Northern alliance wins vital support

By M R Rao

During his recent tour of the western world, Afghanistan's Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masood was heard with respect wherever he went in the European Union, in Paris and Brussels. He was able to present his case before the world media and political leaders. Whoever met Masood promised material assistance to the anti-Taliban Alliance and diplomatic support to his mission.

Ameer Saheb as the Tajik warlord is known. Masood stands for the defeat of the Taliban. He and his comrades have been battling the fanatic militia for a long while. Some success came their way. In fact, there were more reverses than success in the recent past and if he can put his act together, probably he and his colleagues in the Northern Alliance have an opportunity to redeem their pledge.

The international community is angry at the Taliban regime for what they have already done and are doing. With its commitment to the rule of law, with its pledge to protect human rights and with its promise to respect freedoms and democracy, the Northern Alliance (NA) and its warlords have earned the sympathy and goodwill of the world outside the troika that Taliban has constituted since it seized Kabul. Moreover, there is the increasing realisation in the capitals that matter that the NA can provide a moderate alternative to the fundamentalist rule of the Taliban and act as bulwark against the jehadis who are out to export their brand of religious intolerance and fanaticism to countries across the globe from the Philippines to Chechnya and Kosovo and to Northern America. From media reports on Masood's visit to Europe, it is clear he deftly exploited the groundswell of sentiment. The timing-so soon after Bamiyan vandalism- of the visit also helped him no less. Report from Kabul that the provinces of HERAT, Tauloqan, Bamiyan and cities like Shibragan, Farayab and Ghour, may fall to the Northern Alliance, if anti-Taliban forces launched a fresh joint offensive made his interlocutors hear him with respect. The fact that these reports emanated from Pakistan sources and found a place in dailies known to be close to the military junta added a new dimension to the interaction, since it is public knowledge that Uzbek Commander Gen Dostum and former Governor of HERAT Ismail Khan have joined hands with Ahmed Shah Masood once again to take on the might of the Taliban in post-winter offensive.

There are two routes to end the nearly three decades old Afghan crisis-- political settlement or the barrel of the gun. Before the UN sanctions were clamped on January 19 this year and Bamiyan was savaged, there were hopes of a political settlement, courtesy UN special envoy, who succeeded in persuading the warring groups to sit across the negotiating table. The idea of a broad-based government and concepts like power- sharing and coalition were much talked about in the past and are even now, since these are relevant to the ethnically pluralistic Afghan society. The minorities of all hues should get properly represented in the power structure to impart stability to any government. But the Pushtoon-dominated Taliban are averse to this idea. So are their props in Islamabad.

When the 49-year old ethnic Tajik and vice-President of the Rabbani government told a receptive audience in Paris, ''The shortest way to reach peace in Afghanistan is to stop Pakistan's interference'', he was not making any new proposition. He was merely repeating himself. At least in the short run, he and his NA colleagues know they cannot afford to hang their gun.

Any political settlement will necessitate a greater degree of understanding amongst the various Afghan groups not merely on the short-term goals and long-term plans, but on the immediate issues of concern of bread and butter. From all accounts it is clear that the Afghans have a long way to cover to come anywhere nearer to a mutually acceptable plan.

In fact, it doesn't seem even remotely possible at this stage that both sides can enter into a dialogue for power sharing. There is ample evidence, according to reports in the Pak media, to suggest that the Afghan groups on both sides of the divide have not given up hope of delivering a knockout blow to the other. The Taliban feel that they have already delivered such a blow to the Northern Front, though the letter is on the comeback trail. Viewed against this backdrop, Masood's journey through Europe at a time the UN Commission for Human Rights was holding its annual session in Geneva, helped in building two kinds of pressures.... one against the Taliban and the other against Pakistan.

Two other developments have brought cheer to the NA camp, and both took place almost simultaneously and coincided with the ''triumphant'' return of Masood to his base near Dushanbe after meeting French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, Speaker of French parliament Raymond Forni and EU foreign policy supreme Javier Sona.

The Teheran declaration issued after Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's summit meeting with Iranian leaders was very forthright on the Taliban issue. It issued a rather blunt call to Pakistan: work with New Delhi and Teheran to resolve the Afghan tangle. For the first time, Teheran also came out voicing a role for New Delhi in bringing peace and stability in the war-torn Afghanistan. This is notwithstanding the limitations both India and Teheran suffer from in dealing with the Taliban. New Delhi on its part has pushed itself to a corner vis-a-vis Kabul over the years; it cannot afford to suffer from any illusions of acquiring a role for itself in the six-plus two groups set up by the United Nations. Besides the US and Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are the peace brokers as a group.

The Chinese reaction to the Teheran declaration is however sweet music to both the Foreign Office mandarins in New Delhi and the Northern Allinace. Beijing welcomed a role for India in Afghan affairs. ''China welcomes all efforts that are conducive to a peaceful resolution of the Afghan issue'', Chinese foreign office spokeswoman Ms Zhang Qiyue said as Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar was about to leave Islamabad for Beijing on an official visit on April 16. Obviously, Beijing has decided to send a clear single to Islamabad as to what its concerns and priorities are. Not that Pakistan was not unaware of Chinese worries over the links the Taliban has forged with Islamic separatist groups in the Xinjiang province. Chinese reservations against Taliban brand have been conveyed to Pakistan, now and then in the past too but this was the first time they have gone public, knowing fuly well the Islamabad mood. The Pakistan media reacted violently, as can be expected of them, to the Chinese comment because they see in the comment a failure of Pak diplomacy. This shows that whether by design or by sheer accident, the multi-pronged approach has begun to place Pakistan and the Taliban under pressure.

Another development that has a bearing on the Afghan scene and South Asia is Christina Rocca's appointment as the new US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. It is bad news for Pakistan and, yes, to Taliban too, Rocca is known to be tough on exporters of terrorism. And as Staff Operations Officer of the CIA, she had first hand knowledge of the Afghan war in the Zia days. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, her interest remained undiminished in the area, because she had to closely monitor the plans for buy-back of unused Stinger missiles the CIA had generously provided to the Afghan factions and the ISI. That the plan (Buy-- back) suffered from infirmities right from the word go is a different thing. What is germane to our discussion is the fact that Rocca is an advocate of cooperation on counter-terrorism among US allies and friends to deal with threats, new and old. To what extent this will translate into an advantage for the Northern Alliance is too early to say. What is clear as of now is that there is going to be no dull moment but action and more action in the days ahead. -- CNF

Strategic benefits from NMD

By Avinash Shirodkar

The Vajpeyee government has endorsed US President George W. Bush's plan to build strategic defences against nuclear missiles. Cynics may see this as a case of a government trying to shake off its impotence against neighbouring States by applauding the interceptor-rockets planned by the world's some superpower.

However, NMD plan fits will with India's options and interests in an Asia marked by missile buildups and a growing power disequilibirium. American scientists have been working on strategic defence against missiles for at least two decades now. But it is only in recent years that this has turned into a major public issue because such defences cannot be deployed without dismantling the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The obstacle -and the target - is treaty.

>From repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol to the readiness to disband the ABM Treaty, the Bush White House is signalling America's intent to utilise its global pre-eminence to full advantage. Bush's ambitious NMD plan involving a triad of land, sea and air defences, however, is no surprise. Just the way the Vajpayee government conducted nuclear tests in keeping with the NDA's pre-election nuclearisation pledge. Bush has simply unveiled a plan he had promised during the presidential campaign. New Delhi is right to point to NMD's "strategic and technological inevitability".

The inexorable drive towards strategic defences actually began under Bill Clinton. But while Clinton was committed to a limited NMD through ABM Treaty's modification, Bush is singlemindedly devoted to broad defences whose construction demands the elimination of the legal obstacle. It is NMD's unavailability that had already spurred Germany to give up its opposition and Russia to adopt greater flexibility in its approach.

So before Bush made his announcement, India had ample time to formulate its position on NMD. In fact, in recent months, New Delhi had scrupulously avoided making any critical reference to NMD, signalling a subtly evolving shift in favour of the Bush plan. Its positive reaction to Bush's announcement thus can hardly be described as impulsive or hasty, although it was na‹ve of it to parrot Washington's public-relations line that NMD will yield deep cuts in nuclear armaments.

NMD signifies a new arms race - a race for control of, and dominance over, outer space. As this race picks up momentum, America will no longer need to retain all is older armaments. Just like defence is the other side of offence, armament and disarmament are interlinked. Every major arms buildup leads to disarmament, a process in which only the surplus, obsolescent or vulnerable weapons are eliminated.

Over the past three centuries, the drive for supremacy through technology has advanced from sea power (which led to colonization of today's Third World) to air power and to space power now. NMD is an acronym covering a host of futuristic space-related technologies whose development will change the face of the world - and the nature of war. America's heavy investment in NMD is a venture to secure its global dominance for decades to come.

However undesirable a new arms buildup may be, the logical progression of military technology is unstoppable in a world in which States compete fiercely and seek relative advantage. As a vulnerable State living in a dangerous neightbourhood, India has to look at NMD strictly from the prism of national interest. Having wasted half-century mouthing didactic, internationalist and self-righteous rhetoric, India has to get on with assertively advancing its interests.

One of its top priorities today should be to build a strategic partnership with the US on mutually beneficial and level terms. If New Delhi does not hit off with the Bush administration, it may be many years before a fresh opportunity presents itself. After all the talk and no substance under Clinton, the Indo-US relationship now demands concrete strategic engagement.

India's supportive stand on NMD presents a new opening for engagement with the Bush team, even though traditional friend Russia has been embarrassed. Russia, the world's richest country in natural resources, will always remain a natural ally of India, as both have a fundamental commonality of interests. But while India has to work hard to mend the decade-long decline in the relationship with Moscow, those ties cannot come in the way of building an Indo-US strategic partnership - a partnership critical both for Indian security and Asian stability.

With Bolshevism dead and democratic Russia no longer an adversary or even a competitor of the United States, it is conceivable that in the years ahead a Washington-Moscow-New Delhi strategic formation may emerge, with India as the go between. Without a larger strategic blueprint, India will remain boxed in by the China-Pak-Burma axis. It is the strategic imperative to keep Russia firmly on India's side while wooing Washington that has prompted Jaswant Singh to ride two NMD horses simultaneously - support for the Bush plan, and support for Moscow's stand that the ABM Treaty should not be unilaterally abrogated.

The current international line-up on NMD may be the precursor of things to come - the US, its traditional allies and India on one side, China and its militaristic friends on the other side, and Russia somewhere in the middle. If Washington manages NMD issue well with Moscow, offering it defensive technology and agreeing to deep nuclear cuts, Russia could become part of the West.

US missile defences will not threaten India's security but could yield strategic benefits if New Delhi handles the issue deftly. Too often in the past India has allowed expectations to substitute for hardheaded strategic calculations and bargaining. New Delhi has to exploit its NMD support to its advantage by pushing the Bush team to take a fresh look at the decades-old technology and military sanctions against India.

If Washington were to interpret its export-control laws more broadly in relation to India, it would throw open for sale many high-tech commercial items. It also makes no strategic sense for Washington to continue to keep India out of its arms market. Further, there is no reason why Washington should still keep India as a key target of the punitive restrictions of key Nuclear Suppliers' Group.

India faces a difficult situation in Asia that demands strategic engagement with Washington. Its largest neighbour, China, will use NMD to justify its already expanding nuclear and missile arsenals. With or without NMD, India's security will be adversely affected by the increasing trans-Himalayan missile threat and Beijing's continued nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan. But with NMD, China is likely to more openly flout international norms and conventions and seek new ways to deliver lethal missile blows.

If India does not wish to abandon its plans for maintaining a nuclear-deferrent force at very modest levels, it will have to look at other options. It seems inevitable that it will develop an ICBM capability in order to provide adequate reach to its small nuclear arsenal. It will also have to arm its missiles with decoys and other penetration aids. But one can already foresee that it will be attracted to missile defences and potential collaboration with the US.

NMD is likely to strengthen and expand US-led security arrangements. If it is seen to work, the US could extend a 'missile umbrella' to its allies the way it presently holds out a nuclear umbrella. An India strategically aligned with the US could avail of such benefits in a manner to reduce its own security burden. In a world marked by rapid change, it is imaginable to think of a future India with its own nuclear force but deriving certain benefits from US missile defences.

As a concept, strategic defence can be expanded to involve technology and cooperation in fields beyond the missile domain. India can partner the US on strategic defence against theatre and long range missiles and also against international missiles and also against international terrorism and to safeguard borders and share intelligence. The action-reaction cycle triggered by missile defence is bound to drive India closer to the US. INAV