The Vajpayee charisma wearing thin!

By Kedar Nath Pandey

The message of the election results is crystal clear. The Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance is on the decline, and the fortunes of the Congress are looking up, poised as it is to form a government in Kerala, in Assam and possibly in Pondicherry. And in Tamil Nadu, the AIADMK-led alliance of which the Congress is part, has been swept to victory.

The body language of the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, as he left for Malaysia told it all. Visibly downcast, he could barely articulate a coherent sentence, and when the did, all that he managed was "the results were along expected lines." The Vajpayee magic may be wearing thin, and he knew it.

Although the BJP itself is not a dominant player in the States, there can be no denying that the national coalition as a whole has suffered a terrible loss of face, given that its key allies heading governments in Tamil Nadu and Assam - and on whom it was riding piggyback - have met with a disaster at the hustings. The political consequences of the electoral slap will have a negative effect on the morale and functioning of the Vajpayee Government, even if the Lok Sabha arithmetic remains unaffected for now.

In fact, ever since the withdrawal of the Trinamool Congress from the NDA fold, Mr. Vajpayee has not felt secure (relatively speaking) in view of the fact that the fate of his Government is solely dependent on the support of the Telegu Desam Party, that is, Mr.Chandrababu Naidu. Admittedly, when Ms Mamata Banerjee was part of the fold, even then the TDP's support was crucial for the Government. But it can be argued that, in relative terms, the threat to the Government is much greater now than before.

The TDP's support is, therefore, some sort of a Damocles sword hanging over the head of the Prime Minister. What has made the situation even worse is that this enhanced threat has come at a time when the Government is under attack from more than one direction.The BJP had announced that the results can in no way be treated as a reerendum on the performance of the Vajpayee Government, which was a sensible stand to adopt in view of the fact that in each of the five States the results were determined solely by local issues. But the fact remains that the Congress(I) has fared well at the hustings, the Opposition in the Lok Sabha (and the Congress-I is the principal Opposition party there) will start baying for the blood of the ruling alliance with renewed vigour.

By itself, this would not have posed much of a problem for a Government in power provided it belonged to one or, at the most, two parties. The NDA Government is, however, a different kettle of fish altogether, and it is precisely because of the large number of coalition partners (nearly all of which are regional outfits) that such a post-poll campaign by the Opposition cannot be taken lightly.

The point is that a "good" result for the Congress(I) - that is, a bad result for the BJP and its NDA allies - could indicate to some of the NDA allies that the people in their respective States are not happy with the BJP-led Government at the Centre. More important, a "pro-Congress(I)" poll result could be taken as a warning by these NDA allies that, unless they distance themselves from the BJP at the Centre, they could fare badly in assembly polls in their own States.

Clearly, there is no reason why the TDP should not be treated as part of this process, the implication being that an adverse poll result for the BJP (or the NDA) could embolden Mr. Naidu to revise this national political strategy (he has shown in the past that he is extremely adept at such "revisions"). The upshot of this could be withdrawal of support of the TDP's 29 MPs from the NDA Government and (possibly) the patching up of yet another coalition, with or without the direct participation of the Congress(I).

Another factor that has greatly weakened the "moral sanction" of the Vajpayee Government is the 'tehelka' episode, the net impact of which has been the drubbing of the Vajpayee Government with the same taint of corruption, which has been an integral part of nearly every Government that has ruled the roost at the Centre. What has made the consequence of the disclosures even worse for the Government is the inept handling of the fallout by the authorities, which has made the public even more suspicious of the Vajpayee Government's intentions.

First is, of course, the entire tamasha involving the demand for a JPC to probe the disclosures, the Government taking the indefensible stand that two probes into the same issue can be self-defeating and, perhaps, also at cross - purposes. To most people, it is clear that the Congress(I) has been taken for a ride by the Government regarding the JPC issue, for which of course no one is to blame but the Congress(I) itself, particularly the party's naivete in taking the Vajpayee Government at its words. However, as far as the Government is concerned, it has come out in a bad light because of the "crudeness" of the way in which the entire issue was handled. In fact, some may even suggest that the Government went back on its words, which is unacceptable even in these devalued times.

Second, the Government did not quite handle the demand to sack two senior PMO officials with the finesse expected of it. Not only was the affair allowed to drag on interminably (which itself made a big dent in the Government's image), but the delay in taking action clearly suggested that, despite the direct allegation made against one of the two official in the disclosures, the Prime Minister himself had some vasted interest in retaining their services. In the event, when one of them was sent to the Planning Commission, it was widely seen as a lateral shunting out and not a punishment posting, which the nation was expecting. Curiously, the official who directly figured in the 'tehelka' tapes continues to hawk his services in the PMO, something which the Prime Minister should realize has not gone down well the nation.

The third factor that has hit hardà Mr. Vajpayee is the sudden upsurge of criticism form within the Sangh Parivar against the Government's economic policies. Indeed, the criticism has been so severe that the Finance Minister has been called a "criminal" by an important functionary of the Parivar for espousing certain types of reform policies. There is little doubt that the issue has reached crisis proportions within the Parivar, which is strongly suggested by the unprecedented (in recent times) meeting Mr. Vajpayee has had with Mr. Advani and, later, the meeting which the Prime Minister has had with the RSS top brass.

It remains to be seen how the Prime Minister will ride out the current storm, perhaps the only silver lining beinghe recent initiatives taken by the Bush Administration to befriend New Delhi, even going to the extent of all but equating Pakistan with the internationally recognized "rogue States". Politically, there does not seem much that Mr. Vajpayee can do to lessen the pressure on himself. Certainly, he can offer Ms Mamata Banerjee a fresh berth in the NDA, thereby propping up his precarious Lok Sabha perch. But in doing so he will only be condemning himself and his party (certainly in the eyes of the people) by agreeing to open the door to someone who had left it to exploit an emerging political opportunity in West Bengal.

The best bet for the Prime minister at this point of time would perhaps be to forge ahead in the sphere of economic reforms, principally by taking even bolder decisions than in the past. This would have the impact of not only diverting attention from the pressing political problems but also furthering the prospects of future growth, which requires a lot of emphasis right now not merely because of the current economic slowdown but also to clear the smoke emitted by the Enron affair which promises to affect adversely the sentiment of foreign investors. INAV

Is the South China Sea really China's?

By N.B.Menon

The incident involving a the US National Security Agency (NSA) spy aircraft and a Chinese military aircraft over the South China Sea on April 1 should draw attention to the deliberate vagueness of China's territorial claims relating not only to the Spratly Islands, but also to the waters of the South China Sea, and to its obduracy in pursuing its claims.

In the past, China had referred to the islands as its territory and to the South China Sea as its "historic waters." Does it claim only the islands? Does it also claim the sea as a whole as its territorial waters or does it admit that these islands are located in the 'high seas', as interpreted by international maritime law? What are the implications of China's description of the South China Sea as its 'historic waters' for navigation rights through it and for air rights in the air space above the sea? These questions keep arising periodically, but Beijing has avoided answering them in a categorical manner.

A similar policy of calculated vagueness is maintained by Beijing regarding the Natuna gas fields of Indonesia. At the fourth informal workshop on the South China Sea attended by China and the ASEAN countries in Surabaya, Indonesia, in 1993, China which had previously been reluctant to produce any documentary evidence to support its claims produced for the first time a map which indicated what it called its historic waters.

The Indonesians noticed to their surprise that the Chinese claim line was marked between the Natuna Islands of Indonesia and a gas-bearing area located 250 km to the North-East of it, which lies within the limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles (320 km) claimed by Indonesia, thereby raising the suspicion that China probably looked on this gas-bearing area also as historically belonging to it even through it had never claimed it before the gas was discovered. Since then, repeated Indonesian attempts to obtain an oral or written communication from China giving a clear elucidation of its claims have proved futile.

It has been the consistent stand of the US that while the ownership of the Spratly Islands should be decided by China and the concerned ASEAN member-countries (the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam) and in which it has no locus standi, it would not accept China's claim that the entire South China Sea constituted its "historic waters". In the past, the US had also made it clear to Beijing that it would resist attempts to interfere with international sea and air navigation rights through the South China Sea.

In March 1995, after Philipines' accusation against Beijing relating to its clandestine occupation of the Mischief Reef, Mr Benjamin Gilman, the then Chairman of the House International Relations Committee tabled a resolution in the US House of Representatives warning China against using force or intimidation in the South China Sea. The resolution added that "the right of free passage through the South China Sea is in the national security interest of the US"

In a statement issued on May 10, 1995, the US State Department said: "Thus US would view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law."

On June 16, 1995, Mr. Joseph Nye, US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security told pressmen at Tokyo: "If military action occurred in the Spratlys and this interfered with the freedom of the seas, then we would be prepared to escort and make sure that navigation continues." A Pentagon study said: "The US takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims. Our strategic interest in maintaining the lines of communication linking South-East Asia, North-East Asia and the Indian Ocean makes it essential that we resist any maritime claims beyond those permitted by the law of the Sea Convention."

In the face of these US warnings, a spokesmen of the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated on May 18,1995: "On the issue of the navigation rights in the South China Sea, the Chinese Government holds a definite and clear-cut position, namely, Chinese action to safeguard its sovereignty over the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands) and the relevant maritime rights and interests will not affect navigation through and the freedom and safety of flights over the international waterway of the South China Sea in keeping with the international laws."

This statement, while assuring Chinese respect for the air and sea navigation rights of the international community over the international waterway of the South China Sea, did not specifically renounce Chinese claims that the South China Sea constituted its historic waters. On the contrary, it asserted that China had relevant maritime rights and interests in the waters of the South China Sea, without specifying them.

Since then, the US has been regularly sending its ships and aircraft through the Sough China Sea to assert its position that the waters of the South China Sea constituted 'high seas' and that the air space over these high seas is international air space and not Chinese air space.

The NSA plane which force landed in Hainan on April 1, after reportedly colliding with a Chinese plane, was apparently sent there not only to collect electronic intelligence, but also to re-assert the US position that the South China Sea is not China's sea.

>From a careful readings of all explanations and accusations which emanated from the Chinese spokesmen, it was clear that the accidental collision took place in international air space over the high seas where the US aircraft, spy or no spy, had every right to be. Whether the collision was due to a faulty manoeuvre by the US or Chinese pilot was, however, not clear.

With his aircraft badly disabled after the collision, the US pilot had only two options: Either fly back to Okinawa or to a non-Chinese airport for an emergency landing, which might have meant certain death for some, if not all, of the US experts on board the plane of land at the nearest airfield (in Hainan), even if it was a Chinese airfield.

Proceeding to a Chinese airfield involved entering Chinese air space with the consequent danger of being shot down by ground fire. He had, therefore, alerted the Chinese airport authorities through Mayday signals before entering the Chinese air space and attempting an emergency landing.

His disabled aircraft was a plane in distress involving the lives of 24 persons, spy or no spy, and he had every right to land at the nearest airport and the Chinese authorities were morally and legally bound to facilitate the landing. If at all, the US pilot had committed a technical violation of Chinese sovereignty under totally understandable circumstances.

Instead of appreciating this, the Chinese authorities conducted themselves in an unreasonable and petulant manner and raised demands such as an unconditional apology, right of inspection of the plane and renunciation of the right to send spy-in-the-sky planes into that area.

On the basis of facts available, no ground for a formal apology by the US existed. All that was required was an expression of regret by the US if the pilot had landed before the Chinese cleared the landing in response to his Mayday.

The US, or any other nation for that matter, including India, has every right to collect electronic intelligence from a platform located in high seas or international air space. The Chinese too have every right to frustrate this through appropriate jamming and other devices, but they cannot use intimidatory or bullying tactics or demand a formal renunciation of this right by others.

The Bush administration has come to office with considerable reservations - some of them, at least, not totally unjustified - about China's intentions and policies. By conducting itself in a responsible and mature manner, Beijing had the opportunity of convincing the Bush Administration that its reservations were unjustified.

Instead, by conducting itself in the manner it has been doing, it will end up convincing not only the US, but also other nations in the region that the Bush Administration is probably not wrong in its perceptions and misgivings vis-…-vis China. INAV