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EDITORIAL

AUTONOMY REPORT

Acceptance by the State Cabinet all the recommendations of the State Autonomous Committee need not be taken at its face value. For one thing when SAC recommendations were forwarded to the centre the comments of the state government did not accompany it. Endorsement by the state cabinet is thus a formality to clear the query of the centre. State could ......more

STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW

The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) has carried out Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and made some specific recommendations to the central government. First, it advocates increase in defence budget to 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the existing 2.3% of GDP. This would mean pumping in thousands of crores in defence budget. Since GDP itself shows rising trend...more

SPOTLIGHT
Controversial ‘Buddha’ may seek asylum in US

From B L Kak
Security has been further tightened, at the instance of the Government of India, to ensure two things-to prevent Tibetan opponents from implementing threats .....more

The fourth solution to Kashmir issue

By M J Akbar
There are, or have been, or could be, at least four solutions to the cancer in Kashmir. Solution One : India wins a decisive war over Kashmir territory. ....more

India's policy on Afghanistan unchanged

By Qamar Agha
To the surprise of the international community, the ruling Taliban militia appear to have behaved rather responsibility throughout the unfortunate incident of ...more

EDITORIAL

AUTONOMY REPORT

Acceptance by the State Cabinet all the recommendations of the State Autonomous Committee need not be taken at its face value. For one thing when SAC recommendations were forwarded to the centre the comments of the state government did not accompany it. Endorsement by the state cabinet is thus a formality to clear the query of the centre. State could not have given any other comment for the very simple reason that SAC members are synonymous with cabinet ministers. To that extent it is a purely National Conference Affair as no other political party was ever consulted or involved while discussing the autonomy. To be precise, such autonomy formed part of the National Conference manifesto and constitution of ministerial committee and the approval now given by the state cabinet only tries to redeem its electoral pledge. There is no denying the fact that right from day one, all that has been done with regard to formation of SAC and recommendations thereof have met with massive flak publicly and on the floor of the assembly due to various reasons. The SAC recommendations had been lying dormant and the topic is sought to be revived by accepting its recommendations for onward despatch to the centre.

Everyone in the country and the state realises futility of such reversal of tide. None can reverse the stream of Jhelum. First attempt in this direction was made by the tallest leader of the state Late Sheikh Mohd Abdullah soonafter his re-incarnation as the Chief Minister of the state under the Indira-Sheikh accord in 1975. As a result he constituted a special cabinet committee headed by his trusted lieutenant Mirza Afzal Beg. The committee was asked to review all the laws extended to the state after 1953, some 300 laws to be precise, and recommend repeal of any law that was considered not beneficial to the people of the state. This committee was subsequently headed by DD Thakur. It is well recorded that none of the laws thus extended were recommended for repeal. This status remained as long as Sheikh Sahib was at the helm. It may be relevant to point out that in the fairest ever assembly election held in the state National Conference which was revived by Sheikh Sahib romped home with thumping majority and certainly autonomy was not the issue in the then manifesto.

Political compulsions and expediency of the National Conference motivated NC to incorporate autonomy in its manifesto and then gradually translate into something that is kept alive although it lacked thrust right from the beginning. It may have been a counter to the secessionist or any other reasons not explained. In fact none in the power apparatus has tried to make it a convincing theme at any fora other than keeping the theme alive.

A look at the recommendations of the SAC now accepted by the state cabinet is quite revealing. It recommends restoration of pre-1953 status. That implies repealing 300 central laws since extended to the state. It has proposed restoration of the nomenclature of Prime Minister instead of the Chief Minister and Sadar-e-Riyasat instead of Governor. Article 370 is included in the Indian Constitution as 'temporary'. SAC wants the word to be substituted with 'special'. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would go and High Court of the State would be the highest court of law in the state. It is interesting to mention that the judiciary as a whole is sought to be subordinated to the Executive. Another interesting feature is that Election Commission of India would have no jurisdiction in J&K state and entire electoral game will be state business. Abrogation of Article 356 is also recommended as far as its application to J&K State is concerned which in fact would mean end of any central intervention in the state even if there be emergency and national security in jeopardy.

From the above it is amply clear that no government at the centre worth its salt can afford to accede to such recommendations. It would tantamount to opening Pandora's box with all other states clamouring for similar autonomy which in ultimate analysis would be suicidal for the integrity of the nation. If state claims parity for all beneficial programmes and funds which have been liberally flowing ever since dawn of Independence, development and prosperity of the state should guide any recourse of changes. Change for the sake of change or political expediency to subserve petty party interests is no change. You can't handle or eat the toast buttered on both sides. Article 370 in any case guarantees special dispensation for the state and successive governments at the centre are committed to retain it on the statute book. The state is already enjoying 'special category' status to be eligible for 90% grant and only 10% loans for all central funds. Another reason why such recommendations cannot be accepted is because of J&K's strategic location so essential for national security.

In the light of the above, it is safe to surmise that though recommendations of the State Cabinet accepting SAC report in toto have been forwarded to the centre, for all one knows centre could sit over it, form another central committee to go through it and then it could be committee upon committee and yet another sub-committee. The only gain for National Conference is that it can claim to have kept the issue alive as long as they are alive. The centre can also rightly claim that it has not buried it. Or at best it can be frequently raked up for playing to the galleries or bargaining something in-lieu thereof. So the story runs.

STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW

The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) has carried out Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and made some specific recommendations to the central government. First, it advocates increase in defence budget to 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the existing 2.3% of GDP. This would mean pumping in thousands of crores in defence budget. Since GDP itself shows rising trend in the wake of liberalised policies and in terms of money it increases every year, there woud be automatic flow of large funds to the defence forces. It may be mentioned that Pakistan spends 5.5% of its GDP on defence. Second, it has called for establishment of Defence Planning & Strategic Group under the National Security Council for integrated planning, budgeting and restructuring of the armed forces. There is the need for constant review and upgradation as per emerging needs. Defence perspective has to be long one and not on day to day basis ie plans should take care of for the next decade and for two decades and/or five decades to take care of futuristic wars and threat perceptions. Third, it suggests overhauling of the intelligence network for better synergisation and collation of human and electronic intelligence gathering. It thus suggests creation of National Intellignece taking within its ambit all intelligence gathering agencies going by different names and under various ministeries. It also implies futuristic satellite intelligence when it mentions 'electronic' intelligence. Fourth, SDR entails formation of a board to identify strategic technologies and then either develop them indigenously through various DRDOs or import them.

For a change the nation is moving ahead rapidly as regards national security.

SPOTLIGHT
Controversial ‘Buddha’ may seek asylum in US

From B L Kak

Security has been further tightened, at the instance of the Government of India, to ensure two things-to prevent Tibetan opponents from implementing threats against the young ‘Living Buddha’ and to foil any attempt by the Chinese to recapture him. The ‘Living Buddha’ ? He is none other than the 14-year-old Tibetan spiritual leader who trekked across the Himalayas to flee Chinese Communist rule in Tibet.

And his arrival in India and sympathetic attitude adopted towards him by the majority of the Tibetan refugees headed by the Dalai Lama have triggered a bitter controversy, irritating the Chinese Government. In the process, the ‘Living Buddha’, too, has become controversial. The Karampa Lama continues to be in close touch with the Dalai Lama in Dharmasala, in an apparent bid to create conditions conducive to his stay in India.

Animated discussions between New Delhi and Beijing have been the outcome of the Vajpayee Government’s unwillingness to push back to Tibet the Karampa Lama at a time when India’s Foreign Office has called for certain details from Beijing on how and why the Tibetan spiritual leader fled Tibet. Significantly, some kind of communication channel has started operating between Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh and Washington on the future of the Karampa Lama.

The Tibetan Government-in-exile in Dharamsala has forwarded a request to the Vajpayee Government in support of asylum for the Karampa Lama in India. In view of the Chinese Government’s message urging New Delhi not to grant asylum to him in India, the Vajpayee Government has chosen to pursue wait-and-watch policy. Tibetan officials have just dropped a clear hint that the Karampa-the third most senior figure in the Tibetan spiritual hierarchy after the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama-would be offered political asylum in the United States if New Delhi finally refused his application.

Similarly, sources in India’s Foreign Office have also talked about Prime Minister, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee’s unwillingness to further antagonise the Chinese, who have been severely embarrassed by the spiritual leader’s flight to freedom. The Minister for External Affairs, Mr Jaswant Singh, too, is for measures to keep Chinese leaders in good humour. On the other hand, the Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, is reported to have favoured the idea for grant of political asylum to the Karampa Lama.

Whatever Mr George Fernandes’ attitude towards Beijing, there is no doubt that New Delhi is embarrased by the presence of the Karampa in India. A formal request for asylum to him has been made by the Dalai Lama on his behalf. A decision on the request is difficult one. More than humanitarian considerations, normally, the strong point favouring asylum. New Delhi has to consider the impact on Sino-Indian relations in case the Karampa is allowed permanent residence in this country.

A decision will have to balance the humanitarian and the diplomatic aspects. Sino-Indian relations have improved in recent months. The strident tones which characterised official Chinese pronouncements after Pokhran-II and Mr George Fernandes’ acerbic comments were noticeably absent during the recent visit Mr Jaswant Singh made to Beijing. The Karampa’s visit has thus coincided with the up-turn in bilateral relations.

New Delhi has to perform a tight-rope diplomatic exercise in order to ensure that Sino-Indian ties remain on an even keel and register further improvements conducive to a border settlement.The possibility of the US granting the Karampa asylum in case India rejects the Dalai Lama’s request has been mooted, in the past some days, in Tibetan circles in Dharamsala. This is because US Assistant Secretary of State and Special Coordinator on Tibet, Julia Taft, has journeyed from Washington to Dharamsala. Beijing cannot be faulted for reading meanings into the coincidental arrival in India of the American envoy.

The US may well have complicated matters for India by choosing to depute a senior State Department official at this juncture. Of course, the problem would be taken out of New Delhi’s hands if Washington were to announce that it would grant asylum to the Karampa. Even Washington, according to competent analysts, may have to thing twice before doing so since any misunderstanding with Beijing may affect US-China business ties.

There is a third factor. The world expects that India would finally accord the Karampa the status of a legal immigrant consistent with the country’s record of providing shelter to genuine refugees. It is this historical background and the long tradition of India-Tibet religious and cultural ties that Jawaharlal Nehru cited in 1959 in favour of according permanent residence to the Dalai Lama. In a sense, the circumstances behind the dramatic arrival of the Dalai Lama and the 17th Karampa 41 years later are similar.

It is not the first time that Beijing has been caught out by agile Tibetan religious leaders. When the Dalai Lama himself fled,in 1959, the Chinese issued a series of statements protesting that he had been ‘kidnapped’ by imperialists and spirited off to India against his will. Beijing seems to have learned little of the art of Lama handling in the intervening 40 years. Then, as now, China reneged on promises of religious freedom and underestimated the strength of religious belief.

Then as now, China was surprised that anyone should abandon the privilege that comes, with the role of quisling. Freedom of religion is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution but, like most of the rights in that much abused document, it has had a mixed fate in the 50 years of the Chinese revolution.

The Karampa’s departure is humiliating because, like other high level defectors, he had previously been praised by Beijing for his ‘patriotic spirit’. His monastery, after the Panchen dispute, was the only monastery left that Beijing could point to in which a first rank religious figure was living his life more or less as his religious tradition demanded. The Chinese Panchen Lama is being brought up in the suburbs of Beijing, apparently because the Chinese cannot trust the monks of his monastery in Tibet.

The fourth solution to Kashmir issue

By M J Akbar

There are, or have been, or could be, at least four solutions to the cancer in Kashmir. Solution One : India wins a decisive war over Kashmir territory. In conventional perception this option was lost in 1948 when Jawaharlal Nehru and his L K Advani, Sardar Patel, agreed to the proposal for a ceasefire that stopped the advancing Indian forces at the line that is threatening to become the de facto border between India and Pakistan.

This is a partial truth. Hindsight has a poor reputation but it has its merits, particularly if it can be a good teacher. There was certainly an element of naivete in Nehru's conviction that the United Nations would be an impartial world body that would treat every nation as an equal. Nehru knew all there was to know about colonialism. He was less perceptive, in the early post-war years, about this emerging fact called neo-colonialism, although after the Kashmir-UN experience he would become the world's leading crusader against exploitation by other means. In 1948 the Indian Cabinet seriously believed that the United Nations was an alternative to a prolonged and possibly indecisive war. Why ? Because the United Nations charter said so. But while the second world war may have brought one world to an end, it had not changed power-politicians into human beings. India learnt this the very hard way. We do not trust the United Nations for anything substantive now, but the price of Kashmir is being paid in blood and money.

However, the war option was not truly lost in 1948; it was lost after 1971, in 1972. The Indian armed forces had sliced Pakistan in half, decimated its armed strength and become midwife to a new nation. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who picked up a shattered Pakistan, could go only thus far with oratory, he had neither the weapons nor the confidence to do anything about anything. Mrs Indira Gandhi, who had won the war, lost the peace. If everything went right in 1971, everything went wrong in 1972. She gave Pakistan a pact in Shimla and asked for nothing in return. Not even hindsight can explain or rationalise the policy of the Indian government. All that Delhi needed was one demand : for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute as part of a final package for future friendship. We asked for nothing except a phrase in the Shimla agreement that, for all the benefit it gave us, could have been drafted by Pakistan, and probably was.

Why did India never ask for the rest of Kashmir during the talks on the exchange of captured territories in 1972 ? Did Maharaja Hari Singh accede two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir to India or the whole of it ? I am not suggestion that we could have got back Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir. I am merely asking why we did not want it back. Supposing Pakistan had held on to some territory in Rajasthan or Gujarat - perhaps a slice of Kutch - from previous conflicts : would that have been on the agenda of 1972 or not ? That was the moment to force a decision on Pakistan. Would they accept a compromise with the ceasefire line as the border or not ? If they did not, they could have their defeated troops back, but we would not restore the territory we had captured, and relations would not be normalised. Pakistan would have had to live with Indian-Occupied-Pakistan at the very least, just as we are living with Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir. Opportunities do not return; and 1972 certainly did not. Bhutto's successor (and hangman) General Zia ul-Haq used effective diplomacy to disguise the gradual rebuilding of Pak armed strength, bought peace on his eastern border as the exploited the war on his western. By the time he died, Pakistan was ready to convert Kashmir into a cauldron once again.

Solution 2: Pakistan wins a decisive war over Kashmir. History gave Islamabad two changes. The first was in 1962, when we were tottering under the Chinese onslaught, and were vulnerable militarily as well as psychologically. There is no serious explanation as yet as to why Pakistan dithered in October and November 1962, since generosity can be ruled out as a possibility. President Ayub Khan attempted to compensate for his uncertainty in 1962 by a well-crafted plan in 1965 Operation Gibraltar would set up infiltrators in our Kashmir valley in the autumn of 1965, and Operation Grand Slam conducted with the full force of the Pakistan armed forces would deliver the knockout punch against an Indian army that had still not recovered from 1962. We did get ambushed in the beginning, and badly. The Pakistan army was on the verge of a famous breakthrough in Jammu that would have cut off the valley and opened the road to Punjab from the North, when Indian was saved by Pakistan's generals. General Yahya Khan (the man who would serve India brilliantly once again between 1969 and 1971) decided to replace his field commander in the Jammu sector just as he was poised to complete his pincer. Why ? Because Yahya Khan wanted the glory of victory for himself. As simple as that. We got breathing space, and very soon our breath had become a gale that tore open the international border between Amritsar and Lahore, and trapped Pakistan's tanks at the battle of Asal Uttar. Pakistan lost its chance to conquer Kashmir. We would never be so vulnerable again.

Solution 3 : Plebiscite. Dead. Born in 1947, sired in haste by Maharaja Hari Singh and the Indian Cabinet while Pak intruders were raping the state (literally). Developed serious health problems by 1951, when the Nehru-Liaquat talks settled a number of problems between the warring neighbours but not this one. Pakistan refused to withdraw its troops from occupied Kashmir, a necessary precondition for a plebiscite. Tottered through various Indo-Pak talks, until it was buried constitutionally by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who replaced Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Ghost has been given residence and preferential treatment in Islamabad, but indications are that Pakistan also recognises that ghosts frighten only children, not nations.

Solution 4 : Reality, with a touch of Edward de Bono (the management guru who suggested that answers were also available in curves and trajectories in addition to straight lines). What are the facts of the Kashmir situation, and unlikely to alter. Two thirds of the Kashmir area is part of India and will remain so. The Pakistani army is not capable of defeating India in a war across the ceasefire line, and there is no other way of removing the presence of Indian administration from Srinagar. Fact : India has no desire to seize the part of Kashmir it lost in the first war in 1947-48. Pakistan has already annexed the northern parts of Occupied Kashmir into its territory, and will not surrender its hold on the rest. Fact : The ceasefire line is the effective border. Fact : The United Nations is present at this border, albeit in a ceremonial, non-combatant role. The resolution bringing the United Nations to this border has already been passed and accepted by the belligerents. Fact : The belligerents possess nuclear weapons, and even those nations why do not care whether India and Pakistan join hands on the journey to perfidy are certain that a settlement is necessary to prevent an international catastrophe. Fact : There is a sizeable terrorist force fed, armed and trained in Pakistan whose single mission is to raise the bloodshed to a point where either one side crumbles or both blow up. Fact : There is a government led by the Army in Islamabad, and no one can be more hardline on Kashmir than generals. Fact : There is a BJP government in Delhi, and if anyone can deliver a settlement it is the BJP, member of the Hindutva parivar.

Do these facts add up to anything?

There's the rub. What the facts do indicate is that the fire could become a nuclear arson, despite the best of intentions. General Musharraf has actually said that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons in a war with India. Obviously he added "if required", but trust me, Pakistan will require them if it is so foolish as to take on the Indian army. The facts also indicate that there is space for wisdom, if there is some wisdom left in the subcontinent. Let me give an instance of the de Bono methodology. Article 370 used to be one of the great contentions issues, until the BJP set it aside in favour of a conciliatory national agenda. There are two ways of solving the Article 370 problem : either by removing it from Kashmir, or by giving it to everyone else. Equality is achieved in either case. This is not to advocate any such move, merely to indicate possibilities. The first step on the ladder of logic is to leave the non-negotiables where they are; Kashmir is divided, and let it remain so. It is axiomatic that a settlement will be part of a larger Indo-Pak agreement, and that any movement forward would mean both countries cooperating on agreed SAARC principles of softening the borders for trade and travel. India and Pakistan can therefore agree on a date for the culmination of this process, and include Kashmir within the ambit of this proposal. This does not work until another international demand is honoured. The world is in no mood to tolerate terrorism and Pakistan will have to eliminate terrorists from its soil. If it does not, then it must face the judgement of the world, which will be harsh. Pakistan has to stop being a de facto terrorist state. Nothing is possible if that is not possible. It is up to America, which may or may not control the world, but can certainly control Pakistan if it so wishes, to ensure this. In its own interest, as much as in India's interest.

This will be the beginning of a process, nothing more. But when President Bill Clinton comes to India this March, he will have achieved enough if he can start something. It will need another visit by a US President to create a handshake.

India's policy on Afghanistan unchanged

By Qamar Agha

To the surprise of the international community, the ruling Taliban militia appear to have behaved rather responsibility throughout the unfortunate incident of hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar. Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh even thanked the Taliban authorities for their 'constructive' co-operation in bringing to an end the hijacking crisis.

However, Afghanistan is considered in international pariah State for its 'harsh Islamic system' and the support the Taliban militia gives to the terrorist organisations operating in different countries, including India. But, for the first time, Taliban acted as a responsible Government, ensuring the safety of the ill-fated passengers and the crew of the hijacked plane.

Despite the Taliban's helpful attitude during the stand-off with the hijackers, there is no possibility of a dramatic changes in India's policy towards Afghanistan. Jaswant Singh has declared that 'the fundamentals of India's policy on Afghanistan remained unchanged'. Therefore, India is not likely to consider the Taliban desire for good relations especially at a time when the regime is facing UN sanctions and is not recognised by even the large number of Islamic countries. The Taliban regime is neither the member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference nor is it recognised by the United Nations.

Afghanistan's seat in the UN General Assembly is still occupied by the ousted regime of Burhanuddin Rabbaini. But, the Pakistan backed Taliban Islamic militia is controlling more than 80 per cent of the territory in Afghanistan. Taliban are engaged in a fierce fight to capture remaining territory still controlled by the opposition forces led by Ahmad Shah Masood, who is a Tajik Warlord. The Taliban Government is recognised only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its relation with the Saudi Government has also deteriorated ever since the Taliban allowed Saudi Fugitive Osama bin Laden to operate from the territory controlled by them.

Saudi are angry with Taliban also because Bin Laden is said to be involved in master-minding terrorist activities inside the Saudi Kingdom. The Taliban has not only turned down the Saudi request to hand over Bin Laden but has been declared that he is their 'honoured guest.'

The US administration is also demanding that Bin Laden be handed over to US or to a third country to stand trial on charges of master-minding the twin bombing of the US embassies in East Africa that killed 224 people. The Taliban has refused to hand over Bin Laden on the pretext that it has no extradition treaty with US and the Afghan culture and traditions do not permit a host to hand over a guest to his enemies.

In such a situation it would be difficult for India to improve ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which is facing sanctions from the international community. Besides, it is openly aiding and abetting terrorism in Kashmir, the newly independent Central Asian Republics, where it is trying to install friendly regimes in place of secular Governments. The Taliban is also maintaining hostile attitude towards the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Taliban are essentially not a product of any national movement. They are creation of Pakistan security forces. Its members are mainly Pashtoons living in Pakistan, having Saudi-funded religious studies inside Pakistan. The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam belonging to the Deoband School of Thought are running these Madrassas. Both these organisations subscribe to the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Being conservative, they are opposed to any meaningful role for women outside their homes and they nurse a strong anti-Shia bias. The ethnic minorities in Afghanistan are not only fighting against the Pashtoon domination but they are also opposed to Taliban extremist Islamic ideology which has brought tension in the entire region.

Taliban was created basically to serve Islamabad's regional ambitions as well as the US interest in the region which included the containment of Iran as well as the Russian influence in the region. Tehran was perceived by US as a hostile launching pad for anti-American terrorist activities.

Taliban came into prominence in Afghanistan when Robin Raphel was the Assistant Secretary of State and US was involved in the containment of Iran. Once Taliban established its authority in Kabul, US adopted and indifferent attitude towards it. US neither recognised the Taliban regime nor opposed it. But, US quietly encouraged Pakistan to back Taliban as a force to counter the possible Russian-Iranian alliance against the Western Nations. US had shown no interest in preventing Iranian-Taliban tension or conflict. The West considered it as a conflict between the two 'devils' which they wanted both to lose.

The West at that time thought that any major Iranian military involvement in Afghanistan would drain the Iranian economy. A weak Iran would not be able to go ahead with its nuclear and missile programme and be forced to divert its energy from the West to East. The change in US policy towards Taliban came when the moderate Iranian leadership began to improve its ties with the Western Nations. US encouraged moderation in Iran. Karl, F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State said that the Taliban policies towards Iran would 'harm positive trends in Iranian policies towards the U.S.'

US also came to realise that the Taliban militia is simply not capable of containing Iran and on the contrary its policies to encourage Islamic militancy in the Central Asian Republics is helping Russia to forge strategic ties with the countries of the region. The change in Western perception has come a bit too laste. The Taliban have already spread their tentacles in the Islamic world and have become a formidable force. Anti-American elements led by Bin Laden have launched Jihad against American interests all over the world. All these years, US policy - planners were involved in the containment of Iran but they failed to see the growth of a powerful anti -American force inside Afghanistan.

U.S. intelligence failure was mainly because of the US dependence on Pakistan in the region. Pakistan had developed vested interest in supporting the Taliban, who in turn were helping Islamabad in furthering its regional ambitions in Kashmir and the Central Asian region. The Americans came to realise the magnitude of the problem only after Afghanistan -based Islamic militants bombed the US embassies in East Africa.

But, US does not want to get directly involved in Afghanistan because it will give immediate rise to anti-American sentiment in the entire Islamic world. Therefore, it is trying to isolate Taliban from the international community by imposing sanctions hoping that it would split the movement and curb its interference in the neighbouring Republics of Central Asia from where it has planned to bring oil and gas through a pipeline to South Asia and Europe.

US is also seeking the help of the Islamic nations like Turkey, Pakistan and conservative Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf region to contain Islamic militancy. US policy in Afghanistan is to replace Taliban with a friendly government to the Western nations, which would neither enjoy the Iranian nor the Russian influence. It is not interested in replacing Taliban with the opposition alliance led by Burhamuddin Rabbhani.

The Central Asian Republics have no choice but to support the American initiative to get rid of Taliban. Pro-West conservative Arab regimes in the Gulf region will also prefer a Government in Afghanistan, which has no Iranian influence. The UN imposed sanctions against Afghanistan is essentially a first step to end Taliban rule. Many more restrictions will follow to keep Taliban under pressure.

Therefore, there are no dramatic changes possible in India's foreign policy vis-a-vis Taliban. But, once Taliban goes and a new Government comes, it would prefer to have friendly relations with India. The reason being that Afghanistan in the past has always maintained good relations with India rather than being friendly to Pakistan. India should, therefore, cool its heels till Taliban gets extinct and a new government comes in Afghanistan.

PTI Feature
 
 



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