Being aloof makes sense for Vajpayee

By: M. J. Akbar

Atal Behari Vajpayee becomes Prime Minister about twice or thrice a year; anything more is for those with larger appetites. One reason why his leadership has not staled despite three years in office is because he does not spread himself wide, and thin. He is not an interventionist in his own Government, a temptation that Prime Ministers and Presidents are very prone to. He does not come in the way of his Ministers, and start doing their job for them, although, God knows, there are times when India would be happier if he did.

Being aloof makes sense, for him. You cannot be a Minister and not become unpopular in India. That is impossible. The ruling principle of the motherland is that if anything can go wrong, it will go wrong in spades; and if anything goes right, no one will notice. That is the cost-benefit equation of power. If you don't like the mathematics you can choose another profession. Hence, the less the Prime Minister is associated with his own Government, the less vulnerable he is, personally. If the economy is in a mess go blame the Finance Minister. If bombs blast holes all over the country, check with the Home Minister. When Atal Behari Vajpayee, therefore, allows a free hand to his Ministers, we should not confuse it with goodwill or generosity. Just put that in the category of good politics.

However, the obverse is that if you do not understand when those two or three moments of crisis, or national need, come every year; or appreciate what needs to be done when you are standing alone on high ground, then you are irretrievably sunk. Such space opened up after the terrorist attack on our Parliament on 13 December, and nearly inflicted damage than the worst nightmare could not have envisaged.

The response had to be multi-tiered. At one level was the immediate need for security forces to eliminate the terrorists. This was done with commendable speed after the embarrassing initial failure when the security ring was punched open. The political response and the overall management of the incident is a more complex business. The first duty of the Government was to prevent any ugly internal fallout; there is no shortage of elements, some in the ruling phalanx, eager to fan communal fires out of every spark that comes their way. All political parties, very consciously and very carefully, refused to identify terrorism with Indian Muslims. There were times, during the debate in Parliament, when one could see rhetoric beginning to wander in dangerous directions but at least one important politician pulled himself back from the brink.

The highlight of the national response to terrorism was surely the debate in the Lok Sabha. The context might seem slightly inappropriate, but what a pleasure it is to see a master democracy in full flow. Parliament was attacked; it was obvious in 48 hours that the objective was to hold as many of its members hostage, spread death and havoc if necessary, and defeat the Government on the bargaining table just as it had been defeated during the hijack of the Indian Airlines plane. India's Parliament responded with the strength of confidence and the grace of a democracy. Clearly the tone of the debate had to be set by the Opposition: what can a ruling party MP do except be obedient to the powers that be or, if his IQ is on the lower side, find a surrogate to hit? The leaders of the Opposition shaped national policy with their views. Mulayam Singh Yadav, who has no reason to be kind to the BJP with the elections in Uttar Pradesh only weeks away, defined the difference between the national interest and the national Government, identified himself with the first and left no doubt that the second needed a wake-up call. The real impact, however, came from former Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar. He spoke at a moment when war type was dominant, and when any opinion poll would have found a majority of Indians urging a war that they wanted to start without knowing how it would end. If ever a speech can claim to have helped after a mood, then that must be one. That speech did not change the mood, but it interfered with a rising spiral. Prime Minister Vajpayee acknowledged this contribution when he intervened during the debate, noting that Chandra Shekhar's questions were worthy of Arjuna on war during Mahabharat. Mrs Sonia Gandhi was the one disappointment of an outstanding debate. She should not really speak in Parliament until she has learnt the value of conviction over compromised as well as the art of discourse. She is not in the league around her.

You could be forgiven for believing that the Prime Minister sitting in the House, was resting while the others had their say. His eyes were half-closed. The good news is that his mind was open. He could have turned the wind in whichever direction he wanted. Mercifully he chose to be a Prime Minister of India rather than a leader of a political party. By the time he had finished, he had become quite the master of ceremonies. He achieved many things simultaneously, at least one of them good for his own political health. One presumes he realises that the national anger against terrorism, and against Pakistan will not translate into a vote for his party in the UP elections. If the war in Kagil could not change the UP mind in the last general elections, when Mr Vajpayee was asking for a vote for himself, then December 13 is unlikely to bring Mr Rajnath Singh back to power. The goodwill Mr Vajpayee is accumulating now will serve him in good slued when the backlash of a Lucknow defeat begins creeping towards Delhi.

The big question between now and those elections is relations with Pakistan. Delhi has done everything short of opening hostilities to indicate its rage, and its conviction that December 13 was yet another battle in an undeclared war by Pakistan against India. There are enough Indians who believe that the only meaningful response to a undeclared war is to declare one.

There used to be a time when a clash between India and Pakistan had all the cozens of neighbourhood acrimony. The two countries are now simply too powerful for the worked to sit back and let them get on with it. Between them they could bring the most sensitive and unstable bit of unreal estate tumbling down.

However Indians must decide their own course of action, on the basis of the Indian interest. Every war has to have an objective. Our objective is the elimination of terrorist camps and arsenals located in Pakistan. By definition such camps are unconventional, disguised and mobile. Can they be hit in a conventional war? Terrorists do not operate from cantonments. Will it help to defeat the Pakistan army, assuming that the Pakistan army can be defeated in war that it will fight to protect its country's borders? Can you defeat only those elements in the Pak armed forces who are encouraging this Jihad against India? Is the objective of such a war to seize territory? It cannot be, for what do you do with that territory? Are there are any guarantees that a conventional war will not escalate under the pressure of circumstances?

You cannot launch something as serious as war without thinking through the questions, answers and options. Colin Powell made a wise comment to Ariel Sharon when he reminded the Israeli Prime Minister that there was a tomorrow, and then a day after. Today's anger must always be matched against tomorrow's possibilities.

India has the sympathy of the world today; the challenge is to convert that sympathy into active and meaningful support. I do not think the terrorists realise how much they have hurt their own cause, if their cause is Kashmir, by this sustained, suicidal adventurism. However, there could be a method in this madness. Terrorists, living on the fringe of reality, may want to provoke a larger conflagration.

General Pervez Musharraf is not a terrorist, but he is doing what he can to provoke Delhi. To describe India's reaction as arrogant is stupid; there is no other word for it. President Musharraf is generous with his tongue because generals, not being familiar with the demand of democracy, are not used to accountability. They think they can get away with anything as long as it sounds faintly patriotic. Perhaps the General has been spoilt into believing that his interaction with the media is consistently brilliant. Sound bites can bite back, General.

If his genuine assessment of Indian feeling after 13 December is that Delhi is begin "arrogant" then the General has no appreciation of what is happening in a democracy next to his dictatorship. Such ignorance can do more damage than intelligent hostility. Mr Vajpayee will have to steer through difficult minefields in the coming days, and try to keep his balance all around him are losing theirs. However, this might require becoming Prime Minister more than twice or thrice a year.

Original versus official versions of Regional
Autonomy Report

By Balraj Puri

The intro by your correspondent to my interview (Excelsior, December 22) could possibly give an impression that I was reacting to the bill reportedly being introduced by Sheikh Abdul Rehman in the assembly. The text however makes it clear that I no where referred to that bill. I was commenting on the statement of the chief minister in which he announced its opposition to the idea of regional autonomy. As far as I know, he has not changed his views on that issue.

I neither want centre to unduly dominate over the state nor want any region to dominate over the other regions. Extending the logic further, I am opposed to domination of one district over the others. Within districts, too, I have been pleading for devolution of political power to blocks and panchayats.

In my report on Regional Autonomy I have therefore recommended devolution of sufficient powers to the districts including Doda. If Sheikh Abdul Rehman's bill seeks powers and safeguards for Doda within Jammu region. I can only welcome it; except that it should apply to all the six districts. May be I have recommended more power to the districts than he demands.

The official report, on the other hand, breaks the identity of the region and divides it into Hindu majority and Muslim majority parts. It withdraws whatever measure of decentralisation exists at regional level and denies whatever powers have been given to the districts in the rest of the country and in my report. The official report does not clarify what would happen to regional administrative institutions like the university and the High Court as also to the practice of the Durbar move after trifurcation of the region it has proposed as all the three regions are supposed to be of equal status. Would these institutions be set up in all the three regions or folded up and centralised in Srinagar ?

At the district level, 29 subjects have been delegated, according to my report, to an elected district board, with powers of taxation on those subjects. The deputy commissioner would work under him. In the official scheme of things, the head of the district board will be nominated by the government alongwith some members including one third of its members who will be women while the deputy commissioner will be its chief executive. Thus state Government control over districts will be strengthened.

Moreover, I have recommended an eight point objective and equitable formula for devolution of funds by the state government to the regions and the districts through an autonomous state Finance Commission. The formula will take into account factors like. i) area; ii) population, iii) road mileage as a percentage of the total area iv) infant mortality; v) girl literacy, vi) share in government services, vii) share in admissions to technical institutions; viii) contribution to the state exchequer.

Thus more backward a region or a district, more will be its share in devolution of funds till it comes to the level of advanced region and district.

The official report does not propose and formula for devolution of funds which means it will continue to be determined by the arbitrary and discretionary powers of the state government i.e. the chief minister.

Will backwardness of the Doda be removed simply if it is separated from the rest of Jammu? Or if a Muslim majority pocket of Mahore and Gool Gulabgarh, from Udhampur district, is added to it? Whatever sentimental appeal these measures may have for the short term, it would be more than offset by increased subjugation to the centralised authority. In no case it is an answer to the urge for political and economic empowerment of the people. The official move for trifurcation of Jammu region has already triggered off a move for trifurcation of the state. Let the saner section of the society ponder over consequences of both types of trifurcation from the point of the districts the regions, the state and the country; in particular their communal implications for each of them.

While the government has denied people on opportunity to debate over the original report by scuttling it. Some non-official initiatives are needed to discuss the pros and cons of that report-- which is available in the market-- and the official report.

The concept of regional autnomy is universally acknowledged as the most democratic and equitable system of governance and accepted by national leaders like Nehru, Jayaprakash Narayan, Shyamaprasad Mukerjee and Indira Gandhi and in principle by ever Kashmiri leader from Sheikh Abdullah to Farooq Abdullah. The attempts to discredit it by the government, in which some of its opponents are unwittingly collaborating would cause a serious blow to prospects of removing regional tensions which is a principle pre-requisite for settling a satisfactory status of Jammu and Kashmir and restoring peace in the subcontinent.