The Inside Truth-II
Govt. ignored alarm bells before Kargil war

From B L Kak

The Vajpayee Government has been charged with having paid little attention to alarm bells, big and small, that were being sounded well before the armies of India and Pakistan fought the bitter war in Kargil sector of Ladakh in 1999. The Government has also been accused of having told the Army in August 1998 that they should not use equal or higher calibre artillery in reply to the Pakistan Army shelling across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kargil and other sectors "even if it was being used as a cover for the terrorists to cross".

These and some other startling allegations are contained in the book written by the dismissed Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat. Allegation number three: Intelligence reports were disregarded, not analysed, not assessed by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

Allegation number four: Political intelligence was ignored. Air surveillance was not being authorised, although the then Chief of Air Staff, according to Admiral Bhagwat, had recommended it. The then Air Chief had, in fact, stated that the IAF was ready to undertake air surveillance.

Allegation number five: The navy was being hauled up for procedural errors, rather than action by the Ministry of Defence when an officer of the rank of Commander in the Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DNI), mistakenly wrote directly to the Pak High Commission, the substantive violation by Pakistan Naval aircraft of flying over ships in territorial waters, which violated the CBMs (confidence-building measures), ratified by the heads of Governments of India and Pakistan.

Stating that Mr George Fernandes was exploding ‘myths’ that Pakistan was a threat to India’s security and writing in the foreword to the specially issued new edition of The Guilty Men of 1962 that a new realism of threats (meaning China) was beginning to take roots in the Government, Admiral Bhagwat recalled: "This was on December 17, 1998 in the midst of his politico-military coup against the Armed Forces and democracy".

Admiral Bhagwat’s allegation number six: The January 1999 intelligence reports were similarly ignored and suppressed. He has regretted: "This was the time when Mr Fernandes said the sacked CNS (Admiral Bhagwat) would be stripped of his rank, his pension, his terminal benefits of hospital care etc. It was not a threat to me, for I was not one to bow down to threats from these people. It did not succeed in demoralizing officers who would certainly not want to be stripped of their rank…"

Admiral Bhagwat’s book has made a pointed reference to Mr Geroge Fernandes’ lack of knowledge and of facts vis-à-vis the number of Pak intruders on the Kargil soil. The book has recalled the Defence Minister’s statement in early May 1999 that "the artillery firing was sporadic, the few infiltrators would be thrown out in 48 hours. The book has insisted that the then Premier of Pakistan, Mr Nawaz Sharief, was fully briefed in January 1999 by both the Army and the ISI in several presentations and meetings. "It is now known on record that he had visited the frontline before Lahore (Lahore Declaration of February).

Hence, Admiral Bhagwat cannot be faulted for his cryptic remark: "The job of the Defence Minister of India, apparently, included giving good character and conduct certificates to the Pakistan Prime Minister and the ISI".

Loaded, indeed, is Admiral Bhagwat’s verdict: "Mr Fernandes has no regrets. He has achieved his aim. Kashmir is irrevocably internationalised. After all, he hates former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and perhaps, therefore, the Shimla Agreement which held peace on the LoC for the last 27 years.

Yet another startling allegation levelled by the former Navy Chief: "These people were ready to barter the Kashmir Valley because it is a secular thorn to the Hindu Rashtriya Government in New Delhi (and the Panthic Government in Punjab). Behind their clever words are the promises made to internationalise the Kashmir issue, eventually leading it to ‘an independent nation-hood, without an international personality’; that is only a slight variation from what Maharaja Hari Singh wanted, but Sheikh Abdullah opposed in 1947".

Admiral Bhagwat’s yet another verdict: "To proclaim Kargil as a victory over Pakistan, to further proclaim it as a victory greater than 1971, by Major Jaswant Singh, this Government’s Foreign Minister, is a travesty". Admiral Bhagwat can’t also be faulted for his argument that Pakistan, in 1971, suffered a decisive military defeat, a nation was created, and this defeat deterred it from committing armed aggression across the border until recently (1999 Kargil conflict).

That former Navy Chief does not refute the ‘fact’ that Washington bailed out the Vajpayee Government during the Kargil war has been illustrated by the inclusion of these words in his book: "Prior to during and subsequent to President Clinton’s visit to India, US officials at the highest levels have stated that US intervention secured the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from, in and around Kargil. Thus, they ‘bailed out’ the Indians. The so-called victory constituted the main plant of the election campaign and the subsequent return to power of the BJP-led NDA (National Democratic Alliance) in October 1999".

(To be continued)

Emerging triangle in Eurasia

By V D Chopra

In the midst of a controversy over the American move to establish a National Missile Defence (NMD) system, in essence to consolidate its hegemony over the world, another parallel development is taking place - shaping of a triangle consisting of India - Russia, China - Russia and China - India. Though it will be naive to equate this trend with a military alliance, it has a far-reaching political implication. In fact, if this triangle matures and deepens, it will become a major political factor in the international relations, in general, and in the evolution of a multipolar world order, in particular. Above all, it will change radically the situation in the Asia - Pacific region in more than one sense.

That the world's two most populated countries of Asia, China and India, are restructuring their relations and are striving to come closer to each other and that Russia and China have evolved a new model of bilateral relations are significant developments. From the long-term point of view, this triangle will become a key factor inthe international affairs. Though it is too early to draw any hasty conclusion on this development, there are clear indications that new contours have begun to unfold in the bilateral relations on three sides of this triangle. It will, therefore, be relevant to make a concrete study of the bilateral relations among these three countries.

It will be simplistic to equate Indo-Russian relations, as they have developed during the last one decade, with the Indo-Soviet relations. After India became an independent and sovereign State, Indo-Soviet relations matured in entirely different historical conditions, the most important factor being the emergence of the Soviet Union as a socialist State and India becoming a spearhead of a worldwide anti-colonial movement and founder of the Non-Aligned Movement. Those historical conditions no more exist.

Nevertheless, what is pertinent to recapitulate is the long-term complementarity of Indo-Russian national interests. The relationship is equally marked by the absence of any national irritants - no border disputes, no negative legacy of history. The identity of their views on the political and economic world order and on major international issues ensures that their "strategic partnership" would be a significant factor in the Asia - Pacific region. The concept of 'strategic partnership' has put Indo-Russian relations at a qualitatively higher level. Notwithstanding the fact that Russia wants India to sign CTBT and has not yet recognised India as a nuclear power, international restrictions would not come in the way of Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes. This is an important component of the concept of strategic partnership.

The importance of the declaration of strategic partnership signed in 2000 between India and Russia is that it promises economic, political, scientific and cultural cooperation. The two countries will not only share vital information, hold consultations on important issues, but evolve joint decisions to face international terrorism. The establishment of an inter-Government commission on defence and technology will lead to close cooperation on defence matters. Above all, they have pledged to work for a multipolar world based on sovereignty and equality of States. There is something more to the concept of strategic partnership.

In the past India had relied on the Soviet Union as the most reliable strategic partner and weapons supplier. In Today's context, Russian defence companies are seeking to supply any armaments from basic to the highly sophisticated ones and India sees Russia as a steady source for the supply of defence equipment. The export controls, non-proliferation policies, unreliability of supplies and denial of key military technology to India by the West made Indo-Russian defence cooperation a long-term stable option.

However, Indo-Russian economic cooperation is not expanding rapidly for a variety of reasons. That does not mean that the upward swing in Indo-Russian economic cooperation should be ignored. There are ample opportunities for Indians to have joint ventures in Russia. The areas include petro-chemicals, telecommunications and development of port facilities in the Black Sea region. Department stores, fast food chains and hotel industry also offer investment possibilities in Russia, where joint ventures can also help us in penetrating the European market.

Many Indian firms have gone to Russia in a big way. Lakme has several distribution outlets there. Hindustan Lever and Ganpati Export have increased their trade substantially. Lupin Laboratories and Nirma have their ventures in Russia. Alpha Group, Procter and Gamble and BPL are also setting up manufacturing units. This is a clear manifestation of the multi-dimensional character of the new Indo-Russian relations.

In the past ten years, Sino-Russian relations have developed from normalisation to goodneighbourly ties, and then from constructive partnership to strategic cooperative partnership. The most important development which has taken place is that both the countries have settled their border disputes left by history. They signed agreements acceptable to every side on solving border issues with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and took the opportunity of the 1996 Shanghai summit meeting among the five countries to establish an important five-nation consultation mechanism on resolving regional and international issues. The significance of the Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership can be reflected in the following three aspects.

1 - Safeguarding the international strategic stability and world peace and creating a favourable international security environment for Russians to realise its own, national development strategy. Both Russia and China are powerful countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council. They shoulder important responsibility in dealing with the current international affairs. They cooperate with each other in defending the anti-missile treaty and preventing the United States from deploying the National Missile Defence on the ground that will destroy the world strategic balance.

2. - This partnership will maintain stability and prosperity in south-eastern Russia, which shares a long border with China. Conflict between the two countries on this border harms the interests of both countries. China and Russia have resolved a large number of problems left by history.

3. - The most significant development is the fast widening Sino-Russian economic cooperation, though each has its own model of economic reforms. Their trade volume averaged US $6 million annually from 1992 to 1999, higher than that between Russia and the United States in the corresponding period. This is a very significant trends as seen in the context potentialities of cooperation between the two countries.

In the totality of the situation, the new relationship between Russia and China has already become a major factor for creating a multipolar world and a new international economic order based on the respect of sovereignty and independence of all the nations, big and small.

Seen within the framework of the new thrust in Indo-Russian and Sino-Russian relations, it is equally important to make an objective study of the direction of Sino-Indian relations. Since the 1962 war between India and China, Sino-Indian relations have witnessed irritants and have developed in a zig zag manner. However, in the recent years these relations slowly though steadily have begun to improve. In 1976, former Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi took the first step in signalling to China that India sought a more normal pattern of relations when she took the decision to despatch to Beijing a full-fledged Indians Ambassador, thus ending a hiatus of 15 years where diplomatic relations were downgraded to the levels of charge d'affaires from 1961. It took another nine years for an Indian Prime Minister to respond to China's repeated invitations successively to Morarji Desai, Mrs Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi to visit China. The Rajiv Gandhi visit to China in December 1988 marked a turning point in the normalisation of relations between the two counties.

India has its longest land border with China. It, therefore, looms large on our security and geopolitical environment. China has disputed large segments of this border. It is of far reaching importance, therefore, that India and China have begun negotiations to settle their border disputes at the level of expert groups and exchange maps. This was announced by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on January 14 before his visit to Indonesia. Significantly, almost simultaneously, Chinese leader Li Peng said in New Delhi (to be precise on Jan. 13, 2001) that China and India were required by the reality of the 21st century to take their relationship to a new height.

While differing on some key issues such as transfer of missiles to Pakistan, pragmatic India and China have decided to broaden their engagement by building new institutional contacts. This is the essence of the new trend. -- CNF