The Inside Truth-VI
Politico-military coup was meticulously planned

From B L Kak

Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat’s book is worth reading more for the characters than for the story. And the most provocative characters for the sacked Chief of Naval Staff are the Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, and his two controversial ‘yes-men’, Mr Ajit Kumar and Mr Sushil Kumar.

Mr Sushil Kumar succeeded Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat after what the latter termed as "the coup against democracy". According to the book, in August 1998, the Defence Secretary, Mr Ajit Kumar, established "a convenient relationship" with Vice Admiral Harinder Singh.

Vice Admiral Harinder Singh, the book asserts, had "live communication channels" with the Akali Dal, Ms Jaya Jaitly of the Samata Party, Mr Asvini Minna of the Punjab Kesari and various people connected with arms business. "This trio", the book has also asserted, "was working and planning a politico-military coup to oust the Navy Chief".

The book says that an "excellent" working relationship had already developed between Admiral Bhagwat’s Vice Chief, Vice Admiral Sushil Kumar, and Mr Ajit Kumar. Admiral Bhagwat has disclosed that the first actual move against him was initiated in the end of August 1998 at the behest of Mr Ajit Kumar, who believed that he was well-versed in the Navy Regulations (Statutory) and Regulations applicable to the Defence services.

Mr Ajit Kumar, to quote Admiral Bhagwat, advised Mr George Fernandes to get the Prime Minister, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee’s concurrence to send him (Admiral Bhagwat) on long leave and put Vice Admsiral Sushil Kumar in his place. Portraying a dismal picture about the role and performance of Mr Ajit Kumar, Admiral Bhagwat states that his (Mr Ajit Kumar’s) connections included his mentor, Mr NN Vohra, and Mr IK Gujral.

The concluding paragraph of chapter 22 of the book runs thus: "The wheeling and dealing had begun to bring Vice Admiral Sushil Kumar as the Chief. Vice Admiral Harinder Singh in the Andaman & Nicobar Island acted as the cat’s paw for a George Fernandes, Ved Malik (then Chief of the Army Staff) and Sushil Kumar take-over. The coup against democracy was meticulously planned and executed. The officers and men of the Army, Navy and Air Force, people at large, and media (except for India Today, Pioneer and Avik Sarkar’s Anand Bazar Patrika) saw it as a coup. The Emperor wore no clothes".

Admiral Bhagwat has also brought to the fore yet another inside story: Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Air Chief Marshal SK Sareen, had rung up the Defence Minister, Mr Fernandes, a dozen times with respect to an important matter-that is, the request of the three Service Chiefs to see him in connection with the conduct and behaviour of Mr Ajit Kumar, which had created quite an unprecedented situation.

And one more inside truth told by Admiral Bhagwat: Except the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. VP Malik, who had "private channels" connecting him with Mr Ajit Kumar and Mr George Fernandes, none of the principal staff officers and senior officials of the Army, Navy and Air Force Headquarters were willing to discuss any matter with Mr Ajit Kumar.

Subsequently a note was dashed off to Mr Fernandes. And lamented Admiral Bhagwat: "Not only did the Minister refuse to meet the Chiefs of Staff on this issue, but also sadly within hours of the note having been sent Air Chief Marshal Sareen informed me that Gen. Malik had made a deal with George Fernandes".

What was the agreement? Admiral Bhagwat’s reply: "That Gen. Malik was not only given one year’s extension but was also assured that he would be made the Chief of Defence Staff on 31st December 1998, when Air Chief Marshal Satish Sareen would have retired in the normal course".

That Admiral Bhagwat has been hurt by the then Chief of Army Staff is amply evident from the question the former has posed: "Why is it that Gen. Malik, who was a course-mate of mine and who received my full support in every matter pertaining to the Army, sometimes at the expense of my siding with him vis-à-vis the Air Chief, turned so much against the Navy Chief?"

Emphasising that Admiral Bhagwat hadn’t any political or military ambitions of becoming the right hand of Mr Fernandes or Mr Vajpayee, the book states that Gen. Malik had earlier established a close relationship with Mr IK Gujral, both as Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. "Now we had him (Gen. Malik) telling the Minister (Mr Fernandes) all that transpired between the three of us, or even the two of us", Admiral Bhagwat says.

Admiral Bhagwat has ridiculed Mr Vajpayee’s announcement that he (Admiral Bhagwat) had "damaged the Navy". The announcement has been termed as "funny". And the book says: "Vice Admiral Harinder Singh, a candidate of the Akali Dal, Acting Vice Admiral Raman Puri, their own man and one Rear Admiral Sampath Pillai, who had collisions and groundings in every ship that he had commanded were presumably in the mind of the PM as examples of the damage done by the CNS to the Navy".

Admiral Bhagwat has concluded chapter 34 of his book by saying: "A soldier like me has a level of integrity that may surprise Geroge Fernandes. Fernandes’ track record, his visits abroad, his relationship with international organizations, receipt of foreign funds, his relationship with foreign intelligence agencies which has to be on record with the concerned agencies of the Government. The only problem may be that our own intelligence agencies cannot understandably bring all this in front of the present Government, as it will fall on this single issue. George Fernandes’ past years are too well-documented, too well-known to too many people".

(To be continued)

Is trifurcation of Kashmir an untouchavble idea?

By B.K.Karkra

By now, many quarters have mooted the idea of trifurcating the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as a step towards solution of the Kashmir problem. The Jammu and Ladakh regions of the state are not only largely undisputed, but the people here also have longstanding grievances against the state government dominated by the Valley politics. Both would any day like to delink themselves from Kashmir. The minority communities driven out of the Valley are equally keen to settle down at Jammu under a new dispensation. The main advantage of trifurcating the state would, of course, lie in shrinkage of the primary area of conflict with Pakistan to the Valley alone. This would enable our armed forces to address the security concerns of Kashmir more effectively. As against this, there would, no doubt, be a few obvious disadvantages also. In any case, trifurcation is not that bad an idea that it cannot even be discussed.

It is time now to have a brief look at the history of the troubled state, as this may greatly help in studying the suggestion in a proper perspective. So far as politics goes, Maharaja Ranjit Singh was the first and last ruler of consequence in the Sikh history. His empire chiefly extended over what is now Pakistan (minus Sindh, of course) and the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed at the time of partition of the subcontinent. In addition, certain areas of the Indian Punjab, like Amritsar were part of his kingdom and the Maharaja also enjoyed some suzerainty over the Phulkian states. His domain was largely integrated into the British Indian empire as the provinces of Punjab, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. after the victory of East India Company in the two Sikh wars of eighteen forties. The Sikhs, though then virtually leaderless, fought like the men possessed (history records that even when transfixed on bayonets, they would not stop wielding their swords), but ultimately came to the conclusion that the British were unstoppable.

After these wars (which might as well have thrown the British out of this country, had leadership of the calibre of Maharaja Ranjit Singh been available to the Sikhs then), the Company felt that it did not have the resources to administer the hilly areas of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu (a sort of governor of Maharaja Ranjit Singh) was not only allowed to retain his own territories of Jammu and Ladakh, but also he was sold the state of Kashmir against payment of seventy five lakh Nanakshahi rupees. (Incidentally, the American State of Louisiana was also similarly purchased from the French during the reign of Napoleon for fiftee million pounds).

Thus, when the Independence finally dawned in the subcontinent, Maharaja Hari Singh, the great grandson of Maharaja Gulab Singh, happened to be the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. As per the Radcliffe Award, the British India was bifurcated, with three provinces (Baluchistan, Sindh and N.W.F.P.) going to Pakistan , six to India and the remaining two getting partitioned between the two emerging nations. The rulers of some six hundred princely states were left free to decide the future of their territories with due regard to the geographic realities.

The matter relating to accession of Jammu and Kashmir was, thus, purely the prerogative of Maharaja Hari Singh, as there was no provision in either the Independence of India Act, 1947 (passed by the British Parliament) or the Radcliffe Award for any plebiscites or referendums. The down-to-earth Pakistan saw an opportunity for territorial gain in the factcthat the Muslim constituted 77% of its population. It, however, knew it well that the Hindu ruler would never opt for the merger of his state with it. So, it engineered a tribal uprising to grab the state. This mischief made the Maharaja who otherwise seemed to be toying with the idea of independence to make up his mind in favour of merger with India. The then Indian government, in their democratic euphoria, accepted the accession only provisionally and declared that final decision would be taken after reference to the people of the state once the law and order situation stabilized. As if this was not enough of a blunder, we made a series of further mistakes that enabled Pakistan to develop a locus in the case out of nothing.

The contours of the Kashmir, as of now, are quite clear. There are four parties to the dispute—India, Pakistan, China and the Kashmiri’s themselves. India wants the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh at the time of our Independence i.e. all areas presently under its control, the territories occupied by Pakistan and China through aggression and the area ceded by Pakistan to China. Pakistan has been pressing for a plebiscite that it thinks would put the entire state into its pocket. Its claim can obviously not extend to the areas already handed over by it to China. China wishes to retain all territories surrendered to it by Pakistan and annexed by it before and during its war with India. In addition, it has some more claims in the Ladakh region. The Muslim majority in Kashmir is divided between merger with Pakistan and independence. A small section of them, however, is desirous of continuing with India with greater autonomy. Having a deeper view of the things, they know that independent Kashmir is not a viable option and it would any day be better to be with democratic India, rather than offering their buttocks to be battered and kidneys to be crushed by the Pakistan dictators.

All this, of course, constitutes the formal posturing by various parties. Otherwise, the apparent position is that China would be quite happy to settle with what it has already got. It may even be willing to make some concessions. India seems, more or less, reconciled to a settlement on the basis of ‘LOC plus/minus’. Pakistan’s ambitions have got fired because of its earlier link with the Western world and the present back up by the Chinese. The sympathy and support that it has among the fifty odd Islamic countries in varying degrees has further added to its intransigence. Once the borrowed feathers get clipped, Pakistan may also see reason and reconcile to the status quo. As of now also its real interest is limited to the Valley only.

Since the central point of dispute is the Kashmir valley, it would make considerable sense from the politico-strategic angle to deal with the Valley separately. Our difficulty, however, is that we have driven our commitment to secularism to such a fanatical limit that even a slightest deviation from it is seen as a blasphemy. Secularism is not a matter of national value, but wisdom. It is not an ideal, but a situational necessity. Most of the nations in our neighbourhood do not subscribe to our views on secularism. They are certainly not the heretics.

In the circumstances, the idea of trifurcation of the state might be seen as a compromise on our commitment to secularism or still worse, it might be read as our willingness to part with the Valley. However, if peace does not suit Pakistan and it has a vested interest in keeping the cauldrons boiling in Kashmir, it would not agree to settle the issue even on the basis of the ‘LOC plus/minus’ principle. In that case, we may be left with no option, but to segregate the primary area of conflict and concentrate on it. Even on trifurcating, the Muslim would be evenly balanced in Ladakh and constitute around one third of the population of Jammu. The exercise may not therefore assume the communal colour, as we suspect at the moment. We shall have to, however, prepare our people for it in advance and make the move only when adequate national consensus on the issue is in place. The complete integration of Jammu and Ladakh in the national mainstream would, undoubtedly, relieve us of some of our worries in Kashmir. It may then, in fact, even be possible to consider the Kashmir region for greater autonomy in line with the local aspirations..