political churning that began with the withdrawal of the Trinamul Congress from the ruling coalition at the Centre in the wake of the Tehelka expose, has been intensified by the developments in Manipur. Indications are by no means uncertain that the next few months, particularly the period between June and October, are going to be quite crucial for all the political parties, specially the BJP, which may witness a process of alignment and realignment of equations. The BJP has succeeded by beating a quick retreat on the issue of forming the Government in Manipur, in tiding the NDA over its imminent crisis in the face of the Samata threat of pullout following the fall of the Peoples Front Ministry there. But the cost of it may end up being pretty heavy for the BJP as well as the NDA. To begin with, the unhappiness of the BJP legislators in Manipur over the party high commands decision not to stake claim to form the Government could well lead to a completely new political scenario emerging there. Already, if one is to believe that the BJP did issue a whip, as it claims to have done, to its MLAs to vote for the Koijam Ministry, then what happened on may 21 during the voting on the confidence motion of the Chief Minister was a clear case of defiance. The BJP MLAs are unlikely to sit quiet in the wake of the party leaderships decision not to form the Government, which, on the face of it, appears to be a clear case of compromise, albeit a necessary one. The entire Manipur affair has, in fact, created a dilemma for the BJP. A dilemma that is not really new for a party caught in the pulls and pressures of a coalition Government. Experience shows that sooner than later a political party heading a coalition Ministry succumbs to the pressure of its allies on some issue of the other. The reason is not far to seek. It is, after all, a matter of survival. Something that clearly dictated the BJPs obvious backtracking in Manipur this time. One will, by delving a little deeper, find that the dilemma extends to almost all the States in the country. Keen to expand its limited organisational base, the BJP is, quite understandably, desperate to strengthen its roots in as many States as possible. The results of the just concluded Assembly elections in four States and a Union Territory have added to this compulsion of the party. But this ideaological desire of the BJP to grow and expand its base regularly comes into conflict with the ambitions of its coalition partners, who usually succeed in forcing the party to retreat. While for the central leadership of the BJP it may be easy to dismiss this as part of the game, and an imperative to remain in power at the Centre, for the local units of the party in various States it is not as easy to understand, or to accept. And for the high command, it becomes a constant struggle to dissuade these disgruntled local partymen from taking any extreme step. And that is what the BJP is now going to find very difficult to handle-the wrath of its disgruntled party MLAs in Manipur, who saw in the latest political developments there a rare chance to seize power in a State where the party has no ideological base whatsoever. How it handles the situation will show the political acumen of the party stalwarts and will eventually determine their political future in this era of coalition Governments and politics. |
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