Hope from the past

Allabaksh Hyderabadi

Taliban and their clones have im-mensely damaged the image of Islam. There can be no doubt about it. With their single-minded pursuit of what they perceive to be the right course of Islam, they have virtually alienated the civilised public opinion and thereby caused immense pain to the Muslim community as a whole.

Sadly, the Muslim World has not covered itself with glory by their reaction, which can at best be described as muted to the actions like destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas. Religious leaders, who should be in the forefront of any condemnation of acts that are against the tenets of the faith, have been observing, generally speaking, masterly silence, neither supporting nor condemning.

May be they are embarrassed by the acts of Islamists. It is also possible that they are tongue tied by the fact that long centuries ago, when sentiment was inflamed with the sacking of Baghdad by marauding Mongols, the Christian world raised no murmur of protest. One doesn't know for sure. Both possibilities cannot be ruled out.

Naturally, therefore, rises the question: should we make the present a prisoner of the past. More so in these days of welcome with open arms to a future where the global village doesn't remain a myth but is about to become a reality. Any number of incidents can be cited from the religious folklore that our ancestors too looked to the future always with hope and never allowed themselves to be tied by the past to the past.

Two incidents from the long Islamic history offer us an insight that certainly holds out a similar perceptive. One of these episodes goes by the title, Statue's Nose and the other is known as story of the Lost Pig. Both are an education to the ignoramus of the glorious Islamic past particularly the attitude of early Muslim rulers towards their non-Muslim subjects.

First, the incident of Statue's Nose.

It happened in the present day Egypt during the period of Caliph Umar. Amir ibn, al-As (RA) was the governor of the day. He had just conquered the territory. He was popular amongst his subjects. One day when he was still in Alexandria, a Christian delegation headed by the Archbishop waited on him. They were seething with anger and wanted justice.

The nose of a statute of Christ in the market place had been broken off and it was the considered opinion of the delegation that only a Muslim could be the culprit. The governor was distressed and shared their grief. He offered to pay for the statue's repair. He was even willing to get a replacement for the broken statute.

Both offers did not find favour with the delegation. In fact, were rejected outright. The governor asked them. What would satisfy you? In halting but measured tones, the reply came the only compensation acceptable to them was permission to make a statue of the Holy Prophet and break its nose off. Amar's reaction was predictable it was unfavourable. The governor ruled that the Christians would be compensated by being allowed to cut the nose of any Muslim they wished.

The next morning the Christians of the city as well as the Muslims of the garrison were summoned to the court to hear the governor. He first described the incident and then summoned the Bishop and spoke as follows: ''You are the head of the Christians and I of the Muslims here. The responsibility of ruling this country is mine and I must accept the punishment for any insult that may have been offered to your religion fo the weakness of my administration. Take this sword and cut off my nose.''

According to historians, the governor immediately handed over his sword to the Bishop. Amidst the commotion his decision had created,a Muslim soldier broke ranks and ran upto the platform with the broken nose in his hand and admitted his guilt offering his own nose.

The Bishop thereupon remarked: It was wrong to break the image but it will be greater wrong to mangle a human face for that. And he threw away the sword. Smile returned to all faces around.

The second story, as told to us, is no less interesting in holding a mirror to the past without prejudice. It goes like this. Once a Khariji war party was on its way. A wild animal attacked them suddenly. It appeared to be a pig but it could be a wild boar. The soldiers killed it with their lances. And continued their march.

After a while some of them had a doubt: Did we kill a tamed, domesticated animal by mistake? They decided to go back on the pig's traces through the desert. After a journey of three days they finally reached a Christian settlement. On enquiry, there they found a man, who said that a pig of his had been lost about a week before.

The soldiers told him that they had killed the animal in the mistaken impression that it was wild and offered compensation. He refused. He said that he had already given it up for dead and as such he needed no compensation. The soldiers were in no mood to yield. They virtually at sword point paid him compensation . Because ''they were not going to risk having to answer on Judgement Day for an unclean pig''.

What is the moral? What do these incidents reflect?

Let us remember that Kharijis are often described as the fundamentalist' fundamentalists. While they saw nothing wrong with ruling non-Muslim majorities or with excluding them from political life, they were scrupulous in ensuring that spiritual lives and material property of all subjects, non-Muslims including were fully protected. They practised what they believed-religious tolerance. For the Muslims of that era, what had happened in Bamiyan would have been incomprehensible. The Taliban fatwas too!

--Syndicate Features

Need for review of NFU policy

By Avinash Shirodkar

The NDA Government's decision to carry out nuclear tests in May 1998 appeared to herald a new era of an assured and confident India, aware of its rightful place in the international arena. After the explosion, it took us more than a year to formulate the draft nuclear doctrine. Sixty days instead, would have reflected our seriousness of intent. And despite the stimulating debate that followed the promulgation of the doctrine, we are again witnessing a worrisome silence. There seems to be a palpable absence of purpose. One wonders whether Pokhran-II was just tokenism and not an event to mark the unfolding of a new chapter.

To reopen the debate some comments are being offered on three aspects where opinions are divided. The principle of no first use (NFU), the posture of minimum deterrence, and that our inventory will be based on the triad of air, surface and submarine-based delivery systems. It is important to emphasize that when dealing with weapons of mass destruction, the voice of reason must prevail over moral rhetoric. An unquestioning adherence to policies formulated a decade or two ago would be equally unwise. Before examining the NFU principle, a brief explanation - the negation of this principle does not imply that we would always be the first to launch a nuclear attack. It only indicates that while exercising our inalienable right to self-defence, we retain the option to use nuclear weapons. It's situational premise, which allows us the flexibility to strike first or retaliate.

Let us now look at the expected pay-offs of a NFU policy. What are the advantages? Has it succeeded in softening the impact of our entry into the nuclear club? Will this clause facilitate the lifting of sanctions and allow us easy access to the technologies that we need? Does it help in ensuring credible deterrence at lesser cost? Does it facilitate in persuading possible adversaries to adopt a benign posture towards us? Since the answer is an unambiguous no to all these questions, there is a case for a serious second look at the NFU policy, Renouncing the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states is understandable, and so are agreements between nuclear weapon states (Russia and China) on NFU. A blanket NFU denies a country the leverage it could exercise to push bilateral treaties. This is in some measure the reason why Pakistan has scoffed at our offer of an NFU treaty. The defendants of the NFU posture may quote the Soviet and Chinese example. It should be noted that the Russians initiated this approach only when their nuclear armoury was hugely inferior to that of the allies (their main adversary) and abandoned it thereafter. To the Chinese, the threat of the NATO arsenal was in the abstract. With the Russians they negotiated an agreement.

While political scientists may observe that nuclear weapons are not for war but for averting war, and that nuclear weapons are political weapons for those charged with formulating national strategy must not permit themselves to be befuddled with such notions. Nuclear weapons, at the basic level, enhance exponentially a nation's war fighting capability. Much as we may abhor violence and war, if national security is threatened we must declare our resolve to use conventional forces and, if necessary, nuclear weapons. Our nuclear doctrine must not be ambiguous on this issue.

There are two other serious pitfalls of the commitment to a retaliatory response. One, it may encourage an adversary to gamble on a "take out" attack to neutralise our arsenal (in the hope that the resultant destruction and shock will cause the collapse of our consequence management arrangements to the extent that the counter attack does not happen). Two, the effect on the size of the arsenal. A retaliatory posture implies adequate residual capability. This has a spiralling effect on the arithmetic of numbers.

The position of minimal credible deterrence as against just credible deterrence is again symptomatic of our cultural and historical pacificism : "I will use force only if you use force and then too I will use the minimum force." In war, the concept of minimum force is dangerous. Is minimum credible deterrence compatible with credible deterrence? Is "minimum" a reaction to the ridiculously large arsenals that the Cold War adversaries built up? The governing concern should be affordability and cost. We must strive to acquire credible deterrence with the greatest economy. The prevailing confusion is clearly discernible when we look at the number of warheads meant to define our minimum credible deterrent capability. It is from a dozen to over 300 warheads with capability of each warhead ranging from kilotons to megatons.

The draft documents states : "India's nuclear forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible & responsive.will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land base missiles & sea based assets." This is an extremely balanced position. Its implementation requires careful deliberation, especially as there is a need to look at the problem somewhat unconventionally. In the beginning nuclear bombs could only be delivered by air. Later, when surface-based delivery systems became available, the US continued to retain a sizeable air delivered capability for reasons unique to its strategic perspective. An indepth analysis will indicate that with the acquisition of appropriate surface and sea-based capabilities the relevance of air-based delivery systems diminishes correspondingly. Currently we do not have a sea based capability. Our air-and land-based assets are also minimal. Therefore, the course to be charted is to be carefully evolved. The main focus must be on sea -and surface-based systems with air delivery, initially as a necessary option, and later for adequate redundancies.

Our immediate concern should be to focus on acquiring capabilities. Maximise the yield of fissile material. Acquire thermonuclear warheads; simultaneously explore miniaturisation. Further testing if necessary must be undertaken - pressures of CTBT notwithstanding. Currently low-yield weapons (tactical nuclear weapons) appear to have little relevance. The scenario may change tomorrow, particularly with into "the window accuracies" at considerable ranges. Increase the ranges an accuracies of our delivery and surveillance systems. (We must accelerate the PSLV and GSLV programmes). These are technology trajectories relevant both for conventional and nuclear weapons.

Finally, for achieving and managing our credible nuclear deterrent in this age of rapidly changing technologies, all echelons of our security apparatus must be more time sensitive. Investment in capabilities will translate into deterrence only if they are operational within specified periods. The Russian nuclear deterrence will be seriously degraded the day the Americans succeed in deploying their ABM shield. The other imperative is that we cannot afford to look at technology incrementally. We have to leap-frog to catch up and move ahead. INAV