Give and take

By M J Akbar

History is a mystery word. It evokes the most curious reac-tions. Eyebrows are being arched in at least some ruling class drawing rooms in Delhi to emphasise a cynicism : ''They want to make history!'' It is not quite polite to make history, even possibly a little vulgar. Or perhaps there is an implicit suggestion that history should only be made by those Richard Attenborough considers worthy enough for a movie. You have to earn your page in history by long years of drama; you are not allowed to enter the text books if you need a knee operation or get lucky on a flight from Colombo. There may even be a feeling, among extremists, that history, properly, belongs to the dead and the living should not be so crass as to claim it.

A mood has suddenly seized India and Pakistan, of the kind that surrounds a great event. But what is happening is being misunderstood. It is not Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf who are creating the excitement. If anything, they are worried about expectations rising beyond the low ceiling of reality. There is no denying this palpable spirit of hope; even the sceptics, may their tribe remain replenished, are wondering whether something might not actually emerge on the Ides of July. They too are influenced by the atmospherics.

But this is not a mood that has travelled down from the high reaches of government to the ground beneath our feet. It has instead taken the other direction. It has emanated from the people and is forcing the pace of the leaders. That is why it is so exhilarating, significant and so potentially frightening. The people of both countries want peace, however piecemeal, to happen.

The exhilaration is understandable. We may or may not admit it, but we are both a little exhausted by enmity, and the sheer uselessness of it. The war parties in both countries have drained our wealth; often with legitimate reason and popular support, but equally they have sustained the Institutions of war as vested interests that feed a few at the expense of the many.

The power of friendship is built on common sense, and is all the more powerful for that. Peace brings prosperity. People do not have to learn this from a book, or from a dogma, or from religion or philosophy; or from the history of other lands; they know this from the daily wear and tear of their lives. Confrontation and violence hurt, a mohalla as much as a nation. A very deep well of desire, poisoned so often by the events of the last hundred years, is bubbling again with fresh water.

So why should this induce any fright? Because of the dread of failure. No one quite knows the price of failure, and how it will be paid. Failure may not emerge necessarily from ill-will or malice; the best of intentions can light this tinderbox of passion, waiting for a spark from miscalculation.

This is the second time that the post-Independence generation has attempted to sort out this terrible consequence of British rule and Indian-Pakistani mistakes. Indira Gandhi was shaped by the experience of the Freedom Movement; her son Rajiv Gandhi brought a different mindset when he sought, sincerely to bridge some of the gaps with the help of Benazir Bhutto. Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir made one fundamental of their personal will, and the power of the governments that they controlled. They made no attempt to broaden the base of their support for this endeavour, even among the other political parties. This was partly because neither was on speaking terms with other political parties. Rajiv Gandhi was not terribly keen on conferring with V P Singh, who had Bofors in one hand and a demand for his resignation in the other. I cannot recall who were the two BJP MPs. In that Parliament, but Atal Behari Vajpayee was not one of them: he had been defeated in Gwalior in the previous election by Indira Gandhi's assassination. Neither was Lal Krishna Advani. Of course Rajiv Gandhi could have stepped out of any mental block and conferred with the BJP, but that did not occur to him. Benazir Bhutto would not even consider the possibility of a convivial word with any of the people or political forces that she held responsible for her father's judicial assassination. Both erred. While their mistakes can be understood, they remain mistakes.

A basic fact about Indo-Pak relations is that governments can do nothing if the people do not want them to, for the problem started long before the two countries were born. Governments can, and must, help create a point of departure from convictions rooted in suffering and suspicion, but that is only one of the many starting points in a process replete with false starts and dead ends. It is complicated; a political leadership must first be convinced, in itself, that there is value in compromise, and then begin the slow dance of carrying its own party, its own government, and then, with the cooperation of opinion makers, shift attitudes across a wide line. There has to be a corresponding effort, a parallel dance, on the other side. To get such an exercise going in one country is difficult enough, to expect a matching mirror across the border requires some serious help from divinity. Time is the least of the requirements.

Agra began at Lahore and passed through Kargil traversing perhaps every element of the Indo-Pak relationship within 29 months. Nawaz Sharif made the same mistake that Benazir Bhutto did, possibly for similar reasons; his aversion to the armed forces had become pronounced during the continual battles for Internal power. The armed forces were not consulted and signalled their separate India policy by starting to shell in the Kargil sector at the very moment that the Lahore accord was signed. The rest is familair. One consequence of the Kargil eruption was that Mr Vajpayee hardened his attitude towards the military government that took over from Nawaz Sharif after a coup. In the last 29 months therefore we have seen in Pakistan an elected civilian government; a coup; the institutionalisation of the coup by making the successful general President and executive authority, an accord a war; ferocious militancy; a long freeze in ties; the promise of a thaw, and then, suddenly, a burst of hope. Mr Vajpayee has done in 29 months what other Prime Ministers collectively took fifty years to experience. Perhaps that is why he believes that he knows what he is doing.

Both Mr Vajpayee and General Musharraf have taken care to arm themselves with some form of a mandate before they talk in Agra next Sunday. If Mr Vajpayee has any critics of his manoeuvre, then they are within his own party, making them (presumably) more manageable at any moment of decision. All other political parties have offered him the support he needs. General Musharraf does not have parties to deal, with just at this moment, but he has spent a good deal of his time since he received the invitation to India consulting his corps commanders, the Kashmir lobby and their hardline supporters. It has been a carrot-and-stick operation. He has described the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami's chief as Insane (In an interview to The Asian Age, among other places), and told the Jihadis that it was time they entered the twenty first century). The carrots were led to those who were persuaded to give this summit a chance. The upshot is that even the Jamaat-e-Islami, which organised demonstrations when Mr Vajpayee went to Lahore, Is silent as the General prepares to fly to the city where he was born.

The Jamaat would not get an audience if it tried to disrupt this effort.

It will however get its audience back if the summit ends in disarray. The principals know that much; the risks they carry are subjective as well as objective. When General Musharraf said that he was flexible and would go to Delhi with an open mind, he had to face questions asking precisely how open that mind of his was going to be on Kashmir. His questioners did not want his mind to be so open that a valley would get lost in it. It stands to reason that if Mr Vajpayee's mind had not been similarly open he would never have risked the invitation, but the question is the same.

If this is going to be an exercise in the irresistible force meeting the immovable object, then the point of the summit is pointless. Both sides must begin the dialogue from one premise;: in order to take, they must first have to give. What, how, how much, how much of what; the riddle will take its own time to solve, if there is any answer at all.

So is there?

What has disappeared from the Indo-Pak equation? Confidence. Neither side has any confidence that the other will honour any agreement, any gesture; there is no goodwill left. We have scraped the barrel to reach Agra. Pakistan does not believe that India will ever do anything on Kashmir; India believes that Kashmir is only an excuse for Pakistani fundamentalists in collusion with governments to bleed India-and if Kashmir is not available then terror will be exported through Punjab or through soft points in Nepal and Bangladesh. The culture of disturst has affected all else, from business to cricket. Communication is dead. The electric wall that glows like some surreal work of art along the border is a wall that has cut off sound and sense and warped human feeling. Long before there is success of any other issue, the two coutries must begin to build confidence in each other, at both the government and the people-to-people level. My Vajpayee has already begun to do so; when twenty Pakistani children study in our superb institutes of technology and management schools they will be symbols of this new confidence.

We have to discuss options on Kashmir, without either side feeling that it is negotiating its way to defeat. Kashmir is not a collection of fragmented realities, with both sides clutching their preferred fragments. Nor is reality frozen. Ten years ago no Indian would have accepted a solution any other than the whole of Kashmir for India, if settlement there was to be. Today an overwhelming majority would accept a Partition of the Kashmir Vallley along the ceasefire line. We have therefore seen that famous ''paradigm shift'' from principle to pragmatism; Maharaja Hari Singh after all did not accede only half of the Kashmir Valley to India. But we are willing to accept a partition in the interests of peace. What happens if we take this logic a couple of steps further, and include the proposition that the Kashmiri Hindus who have been made refugees have as much a right to a place in the Valley as the Muslims? Should there be a reorientation of the line to accommodate all demands ? Or can this concept be addressed through some form of autonomy guaranteed by both India and Pakistan to the whole of the state? The Legislative Assembly of our Kashmir has already passed an autonomy resolution; was that done as a stray thought or with some future purpose in mind?

I do not know the answers; but I do know that within those questions he options that must be discussed with minds that are open to the future, not closed by the past.

Machiavelli, who does not deserve the reputation he has, asked a good question; how far are affairs governed by fortune? ''I compare fortune,'' he wrote, ''to one of those violent rivers which, when they are enraged, flood the plains, tear down the trees and buildings-- Everyone flees before them... Yet although such is their nature, it does not follow that when they are flowing quietly one cannot take precautions, constructing dykes and embankments so that when the river is in flood it runs into a canal or else its impetus is less wild and dangerous..''

To the dykes and embankments, please.

Musharraf and Vajpayee in Agra
Will they create history?

By Daya Sagar

''Secretary level, talks''- No medication for PAK Acromania*- was what had I said in my column (Daily Excelsior 11-02-1992). A thoughtful suggestion had also been made in Indian Rajya Sabha that the secretary level talks scheduled for 17th August 1992 be abandoned. And Mr Salman Haider and Mr Shamshad Ahmed again met on 28th March 1997 simply to cordially decide the modalities for next meeting although the fate of J N Dixit meeting Sharayar Khan from 17-2-92 to 19-2-92 and in January 1994 had so simply costed only to the exchequers of India and Pakistan. In short it was all hopefully hopeless. Atal Behari Vajpayee was not received that warmly by Nawaz Sharif on 20th February 1999 at Bagha when Vajpayee wanted to hug Sharief affectionately immediately on boarding off the bus but Sharief was reluctant, responded coolly and that too after moving a step or two. And Vajpayee and his team failed to sense what was in store from 11th May 1999 in Kargil.

Resolution as passed by Indian Parliament on 22nd February 1994 for liberation of part of J&K under the occupation of Pakistan and that as passed by the Pakistan National Assembly on 6th February 1992 for all solutions to Kashmir problem in plebiscite under UN supervision need to only speak during the Agra Summit in the matter of return of Brotherhood between Indian and Pakistani citizens since over last five decades in Pakistan their leaders have introduced and described India as a Kafir State to the innocent citizens; and Indian home minister, L K Advani had gone to the extent of calling Pakistan a Rogue State on 23-6-1999 while he was at Lucknow.

Discussions on trade, culture, music and the like are no concern for Pakistan as far as the disputes are concerned. It has been Kashmir and only Kashmir and has over the years cost the blood of common citizens of both India and Pakistan. Pakistan President Gen Musharraf has very explicitly, and repeatedly almost declared that it is only the Kashmir issue that will become the core of the meetings with the Indian Prime Minister as far as he is concerned for cooling down the hot patches on Indo-Pak relations. He has talked very recently to electronic media of his desires to talk to Hurriyat leadership from Kashmir though Indian Home Minister as well as the Prime Minister have ruled it out as of any relevance to the Agra Summit.

Pakistan president has talked of only Kashmir and has even said that Vajpayee Musharraf meet could not lead to a meaningful result without talking to Kashmir and has seen Kashmiri only in Hurriyat Conference Musharraf has made clear to Vajpayee about a couple of weeks before the summit that to Pakistan Kashmir is the only matter of dispute with India and Pakistan only those of Kashmiri matter in J&K who do not endorse the accession of of 26 August 1947 of J&K with India. And to Pakistan it is Kashmir and not J&K as a whole since Musharraf has found only Hurriyat Conference as a party that needs to be heard before India and Pakistan finally settle for resting in peace. It is too much for Musharraf to say that he could sign with India a no war pact, which is a total imagination, since in his convictions Kashmir is a core issue of dispute and to Vajpayee J&K is an integral part of Union of India.

Political compulsions, irresponsible utterances, and neglect of ground realities has kept the Indo Pak relations strained over fifty years and the people of Pakistan have suffered economically, socially and even culturally much more than what has been the fate of people of India. Pakistan in particular has made the use of Kashmir Kashmiriat and Islamic brotherhood slogan all along to carry on its. raw polity and poor economy. It is no use now discussing the history, blaming the British or the American or the other world for the strained relations of India and Pakistan.

It is no use seeing Musharraf's compulsion in big brother role Vajpayee or Indian Prime Minister of the day could play in shielding HIM from the self created communal devil in Pakistan itself shattered economy, retaining the goodwill of the Military General on return of democracy next year (if it comes) with Benazir and Nawaj Sharief ruling the political roost, and the like. The principles of working out who is the Best of the Two have neither paid the either side over last 54 years nor will pay on 15th July 2001.

India and Pakistan have been pleading their case to third parties all these years and when ever the Tops had any one to one summit they have failed to use the opportunity for settling the doubts and disputes, so far it all has been lost in exchanging pleasantaries or terminating into broad based declarations with Pakistan saying that Kashmir is the only (core) issue and India saying it could be one of the items of common interest.

UN Security Council had again taken up the Kashmir issue on 28th February 1951 and Jawahar Lal Nehru (Indian PM) had visited Karachi for talks on 25th July 1952; Pakistani PM Mohamed Ali & Minister for Interior Iskandar Mirza had visited Delhi for talks on 13th May 1955 and the Pakistan PM termed the talks neither a failure nor success while in Karachi five days later. Nehru and Ayub met in Karachi in September 1960 to sign the Indus Water Treaty; Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan met in Karachi on 12th October 1964; Shastri and Ayub meet in Tashkent (January 4th to 10th 1966) and Tashkent Declaration signed on 10 January 1966, India Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto meet in Shimla in 1972 to sign Shimla Agreement after the Birth of Bangla Desh in 1971 Narasimha Rao and Nawaz Sharief had met in 1991 while attending the Common Wealth Summit in Harare and before that a Colombo (SAARC Summit) as well as at Devos (World Economic Forum); Narasimha Rao (Indian PM) met Nawaz Sharief at a breakfast meeting 16th June 1992 during Earth Summit at Rio-DE-Janeiro (Brazil) claiming to have talked unambigously and before this Nawaz Sharief had official observed a Bandh in Pakistan on 5th February 1992 to observe solidarity with the people of ''Indian Kashmir'' and there after the Pakistan National Assembly had passed a resolution on 6th February 1992 for once for all solution to Kashmir problem in plebiscite under UN supervision; Rao and Sharief again met in Jakarta at break fast on 3rd September 1992 for 75 minutes (10th Summit of Non Aligned Movement) it was their fifth meeting and Sharief had said ''hopefully we will be able to keep on discussing with each other when ever we have a chance to meet''; the then Indian Prime Minister I K Gujral traveled in lounge with Nawaz Sharief on 12th May 1997 on way to his chairing the 9th SAARC Summit in Male and had a meeting too; and Atal Behari Vajpayee took a bus to Bagha Border to be received by apparently hesitant Nawaz Sharief on20th Feb 1999 and there after signing the Lahore Declaration. One and only one issue could not be trimmed by leaders occupying the decision making positions and Foreign Secretary level talks have remained a matter a routine for years.

On 1-9-1992 Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee while addressing the members of Indore press Club had almost advised Mr Narasimha Rao that he should frankly ask Mr Nawaz Sharief whether Pakistan was in a position to give assurance that they wanted cordial relations with India since as per Vajpayee till then holding talks at different levels had become mere drama. True Mr Vajpayee will have to practice this on 15th July 2001 while in the Indian city of Taj Mahal, the cool pigeon white monument.

How will Vajpayee carry with the resolution as passed by Indian Parliament on 22nd February 1994 for liberation of POK while in the company of Musharraf who has in his brief the Pakistan National Assembly Resolution of 6th February 1992 for all solution to Kashmir problem in plebiscite under UN supervision and has written in his brief letter dated 2nd July 2001 to Hurriyat Chairman Abdul Gani Bhat saying- ''Let me assure you that Pakistan will continue extend full moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiri people in their struggle'', will have to be imagined.

Going into the history and Vajpayee should not be tossed like Narasimha Rao and Indian Prime Minister working out the technical logics will of no use for both India and Pakistan of today. I am of the firm opinion that India and Pakistan will always carry the ill will out of the Kashmir issue unless India and Pakistan work as one nation and two countries and not as two nations and two countries India may not regard Kashmir as dispute but Pakistan leadership can ill afford to abandon it. It is a hard fact that Pakistan can not look back in the history of its people without looking at India. Musharraf while in India will feel Indian when he will look at the soil where his grand parents of only one generation lived (Nehrawali Haveli-Delhi) and worked.

Time has come when Vajpayee and Musharraf will have to look at each other's claims and counter claims as two brother starting their separate kitchens do. Sentimentally accommodating each other even at the cost of some material imbalance could bring lot many pleasures with the pockets swelling. Hence unless some common compromising sector is available it will be impossible to lay down the foundations of mutual trust.

It is no use talking of Indian Independence Act of 17th June 1947 of British Parliament for transfer of power to two newly created Dominions of India and Pakistan (a part of India having a preponderating Muslim majority) out of British India; and the Memorandum on States Treaties and Paramountcy presented by the Cabinet Mission to Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes in India and Pakistan having violated the stand still agreement with Maharaja Hari Singh Bahadur of J&K (as per Maharaja's letter dated 26th October 1947 addressed to Lord Moutbatten of Burma, Governor General of India) as had been arrived at with regards to communication, supplies, post and telegraphic arrangements when Kashmir was invaded on 22nd October 1947 by tribesmen from North West Frontier Province of west Pakistan allegedly with connivance or active support of Pakistan Government or remembering Sardar Patel for having said in 1948 ''that we accepted UN Commission's cease fire proposals but the other party (Pakistan) did not we could perform the Kashmir operation without danger if only we could free ourselves from the commitments. Unless Kashmir issue is settle the financial pact between India and Pakistan can not be implemented Let there be no mistake that Kashmir belongs to India.''

So hence the present summit has to answer many questions after 16th July 2001. Of course any one visiting from Pakistan becomes sentimental at ones personal level, the same is the case with one who visits Pakistan from India. All is common the way people live, eat, dance, pray, entertain, sing, look into the past of these two countries and talk of territories but at the mass or community level so much of divides have been carved into that they appear enemy number one.

Ego has to be downed. Territories have to be seen from practical angles. Losses suffered over last 50 years have to be priced. It must end some where. Will have to play little different this time. No fears, no appeasements, and no political gamesmanship.

Things are very much known to the world now. Whole world is curious to know about outcome of Indo Pak summit. A fair play has to be the objective now. Foreign powers are now looking at both India and Pakistan. People in J&K and POK have suffered a lot. War and battle has only consumed our energies. Let energies be conserved. More delay will disturb the local peace. J&K is already under tremendous pressure regional misunderstandings are growing.

Pakistan has remained like Multatto Martlet, China, America and Britain have used Pakistan for political balance with India. Growing Islamic fundamentalism may have brought Pakistan under pressure of these countries but Pakistan coming close to India will not be so comfortable for them.

Indo-Pak relations can improve only through one to one open talk and that too only at highest political level. Enough has been by all to make J&K a dispute. Those who openly declare that they do not accept the 1947 accession of J&K or those who say in public and in media that they do not treat J&K as a Part of India and even those who sat in the Chief Minister seat of J&K and are quoted in media as having said that they do not treat themselves as Indian, when allowed by Indian government to move as freely and boldly as an Indian citizen as well as to question government for citizen rights or are allowed openly to profess and carry on anti India movements to the extent of running even an propaganda office at New Delhi, how could Vajpayee convince the world that there is no political dispute (territorially) on J&K, may it be internally or with Pakistan.

Histories are created boldly and honestly. It is time to create one.