The Inside Truth-V
Is George’s agenda to uproot Armed Forces?

From B L Kak

A highly sensational revelation: The agenda of Mr George Fernandes was the uprooting of the Armed Forces in India, thereby weakening, if not destroying, the Indian Republic.

Making this revelation, India’s former Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, has, without coming out with full details, briefly mentioned what he has described as "the necessity of a pliable, political and communal leadership for the Armed Forces".

And his pathological hatred for Mr George Fernandes can be easily explained by the former’s question posed in the book that is: Was this also the genesis of the Defence Minister’s extraordinary interest in gun-runnning and narcotics operations through the Andaman Islands and the Andaman Sea to the North-East?

In fact, Admiral Bhagwat states in his book: "The Defence Minister himself told us with bravado, many times, of his regular and long standing interest in the North-East, the movements, the leaders and the insurgent groups operating there". Admiral Bhagwat’s another disclosure: Documents, which are in safe custody and will be produced when a joint Parliamentary committee or a high-level probe is conducted, reveal that Mr Fernandes was a regular visitor to Moreh in Manipur, which is at the centre of the drug trade in the North-East.

Disclosure number three: The visits were made in the company of Ms Jaya Jaitly, Lovely Anand and others. On one occasion, the business community demonstrated against Mr George Fernandes. He, however, got a friendly journalist who also reports for a foreign news channel to report that 5,000 people had formed a human chain to support him, while in actual fact it was a demonstration against him.

Disclosure number four: Mr George Fernandes was never short of funds for the underground, including air travel and foreign travel. Intelligence agencies were to report his activities including a meeting in Watergate Hotel, Washington D.C. with the Deputy Director of the CIA, Mr Ray Klein, recalled by Mr K Subramanyam at Navy House on February 9, 1999, after the dismissal of Admiral Bhagwat.

"This", Admiral Bhagwat says in his book, "confirmed Mr PN Haksar’s warning to me at his residence on August 30, 1998 that there was 200 per cent proof with those who had worked for RAW and IB that Mr George Fernandes worked for foreign intelligence agencies". The book adds: "The late Mr PN Haksar, it may be recalled, was one of those who had established RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and closely monitored its functioning as the Principal Secretary to Mrs Gandhi".

The dismissal of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat and his replacement by Vice Admiral Sushil Kumar, a personal choice of the Defence Minister, without a selection process, dispensing with consultation of the Cabinet and without a statement in Parliament, the book points out, was not the first time that Mr George Fernandes had attempted to determine subjectively the choice of leadership of the Navy, a targeted service in view of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and the vast island territories.

Disclosure number five: In 1979, Admiral Pereira was appointed on the personal intervention of Mr George Fernandes in preference to Admiral RKS Gandhi, as the Chief of Naval Staff, though the latter had exceptionally outstanding record backed by the vast experience of a series of key commands and staff appointments not matched by Admiral Pereira.

Admiral Bhagwat, for obvious reasons, has included in his book a portion of the report in Arun Gandhi’s book The Morarji Papers. The report, Admiral Bhagwat says, elaborates that during the Emergency, financial assistance for Mr George Fernandes and his family, while they were underground, was provided mainly from West Germany and the American Trade Council.

The report goes on to say that since the entry of Mr Fernandes into the Government, both these sources have been trying to cash in on their old links with him by securing concessions in new business ventures and technical collaboration deals in India… Messrs Siemens, a West German multinational corporation with vast business interests in India, is said to be the main financier of Mr Fernandes.

Disclosure number six: In Prime Minister, Mr Atal Berhari Vajpayee’s list, Mr RK Hegde was the Defence Minister and Mr George Fernandes was sworn in as a Cabinet Minister. Mr George Fernandes, "the giant killer", had already made up his mind-he wanted nothing other than the Defence portfolio. He made it clear that he was in it as the Defence Minister or he and the members of his party would remain out of the Council of Ministers and the Government.

Mr Vajpayee, according to Admiral Bhagwat, had no alternative, but to ask Mr Hegde, with "great reluctance", whether he could make way for Mr Fernandes. Mr Hegde had no hesitation in saying that he had no objection, even if he was not a member of the Cabinet. "On hindsight, this singular event on 19 March 1998 had profound repercussions on the defence apparatus of the country", Admiral Bhagwat has said.

Disclosure number seven: The month that was-July 1998. Mr Ajit Kumar, the controversial Defence Secretary, and Mr George Fernandes were found directly communicating with Vice Admiral Sushil Kumar, almost on a daily basis; some of the calls being so long as 40 minutes duration on STD at the New Delhi end. Admiral Bhagwat says: "It could be reasonably inferred that being the junior of the three and the most ambitious, he (Vice Admiral Sushil Kumar) would have in the normal course made the large number or calls to the Minister and Secretary".

(To be continued)

UN resolutions and Kashmir

By Sati Sahni

The wheel has turned full circle. The UN has made it known that in resolution of differences on Kashmir between India and Pakistan it can play no positive role. The categorical statement made in Pakistan by UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan that Resolutions passed over half a century ago cannot be implemented or enforced, has annoyed and upset Pakistan as also secessionists in Kashmir.

Since Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced on November 27,2000 cessation of operations against militants in Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistani leaders from General Pervez Musharraf to Barrister Sultan Mehmud (PoK) and Hurriyat leaders, have all harped on ''solution of Kashmir's future based on UN Resolutions.'' The Pakistani Jamait-e-Islami Amir, Qazi Hussain Ahmed has said they ''will not accept any solution of the Kashmir issue other than the one provided in the Security Council Resolutions.'' All those elements who have now realised that war or armed militancy will not make Kashmir a part of Pakistan, have taken recourse to pressing India to implement the UN Resolutions. It seems most of people who talk of these Resolutions as an ideal solution, have not studied them at all. Will Pakistan vacate area of Jammu & Kashmir occupied by it and known as PoK? Will Pakistan give up areas of Gilgit and Paltistan (62036 sq kms) incorporated as Northern Areas under direct control of Pakistan Federal Government ? Will Pakistan be able to take back from China, Kashmir area of 5180 sq kms. illegally ceded to it in 1963? With so much at stake does Pakistan sincerely and honestly want these Resolutions to be implemented ?

I will try and put this matter in right perspective so that confusion sought to be spread, is cleared. The impression that has gained ground round the world is that India has refused to implement these Resolutions after having owned and accepted them. In fact, the boot is on the other leg, as I have mentioned earlier.

On October 22, 1947 Pakistan launched an armed invasion both in Kashmir Valley and on some sectors of Jammu Province. Having failed to persaude Pakistan to withdraw the armed raiders, the Indian Government referred the problem of aggression to the United Nations on January 1, 1948 under Article 35 (1) and Art. 34 of the United Nations Charter. This was under Chapter IV which deals with ''Pacific Settlement of Disputes''. New Delhi has been criticised all these years by many, why it did not refer the matter to UN under Chapter VII where action could be taken ''with respect to threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.'' On 31st July 1957, the UN Security Council was told by Mr V K Krishna Menon, Representative of India, that Kashmir case was referred to the United Nations under Chapter IV because it could not be referred to under Chapter VII since only a member of the Security Council could bring a matter under this Chapter. Mr Kofi Annan has made it explict that Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII only, are self-enforcing while all other resolutions have to have support and co-operation of concerned parties.

Following the end of Second World War the major powers had got enmeshed in Cold War and thus were divided into two rival blocs. Kashmir became a shuttlecock between these blocs and the real complaint of armed aggression against a sovereign State got submerged under other less relevant issues. Due to various factors including its insatiable enmity towards India, Pakistan got sucked into military blocs of SEATO and CENTO. It also signed in 1954, a military pact with United States.

When the UN Security Council took up India's complaint, it passed its first resolution on January 17, 1948. Within the next three days the Security Council decided to set up a Commission of 3 UN Member States, to go to the sub-continent and investigate the facts of the case and report back. Later, on 21st April 1948 the Commission's membership was enlarged to 5 members and was asked to proceed to the sub-continent to ''help restore peace and make arrangements for holding of a plebiscite.''

The UN Commission for India and Pakistan arrived at Karachi on July 7, 1948. It toured parts of Jammu & Kashmir and visited New Delhi and Karachi to meet with senior civil and military officials of both countries besides meeting the respective Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. During Commission Members' stay in Kashmir, they had many meetings with Kashmiri leaders including Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. The Commission while in this sub-continent also adopted two resolutions which have been referred to in all these 52 years as holding the key to the problem of Kashmir. The first UNCIP resolution was of August 13, 1948 and the second one of January 5, 1949.

The August 13 (1948) Resolution proposed a ceasefire followed by a Truce Agreement. This Resolution asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Jammu & Kashmir and also ''use its best endeavour to secure withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally residents therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.'' It further said ''The Commission will station Observers to help maintain lines existing at time of ceasefire. After these two conditions are implemented the Governments of India and Pakistan in consultation with the UNCIP would determine future of Jammu & Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people.'' India raised some objections and after Commission's written assurances, accepted the Resolution on August 20, 1948. Pakistan's acceptance was laced with reservations and conditions which virtually amounted to rejection without saying so.

The UNCIP continued to persue the matter. In the month of November/December 1948, when India had launched operations on various fronts to throw out the aggressor, the Commission stepped up its efforts. The UNCIP Chairman, Dr Lazano assisted by his colleagues, had long meetings with the Indian Prime Minister, Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru. The discussions were reduced to writing and became part of the archieves as Aide Memoirs of December 21 and 22, 1948. The result was the Cease Fire between the two countries effective from January 1, 1949.

Following discussions between the Governments and the respective Army Chiefs and later between delegations of two countries an Agreement was signed on July 27, 1949 at Karachi. The demarcation of the Cease Fire Line on the ground followed soon after. The UN Secretary General appointed Military Observers from different countries on either side of the Cease Fire Line. They formed part of the UN Military Observers Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Its main offices are Srinagar in India and Rawalpindi in Pakistan. The strength of this Group keeps on varying but at one time, was 45 military officers from costly Anglo-Saxon countries. Representatives of either Army would report to this Group, any violation of the Cease Fire Line. This arrangement continued till Simla Agreement following the Pak-India War of 1971. For 22 years till 1971, Pakistan had failed to carry out its obligations under the two Resolutions of the UNCIP. To cover this up Pakistan once again resorted to war against India.

A point to be noted is that these Resolutions mention territory of Jammu & Kashmir whose future was to be determined. It necessarily means that included in this are territories presently occupied by Pakistan. These areas will have to be vacated by Pakistan and to be reunited with rest of the State before next step can be considered. Plebiscite is envisaged only after Clause 2 of Resolution of January 5, 1949 has been implemented. This clearly States that Plebiscite will be held only after Part I and II of Resolution of August 13, 1948 has been carried out. Pakistan today is unable to rein in and control militant groups on its own soil. It is difficult to believe that she would be able to implement Clause A(2) of Part I of this Resolution which says : ''The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu & Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.''

This Resolution envisages disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces or their withdrawal to Pakistan. It also envisages re-establishment of India's sovereignty over the entire State of Jammu & Kashmir as it existed before Pakistani occupation of these areas. The situation in Jammu & Kashmir has to be made status quo ante. It follows that Jammu & Kashmir Government is recognised as the only lawful authority in the State since the Resolution talks of Plebiscite Administrator to be ''formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu & Kashmir.'' Clause 3 (b) of Resolution of January 5, 1949 says, ''The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu & Kashmir the power he considers necessary'' for organizing and conducting the plebiscite.

The big question is : Is Pakistan prepared to accept and implement all or any important part of these Resolutions?

The Simla Agreement of 1972 coverted the Cease Fire Line into Line of Control. Since then India has considered the UNMOGIP as irrelevant and has not reported any violations of the LoC to them. This is so because clause (D) of Part I of 13th August 1948 Resolution clearly states that the military observers ''will supervise the observance of the cease fire order.'' Since the ceasefire order of 1948 does not exist the military observers have nothing to supervise, officially. The Government of India, however continued to extend hospitality to its members in form of accommodation, transport, POL, Canteen Services and diplomatic immunity. The Indian Government has not made any attempt to either ask them to leave or to withdraw its 53 year old complaint from the UN. This, inspite of provocations by its Observers indulging in activities not strictly conforming to their defined role. They willingly received memoranda from different secessionist groups in Kashmir and passed them on to UN HQs at New York. Some UN Observers from time to time have gone into areas of tension and thus indirectly encouraged anti-Indian elements. The stand-off at Hazratbal Shrine near Srinagar in October-November 1993 when large number of armed militants had holed themselves up inside the Shrine, was a glaring instance when without any official purpose, UN Observers made visits which apparently boosted militants' morale and received media publicity. They had to be told to keep off the sensitive turf.

To get the correct perspective it will be helpful to refresh our memory about how UN has dealt with this problem.

The UNCIP had passed two resolutions which have been dealt with above. And the Cease Fire Line was one solid contribution it made though it left without delineation of the CFL beyond the Point NJ 9842 southwest of Siachen Glacier in Ladakh. This direliction of its duty has left seeds of Siachen problem which has further vitiated the Indo-Pak relations resulting in enormous strain in terms of men, money and material.

It is pertinent to point out that these two crucial resolutions are always referred to as resolutions passed by the UN Security Council. This is not a fact. On the other hand it has been pointed out at the United Nations that the Security Council was not competant to delegate powers conferred on it by the UN Charter, to any Commission or subsidiary organisation. It was further pointed out that the decision of the Security Council to confer on the UNCIP the power to exercise mediatory influence in the Kashmir situation, is incompatible with the UN Charter.

The problem had been discussed and debated in the UN Security Council from time to time and between January 1948 and December 1957 it passed as many as 11 Resolutions, as under :

1. Resolution No. 38 (1948) of 17th January 1948 (S/651)

2. Resolution No. 39 (1948) of 20th January 1948 (S/654)

3. Resolution No. 47 (1948) of 21st April 1948 (S/726)

4. Resolution No. 51 (1948) of 3rd June 1948 (S/819)

5. Resolution No. 80 (1950) of 14th March 1950(S/1469)

6. Resolution No. 91 (1951) of 30th March 1951 (S/2017/Rev 1)

7. Resolution No. 96 (1951) of 10th November 1951 (S/2392)

8. Resolution No. 98 (1952) of 23rd December 1951 (S/2883)

9. Resolution of Security Council on January 24, 1957

10. Resolution of Security Council on February 21, 1957

11. Resolution of Security Council on December 2, 1957

Later, during the 1965 and 1971 Pakistani Wars against India, the Security Council was seized of the matter and passed :

1. Resolution on September 4, 1965

2. Resolution on September 6, 1965

3. Resolution on September 20, 1965

4. Resolution on September 27, 1965

5. Resolution on November 5, 1965

6. Resolution on December 22, 1971

Following failure of Pakistan to implement Part I and Part II of UNCIP Resolutions of 13th August 1948, the Security Council decided to appoint Mediators to explore possibilities of settlement of Kashmir problem. They were as follows :

i) Gen. A L McNaughton of Canada. He was appointed on December 17, 1949. He submitted his report which had proposed demilitarisation primarily. This was unacceptable.

ii) On March 13, 1950 the Security Council decided to appoint a UN Representative for Kashmir. On April 12, 1950, a wellknown jurist, Sir Owen Dixon of Australia, was appointed to this office. He travelled to the sub-continent and met leaders of both, India and Pakistan. He toured many parts of Kashmir and visited even Leh in Ladakh. At Srinagar he had two meetings with Kashmir Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. Dixon submitted his Report to the Security Council on September 15, 1950 saying that no agreement could be reached with the two parties. Broadly, he proposed merger of moslem majority areas with Pakistan and non-Moslem majority areas like Jammu and Ladakh with India, with plebiscite proposed only in Kashmir Valley. This proposal has come to be known as Dixon Plan. The most significant part of this Report was his categorical assertion that Pakistan was aggressor in Kashmir according to international law. Here was jurist of world standing declaring Pakistan guilty of aggression against India.

iii) The Security Council did not give up and on March 30, 1951 appointed another person, Dr Frank Grahem as UN Representative for India and Pakistan. He travelled to this sub-continent many times meeting leaders and representatives of public in both countries. He submitted as many as 5 reports to the Security Council, last being on March 27, 1953. His recommendations virtually undid the UNCIP Resolutions of August 13 1948 and Jaunary 5, 1949 by recognising Pakistan's full authority over illegally occupied Indian territories in Jammu & Kashmir. Obviously, India did not accept these proposals.

After gap of 4 years the Security Council once again got active on Kashmir when Pakistan protested against the enforcement of the new Constitution in Jammu & Kashmir on January 26, 1957. This was the time when Mr V K Krishna Menon, as Representative of India, made 9 marathon speeches in the Security Council between January 23 and February 21, 1957. Following this the Security Council did not adopt any resolution condemning India for the new Constitution, as wanted by Pakistan. Instead, the Security Council by a Resolution asked its President, Dr Gunnar Jarring to ''examine possibilities of an early settlement of Kashmir problem.'' On September 29, 1957 he reported his inability to submit any concrete proposals''.

On December 2, 1957 the Security Council adopted a Resolution asking Dr Frank Graham, UN Representative for India and Pakistan to make efforts to get UNCIP Resolutions implemented. On March 28, 1958 he submitted his Report to Security Council. The recommendations were not acceptable because Dr Graham had drifted away from basic facts.

Five years later, Mr Menon again addressed the Security Council on May 3 and 4, 1962, in reply to address by the Pakistan Representative. However, no resolution was adopted by the Security Council.

The Tashkent Agreement of January 10, 1966 between India and Pakistan was not direct result of the United Nations but it was brought about by the Soviet Union with tacit support of other members of the Security Council.

In the Simla Agreement of 1972, it was decided to convert the Cease Fire Line into Line of Control. Following this the stand of the Government of India is that UNMOGIP has no official status in Jammu & Kashmir and therefore it has no role to play in maintaining peace along the LoC. But India has not withdrawn its recognition nor have its members been asked to leave Jammu & Kashmir. They continue to be extended courtesies along with hospitality. India also continues to contribute financially to UN for maintaining them here.

The Simla Agreement by deciding to settle difference over Kashmir bilaterally, put the UN out of pail. Pakistan should not harp on UN Resolutions because Simla Agreement has the seal of approval of Pakistan National Assembly. Then in 1999 Pakistan willingly subscribed to Lahore Declaration which reiterated both countries' committment to settle their differences bilaterally. In view of this the United Nations has no role to play in Kashmir. We are informed that neither India nor Pakistan can withdraw the Kashmir case from the Security Council unless it is taken off the agenda of the Security Council. Now that even the Secretary General Kofi Annan has said that differences between India and Pakistan can best be settled between them on the basis of Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration, the UN seems to have withdrawn. It is inexplicable that while all permanent members of the Security Council have separately asked Pakistan and India to settle their differences over Kashmir bilaterally, not one member of the Security Council has shown any intention of taking the case off from its agenda.