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EDITORIAL

AGGRESSIVE POSTURES

BJP is all set to come out of the defeatist mentality of appease all, accept all humiliations and yet be benevolent and magnanimous towards its allies in the National Democratic Alliance. The fact is that it has been at the receiving end more from within than from outside. Its only fault happens to be that BJP is the bigger brother who is expected to be always giving to the younger brothers and expecting nothing in return. That has been the case all along. Even during its earlier stint Vajpayee Government continued to meet all the demands of the ambitious and wayward lady from South Ms Jayalalitha. In the process many compromises were made which not weakened the alliance but also rendered the Government virtually paralysed. Taking cue from Jayalalitha other allies howsoever miniscule also demanded their pound of flesh. The end result was defeat of the Government on the floor of the House by a solitary vote leading to mid-term poll......more

By B. Raman

Though China and Pakistan established diplomatic relations on May 21, 1951, the first high-level contacts between the countries took ....more

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EDITORIAL

AGGRESSIVE POSTURES

BJP is all set to come out of the defeatist mentality of appease all, accept all humiliations and yet be benevolent and magnanimous towards its allies in the National Democratic Alliance. The fact is that it has been at the receiving end more from within than from outside. Its only fault happens to be that BJP is the bigger brother who is expected to be always giving to the younger brothers and expecting nothing in return. That has been the case all along. Even during its earlier stint Vajpayee Government continued to meet all the demands of the ambitious and wayward lady from South Ms Jayalalitha. In the process many compromises were made which not weakened the alliance but also rendered the Government virtually paralysed. Taking cue from Jayalalitha other allies howsoever miniscule also demanded their pound of flesh. The end result was defeat of the Government on the floor of the House by a solitary vote leading to mid-term poll.

The experience with the present partners has not been a happy one. BJP's fortunes at the husting continued to sink as manifested by results of elections held last year as also Panchayat and Zila Parishad elections this year. The BJP think-tank has been trying to analyse the reasons for such slide in support which means erosion of its vote-bank. It is safe to surmise that this think-tank has attributed the slide to being soft and apologetic within the NDA besides being off-track while facing the opposition's over-stretched demands. This conveys the impression that BJP has gone off-course in its zeal to remain in power. In the process it has forgotten its own agenda even as alliance partners continue to not only stick but also pursue their agendas repeatedly. It has also been the persistent wont of the allies to black-mail the big-brother by making him concede somewhat frivolous demands. In this context Mamata Banerjee's role needs specific mention. She is known to tender her resignation repeatedly unless the demands are acceded. May it be the portfolio, may it be seeking dismissal of leftist Government in W Bengal, may it be the railway accident or even petroleum prices. There is a regular cabinet minister for Petroleum affairs. She has no right to transgress into other's domain. Just as railways work as per her whims and fancies including fare structure, petroleum products is somebody else's baby. And now she dares use very strong language against BJP and PM right inside Parliament on Ayodhya issue. In fact, she virtually threatened to abstain from voting on the censure motion. This is despite the fact that she continues to push her party's individual agenda in W Bengal very aggressively but refuses to allow any such liberties to BJP for its agenda. That is bad enough. BJP also came under attack from Telugu Desam leader in Parliament. It is a known fact that Prime Minister Vajpayee has been very benevolent on all demands put up by Chander Babu Naidu, including giving short shrift to all rules on paddy procurement . In fact, Vajpayee conceded all the three demands put up by Telugu Desam pressed on the eve of censure motion by staging MPs dharna outside Parliament. So TD also pushes its agenda irrespective of how much it hurts the economy because it wishes to keep its vote base intact. But TD refuses to provide any similar room to BJP. Same is true of all partners howsoever miniscule.

So it is BJP whose vote base stands eroded substantially while allowing allies in the NDA not only to have the cake but eat it too. Again whenever anything bad happens, it is BJP that is cornered by the allies when it is joint Government responsibility. The NDA Government as a whole has to own both good and bad. This cannot go on to the detriment of the BJP and advantage of allies. Again, in states BJP is unable to pursue the national agenda like in J&K where it opposes Farooq and NC tooth and nail. Incidentally, NC is NDA partner at the centre. Such contradictions have brought the party to present sorry pass. It has given the rivals chance to describe BJP is double-faced. It is indeed difficult to reconcile such contradictions and to that extent its vote-base is bound to slide down further. Again, new BJP president went out of the way to woo minorities which drew massive flak from its traditional vote base even as it failed to draw any sympathetic response from minorities. It is thus net loser from both sides.

In the light of the above analysis, it is certain that Vajpayee's remarks about Ram Temple as involving ‘national sentiments’ are well-calculated. It is one thing to go by the Court verdict; it is quite another once it comes to expression of such sentiments. No party can afford to ignore its constituency. It is precisely in this context that party stalwart Vijay Kumar Malhotra says, "If nothing is said in favour of such issues (put aside in the NAG), nothing should be said against them as well". LK Advani also conveys the same thing when he says, "Ideology is not required for running a Government (it is the programme). But that does not mean I have to be apologetic about my ideology". This is clear confirmation of BJP adopting tough line with NDA partners as also aggressive line against the Opposition parties. It is not going to be apologetic anymore nor concede any frivolous demands. In the process of Government falls, well it is all part of the game. When one says aggressive policy towards opposition it finds its manifestation in Arun Jaitley's open charge against Congress for opening the gates of Babri Masjid, allowing installation of statues of dieties and worship besides performing Shilyanas for construction of Ram Temple at the disputed site. Advani has gone a step forward when he says. "If Congress is hell bent upon raising and repeating Dec 6 event every year as a ritual to derive political mileage, it would be quite appropriate for BJP to rake up Sikh riots of November 1, 1984 when thousands of them were massacred by the Congress in Delhi". Yes this is quite gamely, a tit-for-tat treat or paying the adversaries back in the same coin.

The latest BJP stance is that it would do nothing to hurt its constituency just to appease and accommodate NDA allies. It would be indeed two-way traffic of give-n-take. It is neither the question of big brother or small one. It is the more important question of joint responsibility and sharing both good and bad of remaining in power to what in electoral parlance is mentioned as ‘incumbency factor’. Yes. This factor must hurt all alike and not BJP alone as much as it should prove beneficial to all. There is indeed belated realisation in the BJP camp that it has hurt its traditional constituency; it has hurt Sangh Parivar, it has hurt its lobbies which stands translated into non-acceptance and massive slide at the husting. Now the bigger question is posed asto which of the two courses are favourable. First, to persist in its softness and appeasement of the allies as also remain at the receiving end from the Opposition. Second, to stop being apologetic to the allies and become aggressive towards the opposition even if it means loss of power. Power in any case will be short-lived in the face of loss of popularity. So BJP sends the message loud and clear to the allies that they should respect their sentiment and not to cross limits as much as BJP is accomodative to their demand and sentiments. It will be watched with interest how the allies respond during motion in Rajya Sabha where NDA is in precarious minority.

Sino-Pakistan relations

By B. Raman

Though China and Pakistan established diplomatic relations on May 21, 1951, the first high-level contacts between the countries took place only in 1955, when the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and his Pakistani counterpart Mohammad Ali met twice in the margins of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia and agreed to strengthen bilateral exchanges and cooperation in various fields. This was followed by a visit to China in October 1956 by the then Pakistani Prime Minister H.S.Suhrawardi and a return visit to Pakistan by Zhou Enlai in December.

Despite these high-level contacts, the bilateral relations lacked warmth and content because of Pakistan's association with the US and other Western countries in their anti-Communist military blocs and its support to the US stand on issues such as China's admission to the UN, Taiwan and Tibet.

However, the relations took a turn for the better in 1961,when Pakistan reversed its past policy and supported a resolution in the UN General Assembly for the admission of China to the UN. Thereafter, it supported this resolution every year and from 1965, co-sponsored it. This was followed in 1962 by the conclusion by the two countries of an Agreement of Principles on the Location and Trend of the Sinn-Pakistani boundary and in 1963 by the signing of the Boundary Agreement between the Xinjiang province of China, and the "Contiguous Areas the Defence of which is under the Actual Control of Pakistan". The initiative for this agreement was taken by President Ayub Khan.

He succeeded in convincing the Chinese leadership that Pakistan's membership of the US-led military alliances should not be misread by Beijing as indicative of its sharing with the US its objective of containing China and that the only reason for its membership of the SEATO was to benefit therefrom for strengthening its military capability vis-à-vis India. He reportedly resisted pressure from the Kennedy Administration during the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 that he should reassure New Delhi that Pakistan would not take advantage of the conflict to launch an attack on Jammu & Kashmir. Knowledge of this also brought him closer to Beijing.

Since 1964, there was a regular exchange of high-level visits between the two countries, which were brought together by the India factor---their shared strategic objective of countering perceived Indian attempts for political and military primacy in the South Asian region, with the assistance of the erstwhile USSR.

China and Pakistan had each its own reason for looking askance at India. China, which had not succeeded at that time and which has still not totally succeeded in pacifying the Tibetan population, was concerned over the presence of the Dalai Lama and a large number of Tibetan refugees in India and the likely threat to its hold in Tibet due to their activities. It was also concerned over the implications of India's proximity to the USSR for its national security.

Pakistan saw in China an ally or accomplice for achieving its objective of annexing Kashmir, if and when an opportunity presented itself. Under the impulse of this India factor, the relations between the two countries developed from strength to strength. The role played by Pakistan in facilitating the secret visit of Dr.Henry Kissinger, the National Security Adviser to President Nixon, to Beijing in 1971, which helped China in breaking out of its diplomatic isolation, contributed to this process.

China emerged as a major supplier of military equipment to the Pakistani Armed Forces, particularly to its Air Force, after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and, subsequently, since the 1970s, it helped Pakistan, initially, in acquiring a military nuclear capability in the 1980s and in acquiring a delivery capability through the supply of M-11 an M-9 missiles in the 1990s, despite strong US pressure not to do so and threats of US sanctions, which were not carried out.

It is conceded not only by non-governmental experts of the US, but also by its intelligence agencies that Pakistan might not have been able to acquire the military nuclear and delivery capability without the Chinese assistance. While China and Pakistan have always denied any Chinese assistance to Pakistan in the military nuclear field, they had admitted in the past the supply of some missiles for self-defence, but contended that the missiles supplied did not violate the prohibitions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The recent Chinese assurance to the US on the observance of the restrictions under the MTCR is unlikely to have any value in the light of China's past conduct in this regard.

The Afghan war of the 1980s and the Chinese concern over the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan's willingness to agree to the use of its territory by the US and other Western powers for making the Soviet troops bleed through the Islamic surrogates further cemented the relations between the two countries.

This period also saw China invariably supporting Pakistan's claims on Kashmir. However, two important post-1979 developments brought the first indications of re-thinking by Beijing of its national security policy.

* First, China's opening-up to Western investors under Deng Xiao-peng from 1979 onwards and the post-1992 obsession with economic development and with the need to catch up with the developed world in the economic and technological fields. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 made China realise the futility of a national security policy based only on military security unless it was buttressed by economic security and prosperity. To achieve such economic security and prosperity, China felt it needed tension-free relations in the region, particularly in its vicinity.

*Second, the emergence of the US as the sole super power, its assertion of its military and economic might without heed to the sensitivities and concerns of other countries made China realise the imperative of countering its primacy in the region, while at the same time benefiting from its market, the purchasing power of its population, its technological advance etc.

The re-thinking in China on the concept of national security in the post-1991 world led to the coming into the fore in the writings and statements of leading Chinese think tanks such as the Shanghai Institute For International Studies and analysts such as Mr.Cheng Ruisheng of new concepts such as "comprehensive national power", "comprehensive security", "maximising bilateral, regional and international co-ordination and co-operation" and "minimising contradiction and friction" etc.

These new concepts underlined the importance of economic security and prosperity in ensuring national security and the need for regional stability to enable China catch up with the developed world. Issues such as removal of trade barriers, admission to the WTO etc assumed greater priority than in the past.

Another concept to acquire prominence in this debate was "mutual and equal security" as the objective of international relations in place of "balance of power" and "mutual containment".

This debate had an important influence on State policy too. Another post-1991 development, which influenced policy formulation, was the spread of the Afghan infection to the Muslim Uighurs of Xinjiang and Chinese fears of the continuing pockets of alienation in Tibet and the resuscitated pockets of alienation in Xinjiang being exploited by the US to weaken China in its outer perimeter.

The first impact of this debate and these concerns was seen on Chinese policy towards Pakistan and India. While continuing to project itself as the "all-weather friend" of Pakistan and sparing no pains to help Pakistan strengthen its military capability, Beijing gave indications of a more neutral policy on the Kashmir issue, ridding itself of the past automatic reflex of supporting Pakistan, right or wrong.

This was clearly seen during President Jiang Zemin's visit to India and Pakistan in December, 1996, when he advised Pakistan to emulate China by settling with India the easier issues first and keeping the Kashmir issue aside for being tackled at a more propitious moment. After the nuclear tests of 1998, Beijing, in its moments of disquiet, gave signs of reverting to its past policy of automatic support to Pakistan, but it pulled itself back from this change.

During the Kargil conflict, like the US and the G-8 countries,it called for the respect of the LOC, much to the disappointment of Pakistan. The post-Kargil debate in the think tanks and amongst analysts of China has been stressing the need for a strict adherence by India and Pakistan to the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration with a commitment "to exploring a settlement of the Kashmir question in a phased and peaceful way." This debate shows that the relevance of the India factor in Sino-Pakistan relations has now a reduced importance in Beijing's perspective when compared to the past.

China is concerned over the activities of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the Islamic jehadi organisations from Pakistani territory and their instigation of the Uighur separatists of Xinjiang. It has, however, been taking up these issues discreetly with the Pakistani military regime without over-dramatising its concerns.

From the benign evolution of Chinese policy in favour of a greater balance in its relations with Pakistan and India, it would be unwise to jump to the conclusion that Sino-Pakistan relations need not be of as great a concern to India as in the past.

China is as greatly concerned over the activities of the Dalai Lama and his followers from Indian territory as it is over the activities of the Uighur separatists from Pakistani and Afghan territory and the newly close relations between India and the US are likely to evoke in its mind the spectre of the US and India acting jointly for using the Tibetans against Beijing as, it thinks, they did in the late 1950s.

Moreover, China and Pakistan continue to share a common desire not to let India acquire primacy in the Asian region in general and in the South Asian region in particular. It is, therefore, likely that China, while projecting outwardly its policy of better balanced relations with Pakistan and India, would continue to assist Pakistan in the economic and military fields in order to keep India preoccupied with concerns over the likelihood of a two-front threat to its national security. (11-12-00)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and ,

presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.)